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ABSTRACT 
The Idea of Personal Development with Special Reference t-- 
Personal, Social and Moral Development (PSME) in Education 
The notion of Personal Development is situated in the domain of 
values, especially moral values. Moral values are concerned with 
what is right alongside what is good in its several aspects. For 
curriculum purposes, Personal Development finds its sense largely 
within the content provided by the terms 'moral' and 'social' in 
PSME. 'Personal' is not an independent category. But there is a 
certain overlap between Personal Development and Self-Development, 
where the latter term refers to an individual's generic human 
development. A person's individuality is not in a confluence of 
differently combined qualities and attributes. An individual is 
strongly a person in those values that he appropriates or endorses 
as his own. Values connect a person strongly with his unity and 
continuity as an individual over 
_time. 
Our worth as persons 
attaches to our reciprocal relationships with each other and to our- 
selves for ourselves insofar as we maintain integrity in our own 
projects. To this extent values have an objective reference. 
I want to show the manner in which a person is attached to the 
values that confront him in a pluralist society. It is not just 
that values are realized in a person's life; it is the relation he 
has to those values. Those values are expressed in the constituents 
of Personal Development - namely, those personal qualities and 
attributes thought desirable - and will be 'strongly' or 'thinly' 
present in that person. In respect of these qualities and attri- 
butes he will be strongly or thinly attached to his human world. 
This is a question about the manner of our residence in our own being 
and about the relation that our being has to the 'ways of being 
persons' in the human world. 
A person is culturally emergent, although some versions of self- 
realization give the impression that the individual is prior to cul- 
ture. There is a certain circularity in what we might call absolute 
or intrinsic values, especially moral ones. For example, we may want 
to say that we acquire virtues in order to flourish in life. But 
what constitutes flourishing will be captured in 'contested' value- 
terms and will therefore shape what we take virtues to be. 
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open society. But what are our criteria of justifiable diversit-y -'- 
acceptable ways to be persons? The notion of absolute value r-, Lý: h-_ make 
its appearance here. A substantial literature has been built on 
Wittgenstein's distinction between relative and absolute value. e -., e- 
the ways to be persons is the substance of culture. It is from meanJI-ng 
and value that our identities are constituted. Our identities ex--ress 
possible, but not always acceptable, ways to be persons. 
Education in the shape of personal development draws its content 
and inspiration from culture. If our culture is not all of a piece, and 
given that personal development is intimately connected with the forma- 
tion of personal identities through the initiation into culture, we 
should expect disagreement about desirable ways to be persons. There 
might be sufficient general shared values to withstand the excesses of 
disagreement. Yet some people would still want to assess further such 
tolerant live and let live values. Personal development as a way of 
thinking about the proper constitution of persons will have to address 
such difficulties. 
I hint, suggest and stress throughout my discussion that the notion 
of personal development as -a curriculum aim is not a subject like other 
subjects. This is not to say that it is not supervenient upon other 
subjects. However, the use of the expression (personal development) in 
educational literature, especially the official literature of government 
and educational departments and so forth, ranges from the portentious 
through the pretentious to the merely residual. On the one hand the 
highest 'pro' words point to ideals of properly constituted personal 
identities. On the other, less grandly, Personal development is tagged 
on to curriculum suggestions as residual afterthoughts. We find 
strongly idealistic language urging moral responsibility and weakly 
utilitarian language encouraging survival skills. Perhaps behind both 
is the thought that personal development has replaced moral education as 
the preparation of a person for his life as a moral being. We might 
develop this last thought and say that 'moral being' is internal to the 
idea of personhood. 
This idea of the constitutive link between possessing the capacity 
to form a moral identity and the capacity to become a person is not 
simply to be put to the service of marking human beings off from the rest 
of Creation. We assess each other in terms of these realized capacities. 
4 0- ,w This is not just a verbal point to help classify reality in the r__nt ay. 
If we fail to develop these capacities we have no proper hold on our- 
selves as human beings. It is to be without an identity accordinc. - to 
our own kind. If personal development is connected with the idea of-' the 
- 
4 , : 2! proper constitution of persons and if the transmission of culture __ 
generative of personal identities and if the main contours of culture 
are found in what we might call Ethics, then personal development 7, us-- 
be a reflection on and absorbtion of the values that ethics addresses. 
What I have in mind in using the term ethics is captured by 
Wittgenstein in his 'Lecture on Ethics' (1965 pp 4-5). Instead c-, " 
saying what ethics consist in, he presents a Galtonian Churchillian 
facial analogy. The characteristic features held in common by etlý-ics 
are: 
Ethics is, the enquiry into what is valuable 
Ethics is the enquiry into what is really important 
Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life 
Ethics is the enquiry into what makes life worth living 
Ethics is the enquiry into the right way of living 
As reflection personal development is to think about how values enter 
our lives for good or ill. As practice personal development, in its 
supervention on other things, is concerned with the constitution of 
persons. What teachers are as persons, so they need to be as teachers 
(with the necessary adjustments to their demeanour for the age of the 
children). The danger in personal development is that we may let 
ourselves as persons intrude in the wrong way into our engagement with 
pupils and students. At worst we subsume under the expression 'personal 
development' all those things that we should like people to be as a. 
reflection of our self-serving hang-ups. 
A further danger is that the language of personal development can 
easily become a rhetoric in the service of ends external to educational 
values. A vocabulary can be put to the service of anything. 'The 
Devil can cite scripture for his purpose'. In rhetoric we do not lie 
as such, in the sense of offering falsity for truth in the depiction of 
things. As long as the display succeeds and is seen in the right light 
in public space, it is enough. For example, I want you to see me as 
someone who cares, who sacrifices for the good of the school, who 
willingly attends meetings and rehearses the current buzz words, especi- 
ally those in the emerging vocabulary of personal development. This is 
the heart of much that I want to say. There is a need to find a 
text for what is taken as a vocabulary of personal development -a 
context other than one in which one rehearses high sounding 'pro, -,; Ords, 
whether these be in D. E. S. publications or curriculum development -ee-, - 
ings. If there is a serious ianguage ol" personai aeveiopment, 
problem is to find a discursive context for it, in the first in s-- .. -, ýnce. 
- 
The language of values is our language but we need 
to knCT 
ýi how Ito ref 7-ec' 
on it and use it. it is not only in the obvious sense that rhet-ric 
displaces truth. 
A danger also exists in annexing a language of personal developmen-. 
to the requirements of what has been called the New Vocationalis-1. On 
one interpreation the New Vocationalism is attempting to industrialize 
education. In earlier times wisdom was thought to be collapsing into 
knowledge and knowledge in its turn into information. So now, i'- is 
thought that education is reduced to training and training in il. - -s turn 
to the notion of preparation for work or enforced leisure in -a 41--hno 
logical society. Intrinisic values internal to education are lost in 
the instrumental and utile demands of the immediate needs of life. 
Man's environment is one of work or the regret that one has not got it. 
On such a view we are in the process of losing the concept of leisure, 
which is not just the absence of work and a pick-me-up for more work. 
This again is not to say that work does not release our creative energies 
and the products of which do not embody our humanity. (It is not 
obvious that work has ever embodied our humanity in its processes or 
products as some modern Hegelians would suggest, at least for the 
majority of people. ) Leisure is nevertheless a positive freedom 
from necessity, which is a condition for the cultivation of man's dis- 
tinctive characteristics. Leisure liberates man so that he can find 
himself in the best that our culture has created. We might remind 
ourselves that the Greek skole and the Latin scola from which the 
English 'school' is derived means leisure, that is freedom from necessity, 
a release from servile pursuits into the freedom of the liberal arts. 
The idea of school points to a freedom from the fetters of work or, if 
one prefers, labour. If the New Vocationalism is a danger, it is 
equally a danger to forget that we do have to earn our living. We have 
to beware of too easy oppositions. We must, however, as educationalists, 
resist the fashionable direct route from 'learning to earning'. 
We might, theng reflect on some of the obvious fatuities of an 
emerging caste of mind. Vocation lists turn things of internal worth 
into external utility with a surrealistic twist. For example, religious 
education is justified (or is it excused? ) in vocational terms. A pass 
in G. C. S. E. might be valuable for young people who consider careers as 
organists, stained glass window designers, mortuary attendants or being a 
nurse. Biology may be 'some use for' the Women's Royal Air Force, 
Chemistry 'some use for' window cleaning, English 'some help' towards 
being a traffic warden, Geography 'useful for being' a bus driver or 
- 
taxi driver. If these examples are humorous, they do point, - to a ten- 
4 dancy wherein people fail to have any other than an external relat_cn 
ship to what enters into their lives. I have chosen these examples 
random and they are not all of a piece. Many young people woul-- 
settle for the intrinsic satisfactions of musicianship or nursing. 
The more serious point is that what is external is either out of reach 
of many young people or soul destroying in its meaninglessness. '%'ould 
that there were a wealth of vocations and a just distribution of t1hem. 
Vocations must be central if people are to find meaning and purpose in 
their lives. How splendid to become a stained glass window designer! 
There is an exchange in the play 'A Man for all Seasons' by 
Robert Bolt (1963) that may help to make my point. Thomas More, 
knowing his man, tells Richard Rich that he will not sponsor Rich's 
preferment for a career at Court. Rather he suggests that Rich should 
become a teacher. Rich wonders what there could be in such a career 
for a clever and ambitious young man. More tries to impart some wisdom 
to Rich. If Rich becomes a teacher and teaches well, More says: 
'You will know it, your pupils will know it, and God will know it'. 
We might interpret land God will know it' as 'doing what one does for 
the good of it' or, to put it in the form of a question to which a reply 
is precluded if the question is taken in the right spirit, 'what could 
be more important? ' or 'what else would you want to do with your life 
anyway? ' Above I alluded to T. S. Eliot when I spoke about information 
being mistaken for wisdom. The meaning of wisdom that More had in 
mind is something like a true perception of the best ends in life. 
Educationalists, even if they do not share More's elevated conception 
of their profession, must have some appreciation of the subjects they 
teach, or the attitudes and assumptions they try to instil, as having 
intrinsic worth. 
In Bolt's play More himself is called upon to say who he is. 
It is in his deepest values that More locates his self. Perhaps con- 
trary to the real Sir Thomas, More in the play is presented as a kind 
of Existentialist hero. More says that it is not a matter whether the 
Pope's Supremacy is true but that he (More) had committed his deepest 
self to it. More says that: 'What matters to me is not whether it's 
true or not, but that I believe it to be true, or rather not that I 
believe it, but that I believe it'. Bolt in the Preface to the play 
says that More had 'an adamantine sense of his own self. He knew 
where he began and left off He was executed because he was 
asked and refused to 'retreat from that final area where he located 
- 
himself I. He could not give in 'for that's myself: on1v God is love 
right through, and that's myself. ' More fears a kind of bi-pcrca-e, -' 
spilling of the self. (Later I shall argue that such siýlitt-JnF- o-f "Ine 
self can be redescribed in terms of kinds and degrees of worth. ) 
'When a man takes an oath, he's holding his own self in his own ýý-ý--Js'. 
As with water, if a man 'opens his fingers then he needn't hope to f4Lnd 
himself again'. In the play More exhibits those modern ideals of 
toleration, autonomy in ultimate matters of value, authenticity and 
respect for sincerity. The innermost self should be inviolate. 7 
continue this discussion of the play because I want to illustrate, 
albeit in an extreme form, my claim that a person is in his values - 
he is his values. Values are realized in his life and he can be 
related to them in a variety of ways. 
I would interpret More's relation to his values in the following 
way. A certain view of integrity is central to More's moral stand. 
He could not conceive of whom he might be were he to detach himself 
from his values. Since his notion of goodness is part of what it is 
for him to be a person, to relinquish the whole of this goodness in 
his life would be to lose his sense of his personhood. And to be a 
person is the highest status in his or our self-interpretation. 
This self-interpretation goes 'right through' and one might put it 
right down. This is what I mean when I say that there is a constitu- 
tive tie between what a person is and what his moral identity is. 
A further point important to my thesis about personal development 
is that More, the character in the play (and More in life too) is not 
one-dimensional -a moral paragon. He is a man at ease with his 
family, friends, acquaintances and servants; he is at home in his 
professions and callings; finds things of worth and amusement in the 
variety of circumstances and settings of his life; and of course he 
is a shrewd observer of the strengths and weaknesses in men. He is a 
man of 'splendid social adjustment' as Bolt says. He is a man at home 
in the world in spite of enemies he has the measure of. Now this pic- 
ture might be an ideal of a developed person. 
Both positively and negatively a knowledge of the social and 
cultural conditions that form the background to an individual's personal 
development will indicate what is thought to be required features of' it. 
More is presented as a mature man, even though he develops in the play. 
One might reflect though on what went into his becoming who and wirat he 
is. Novels of 'personal formation' known in German as Bildungsroman 
describe what goes into person-making. 
- 
Wisdom is a term that appears frequently in much of the literature 
on what personal development might consist in. Thomas More has aý, per- 
ception of what man's true ends might be. He also has the practic-al 
wisdom to bring these ends about. He knows how to act well in 7ý, arriaz-p 
and friendship and, of course, he knows what a proper ordering of t. nese 
ends might be. He knows too what can be bought and sold and wha, ý cannot. 
And many things can be bought at too high a cost. 
In my discussion I want to suggest that the notion of personal 
development is best situated in the domain of values, if we are to give 
it a context in which to reflect on it. This must be prior to attempt- 
ing to make personal development a curriculum aim. 
On the Introduction page of Personal and Social Education in the 
Curriculum (1984) by Richard Pring there appears a letter from a 
Principal of an American High School to his teachers. 
Dear Teacher 
I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw 
what no man should witness: 
Gas chambers built by learned engineers. 
Children poisoned by educated physicians. 
Infants killed by trained nurses. - 
Women and babies shot and burned by high school and 
college graduates. 
So, I am suspicious of education. 
My request is: Help your students become human. Your 
efforts must never produce learned. monsters, skilled 
psychopaths, educated Eichmans. 
Reading, writing, arithmetic are important only if 
they serve to make our children more human. 
Those who are concerned with Personal Development should reflect on this 
letter, but not in a glow of self-righteousness such that one knows 
already who may lead pupils and students astray. And importantly 
students must not lead themselves and each other astray. An integral 
part of being a well constituted human being is that one is also an 
individual. What shape individuality takes is also the responsibility 
of the individual and the tension between individual difference and 
human decency is partially resolved by each individual himself'. This 
is not to say that individual difference does not express itself in 
human decency, perhaps of an uncommon kind. But the undistinguished 
too can be of an uncommon kind. 
- 
CHAPTER 1 
Personal Development, PSE, PSME, PSMHE 
In matters of the curriculum the term personal development may or 
may not be the highest or the most general term of commendation but it 
is one of the most widely used. The utility of the expression is in 
its indeterminacy. If all else in teaching appears doubtful, unobtain- 
able, specialized, narrow, abstract or, to use the most general term of 
disapproval, boring, the aim of personal development can give the air 
of being at once the most comprehensive and yet the most intimate good 
that can be done to or achieved by a human being. Also, to characterize 
a human being as a person is, it is felt, to bring him or her under the 
highest term of assessment. (These kinds of flourish can take their 
cue from such judgements as that health is the highest assessment of' a 
person's bodily condition whilst happiness is the highest assessment of 
a person's total condition. ) 
An inspection of the 'subject' area to which the term personal 
development refers presents a complication at the outset. As the 
subject area expands so does the heading which is meant to capture its 
sense. Many schools and colleges do indeed use the term personal 
development to designate such a separate sphere of the curriculum. 
This does not necessarily mean that this area has a separate slot in the 
curriculum, though it mostly does. Personal development might rather 
inform the ethos of the whole school or college. However, in many 
other schools and colleges and of course in the literature and documents 
that now proliferate in this subject area, personal development has 
several cognates and extensions. One comes across the terms self- 
realization, self-discovery, self-fulfilment and self-direction as 
either parallel terms or as constituent elements within personal develop- 
ment. Also personal development becomes PSE (Personal and Social 
Education or Development), PSME (Personal Social and Moral Education or 
Development) or PSMHE (Personal Social Moral and Health Education or 
Development). Often 'moral' in these extensions of the general head- 
ings begins to include spiritual aspects of a person's total development. 
The terms used to characterize the general end of this total developmen-, 
begin to proliferate too. Such words as wellbeing are introduced to 
describe the overall condition which is aimed at. 
I am not saying that personal development was the first expression 
- 
in this field and that increasingly more comprehensive ter-ms were in'=- 
duced to capture what goes on in the curriculum when informed by w.. a. is 
included in the extensions to the original term. Personal, Social and 
Moral matters were together at the start. However, the single 'Ier7 
is used frequently in schools and colleges and in the accompanying 
literature and documents. For the time being I shall use the term 
personal development in af airly indeterminate sense simply because of 
its ubiquitous use. 
Apart from its use in the institutional framework of formal educa- 
tion, the term personal development is also used widely in industry, 
commerce, the professions and the service sectors of the economy. 
Obviously there is a certain reciprocal exchange between its use in 
education and the 'wealth producing' parts of society. The acquisition 
of personal qualities and attributes is thought to be as economically 
relevant as specialized skills and knowledge. A salesman is more 
likely to sell a product if he can sell himself as well, it is claimed. 
Certain properties of personhood are now thought to be part of the 
'marketing package'. Personhood in this sense is a 'sign', as semi- 
otics puts it, similar to a brand name, a logo, the design and packaging 
of a product. Personhood is an envoloping enticement as is any 
seductive appearance which is meant to enhance a non-descript product. 
Also in an age of differentiated consumption reflecting non-standardized 
products and services, we are told there is more scope for individual 
difference, independence and expression. Consumers and producers are 
more individuated, even if there is a dark side to this trend. This 
individual difference somehow gets turned into de-individuated and 
desensitized aggregative menace. Instances are football hooliganism 
and mass picketing and policing. Another image of how the personalized 
and individualized erupts into mass menance is the spectacle of lager 
and champagne louts with their 'hair down'. Individualized initiative 
at personalized computer terminals provides the wherewithal for people 
to express themselves in mock Tudor taverns - and all this part of a 
self-chosen life-style. The claim that there is no such thing as 
society may license such talk. We have the 'personalized' individual 
on the one hand and mere agggregates of people on the other. 
An example of' a personal development guru from industry is the 
millionaire Robin Fielder. In the Sunday Correspondent Magazine 
(16 December 1989) we find Fielder billed as The Great Communicator. 
He was 'once a people-failure', though now he has 'the flickering 
aura of Success Mental Health'. He had accummulated 'all this education 
- 10 - 
at school' but no one had ever told him 'how to sell me'. Fielder r-s 
courses on personal development. We are told that if one is an effec- 
tive person one is an effective salesman. 'All social intercourse is 
a negotiation'. A human being in his most intimate contacts is a 
salesman. Its all about persistence and cheerfulness. ýie savs 'we 
all conform to our environments. If you spend too much of your time 
with too many laid back, woolly, unambitious people, you tend to con! "orm 
to that environment'. One should get away from those who are negat4-vely 
critical and moaning. This is it then! Personal development is to 
avoid a mismatch between personality and environment. And, we must say, 
this leaves everything unsaid. 
It is interesting too that one can have a personal development 
holiday. One can pick up a brochure in travel agents' shops in which 
one is urged to escape to a humanly fit environment in the Greek Islands 
where one can realize one: 'sdormant potentialities. The setting will 
bring out 'what one has got it in one to become'. Eudaimonia and 
arete are the proferred personal goods. All the paraphanalia of the 
The Human Potential Movement is put to the service of realizing chosen 
excellencies of character and personality. The metaphor of growth is 
exploited. But it only selects certain aspects of the growth figure. 
What is emphasized is the fullness of an ephemeral state. One will 
blossom. This blossoming is attained in I peak experiences' and with 
luck the consciousness change will illuminate the rest of one's life. 
In short one will find one's telos - some completion or fulfilment, 
some epiphany in peak experiences. The important question for educa- 
tionalists is how much of the wider society and its current crazes is 
now influencing education in our schools and colleges. 
The term personal development has found its way into the language 
of' human fulfilment. It is not on the lips of everyone but the term 
is not uncommon amongst people at large. How the term has found its 
way into our common language is an interesting question. Its use is 
of' course pervasive on the West Coast of the U. S. A. where leisure 
counsellors offer programmes of 'life-style enhancement' to the disaffected 
in a disenchanted world. It is no surprise to learn that the word 
I enhancement' is now used widely in the second order talk of curriculum 
development. The term personal development is then now used in every 
day speech, alongside such terms as personal fulfilment and sel. '- 
expression. 
One important context of its use is when people reflect on the 
constraints that frustrate the possibility of fuller and higher satis- 
- 11 - 
factions in their lives. These people express a desire for a breathins 
space in which to find themselves. The way one might capture this 
expressed lack in people's lives is in the contrast between negative and 
positive freedom. Negative freedom picks out those external restraints 
and obstacles that fence people in. They are locked into jobs, rela- 
tionships, roles and demands, the absence of which would give them a 
taste of liberty. Positive freedom points to those perceived or dis- 
cerned resonances and possibilities that if made real in their lives 
would provide people with richer and more fulfilled existences. In 
this sense of personal development then people feel that their lives a-e 
unduly circumscribed. They feel that their lives are truncated and 
stultified. And they realize that they have potentialities for some 
renewal and enhancement in their lives. People can get it wrong though. 
One might find people saying that they now have space in their lives but 
do not know what to do with it. Also the fulfilment to be found in 
what was thought to stifle them might have been what was truly fulfilling. 
So called self-actualization might be bought at too high a cost for them 
as well as others. 
I am not saying that when educationalists use the term personal 
development in the context of a school or college, they are drawing on 
all the man y threads or strands that give the term its pervasive use. 
Nevertheless we do find traces of its wider uses. 
A Language of Personal Development 
One might ask whether personal development and its extensions is 
something or nothing - that is whether there is a reasonably determinate 
area which one picks out as that of personal development. It might be 
nothing because there is nothing to pick out, either because the elements 
are too far flung and disparate or because anything that gets said is 
largely covered in other and more established areas of the curriculum. 
Or more strongly one might say there is confusion or incoherance in the 
very idea. On the other hand one might enquire whether there is a 
sufficiently distinctive language of personal development. We might 
split thislanguage into two parts. We speak a first order language - 
fa a language that one naturally uses to characterize the process o. 
person's growing up in the required sense. We have such a language. 
We think of it largely as the ordinary language used in the ordinary 
world. It is pre-theoretical, belongs to the common understanding and 
is the currency of every day experience. 
We find such language in the details of success and failure in 
- 12 - 
living as a person amongst other people, in the 'folk talk' of 
people areequippedto meet the demands of the various human se, -': ý-Os 
in which they live their lives, in those moments of collapse in -. -; -. '-ch 
people lose interest in life because it is not they who live J-1-, 
those situations in which people find themselves in worthwhile aczJivies 
and in the speech about lives lived well or badly in the course and 
conduct of life. So provisionally we have some kind of languaoe of 
personal development. Personal development as a curriculum subject 
draws on this language. This is not to say that there might not be 
confusion and worse at times in this language but this first order 
language is the test by which we assess other languages. 
It is not always easy to distinguish between orders of language in 
this sense. Certainly one tries to impose some order on the detail of 
personal development. One also tries to fashion general pictures or 
ideas to see how much of the detail can be caught in these pictures and 
ideas. These ordering principles or ideas then become part of the 
general language of personal development. In this way certain sugges- 
tive ideas or themes enter the subject area of personal development. 
So too do other themes and ideas. These tend to multiply by verbal 
similarities and by what is thought relevant to what already features 
in this subject area. We might call some of this the Iflavour of the 
month' approach to personal development. I must say from my experi- 
ence that these flavour of the month themes often coincide with the 
emergence of teachers who themselves might fit into this favoured cate- 
gory. Furthermore such areas as personal development are both colonized 
by other academic interests or they themselves colonize other independent 
aspects of the curriculum. 
Big insights into the nature of man or rediscovered notions about 
the needs of society or industry are introduced into personal development. 
As I have already suggested, inspiring ideas from popular gurus or 
'philosophies of life' begin to enter this area of the curriculum. 
An important distinction in philosophy is between word and thing. 
There is something to be spoken about. It is obvious in one sense that 
personal development is not a thing. But people claim that it is some- 
thing. We have some kind of concept. But what goes into giving this 
concept shape? At the outset we tend to make the distinction between 
the something to be spoken about and what we say about it. In the case 
of personal development the emphasis is on what we say about it. n 
fact personal development may well exist in what we say about it. As 
I have pointed out the area is expanding all the time. Additional 
- 13 - 
words are incorporated into the general heading. But more than 
The detail itself proliferates and it becomes increasingly diffic'ý_,. It to 
get a purchase on what might have been the original notion. 
There is another sense in which personal development might be 
nothing rather than something. The term might approximate to those 
pure value terms beloved by politicians. In a similar way the tern 
personal development might be a high sounding value term such that each 
person is invited to fill in the content for himself. Personal develop- 
ment might be nothing because it lacks a sufficiently determinate sub- 
stance. The term is too capacious to be serviceable. But the term 
might signify nothing in the way that Utilitarianism has been said to 
signify nothing. It is confused or factitious and radically distorts 
what it is meant to be a theory of. Such a theory as Utilitarianism 
builds on a central insight or important element in our moral vocabulary 
and then attempts to reconstruct the whole of moral life in terms of the 
insight or element. What is done in its name might be either beneficial 
or pernicious depending on one-sview. But in essence there is something 
conceptually suspicious about it. I mention Utilitarianism because this 
moral view is thought to inform large areas of personal development. 
To this extent personal development gets most of its content from interests 
outside of education. I think Utilitarianism is something. The 
questions is whether one agrees with its central claim and whether one 
wants to give it wide scope in our moral life. Similarly I think 
personal development is something but it is best considered in its 
detail. 
There will nevertheless be attempts to alternate between the detail, 
complexity, particular injunctions, the concrete plurality of the content 
and some general description or ordering picture. As I have suggested 
the difficulties start when fragments of other first order or second 
order languages begin to appear as the first order language of personal 
development. Other obvious sources of such languages are psychology, 
sociology, political theory and psychotherap -y in its many guises. 
When we speak of these areas, we find ourselves considering what might 
go wrong in people's lives and what remedies put them right. For 
example terms from psychotherapy begin to make their appearance in the 
language of personal development. 
It might help to present one such general idea of personal develop- 
ment as a guiding ideal. It is said that teachers should 
foster in 
their pupils and students the desire to lead a well 
balanced life in a 
well balanced society. Implicit in this ideal are thoughts about what 
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might prevent, interfere or distort its realization in the lives of 
these young people. Society itself might be at fault and this is a 
serious limitation on what teachers can do. Again young people may be 
diagnosed as maladjusted, distrubed, imperfectly socialized and so-on. 
The remedies for such defects might be discerned in political engagement, 
psychotherapy or community projects. My point is that fragments are 
ferreted out from areas ranging from psychotherapy to Critical Theory 
in the hope of contributing to the theory and practice of the well 
balanced life. 
I take one example at random. It is fairly repre. lentative of what 
I have found in several schools and colleges. The Daily Mail (Nov. 16 
1988) reports that included in the personal development scheme at 
Oldfield Girls School in Bath are 'stress classes' for teenagers who 
cannot cope with the unrealized expectations of the glamorous life in 
their own lives. Television soaps such as East Enders, Neighbours and 
Grange Hill encourage in adolescents the desire for an adult life when 
they are too emotionally immature to cope with all its implications. 
Educationalists have brought into the School psychologists to run stress 
management and relaxation techniques. Spokespeople from the School and 
Avon County Council justify the experiment on the grounds that stress 
and anxiety are built up outside the School and interfere with what goes 
on in it. Of course what goes on in the School now includes this 
aspect of an individual's personal development. It is not only soaps 
which are the trouble. The Deputy Headteacher says 'There are also 
pressures from advertisers and magazines, telling teenagers what they 
should be like and how glamorous their lives should be'. The scheme 
then shows teenagers how to recognize stress*and teaches them the use of 
Yoga and slow breathing techniques to relax. Grange Hill for example 
shows exciting lives, against which the lives of the young people seem 
'boring'. Also in seminars the young people are encouraged to discuss 
anxieties about boyfriends, families and social life. 
I have myself heard, in personal development seminars, teachers 
express opinions about the strain adolescents face in attempting to give 
personal shape to the new and changing pre-personal processes in their 
bodies and how such issues can be valid concerns of girls' magazines. 
The magazines are then recruited for personal development purposes. 
Teachers are concerned too about the way adolescent energy is exploited 
by those industries catering for the teenage market. This energy is 
then deflected from more authentic educational concerns. 
This then is one language of personal development. In contrast we 
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might put alongside this scheme, a letter that Simone Weil wrote '-c one 
of her pupils. MOIC. Drury 1973 pp 38-40) 
I nave talked enough about myself, let's talk about you. 
Your letter alarms me. If you persist in your i-Itention 
of experiencing all possible sensations - although as a 
transitory state of mind that is quite normal at your age - 
you will never attain to much. I was much happier when you 
said that you wished to be in contact with all that was real 
in life. You may think that they both amount to the same 
thing, on the contrary they are diametrically opposed. 
There are people who live only for sensations and by means of 
sensations; Andre Gide for example. Such people are in 
reality deceived by life, and as they come to feel this in a 
confused manner, they have only one refuge, to conceal the 
truth from themselves by miserable lies. The life which is 
truly real is not one that consists in experiencing sensations, 
but in activity, I mean activity both in thought and in deed. 
Those who live for sensations are parasites in the material 
and moral sense of the word compared with those who labour and 
create; these are the true human beings. I would add too 
that those who do not run after sensations are rewarded in the 
end by much that is more alive, deeper, truer, less artificial, 
than anything the sensation seekers experience. To sum up, 
to seek after sensations implies a selfishness that revolts me, 
that ismy considered opinion. It obviously does not prevent 
love, but it does imply that those whom one loves are no more 
than objects of one's own pleasure or paid, it overlooks 
completely that theyexist as people in their own right. 
Such a person passes his life among shadows. He is a dreamer, 
not one who is fully alive. 
Weil speaks about 'real life'. She presupposes that the realiza- 
tion of any good in life demands a knowlege of reality and a truthful 
relation to it. Those in pursuit of sensation (in its extreme form 
the pursuit by the libertine) lose a grip on themselves, the reality of 
their situation and much in life I that is more alive, deeper, truer, 
less artificial ... 1. To realize ourselves most 
truly is to recognize 
the reality of other people. The letter then continues. 
About love itself I have no wisdom to give you, but I have 
at least a warning to make. Love is such a serious affair, 
it often means involving for ever your own life and that of 
another. Indeed it must always involve this, unless one of 
the two lovers treats the other as a plaything; in that case, 
one that is only too common, love has changed 
into something 
odious. You see, the essential 
thing about love is that it 
consists in a vital need that one human being 
feels for another, 
a need which may be reciprocated or not, enduring or not, as 
the case may be. Because of this 
the problem is to reconcile 
this need with the equally imperious need 
for freedom; this 4L- s 
a problem that men have wrestled with since 
time immemorial. 
Thus it is that the idea of seeking after love in order to find 
out what it is like, just to bring a 
little excitement into 
life which was becoming tediousq etc., 
this seems to me 
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dangerous, and more than that, puerile. I can tell yo- 
that when I was your age, and again when I was older, I 
too felt the temptation to find out what love was like, 
I turned it aside by telling myself that it was of greater 
importance for me not to risk involving myself in a way 
whose eventual outcome I could not possibly foresee, and 
before too I had attained to any mature idea of what I 
wanted my life to be and what I hoped for frot,. it. I 
am not saying all this as a piece of instruction; each 
one of us has to develop in our own way. But you may 
find something here to ponder over. I will add that love 
seems to me to carry with it an even more serious risk 
than just a blind pledging of one's own being; it is the 
risk of becoming the destiny of another person's life, 
for that is what happens if the other comes to love you 
deeply. My conclusion (and I give you this solely as a 
piece of information) is not that one should shun love, 
but that one should not go out of one's way to try and 
find it, and especially so when you are very young. 
I believe at that age it is much better not to meet with 
it .... 
I think you are the sort of person who will have to 
suffer all through your life. Indeed I am sure of it. 
You have so much enthusiasm, you are so impetuous, that 
you will never be able to fit into the social life of 
our times. But you are not alone in that respect. 
As to suffering, that is not too serious a matter so 
long as you also experience the intense joy of being 
alive. What is important is that -you don't let your 
life be a waste of time. That means you must exercise 
self-discipline. 
I am so sorry that you are not allowed to take part 
in sports: that is exactly what you need. Try once 
more to persuade your parents to let you -do this. I 
hope at least that happy days hiking in the mountains is 
not forbidden. Give those mountains of yours my 
greetings. 
I quote this letter at length because it contains many thoughts 
about the proper ends of life and what kind of person one might become 
in pursuit of them. The letter is an invitation to her pupil to 
reflect on her life and engage in activities that would 'build her up, 
into one kind of person rather than another. To this extent it is 
not unlike the scheme of personal development in the Girls' School in 
Bath. Whether such reflection as is found in Simone Weil's letter 
could give a new dimension to what is contained in the scheme at the 
Girls' School depends on what wisdom and what level of maturity is 
brought to it by the participants, not least of which what is brought 
by the teachers or the surrogate teachers. 
If Simone Weil speaks one language of personal development then 
Simone de Beauvoir speaks another. It is interesting that both 
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writers were the pupils of Alain whom de Beauvoir mentions. This is 
what de Beauvoir writes after she had returned to the intoxicating free- 
dom of Paris; 
... I kept on good terms with my parents, but they no longer 
had any real hold over me. Sartre had never known his 
father, and neither his mother nor his grandmother had ever 
represented authority in his eyes. In a sense we both 
lacked a real family, and we had elevated this contingency 
into a principle. Here we were encouraged by Cartesian 
rationalism, which we had picked up from Alain .... There were no scruples, no feelings of respect or loyal affection 
that would stop us from making up our minds by the pure 
light of reason - and of our own desires ... we believed ourselves to consist of pure reason and pure will. 
(de Beauvoir, 1973 p 15) 
In this passage there is an implicit reference to an individual's 
personal development as distinguished from an individual's intellectual 
development. These elements in an individual's development are used 
as descriptive categories. One develops as a person of a certain sort 
both independently of and together with intellectual development. 
Roughly, the direct experience of the stuff of life is distinguished 
from the abstract categories that might interpret this experience of 
life. Personal development as a curriculum aim picks up its 
prescriptive language from sources like these. I might say that 
Sartre later in life wondered however he came to entertain the 
'Cartesian' idea that one's completely foundationless choices could 
bring the moral world into existence and at the same time meet the 
demands of the moral complexities of life. Also he wondered how he 
could have believed that one could 'bracket out' the direct influences 
on one's life in reaching one's considered moral principles. 
These examples of what it is to have a perspective or view on the 
complexity of moral life points up the difficulty of what it is to have 
a perspective or view on what is meant by personal development, PSE, 
PSME, or PSMHE. Morality is something and despite Sartre's theoretical 
view that uninhibited choice is central to the moral life, he testifies 
to the falsity of this view when he elaborates his examples of moral 
dilemmas. The different demands of the pieties of family life and the 
duties to one's country in time of war are the stuff of our moral life. 
Sartre's foundationless choices turn out to be within what is recog- 
nizably moral. Some writers would indeed argue that there is an 
unambiguous core to our moral life or that the term moral is not 
infinitely contestable. However, my point is that some writers feel 
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that a perspective on what is moral helps to determine what it is and 
the sources of this perspective are not wholly constrained by some core 
meaning to the term. Again just What latitude in such perspectives has 
to be argued about. 
If then the word moral is just one of the elements in the variet,,, 
of Headings of personal development, there is much more scope for 
creativity in what we try to get said about these Headings. 
One way into the details of the various headings is to make one of 
the terms central as a category of interpretation. 'Personal' or 
'moral' may be the chosen terms, especially when they are given broad 
meanings. The term social may be too broad and in need of tightening 
up. For the moment I should like to consider the idea that health 
may provide the key to the sense of an inclusive heading. 
In an article in the TES (Tones 1989 pp B9-B10) Keith Tones argues 
that the general heading for this area of the curriculum should be 
PSHE. The PSE part would take care of what he calls the positive health 
task. He takes this idea from what the World Health Organization says 
about the complimentary aspects of health - namely, wellbeing and the 
absence of disease. Tones says: 
The school's health education role is first of all 
concerned to promote the mental, physical and social 
wellbeing of its students. It should try to ensure that 
each student's potential for mental, physical and social 
fulfilment is achieved both while they are at school and 
when they become adult. - 
Health as wellbeing then is what holds together the different aims of 
PSE. Health. as the absence of disease and disability is what health 
brings to the general heading of PSHE. Tones acknowledges that some- 
times PSE is subsumed under health education and at other times health 
becomes the subordinate term. But for him health as wellbeing is the 
key idea. He says that PSE seeks to 'enhance pupils' self-esteem and 
equip them with assertiveness skills ... 1. He then summarizes his 
main point thus: 'Without a social and life skills dimension, health 
education is a sterile academic subject. ' His point seems to be that 
PSE provides the awareness and the motivation to do something about 
those things which cause disease and disability. PSE fosters 'general 
decision-making skills in the context of life skills teaching whereas 
health education employs more specific "health skills" - for instance, 
the application of assertiveness skills to refusing the offer of an 
illicit drug or unwanted sex. ' 
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Wellbeing is the overall end of PSHE. What needs to be sortet 
out is what is included in this comprehensive term of health as well- 
being. It has to include the healthy condition to be achieved, 
whether this be mental or physical. Social wellbeing on the ot., ý--r 
hand seems to be a different notion. We might want to say that a 
certain kind of social context is a precondition for mental and physical 
wellbeing. Good housing and the absence of coercion might be a start. 
These then refer to the conditions for health. It is true that Tones 
does say that PSHE does help individuals achieve healthy lifestyles 
and 'seeks to remove barriers to informed choice'. These barriers are 
not simply personal ignorance. They are social, political and economic 
obstructions. The student has to learn to intervene in both his own 
life and in these general social areas. He has to be more skilled at 
self-intervention and participative group intervention, even in compara- 
tively small things. The insidiousness of the hidden curriculum in 
the guise of the school tuck shop and canteen is something the pupil 
has to be aware of. What is taught about health as the prevention of 
disease and disability in biology and home economics has to be compli- 
mented by health as wellbeing in PSE. Better still the hidden danger 
of a diet of refined carbohydrate and saturated fats and the sources 
of such disease-inducing ingredients should be brought together in the 
aforementioned subject areas. 
At this stage I do not want to comment on whether wellbeing serves 
as an organizing idea for the whole of PSHE. Nor do I wish to discuss 
the moral issues involved. Moral issues are implicit in Tones' 
article without the word actually being incorporated in the general 
heading. For example, the pursuit of ones own wellbeing might inter- 
fere with that of others, unless in Artistotelian fashion we build a 
regard for others into what it is for a person to flourish. Does 
this imply that the word moral should be in the general heading and 
perhaps that it is the word that gives some unity to what one is after 
in the whole area? 
The Meaning of Personal 
Drury says of Simone Weil's letter to her pupil that it contains 
a deeply personal and individual message. 
(Drury 1973 p 41) What he 
means by these words, I suggest, is that the moral and spiritual senti- 
ments expressed in it have been hewn from lived-through experiences of 
suffering and emotional arrest, of joy and sorrow, of the beauty and 
fulfilment in what it is to labour and create and of the love that 
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aches for its proper object. The letter is personal and indivi--; ua' 
because it is the deepest expression of a particular sensibility anc 
temperament. But it is also an immediate, though considered, response 
of one distinct individual to another. The language then must te 
adequate to its object - in this case a person. Such langua. oe has to 
be fine-grained and spun. Although the language is an expression of 
the thoughts and feelings of Weil, such language has to be focused on 
the person to whom it is addressed. 
the experiences mean to oneself. 
One cannot be consumed with what 
One suspends one's preoccupation 
with oneself and in a spirit of humility and sympathy attend to the 
uncircumscribed reality of another person. In such responses we help 
to create and recreate each other and this public space in which we 
identify ourselves then constitutes what it is possible and acceptable 
to be as a person. One of the extreme forms of turning in on oneself 
in relation to other people is a certain construal of sentimentality. 
We enjoy our own feelings for the sake of the pleasure we get from them 
rather than the feelings being part of a just appreciation of the 
person who. is the object of the feelings. 
In contrast to this language of sympathetic understanding of the 
reality of another person is the language of the expert, which in the 
present context might be the expert in academic psychology. The most 
inadequate language for our self-understanding is that of certain kinds 
of learning theory, the worst examples of which is based on rats in 
mazes. The language of specialized knowledge, theraputic techniques, 
detached observation and the abstract categories of scientific investi- 
gation are out of place in such personal and individual messages as we 
find in Simone Weil. Too much of the formalized language of objecti- 
fying discourse can make an individual a stranger to herself. In one 
of its uses the word personal refers to how we are disclosed to our- 
selves and each other in such words that we find in Weil's letter. 
One of course may say, perhaps with more confidence, that it is in the 
language of Shakespeare, Tolstoy or George Eliot that we find language 
at its most fine-grained. But we often surprise ourselves at the 
fineness of our own language in our more expressive moments. The 
stock of common language is extremely rich and we drawn on it and 
extend it all the time. 
The kind of language we find in Weil and the exemplars of our 
language is to be contrasted with the confining language of another 
kind. But this is not to say that this other language is out of 
place in our commerce with one another. It is then not the language 
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of scientific observation and classification but the language of social 
typifications. We might consider the following passage. Seeing 
persons as persons: 
... requires us to abstract from socially-given abstractions, 
namely definitions, typifications, categories or labels, 
which typecast them and thereby limit the possibilities of 
our understanding them. Seeing them as persons requires us 
precisely to regard them not merely as the bearers of certain 
titles, the players of certain roles or the occupiers of 
certain social positions, or as the means to given ends, but 
as concrete persons who - for one reason or another - bear 
those titles, play those roles, occupy those social posittons, 
or serve those ends. It does not, however, require us to see 
them as having fixed and universal human attributes - given 
wants, purposes, interests, needs - that have their source and 
can be characterized independently of their social contexts. 
(Lukes 1973 pp 146-147) 
Lukes then says that the contrary is the case. What we need is a 
point of view on the person that tells us what it is like for him to 
be the person he is. Lukes continues to say that we owe each person: 
what Bernard Williams calls 'an effort at identification', ; 
o'*that 'he should not be regarded as the surface to which a 
certain label can be applied, but one should try to see the 
world (including the label) from his point of view. ' And 
that point of. view will, of course, be socially determinate 
and located, and only characterizable in socially specific 
terms. (p 147) 
An important way into the meaning of the word personal is found 
in what it is contrasted with. More strongly we might say that its 
meaning exists in its explicit or implicit contrasts. To be. 
personal in this sense is to be outside more general or abstract 
categories. These are roles, ranks, social aggregates and typifica- 
tions, offices and formal structures, generalized demands and so on. 
Often the contrasts are defined in spatial metaphors of distance. 
This is not to say that the 'personal' focuses on some fixed and 
determinate essence which captures once and for all who and what the 
person is. In fact one might say that it is against what it is con- 
trasted with that the 'personal' emerges as a reality in its own right. 
The numerically distinct individual emerges into a person as he 
learns to use language in which personal is contrasted with what is 
not personal. And there is a multiplicity of distinctions in langu- 
age which facilitates the process. 'My own' and 'mine' and the case 
and possessive variations on these terms, depending on the inter- 
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locutary context, are crucial to this process. As I will show later 
assertiveness training in some personal development schemes for yc,, ing 
children encourages pupils to say 'no' when unwanted and suspect inti- 
macies intrude on them. (A little different from the days when the 
confident 'yes I to the universe of expressive child-centred education, 
now that innocence is often blighted by predatory experience. ) `ýOw- 
ever, it is thought that children need to learn to put up barriers so 
that later they can bring them down voluntarily. A young child needs 
to be taught that there is a private space as well as a public one and 
that the relevant boundaries have to be drawn. The child has to be 
instructed into a knowledge of what is proper in these separate spheres. 
In drawing these boundaries children begin to have a life of their own, 
begin to be someone in their own right and begin to develop in their 
own way. 
This initial attempt at linguistic phenomenology is of course the 
first item under 'personal' in the dictionary. This initial contrast 
between personal and roles finds its expression in those situations 
where public figures make their personal lives separate from their 
official ones. We find newspaper headlines inviting us to read about 
personal lives that lie behind institutional ones. Also a member of 
the Royal Family might make a personal visit rather than an official 
one. Here a by-stander might make a personal remark after seeing the 
distinguished visitor in person. These examples may seem fairly 
bland uses of the contrast. In addition many contrasts of this kind 
are redundant or superfluous, imparting little of importance. Again 
sometimes no contrast is implied. The presence of personal or per- 
sonally may be there for emphasis. But something of significance may 
emerge from such apparently bland uses of the contrast. People may 
sacrifice or fulfil themselves in their offices and roles and find 
little of satisfaction in their personal lives. They might on the 
other hand have a rich interior life that is not easily reconcilable 
with public duties. 
After this initial dictionary contrast, we begin to see a multi- 
plicity of other contrasts. It is clear that much linguistic refine- 
ment has gone into the initial contrast but whatever the order of' 
priority further contrasts are suggested. All words undergo change. 
It is even happening now. The term personal is certainly much more 
widely used at present. The word, nevertheless, lives 
in its use. 
But sometimes we need to arrest the flow of a word's sense, simply to 
get our bearings. This is artificial of course because 
there are 
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innumerable ways in which one might go with the flow in tracing the 
meaning we are after. We might then attempt to get some purchase on 
the word personal by teasing out its family resemblances. Wittgenstein 
coined this expression to describe the way in which words overlap and 
criss-cross with their neighbours in a multiplicity of patterns and 
contexts and therein evade any designs we might have on their essences. 
Wittgenstein's example is that of games. There is no essence in what 
it is to be a game. Games hang together under the word 'game' because 
they all share, in their different ways, in an uncircumscribed number 
of properties. Some games have nothing in common with others but the 
connections are made through others which share some properties with 
both. Fine spun threads interweave through pattern and context. it 
is difficult then to talk in terms of fixed senses of the contrasted 
terms or, to use the language of post-structuralism, in terms of binary 
oppositions. But we do not need to chase terms into the sand. Nor 
trace them indefinitely until the terms loop back on themselves. 
Inventiveness through endless linguistic play may make us inarticulate 
about anything. 
After the first contrast, then, further contrasts are suggested. 
The close relatives of the word personal have been thought to be such 
expressions as intimate, idiosyncratic, expressive, having a stake in, 
being involved in, direct, spontaneous, exclusive (and inclusive depend- 
ing on context), voluntary, private, ones own and so on. We turn to 
these words and expressions hoping to illuminate what we mean or hope 
to mean by the word personal. But the more general expressions with 
which personal is contrasted suggest neighbouring words and expressions. 
In roles, offices, aggregates, formal structures and so on people might 
experience such psychological states as boredom, frustration, anxiety, 
emptiness, discontent, loneliness, insecurity and even misery and 
alienation. This might be because of the instrumental, detached, 
distant, routine, impersonal, anonymous and faceless nature of the 
roles, functions and standardized behaviour patterns in which people 
have to live their lives. If one puts the best construction on 
personal and the worst on contrasting terms, people may feel at home, 
fulfilled, at ease, alive and vital in the personal and the reverse in 
typifications and restraining hierarchies. People may find meaning, 
happiness and even blessedness in what is direct and spontaneous in 
contrast with the absence of these in what is remote and abstractly 
mediated. Some religious enthusiasts may feel one can meet God in 
passion and direct experience rather than have His nature mediated by 
- 24 - 
formal rituals and theological categories. There are spiritualities 
of the heart as well as doctrines of the intellect. Again wl, ýa-. is 
natural and unconstrained is opposed to what is role-governed, rule- 
bound and alienating. The idiosyncratic and expressive is in 
opposition to academic and boring. Pupils, it is said, are beý--ter 
motivated when they are personally involved. What is relevant to 
their current interests and their lives in general is more stimulating 
than what is subject-constrained and imposed. What is perceived as 
needed, wanted or desired is more inviting than what is spoon-fed. 
We know ourselves best when we are engaged in the stuff of ongoing life 
rather than in passively absorbing inert facts. 
Other contrasts are suggested when the individual is in opposition 
to society. We find very general distinctions between subjective and 
objective, inner and outer, expressive and instrumental, relative and 
objective, self-regarding and other regarding, agent centred and agent 
neutral and self-concern and impartiality. The individual can be 
overwhelmed by a one-sided diet of unrelieved common measures, universal 
standards, abstract constraints, general requirements and imposed roles 
and regulations. What is in a person's life then may be close or 
remote. In these respects a person can be in touch or out of contact 
with what is in his life. One example is the elaborate techniques 
that so-called New Age human resources experts try to use to liberate sup- 
pressed energies in would-be successful managers. Amongst other 
things these managers have to get in touch with is their feelings. 
These feelings are thought to be the most personal things in us but 
they have become foreign to us. 
When the term personal is used, all these considerations become 
relevant although not all at once. If personal is defined in situ, 
certain strands and traces suggest that things are less than neat. 
As I have said what is picked out by personal depends on all the inter- 
locking patterns and contexts in which the word is used. Words in 
one context are likely to have an unexpected contrast in a different 
context. I might have simplified the personal development programmes 
above when I suggested that connections tend to go in one direction. 
What is personal tends to collect all the pro words and what is role 
or rule-governed tends to finish up with all the con words. it 
hardly needs saying that this tendency is strongly resisted and of' 
course reality itself constrains such tendencies. 
For example7 returning to the obvious candidates in our search 
for words that give some guidance in this search 
for the meaning of 
personal, we may characterize a relationship between people as 
intimate 
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or idiosyncratic yet at the same time as impersonal, because of the 
quality of the motivation. Teachers and doctors in their different 
ways can respond to their pupils and patients intimately and id-iosyn- 
cratically (their hearts as well as their minds are in ,. jhat they are 
doing) but they need not be personally involved. We have heart of 
cases where the proper balance is disturbed and a teacher or a doctor 
has found himself without a job. In 'talking cures' intimate details 
are revealed but they do not provide the occasion for emotional involve- 
ment. In another context though an intense emotional attachment might 
be the test of whether the relationship is personal. But such a 
relationship may not involve the idiosyncratic personalities of the 
individual people themselves. Also we hear that inhighly structured 
professions and occupations, formal relations between people are 
allieviated by informal exchanges and relationships. Certainly in 
some of these professions an individual's personal development is 
measured on a separate scale in his total assessment. Whether he can 
get on with other people outside the formal constraints of his profes- 
sion is thought to be important. However,. personal relationships do 
not need to have an invariant content. One needs to know what is 
permitted or ruled out in the whole coritext of an individual's work. 
What is personal then is identified in being outside easily discerned 
constraints within the relevant surroundings. For example, in police 
headquarters personal relationships are probably unlike those in a 
family, a friendship or a neighbourhood. Outside the roles and func- 
tions of the police work itself, personal relationships may be at the 
level of civilities and pleasantries. On the other hand they may 
centre on the weaknesses or foibles of the people who occupy the 
official positions. Individuals may or may not get on as people and 
one can guess what might be unleashed when official constraints are 
relaxed. 
The police are familiar enough with those gangland murders where 
the boss says that there is nothing personal in the killing as he 
despatches his victim. The victim is a representative figure of 
some kind. What the killer means is that he has no feelings one way 
or the other about the victim. There is nothing personal because he 
is not treated as a person. He is not seen in his generic humanity 
let alone as a particular person. He is as faceless as 
the killer is 
to him. 
In our example of the police headquarters, personal relationships 
point to the contrast between formal and informal contact 
between 
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people, without the term referring to the actual quality of the personal 
relationships themselves. The people may not have a stake in the 
relationships as they would have in their relationships with a wife or 
children. An individual gets something importantly self-regarding out 
of the latter relationships, not without of course putting a lot in of 
a self-effacing kind. The meaning of the personal relationships 
involved are partly shaped by the contrast Intended. However, as I 
have previously suggested, a person may feel more secure in roles and 
functions with their stable expectations and lower risks than in the 
intimate detail of personal relationships, no matter the quality or 
intensity of the relatively unconstrained nature of the latter relation- 
ships. Anyone who has brought up a child knows that in the role of 
parent one is fully implicated in the relationship that is intensely 
personal but one is also relieved that in some respects the barriers 
are not down - cannot be down if one wants to retain what, is proper 
in the relationship. These change with age of course. Teachers must 
not forget this too. 
I might say then that when we do treat someone as a person this 
might imply that we do not treat him as the individual he is. To be 
treated as a person might be too broad. Such a person is recognized 
as having the generic qualities of personhood but these are not inter- 
preted in terms of the fine-grain of his personality. At least some 
writers use the word person in this way. They might concede that in 
the generic sense we treat them as types or sorts of people. A 
parallel but more lofty example is when religious believers talk of 
God as being a personal god. He is personal when He is attributed 
with generic personal characteristics but he may also be personal when 
an individual can enter into an intimate relationship with him, as 
many mystics might claim. But at this point a feminist theologian 
may say She in the latter usage. 
Sometimes the word personal may appear too weak to capture what 
we are after. This might reflect the word's increasingly pedestrian 
use. A stronger sense is shown in such observations, for example, as 
in the case of Borodin who would have despaired had he been deprived 
of his music or chemistry. He would have been harmed in his very 
being. In such cases when we say that something is peculiar to the 
person we seem to miss what is essential. And that is the importance 
of the objects of the pursuits. Of course Borodin's style may have 
been peculiar to himself but we or rather he focuses on the objects of 
his pursuits. Furthermore such expressions as too personal or merely or 
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purely personal will suggest in some contexts that one wants to get the 
idiosyncractic personality out of the way altogether. It is to put 
the personality into its proper place relative to something more objec- 
tive. It is true we do use 'too personal! when we want to discourage 
people from trying to capture an experience in too crude categories or 
to keep certain people at arm's length or a proper distance. In 
Borodin's case however it does not mean that he was not fully implicated 
in his music or chemistry. In fact he lost himself in them. It does 
mean though that the objects of his concern were not refracted through 
a distorting personality. A personality in a general sense of course 
is a precondition for the existence of music or chemistry. 
A similar example might be the contemplation of natural beauty. 
When we see nature under the aspect of beauty, we withdraw our person- 
ality and declare that the object be simply there. That it is rather 
than what it is captures our imagination. The object of our desire 
is what is beautiful in nature but the desire is for it to simply 
exist, without any intrusion from us. The desire is part of our 
personality and to this extent we may say it is personal. But we 
want nothing personal for ourselves in a narrow sense. In this 
strong sense of personal, ' the word has something like an inclusive use. 
It comprehends whole aspects of an individual's personality and it is 
bound up with what it is to have a self. We need though to distin- 
guish this comprehensive meaning from the notion of a total personality. 
There can be aspects of ourselves that we do not know about or do not 
want to know about. We might also disown parts of ourselves. We 
disavow certain aspects of ourselves that we take to be unworthy of us. 
These disavowals may involve bad faith. At this point in the discus- 
sion we may begin to introduce the terms authenticity and autonomy. 
I shall return to these notions later. If we can use personal in this 
stronger sense then we begin to talk about an individual's identity. 
When people are deprived of what is part of their identity they can go 
to pieces. When they conceive themselves in terms of their identity, 
life can be quite unimaginable without their being in contact with 
what their identity requires. 
The violation of an individual's identity in this respect would 
undennine his sense of who he is. A person's emotions, feelings and 
visceral processes are involved. In a settled life we are often 
unaware of what is part of our identities and what we need to be in 
contact with to retain our integrity. It is only when we are deprived 
of these contacts that we understand. There is something that is 'us' 
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then that makes things personal. The personal is one way of 
terizing the nature of our attachments. This implies that not all our 
attachments are personal. 
We do find cases where the personal in an individual's li, -e is 
systematically reduced. Vaclav Havel, the Czechoslovakian 
presents an example of this. When he was in prison, he was forbidden 
to write about anything other than what was personal. Of course less 
and less became personal. The prison food and conditions were cut as 
were his ailments because they may have been caused by prison food and 
conditions. In extreme cases life in such institutions is reduced to 
bodily functions but even these cannot be spoken about because of their 
implied causes. A person in situations like these can be become a 
stranger to himself as I have said previously. And that is the inten- 
tion. People can be fortified against such deprivations where a 
strong belief is part of their identity. What Havel said reminded me 
of the story told by Bruno Bettelheim where such a stranger awakens to 
herself: 
Once, a group of naked prisoners about to enter the gas 
chamber stood lined up in front of it. In some way the 
commanding SS officer learned that one of the women prisoners 
had been a dancer. So he ordered her to dance for him. 
She did, and as she danced, she approached him, seized his 
gun, and shot him down. She too was immediately shot to 
death. 
But isn't it probable that despite the grotesque 
setting in which she danced, dancing made her once again a 
person? Dancing, she was singled out as an individual, 
asked to perform in what had once been her chosen vocation. 
No longer was she a number, a nameless, depersonalized 
prisoner, but the dancer she used to be. Transformed, 
however momentarily, she responded like her old self, 
destroying the enemy bent on her destruction, even if she 
had to die in the process. (Bettelheim 1970 pp 239-240) 
As I have said any contrast involving the word personal will 
imply qualification, reservation, elaboration and complication. Any 
suggested synonym or elucidating word or phrase will invite counter 
examples to show that the terms cannot be used interchange, abl, -, and 
in 
some cases the terms may contradict each other. 
We must accept a 
certain open-endedness in our terms then. The words we 
focus on in 
our brief attempt at linguistic phenomenology will not converge onto 
the simple dichotomies we require. Nor as 
I have said does the word 
personal take its sense from some pre-existent sense of personal 
identity. Rather it is in saying what we do say in such words as 
personal that there begins to emerge a person who 
then begins to be a 
IT a 
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centre of thought and action in his own right. 
In a wide ranging discussion on the experience of childhood 
Richard N. Coe cites Michel Leiris' own reminiscences of his early 
years. Coe writes the following: 
Leiris is virtually unique among French poets in that, 
like Thomas Traherne, albeit with a very different 
metaphysical substructure, his ultimate conception of the 
paradis perdu of childhood is of the pre-linguistic state: 
literally, a blessed state in which the infant lived on 
terms of equality with the as yet unclassified immediacies 
of the world around him, 'like our First Parents among the 
beasts and the plants'. The force which drives him out 
of this earthly Eden is the need to establish his own 
identity - 'the cruel conquest of the Self' - for a self 
by definition is what everything else is not. To be 
conscious of the self is to be conscious of one's 
separateness from everything else; everything else must 
be perceived as not-self, and this is precisely the 
function of language: the use of words to give names to 
things, thereby establishing their identity as something 
distinct, both from the rest of the totality, and from 
the self bestowing the names. (Coe 1984 p 40) 
Coe sees a certain loss in this process of establishing individuality. 
In Wordsworthian f ashion he sees virtue in pre-natal bliss. We may 
find something approaching this bliss in a Buddhist obliteration of 
the distinction between self and non-3elf. Whether this could be an 
ideal of personal development is something that would need to be argued 
f or. And to' show how difficult personal development becomes when we 
refer to such ideals, we can easily imagine an ideal that would be the 
contrary of this one. Coe does not argue for it nor did he intend to 
do so. 
I might return briefly to the idea that much we wish to say about 
the notion of the personal can be elucidated by treating personal as a 
spacial metaphor. An individual stands out or withdraws. He can be 
there to another person or not. He can be present in his thoughts 
and actions or absent. He can be close, near or distant from other 
people. He can be attached or detached, lose touch with or be remote 
from what ought to concern him. There are then kinds and degrees of 
closeness and distance in the relationships amongst people. On tele- 
vision chat shows one hears celebrities talking in terms of having 
very close personal friendships with each other or when these friend- 
ships pall they say that they become total strangers 
to each other. 
Kinds and degrees of intimacy become difficult to gauge. As I imply 
one test would be the extent to which friendship endures. 
These very 
7ý - 
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close personal friendships are the stuff of serial marr--ages. a- 
they lack in duration they make up for in intensity, so it is sai- 
Degrees of closeness to oneself can take odd forms. Recently -- neard 
a stage and screen actress on one such talk show say that she woul--1 
not go physically to South Africa but her 'shadow' might. Physically 
might be interchangeable with personally here but there may be nuances 
to be heard. If part of our notion of what it is to be a person comes 
from the Greek idea of a mask, there is a sense in which her mas? ', goes 
to South Africa. But it is not mere physicality that is left at home. 
The important question is what is the moral relation between person and 
mask or shadow here? 
The Meaning and Content of Personal in Personal Development 
I have suggested that a pursuit of essences is suspect in the 
present intellectual climate. If we do use this term, we would say 
that the essence of anything is a set of characteristics that revisable 
language usage lays down at any one time. Yet if there are no cons- 
traints issuing from the thin in question, language as it is used 
imposes its own constraints. We cannot just say anything. My dis- 
cussion then has raised questions about the conceptual limits to what 
the word personal can mean, what educationalists think it means or what 
they want it to mean and what perhaps it ought to mean in an educational 
context. Parallel to these questions about the word personal are the 
same questions about the term personal development. Are there any 
conceptual constraints on its use, what in fact is its content for the 
most part and what ought it to mean educationally? 
One important question about the word personal is: Personal in 
relation to what? There are two terms in a relation. In our case 
it is the individual and what he is personally related to. Further 
to this point is the question of the nature of the relation. What 
makes something personal in personal development? It is this question 
that rivets teachers and educationalists in working parties, meetings 
and seminars on personal development. Teachers try to tease out the 
meaning of personal. If one could find meaning in the word, this 
meaning would provide the criteria for what an individual's higher, 
fuller or more mature state might consist in. A paradigm case might 
be held in mind. A perfectly sound use of personal is in personal 
project as is found in all varieties of General Studies. A pupil or 
student chooses an area of private enquiry. In the process, it is 
hoped that the young person would pick up certain qualities and attri- 
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butes such as self-reliance and independence of mind. One might ask 
why the attempt at meaning might not stop here. It does not and the 
enquiry goes on. 
The word personal defines boundaries, attributes ownership? 
provides motivation and sets content. It tells us where the person 
leaves off and something else begins. It tells us whose it is - mine, 
yours, or its; that is, who or what belongs to whom. It indicates 
what motives are decisive in what people think and do. And it provides 
the content for what is pursued or thought worthwhile. It is not what 
concerns the individual in general but what is of concern to him. it 
is not merely that it pertains to him but is pertinent to him. Personal 
obviously picks out what happens to a person or what he undergoes. We 
have a personal history because we can pick it out from a background of 
what it is for anything to have a history. Throughout our lives we 
are partly built up through habituation. It is ours because we have 
lived through and absorbed it. In this sense we experience it as ours. 
But we also make things happen. Our own motivation orientates us to 
experience. Such involvement is in our reasons, choices, needs, wants, 
desires, feelings and so on. To this extent we are in our reasons etc. 
Everything depends on just what our individuality is expressed in here. 
It might be feelings rather than reasons. It might be both at dif- 
ferent times and places. We have to be in something already to be 
related to something else. There is something odd in asking how we 
are related to our reasons. We are then related to other things 
through what is ours in this sense. Our reasons and feelings can, 
though, cease to be reasons and feelings for us. What we think are our 
most constitutive properties can be objectified and then stand over 
against us. There is a disorientating description of this objectifi- 
cation in Musil. I borrow the following quotation from a volume of 
essays on the category of person: 
In earlier times one could be an individual with a better 
conscience than one can today. People used to be like the 
stalks of corn in the field. They were probably more 
violently flung to and fro by God, hail, fire, pestilence 
and war than they are today, but it was collectively, in 
terms of towns, of countrysides, the field as a whole; and 
whatever was left to the individual stalk in the way of 
personal movement was something that could be answered for 
and was clearly defined. Today, on the other hand, responsi- 
bility's point of gravity lies not in the individual but in 
the relations between things. Has one not noticed that 
experiences have made themselves independent of man? 
They 
have gone on to the stage, into books, into the reports of 
scientific institutions and expeditions, into communities 
based on religious or other conviction, which develop certain 
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kinds of experience at the cost of all the others as in a 
social experiment; and in so far as experiences are not 
merely to be found in work, they are simply in the air. 
Who today can still say that his anger is really is own 
anger, with so many people butting in and knowing so much 
more than he does? There has arisen a world of qualities 
without a man to them, of experiences without anyone to 
experience them, and it almost looks as though under ideal 
conditions man would no longer experience anything at all 
privately and the comforting weight of personal responsi- 
bi. lity would disolve into a system of formulae for poten- 
tial meanings. It is probably that the dissolution of 
the anthropocentric attitude (an attitude that, after so 
long seeing man as the centre of the universe, has been 
dissolving for some centuries now) has finally begun to 
affect the personality itself; for the belief that the 
most important thing about experience is the experiencing 
of it, and about the deeds the doing of them, is beginning 
to strike most people as naive. Doubtless there are still 
people who experience things quite personally, saying 
twe were at So-and-Sols yesterday' or 'we'll do this or 
that today' and enjoying it without its needing to have any 
further content or significance. They like everything at 
their fingers touch, and are persons as purely private as is 
possible. The world becomes a private world as soon as it 
comes into contact with them, and shines like a rainbow. 
Perhaps they are very happy; but this kind of people 
usually appears absurd to the others, although it is as yet 
by no means established why. (Carrithers et al 1985 pp 295-296) 
. This was said by Musil's heroUlrich. Above I asked the question: 
Personal in relation to what? What I mean by this question is that 
what is personal is best seen in how we orientate ourselves to things. 
So the question becomes: Personal in relation to what in terms of what? 
There has to be something in terms of which we are orientated to things, 
such as our motives, commitments and even our likes and dislikes. But 
our contribution as persons is how we stand in relation to things. 
A man without qualities has no centre out of which he thinks or acts. 
What could be his reasons and desires are objectified and depersonalized. 
He is himself depersonalized too, unless in intellectual forgetfulness 
he can return to his backgammon. We are related to whatever it is 
through our reasons, desires, feelings and so on. But the content is 
given by the surroundings in which we find ourselves. So briefly, at 
present, the use of personal in the wider Headings mentioned earlier 
(PSE, PSME, PSMHE) takes its sense from the other terms in the heading 
- that is, personal in relation to the social, moral and health aspects 
of our lives. 
I want then to pick out two main uses of personal. The first is 
about our individual motives, orientationsy springs of action etc. 
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The second is about the range of possible content for these. DnV-Q0r-- ý-ý- -C-__ 
4 is about the person as an individual centre of thought and ac, -on and 
about the content of what it is to be a person amongst other persons. 
There is then an urge, pressure or thrust to individuality and a con- 
tent that provides the proper boundaries of' this individuality. This 
drive to individuality, whether the prompting is within the individual 
himself or comes from outside him, will be expressed in the various 
areas of life. Our main focus is on those areas mentioned in the 
broader headings of personal development. A person will define his 
individuality, whether this be comprehensively or narrowly charac- 
terized, in terms of or against a setting in which social, moral, 
health or even spiritual issues confront him. 
Isaiah Berlin provides one model of what it is for motivation to 
be a person's own: 
The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from 
the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. 
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on 
external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instru- 
ment of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish 
to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by 
conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which 
affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, 
not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self- 
directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other 
men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable 
of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and 
policies of my own and realizing them. This is at least 
part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that 
it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from 
the rest of the world. I wish, above all, to be conscious 
of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing 
responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by 
references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to 
the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to 
the degree that I am made to realize that it is not. 
(Berlin 1969 p 131) 
But it is important to place alongside this quotation what he says 
later in his discussion of positive freedom and self-realization. it 
is only after pupils have been initiated into forms of 
knowledge and 
skills that some kinds of motivation become truly 
theirs. Berlin 
continues: 
If I am a schoolboy, all but the simplest truths of 
mathematics obtrude themselves as obstacles 
to the free 
functioning of my mind, as theorems whose necessity 
I do 
not understand; they are pronounced 
to be true by some 
external authority, and present themselves 
to me as 
foreign bodies which I am expected mechanically 
to absorb 
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into my system. But when I understand the functions of 
the symbols, the axioms, the formation and transformation 
rules - the logic whereby the conclusions are obtained - 
and grasp that these things cannot be otherwise, because 
they appear to follow from the laws that govern the 
processes of my own reason, then mathematical truths no 
longer obtrude themselves as external entities forced 
upon me which I must receive whether I want it or not, 
but as something which I now freely will in the course 
of the natural functioning of my own rational activity. 
... For the musician, after he has assimilated the 
pattern of the composer's score, and has made the com- 
poser's ends his own, the playing of the music is not 
obedience to external laws, a compulsion and a barrier 
to liberty, but a free, unimpeded exercise. The player 
is not bound to the score as an ox to the plough, or a 
factory worker to the machine. He has absorbed the 
score into his own system, has, by understanding it, 
identified it with himself, has changed it from an 
impediment to free activity into an element in that 
activity itself. (Berlin 1969 p 141) 
We might consider here what has been said about such initiation: 
The truly educational subject forces the pupil to 
understand something which has no immediate bearing on 
his experience. It teaches him intellectual discipline, 
by presenting him with problems too remote or too abstract 
to be comprehended within his own limited world. In 
other words, it asks him to stand back from his immediate 
concerns and make a considered judgement of matters which 
are interesting in themselves, whether or not he can see 
their relevance. This is part of what is contained in 
the idea of intellectual discipline, and one of the reasons 
for believing that education is at war with propaganda. 
(Cox et al 1984 p 6) 
This passage is in the context of what, on educational grounds, 
might be suspect as pursuits in a school or college. Peace Studies 
is one area that is out for these writers. But what is important for 
our purposes at present is that some sources of educational motivation, 
as defined by these writers, have a certain autonomy. There is no 
need for the sorts of motivation that might inform child-centred 
approaches to learning. They do not say it but the writers might 
have something like intellectual eros in mind. This is to put the 
best construction on it as far as many pupils are concerned. The 
stick and carrot method might characterize the springs of motivation 
more accurately. However, what is not needed is that motivation 
which springs from its having an immediate bearing on a pupil's 
experience, or belongs to his own limited world or can be seen as 
relevant to his immediate concerns. A pupil has to find the motivation 
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in the intellectual demands of the academic subjects themselves. 
Pupils and students do, as we know. They find excitement, stimulation 
or challenge in these academic pursuits as other young people find 
them in less academic pursuits. Their sense of curiosity and wonder 
is aroused, again as it is in young people who find satisfaction in non- 
academic areas of the curriculum. Depending on the subject, a young 
child -is happy says Coe, the writer we previously quoted, when it is 
engaged in 'what is sensually, intellectually or imaginatively satis- 
fying in the present, or when it is specifically motivated by the idea 
of a remote but well-defined and ultimate1y attainable objective - 
preferably both at the same time. It is unhappy as soon as it begins 
to suspect that it is wilfully and unreasonably being prevented from 
doing either. ' (Coe 1984 p 17) 
That there is something like intellectual eros is suggested in 
what Lonergan says: 'Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of 
other appetites is stilled, there is a desire to know, to understand, 
to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain., 
(1957 p 4) What is important for the discussion at present is that 
there are a variety of motivations which an individual can make his 
own. There might not be any ultimate explanation for such motivations 
that are disclosed in our intentions and satisfactions. Also we need 
to bear in mind that we have to learn what it is to have reasons etc. 
as well as what the reasons might be. That there is a bedrock of 
intention and satisfaction might be seen from this passage from Glover. 
He is discussing what it is to discover ourselves in work. He then 
quotes what a character in the Heart of Darkness says: 
'No, I don't like work. I had rather laze about and 
think of all the fine things that can be done. I don't 
like work, - no man does - but I like what is in the work, 
- the chance to find yourself. Your own reality - 
for 
yourself, not for others - what no other man can ever know. 
They can only see the mere show, and never can tell what it 
really means. ' (Conrad 1973 p 41) 
Glover then goes on to say: 
The experience of recognizing what suits our own nature 
was well described by William James, in a letter to his wife: 
'A man's character is discernible in the mental or moral 
attitude in which, when it came upon him, he felt himself 
most deeply and intensely active and alive. At such moment-ý 
there is a voice inside which speaks and says: "This is the 
real me'"' (Glover 1988 p 137) 
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Glover goes on to say later that we do sense in ourselves a natural 
line of development and that our strong affinities with people and 
pursuits have to be taken as given. There may be something in our 
genetic make-up which precipitates us in these directions in life but the 
need is to leave explanations at the level of intention and satis-action. 
When we reflect on personal development we should bear in mind 
several organizing ideas. In summary of my discussion up to this point 
and in anticipation of the discussion to come I should like to bring 
these ideas together. The key ideas are the meaning of personal 
development, the criteria for its application, the content, form and 
direction that goes into an individual's personal development and the 
source from which the content might come. I want to say then that 
the most general formulation of what the term personal development 
means is captured in the distinction between the cultivation of 
personal individuality and the constitution of a person's generic 
personhood. The notion of the constitution of a human being incor- 
porates the process of becoming an individual person and the nature of 
that actually constituted person. Personal development as concept 
tells us what it is, if it is anything; as content the term tells us 
what needs to go into what makes the person who and what he is; as 
process the term tells Us what activities and practices (what a person 
undergoes) are required to bring it about. To this extent we are 
concerned with an individual's identity. What this identity might be 
presupposes that we have a conception of what is an acceptably, ade- 
quately, or properly constituted identity. I mean by identity that 
first person perspective on the world with its distinctive dispositions 
and orientations. Briefly it might be said that this identity is 
partly constituted by those reflexive powers that persons possess 
implied in such general terms as self-consciousness, agency and auto- 
biography. 
By individuality I mean individual difference, independence and 
agency. We might have a comprehensive view of individuality, a model 
of which might be found in those individuals of Renaissance Florence 
or, nearer to home, in Thomas More. On the other hand we might have 
a restricted view of' individuality, a model of which might be one of 
those people who show initiative in mounting a bike. Either way 
individuality is expressed in the detail of life. 
The division between properly cultivated individuality and fit- 
tingly constituted generic personhood is what personal development 
amounts to. It is not certain that the concept of person can provide 
- 37 - 
us with the criteria for the application of the term personal de, ielc; - 
ment. Other important 'person' concepts are selves, characters, 
individuals, souls, figures, agents and, sliding off the edge, ciphers. 
Each emphasizes different morphological features of personhood and 
suggests the correlative conditions and settings for the realizaticn 
of the content contained in each of them. We need to say though that 
everything depends on the breadth which we give to the word person. 
There is, to this extent, a connection between person, narrative and 
action. 
When we speak about the contrast between the cultivated individual 
and the generically constituted person, it might seem as though there 
are two processes and two products. But an individual person is cons- 
tituted out of generic human qualities, attributes and properties. 
These properties will of course be interpreted in the detail of life. 
An individual might be best considered outside of social typifications 
such as ranks, status, roles, types and so on. But as I have said 
this statement needs qualification. A person may discern his differences 
from other people in all manner of ways but still find his satisfactions 
in his roles and functions and identify with them. His d. ifferences 
from other people are partly defined in terms of the roles and functions 
he expresses himself in. The properties of his make-up are a collec- 
tive achievement, though he will embody them and take responsibility for 
them in his own way. 
The most abstract characteristics of generic personhood such as 
rationality, purposefulness, and self-consciousness only exist in the 
detail of language and activity. These general terms are abstracted 
from the detail of common language and shared activities. An indivi- 
dual is both a product of and a self-created agent within culture. 
With the necessary qualifications, a unique individual is outside 
typifications but inside common practices. But as I have said typifi- 
cations do not in themselves make us foreign to ourselves as individuals. 
Life is made up of the occupancy of roles and the distancing of our- 
selves from them. An individual can go with the grain of society 
against the grain of his own personality or he can go with the grain of 
his personality against the requirements of society. In life we have 
to do the one and may do the other depending on whether we or society 
takes priority. It is how much and in what combinations. 
I have been arguing that we use the term personal in two broad 
senses. The first sense is what is individual to a person - what, we 
might say, issues from a distinct centre of thought and action. e 
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second sense is what is person-like - what the features are of generfý: 
per3onhood. The one converges on personal individuality; the otner 
on our common humanity. The individual person is in language, human 
practices, strong evaluation and so on. His uniqueness is in his 
individual relation to these properties. Nevertheless we are s,, -ill 
tempted to look for the essence of individuality in some magic property. 
If we choose the distinction between separateness and togetherness 
as pointing to such a property, we realize that separateness is not 
changed into togetherness by physical contiguity. Togetherness exists 
in the concepts that govern its sense. Love, duty and sympathy 
characterize what kind of togetherness it is. Separateness, too, is 
governed by concepts. The word separation just as the word personal 
implies relationship. It is defined against a background of given 
social and cultural intelligibility. As I have said a personal life, 
a personal history and so on are possible because there is something in 
general we call life and history. I have a personal interest in things 
against a background of what it is to have interests. 
Again when we say that self-knowledge is the disposition to make 
judgements about oneself, we are interiorizing our participation in a 
collective achievement. But which generic properties does personal 
development pick out as its contribution to the total development of 
the individual? I leave aside at present whether it itself might be 
interpreted as the most comprehensive aim. Human development might 
serve as this comprehensive ideal. Certainly, John Stuart Mill uses 
self-development in this way. What one lives through in Ilifel, or 
what one needs to live through in preparation for it, might be the 
focus of one i nterpretation. But it is not obvious what we contrast 
life with. Another way of putting the question is: What does per- 
sonal development as a curriculum aim have as its objectives? Is it 
some view of' the individual as a fully developed human adult? Less 
comprehensively, is it some limited view of what it is for an indivi- 
dual to take charge of some aspects of his life? Certainly, all- 
embracing ideals and attenuated pictures compete with each other as 
the aims, when we consider personal development. What is common to 
all approaches to the idea of personal development is some view of' 
individual differences and expressiveness within the parameters of 
what it is to be person-like. 
Furthermore, what is common to all approaches to personal develop- 
ment are the formal characteristics of the content, form and direction 
of an individual's life. The content implies a source of that content. 
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I have already suggested that there is a first order language of 
sonal development. We have a common language of success and fa-4,11ure 
in what it is to grow up, in what it is to be responsible for our cwn 
lives and in what it is to have independence of mind and will. 7h, e 
general terms for such powers of the mind and will are self -kno,,. I_edjg7e 
and self-control. These are understood against the detail of our 
collective life. They belong to our collective achievement. 
The sources of the content depend on what is emphasized in our 
individual development. In one important sense, the source of all 
the content is society and culture. But if we emphasize one strand 
of thinking about individuality as illustrated in such ideas as self- 
realization, self-actualization, self-creation and self-fulfilment, 
then there might be a temptation to talk about an individual's distinc- 
tive essence independently of the social and cultural influences on an 
individual's life. 'What we have it in us to become' might capture 
the spirit of this enterprise. We each have a unique potentiality for 
growth. The botanical metaphor requires an horticultural one. 1I 
have got it in me; you provide the proper external conditions'. But 
when we look at these flourishes in more detail, we find that an indi- 
vidual is realized or fulfilled in what culture provides. There seems 
to be no proto-human sentience in the sense required. 'It', we might 
say, identifies its own essence and then sets about trying to realize 
it. (We only have to put it in these terms to see how odd it is to 
speak about self-creation in any fundamental sense. ) 
To the extent that culture provides the content, we are realized 
and fulfilled in the content culture furnishes us with and, if we are, 
the best authority on what we are realized and fulfilled in (given ' 
guidance depending on age and stage of development), then any subject 
in the curriculum can provide those satisfactions. The question of 
who or what is the authority on our development raises the question of 
justification. What do we appeal to when we (morally? ) assess the 
possibilities in our lives - and that includes when each of us assesses, 
for and by himself, his life. 
The form of an individual's development refers to the presence or 
absence of integration, coherence or unity amongst our motivations and 
pursuits. The desiderata of self -realization, if this is what we have 
in mind when we speak of an individual's development, are a spread of' 
excellences brought into some kind of harmony or pattern in an indivi- 
dual's life. The 'self I in self -realization or self -development 
refers both to what is realized and the agency which brings it about. 
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In much of our lives we should be the agent of our own experie-c-ee ant 
development. At least this is the ideal. With reservations, ..; e 
might say that the content in our lives is our own (what we make o, -ýr 
own out of the cultural possiblities); the form of our lives should 
be self-created;: and the direction of our lives should be sel. -chosen. f 
It is only in extreme intepretations of self-realization and self- 
creation that an individual can be the source of everything in his lit'e. 
What this amounts to is very hard to discern, as I have suggested. 
We can help to create the content of our lives and impose some pa-Itern 
on it. We can make things our own and this is what we mean by commit- 
ment or resolve. If we disavow such commitments and resolves when the 
going gets rough we may have not been serious all along. 
To conclude I want to return to two points. I have distinguished 
between two main elements in the word personal; that which is indivi- 
dual and that which is person-like. We recognize differences in our- 
selves and in our lives and we make these differences our own or culti- 
vate them further. We not only identify differences but we identify 
with them. As individuals we do not just happen to be a combination 
of different properties from different general classes of human attri- 
butes and qualities. Nor are we variations on common types. We make 
certain properties our own and we live and act out of them. When we 
say that such properties are our own, we mean that they help to consti- 
tute who we are and enable us to take a stand on things. They are not 
just there in our lives; second-hand, conformed to, and mindlessly 
absorbed and rehearsed. If these properties are individual, they are 
also person-like. They form the stock of what it is to be human. 
Above I raised the question whether the concept of person could 
give us the criteria for what the required sense of development would 
consist in. I also said I would use the term personal development 
until a more adequate term might be found. Some writers have used 
personal to mean the whole range of characteristics that mark off the 
human from the non-human. This is too wide for our purposes. All 
that might be left of the non-human is the View from Nowhere of 
physical science. Even here such a view is the product of human 
reason. (This does not mean to say that there is nothing outside the 
human perspective. ) Obviously we need to bring the personal back 
from such uses to something more manageable. I have said that per- 
sonal should be confined to what is individual and person-like. And 
person-like would be interpreted as the social and moral dimensions of' 
PSME. The individual is how a person relates to the social and moral 
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dimensions of his life - in the area we are discussinc. 
I should say here that some writers on PSME assume tha'ý the use 
of personal in personal value, personal qualities and attributes and 
personal beliefs picksout a distinct category of the personal in '-1-esse 
respects. Richard Pring almost suggests this in his labourecl 
sion of personal values inhis book on personal development. (Pring 
1984 p 24) What should be meant by personal in these phrases is that 
there are values, qualities and attributes and beliefs that pup-"!, -s and 
students actually hold as distinct from discursively entertain. 
One can have ones own beliefs as well as reflect on beliefs in general. 
It is what one lives by rather than knows about in propositions. 
Such values, qualities and attributes come from the virtues and charac- 
ter and personality traits and so on. 
The second point is that once we have distinguished between the 
sense of personal as individual difference, however this difference is 
expressed, and what is person-like, we find that what might be indivi- 
dual is an extremely large class. There seems to be an almost endless 
multiplication of w hat might be personal. People seem to have an 
insatiable appetite to stick the word personal in front of nouns and 
gerunds. What could be more personal than our likes and dislikes, 
our desires and preferences and our tastes and inclinations? We might 
remind ourselves of the personal greed, as a personal virtue-term, of 
those personally disgraced insider-dealers on the Wall Street Stock 
Exchange. Could we not argue that personal just means anything that 
is of concern to the individual no matter how perversely different it 
is? All we need is something more general, apart, distant or formally 
structured as a contrast and our associated likes and dislikes. It is 
a matter of what I consider mine as opposed to yours and what I prefer 
to do behind closed doors. This is complicated by the variety of 
contrasts in the required sense. But context helps to determine the 
contrast. At one time 'domestic' is the personal; at another it is 
contrasted with it. What is important in our lives might not be 
personal. The business man, in his role as business man, likes what 
he is doing and finds his most important satisfactions in it. 
But what might we say about the perversely idiosyncratic? The 
quasi-existentialist hero in 'A Clockwork Orange' by Anthony Burgess 
has had little socialization and no education. He expresses and 
finds himself in violence. This is his thing. Even Beethoven's 
Choral Symphony, especially the hymn 'Ode to Joy', psychs him up for 
violence. (It is expressive of his violent impulses - We might 
bear 
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in mind here what Glover, quoting William James, sai-d ce .. - 
self self-creatively in ones work. ) If one wants t -o press ttýe 
one might say uhat his development consists in becoming more 
at what he does best. We might respond by saying his beýhaviour '; s 
impersonal. It is an eruption of a disturbed psyche. His devel------ 
ment as a person would consist in bringing such pre-personal ener, '7y 
into what is person-like. My point is that to understand the personal' 
J-4 in the sense of individual difference we need a background of intell, ___ 
bility which we find in the content of what is person-like. We can 
characterize our existentialist hero because we have this background as 
our reference. He is defined against it. 
In conclusion it is instructive to look at the example of a per- 
sonal stereo in an individual's life. One comes across young people 
in schools and colleges narcissistically submerged in them. These 
stereos are personal in the sense that they are individually owned and 
privately enjoyed but they are not, in some people's eyes, person-like. 
They cut young people off from each other and other people and the 
content of the music might be depersonalizing. One could debate this 
example, of course, but there are other examples of what is personal 
but unperson-like. When PSME is considered it is the social and 
moral which give the dimension to the personal. But each constrains 
the others, so that the individual is socially and morally constituted 
but he is sufficiently independent to put his own stamp on his life. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Relevance, Needs: the Content or Supports for Education? 
What is relevant, what is needed and quite often what is sIJmpl,., 
wanted are often put at the centre of an individual's required or 
demanded education or training. They provide the content for w1na-- is- 
thought to be educationally necessary and the motivation which pupils 
or students might otherwise lack. They can be both the source of an 
educational content and the source of motivation. We find in needs, 
wants and relevance what does or might orientate pupils and students 
to their world or prospective world. They provide the springs of a 
desire to learn, especially when young people think that what they 
need fits them for the world which they will inhabit later in life. 
Intentionality might be the central idea here. It is a matter 
of encouraging or guiding a young person's actual directedness towards 
experience or the world. It is assumed that he is not autistically 
carapaced in his own world. (As we shall see much depends on how we 
interpret the word needs. Some people do not grow out of or trans- 
form those needs belonging to earlier periods of life. These earlier 
needs linger on in undeveloped or unconcious forms. Such needs may 
fail to develop their proper objects in the adult world. ) 
One way that relevance or needs enter the language and practice 
of education and especially the language of personal development is in 
the following way. Educationalists are constantly reminded of the 
contested status of education and the various components of it in 
society at present. One way that this contestedness is captured is 
in the use of the term relevance as a guide to curriculum development. 
Personal Development as an educational aim is often discussed within a 
context defined by relevance. For example, if autonomy, personal 
responsibility, self-esteem or self-discipline are what young people 
require, then an educational programme would need to be relevant to 
their acquisition. There is always the danger that educational pro- 
grammes are designed in vague ways or inherited in an unquestioned 
manner and then hurriedly justified in terms of what is fashionably 
relevant. The language of need then becomes useful. Children or 
young people in their different ways need autonomy, personal responsi- 
bility, self-esteem or self-discipline because the possession of 
these 
are relevant to the needs of - one then fills in the reference. 
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Although personal development may be seen as an integral -a-t of all 
education, reflection about such development appears repeateýtly in 
areas such as Education as a Preparation for Adult Life, Sociall and 
Life Skills, Enrichment Studies or Life Styles and Values. -. he areas 
covered by these headings are particularly prone to the use of the 
terms relevance and need. Some writers use personal developmen-, l in 
this context as the over-arching concept; other writers make it part 
of what goes on under these other general headings. 
Some educationalists proceed as though the organizing idea behind 
all these areas is 'relevance'. The variety of 1,. nowledge, skills and 
values are relevant to the needs of pupils or students in the context 
of their lives within society. Relevance is a relational term. it 
refers to those considerations which have bearing upon or have connec- 
tions with the matter in hand. Relevance is not a property of 
considerations; it is established in our judgements. It is not a 
matter of fact; but fact interpreted. We make judgements or express 
opinions about what is relevant to something else, presupposing we can 
make the proper factual connections. Relevance need not presuppose 
agreement in judgement or interpretation, even though one may recognize 
what judgement or interpretation is at issue. For example, in a recent 
re-broadcast television episode of 'Yes, Prime Minister', Jim Hacker, 
the Prime Minister, and Sir Humphrey Appleby, his Civil Servant, were 
engaged in the politics of elevating a churchman to a bishopric. 
The possible candidates exhibited different degrees of unbelief but 
Sir Humphrey reminded the Prime Minister that the appointment should 
be relevant. To which Jim Hacker responded by asking 'Relevant to 
what, to God? '. Sir Humphrey engagingly corrected him, pointing out 
that the relevance was to be more in the nature of sociological con- 
siderations. The appointment would be relevant but each has his own 
judgement as to what that might consist in. Of course, as usual, 
what turns out to be relevant is self-interest as interpreted by each 
in his own way. 
Relevance belongs to the language of means and ends. But again 
the exercise of judgement as to what is the best means or the least 
troublesome means to our endsis what concerns us. But we do not 
need to interpret means as mere means. If good health is our aim, 
exercise or diet are not merely means. They are enjoyed for their 
own sakes. Another example is that of playing or listening to music 
for the enjoyment it brings but also because it is required to pass 
an examination. We value the music for its own sake as well as for 
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the sake of something else. One is a condition f3r '-', e -'u c- 
the other. We might also say that there is a certain satisfac-, ion 
the preparation for the examination and perhaps in actually s- 
But this is also instrumental in perhaps getting work in music 
would then provide more opportunity for playing or listening 'Lo -us-ý--- 
These examples bring out that many means can become ends. e 
might take the following lines from Louis MacNeicels poem 'Sunday 
Morning I 
Down the road someone is practising scales, 
The notes like little fishes vanish with a wink of tails, 
Man's heart expands to tonker with his car 
for this is Sunday morning, Fate's great bazaar, 
Regard these means as ends, ... 
(Roberts 1960 p 304) 
It is true that MacNeice is celebrating Sunday morning, which is con- 
trasted with 'weekday time. Which deadens and endures. '. But more 
expansively we might say that for whole stretches of our lives means 
and ends are mutually implicated. We can think of rich and complex 
wholes in our lives. Education ought to be one of these. 
We have seen in recent times that education, broadly interpreted, 
has been required to justify its relevance. It can no longer be 
simply enjoyed for its own sake. One might hear people arguing as 
follows. If there are deeply antagonistic attitudes and assumptions 
to the spirit of industrial enterprise in our culture and if these 
attitudes and assumptions can be correlated with our relative economic 
decline and if education or training can function as a corrective, 
then education ought not to remain uninfluenced. 
The fact that something is relevant to something else or that 
something is a means to an end or that something provides the condi- 
tions for the existence of something else does not mean that these 
are grounds of their own justification. That sex education is rele- 
vant to more adequate personal relationships, that the use of condoms 
is a means to safer sexual practice and that the heterosexual family 
unit is one of the means to an enduring capitalist society are not 
facts that give automatic reasons for their inclusion in an educational 
programme. Apart from the facts being disputed, it is thought that 
such claims need a moral framework for a more adequate understanding of 
them. We could put this the other way round and say that the facts 
can have moral implications. Not knowing the facts, a person might 
find his self-esteem undermined or his relationships with others ruined. 
w 
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(How we interpret the words self-esteem and ruined or whether we 
these words adequate to the experiences, presupposes a moral framework 
and that raises the question of whose moral framework. ) These are 
typical issues that come up in personal development schemes. 
Like the word relevance the word needs has a certain ubiquiý,.,, in 
educational discourse. It might be thought that what is claimed 'Ic 
be needed is incomplete until we indicate what a person would lack 
were his needs not satisfied. To the extent that we fail to giie to 
the indefiniteness of both words a context of use, they easily become 
catchwords. 'Needs' crops up over and again in H. M. I. Reports, 
Government White Papers, L. E. A. curricula recommendations, F. E. U. 
publications, the aims and objectives of courses of study in schools 
and colleges and so on. We read that the needs of pupils and students 
should be in line with the needs of industry, that the present and 
future needs of children should always be born in mind in the classroom, 
that certain needs require attention if pupils and students are to cope, 
su; rv, ive or even flourish in society and that the needs of personal 
development should not be neglected if these needs do not coincide with 
the needs required for the world of work. When the needs of man as 
'economic man' are no longer appropriate because of 'enforced leisure' 
the needs of 'cultural man' or Homo Ludens become the focus of concern. 
Educational needs of children are not so much for 'low-tech as no-tech', 
at least for the bottom forty per cent of our school leaving population. 
Needs vary depending on who is speaking. 
An official at the Department of Education and Science said 
recently, interspersing needs with aspirations; 'We are beginning to 
create aspirations which society cannot match ... When young people ... 
can't find work which meets their abilities and expectations, then we 
are only creating frustration with ... 
disturbing social consequences. 
We have to ration ... education opportunities so 
that society can cope 
with the output of education ... 
People must be educated once more to 
know their place'. (Quoted by G. E. Cohen 1986 p 620) In the recent 
educational troubles in France a spokesman was saying 
the same thing. 
When aspirations inspired by education or, more specifically, 
higher 
education, outstrip employment opportunities, social unrest results. 
Therefore, education should be adjusted to social and economic needs 
and thereby constituting young people differently. 
Two Uses of the Term Needs 
A distinction that is rarely made in all the literature and 
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documents about personal development, its cognates and extensýý=s is 
that between a person's needs that are satisfied in we! -fare pro,., *Sio! ýs, 
the blessings of love and care, the benefits of nature's bounty alr-_4 
the nourishment of cultural riches and what a person needs in the 
shape of personal qualities, attributes, powers, capabilities ant 
knowledge that enables the person to function as a moral, social and 
economic agent in society. We are reminded all the time, of course, 
that they are not satisfied in the one case nor acquired in the o-ý. er. 
Moreover, it hardly needs saying that people do not function at all, 
indeed they lose the very desire to function, when they are deprived 
of adequate food, clothing and shelter. There is a category mistake 
in the classification of certain capacities and capabilities as needs 
even if they are needed. Roughly, we might say that capacities and 
capabilities are exercise- concepts and that the needs for love and 
care are fulfilment-concepts. 
A person will quite properly expect in varying degrees to have 
his intellectual, emotional and perhaps spiritual needs satisfied. 
Just as our thirst is slaked by water, our natural or aroused curio- 
sity is satisfied by knowledge and understanding, our yearnings 
nourished by imaginative literature or religious ritual, our distress 
relieved by attention and comfort and our failures alleviated by 
encouragement. Such needs are satisfied in the amelioration of the 
human condition. Alternatively, a person will need moral and intel- 
lectual virtues, character traits, dis'positions of good sense and 
skills of refinement in order to live or work well. We might say, 
then, that needs either wholly or partly pre-exist their satisfaction 
but the capacities and capabilities we need are acquired and exercised 
in the relevant areas of our lives. The need for food or love are 
satisfied in their proper objects. And we might say they exist prior 
to their proper satisfaction. Of course, what are their proper 
objects is the subject of dispute. Capacities and capabilities are 
satisfied in the exercise of them. 
There are complications in trying to make the above distinction 
between the needs that find satisfaction in their objects and the 
capacities and capabilities that are needed for us to function. 
One 
is that language can mislead us. For example, kindness is a virtue 
and may be expressed in response to someone's misfortune. 
There 
might be a corresponding need in a person's misfortune 
for such con- 
siderateness. The one is a virtue exercised; the other a need 
gratefully attended to. But a person may say that it pleases 
him to 
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act with kindness or considerateness. 'Pleases' may t-en be consýruel_ 
as a pleasure satisfied. So there is a need in the Samaritan %411ýic,. is 
satisfied in acts of kindness. This line of thought makes ever---, -`nýý: 
appear egoistic. Whatever we do we do for the satisfaction deri-., ed 
from it. This move can be resisted by pointing out that all I plea-ses' 
means here is that the action issues f rom the person and that it is 
done willingly. A person does not act out of kindness for the sat'-s- 
faction it gives him, as though the kindness was the occasion "cr the 
person's own satisfaction. There should be no suggestion that it is 
a pleasure satisfied, perhaps, in an appetitive sense. An appetite 
pre-exists its satisfaction. In the case of kindness the satisfaction 
is in the considerateness shown. The satisfaction supervenes, just as 
does happiness, on what is done or in the doing of it and does not 
exist as anindependent state. Moreover, satisfaction should not be 
heard as self-satisfaction. 
Another complication is that we might claim that literacy and 
numeracy are needs of 
-children 
and that we are obliged to satisfy them. 
But they are not needs that pre-exist their satisfaction, that is, we 
can identify them independently of their being characterized as liter- 
acy and numeracy. They are lacks but it is we as teachers who classify 
them as such. They are, then, acquired intellectual abilities. Yet 
after their acquisition certain deprivations may prevent or interfere 
with their exercise. Their exercise may be constrained because of all 
manner of misfortunes that may befall a person. A life may be 
impoverished because the right conditions do not exist for the abili- 
ties to be expressed. If we say that the need to exercise the 
abilities are prevented or discouraged, we are referring to the lack 
of the same conditions that created the abilities in the first place. 
We might want to say the same for music or religion in this respect. 
Both create the needs of which the music and religion are the satis- 
factions. They become needs, and when not satisfied, life can seem 
worthless. We might bear in mind here what I said about Borodin 
earlier. Were he deprived of his music and chemistry he would be 
harmed in his very being. 
In this discussion I have wanted to show that there is a distinc- 
tion between needs that are satisfied in their proper objects or 
under proper conditions and the need to acquire capacities or capa- 
bilities that are exercised in the respective spheres of life. in 
educational literature we find lists of needs which are merely men- 
tioned without any attempt made to discriminate amongst them. 
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Although, more often than not, it is just the word, needs tha-_ iS 
tioned. More importantly, there is little discussion, if any, on 
what educational conditions should obtain for needs to be mer- or 
capacities and capabilities to be acquired. It is as thou. ol- once 
mentioned they occasion their own satisfaction or acq-isition. T 
the case of capacities and capabilities they supervene upon al' manner 
of practices in a school. To become conscientious, autonomous, 
reliable or disciplined; to possess self-esteem, self-worth, personal 
responsibility, a person needs to undertake tasks, engage in activities, 
wrestle with problems and master techniques. Mere lists in a RoSet's 
Thesaurus fashion do little for practising teachers. Unless, of 
course, these lists are meant to be mildly Machiavellian in that they 
are designed to create an impression. The trouble is, that once words 
begin to have currency, each person gets caught up in their exchange 
and the best a busy teacher can do is to quote the next person as the 
authority for the use of the words. 
It might seem unreasonable and a quibble to make the last point. 
Lists and catalogues of items are meant to prompt and remind. But in 
all the areas I have mentioned from PSME to Life Enhancement and Social 
and Life Skills schemes, a teacher's greatest need is for some coher- 
ence in what is listed or catalogued. What teachers require, as I 
have heard expressed over and again, are connections and order in what 
is recommended as curricula aims in these areas. They expect the 
organizing power of l'anguage to. give some unity to the listed words 
and expressions. Such lists do not have the evocative power of 
metonomic lists in imaginative literature. But it often appears that 
thisý is intended, in a much lower key of course. The difficulty is 
that in the areas I am discussing large claims are made or implied 
about what a properly constituted individual might consist in. It is 
true that many items listed in these areas are meant to be hints and 
wrinkles on how a person might function in discrete areas of life. 
But momentous issues are suggested when curricula talk turns to ideas 
about the constitution and transformation of persons. Such add-on 
knowledge and skills mentioned in hints and wrinkles might too have 
implications for what kind of people we turn out to be (self-confidence 
can be developed by learning to read train time-tables) but these can 
be justified in their detail. 
Personal development (to use the term in a wide sense) can be 
seen at one and the same time as a philosophy of education, a curri- 
culum aim and what goes into making the individual the individual he is. 
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Personal development as a curriculum aim has a buill, -- 'J-, motivat- 
4c 
reflect on its own capacity to give an overarching view of eduýýa--4, -on 
in 
its entirety. Such ideals, if they are ideals, as autonomous well- 
being, I can become the overarching aim of education in general. S, .. 
ideals result from reflection within personal development and 
become objects of it. Now, do not such proposed ideals belie w., ýaz, 
I have said above about mere lists? The answer is that such ideals 
are merely mentioned too, without any discussion of them or eluc-idation 
of what they might amount to or any answer to the questions: How and 
When? I shall return to these points later in my discussion. 
At present, I want to say that such elevated ideals can metamor- 
phise into needs. They become something we cannot do without as we 
are launched into life and our living of it. Furthermore, what can 
become the objects of needs seem limitless. And then such questions 
as follows suggest themselves: What do I need, How do I recognize 
them and Who says so? Since some needs are so fundamental to us, 
depending on who says so, they amount in their satisfaction or lack 
to the transformation of who we are. 
The case of Salman Rushdie is instructive. Fundamental needs 
are at issue. It is said by one side that Rushdie wants to capture 
the reality of other people in his narratives. But people of Islamic 
Faith feel that their faith' is inextricably bound up with their self- 
interpretation as human beings. The truth of their religion is 
refracted through their identities and an attack on it is an attack on 
them. Individual identity and integrity is constitutively linked with 
the integrity of their religion. On the other hand, for some Muslims, 
Rushdie cannot escape their stories. The liberal intellectual cannot- 
withdraw from the Islamic narrative into which he is born. The consti- 
tutive narratives of the lives of people contain fundamental needs. 
Elliptical and Non-Elliptical Needs 
The word needs characterizes those possible 'lacks' in a person's 
life that are thought or felt to need satisfying. But over a range 
of such needs, it is a matter of judgement or discernment whether they 
are recognized or accepted as such. Or so it is argued. Whereas 
wants, preferences, desires and likes and dislikes are simply what 
people have and are disclosed in the immediacy of having them, needs 
it is claimed, require identification and that presupposes a framework 
of thought and valuation. For example, Benn and Peters 
(1959 p 143)say: 
'To say that a man wants food is simPlY to describe his state of mind; 
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to say that he needs food is to say that he ,; ill not measure --c an 
understood standard unless he gets it'. Although it would be 
cult to maintain itin the distinction just mentioned, it is tho, -17'-t 
that some kind of gap begins to open up between the immediacy of wants 
and desires in the one case and needs in the other. There is a rec-z-- 
nition of such a gap in Rousseau: 'Give him, not what he wants, but 
what he needs'. If needs are not a felt presence within a person, 
how does that person know he has them and how would he recognize an 
appropriate characterization of them? Wants and desires are somehow 
resident within a person and need no identification. Needs qay not 
be recognized by the person who is said to be in need but identified 
by someone who thinks he knows better. 
Usually the thought is developed further. Even if people come 
to accept as their own the needs identified by someone other than 
themselves, it does not follow that there is an entitlement to the 
satisfaction of the needs, that is, if they are, indeed, satisfiable. 
Such needs have been described as 'objective' in that people may be 
said to have them but may not experience them as such. The drift of' 
these thoughts lead to the type of claim made by Michael Ignatieff in 
his book The Needs of Strangers. He says: 
There are f ew presumptions in human relations more dangerous 
than the idea that one knows what another human being needs 
better than they (sic) do themselves (sic). (1984 p 11) 
In the concluding section of the same book, Ignatieff goes on to 
observe: 
From birth, our needs for help and welfare, education and 
employment are defined for us by doctors, social workers, 
lawyers, public health inspectors, school principals - 
experts in the administration of needs. (1984 p 136) 
Antony Flew writes in a similar vein. His concern is to associate 
wants with choice and needs with command. Our wants are our choices; 
our needs are commanded by others. These points have a certain 
rhetorical force about them and to that extent are in the realm of 
political polemics. Flew writes: 
The main concern (is) to bring out the truth that an emphasis 
upon needs, as opposed to wants, cannot but appeal to 
those 
who would like to see themselves as experts, qualified 
both to 
determine what the needs of others are, and to prescribe and 
enforce the means appropriate to the satisfaction of those 
needs ... 
(We) may want what we do not need, and need what we 
do not want. 
(1981 p 117) 
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Flew's polemic is based on the thoughts that a pers, cn is usl, ---'-!,,, 
the best judge of what he wants and that his freedom consists in 
choosing in accordance with his wants. The presumption of' neerts 
creates a distance between the person who is said to have the needs 
and other people who project the needs on him. The contrast is 
between the individual who largely knows what he is about and collec- 
tivities (or self-appointed spokesmen for them) which know better. 
There is a long history of the type of distinction Flew is after. 
The contrasts between the will and the real will, interests and real 
interests, needs and real needs anticipate Flew's distinction between 
wants and needs. These contrasts point to those who think they know 
what is good for themselves and those who presume to know better. 
The latter group of people, being experts both in the identification 
of the good and in the determination of the means for its attainment, 
appear to speak a shared language of the human good. But they do in 
reality become at once self-proclaimed benefactors and self-serving 
despots. To get at his opponents, Flew finishes his discussion with 
the thought: 
When Plato was dreaming dreams of his own ideal city, stately 
as a Dorian temple, he did wonder for one uneasy moment how 
his guard dogs were to be inhibited from themselves preying 
upon the sheep. Plato then saw 'the chief' safeguard' in 
their I being really well educated I. (416 A-B) (Flew: 1981 p 136) 
But for Nielsen, Flew's chosen socialist target, the "sole but 
sufficient guarantee is not strict Platonic education but 'a full 
commitment to socialist and indeed egalitarian values'". Flew has 
another opponent in Bernard Williams who says in his paper The Idea of 
Equality: 'It is a matter of logic that particular sorts of needs 
constitute a reason for receiving particular sorts of good'. Flew 
acknowledges that Williams qualifies the generality of this claim but 
he nevertheless goes on to assert that Williams is deceived in his 
more specific claims. Flew says 'What he does volunteer is treatments 
of two examples, medicine and education; a pair chosen presumably 
because he wants to justify state monopoly 'free' services in these 
areas but not, or not yet, in the supply of - say - food, drink or 
shelter I. ( 137) Even if one identifies the need correctly, and it is 
not a projection on to uninterested or unwilling recipients, education 
is not 'manna from heaven'. If people need it, or even want it, that 
is not a sufficient reason for its provision. A need or a want, in 
this case, does not make a right or an entitlement. So we pay at the 
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point of consumption and this, presumably, is the whol, e -,,, oint of" 
polemic. Flew's argument is meant to show that wants have priority 
over needs and that even when both coincide this in itself does not 
give an automatic entitlement to their fulfilment. 
My concern is whether the language of needs sheds light on the 
notion of personal development. The satisfaction of many needs is a 
precondition of the development of an individual human being in a multi- 
plicity of ways. Flew has his own ideas of what kind of a person it 
is desirable to be and what sort of world a person needs to inhaDit for 
its realization. A person has his wants, desires and preferences and 
a free market economy is a condition of their proper fulfilment, even 
if this means that some will remain unfulfilled because of deficits or 
imperfections in the person himself. At least the individual is 
sovereign over his own wants, desires and preferences and is not the 
bearer of dubiously ascribed needs. And he can, therefore, take res- 
ponsibility for his own life. If the market is the proper mechanism 
for the realization of his wants and so on, the law inhibits any 
attempted realization of what is legally prohibited. The individual 
develops within the freedom and restraints of such a system. 
But no matter what the system, there will always be intervention 
in the lives of people. The school and its curriculum (for some 
writers more importantly the hidden curriculum) intervenes in the lives 
of its pupils. Such intervention is, perhaps, not as important as 
other kinds of intervention. Indeed, it is increasingly falling on 
the school to make children aware of what does intervene in their lives. 
The immediate question for schools at present is what is the nature, 
scope and content of that intervention and who ultimately decides. 
Like 'relevance', 'needs' is thought to give some purchase on what the 
nature, scope and content is proper to a school's role in the lives of 
the children in its care. 
One does not have to enter the polemics of high politics to take 
at least one of Flew's points. Most teachers can relate anecdotes 
about how people in education develop self-serving discourses which 
create a world of complex non-educational practices to be administered 
and managed by themselves. The language of needs is well suited to 
such manipulation and endows those who use the language with a certain 
authenticity and legitimacy. What could be more important that 
ful- 
filling or satisfying the needs of children! This is to say nothing 
of the way in which any need so described trades on the urgency and 
inescapability of those biological or basic needs whose satisfaction 
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are a precondition of the posibility of the existence or satisfact__, -4 -- 
of other needs. (I would say, here, that I am not concerned 
so-called ascending hierarchy of needs, culminating in peak experiences. ) 
The satisfaction of needs, then, sounds like a self-j USt4 Lfying acti%, ity- 
But the important question, as nearly always, is not what we call some- 
thing but how clearly we specify what it is. We need to specify in 
detail what it is we are calling a need. It would be extremely dilt"fi- 
cult to do without the notion of need as it enables us to articulazýe 
important ways of thinking about human beings. Nevertl-ýeless, one may 
want to bracket the notion temporarily and then s-ecify ,.; hat it is 
that is called a need and what it is that is thought to be needed. 
As Flew and other writers have said, one may begin by asking of 
needs 'what for? '. IX needs Y1 is said to be elliptical for IXI needs 
Y to reach the goal of Z' or IX needs Y in order to Z1. Y becomes a 
condition for the existence or realization of Z. To function as Z, X 
needs Y. Needs have to be fulfilled, if people are to live up to 
their potential; if they are to live anything like a full human 
existence; if they are to function as full members of society; and 
if they are to measure up to what is expected of them. But we still 
need more detail. If needs are relative to ends, what more specifi- 
cealy are the ends? We need food, clothing and shelter to survive. 
One of the cognates of the word need is the word necessity and in say- 
ing that survival is our end, we are answering the question: 'Food, 
clothing and shelter are a necessity for what? '. Apart from what we' 
might call natural needs which may be characterized as intrinsic to 
our nature, there are those needs that are socially defined. They 
are conventional as distinct from natural. These needs are relative 
to our culture and the ends to be realized are defined within that 
culture. Unless we are to live on the margins of our society, we 
need access to the means of communication such as newspapers, television, 
transport and so on. As citizens we need literacy and numeracy if we 
are to be participants in democratic institutions and commercial and 
industrial enterprises. As members of society, we need education, 
culture, a home, medical care and sufficient income and resources. 
Just as there are things which we need but do not lack, there are 
things we lack but might need. Most people in our society do not 
lack food but they need it, even if they are disabling themselves by 
eating it. I have already mentioned the hidden curriculum in the 
shape of the school tuck shop and canteen. Again, there might 
be 
things we need but cannot authentically have. If there are 
demons- 
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trable needs for community and beloning, these might not be poss-ftlee 
in a modern society. We might entertain metaphysical hopes 
'meanings' are not possible in a disenchanted world. The 
for community and religious consolation might be as remote as 
nostalgic return to the Gemeinschaft of local communities. Because 
we are empty inside in these respects, it does not mean that there 
are the proper objects to fulfil (fill full) us. 
It has been said that if all needs-claims are elliptical, they 
are positive statements rather than normative judgements. If '_ "'I e 
goal is survival or flourishing, one requires food and a lot more 
besides. The need is viewed under the aspect of means to an end. 
They are empirically verifiable. These are the means required and 
this is the end satisfied. A normative judgement presupposes a 
standard to be attained and involves words with value implications. 
The force of this observation is meant to shift the emphasis from a 
judgement or assumption of value to a statement of fact. This force 
is best illustrated in an instrumental need. The claim that 'I need 
a cricket bat' is elliptical for 'I need a cricket bat in order to 
play cricket'. or one could simply say more neutrally 'I require a 
bat etc. l. One is the condition for the possibility of the other. 
I require the bat because I want to play cricket; but not much may 
hang on this relative end. I know that cricket is a serious business 
and, even where a livelihood may not depend upon it, a person's self- 
image might. However,, if I have insufficient money for a bat I could 
hardly say it is a need. The bat is instrumental to the end of' play- 
ing cricket but cricket itself could hardly be said to be a need. it 
might be a passion, though. 
On the other hand, were I to say I need a home, it is not helpful 
to unpack the claim into an instrumental assertion of the above kind. 
A home is not a means to an end; it is constitutive of what it is to 
live a decent life. I need a home to live anything like a meaningful 
existence in society as it is presently constituted. All my hopes 
are caught up in expectations of this sort. It is no consolation to 
know that many people in our society (to say nothing of the misery 
suffered throughout the world) live lives well below standards implicit 
in such expectations. We have our expectations that are bound up with 
our id-entities, and these are expressed in normative judgements about 
needs. Moreover, it is in these judgements that we reveal where we 
stand. 
I said above that we are not consoled in the thought 
that people 
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are much worse off than we are. The further thought is tnat we care 
4 
_nj ng: 
about their needs, too. Normative judgements conta t I", ew 
needs express our conceptions of what we cannot get on without, the 
our lives would fall to pieces in the non-satisf action of the needs an, -' 
the way our perceptions of who we are are shattered in our depriva--ions. 
Joel Feinberg is to the point in his book Social Philosophy: 1--n a 
general sense to say that S needs X is to say simply that if he does 
not X he will be harmed I. (Feinberg 1973 p 111 ) Harm is an in--erest- 
ing word because it is said to be one of those essentially contested 
concepts. I shall pick up this thought later. 
At this point I should like to make two observations about the 
notion of want. Firstly, G. E. Anscombe writes as follows: 'To say 
that (an organism) needs that environment is not to say, e. g. that you 
want it to have that environment, but that it won't flourish unless it 
has it. Certainly, it all depends whether you want it to flourish! 
as Hume would say. But ... (it) 'all-depends' on whether you want it 
to flourish ... whether the fact that it needs that environment, or 
won Itf lourish without it , has the slightest inf luence on your actions. 
(Anscombe 1958 P 7) Want, here, is a kind of moral perception. One 
recognizes the need and one cares about it. To one who does not want 
a person (say) to thrive, it could properly be said of him that he 
ought to want the person to thrive and that he should care about such 
things. What it means to come to see more sensitively or to see what 
effects moral imperatives have on people are difficult questions. 
What I want to bring out is that to want in the above example is not 
minimally descriptive like a minor taste. The wanting says something 
about the people who have them and their worth can be the subject of 
assessment. When I want something I may not want it for myself. I 
may want things for other people and what I want may depend on my per- 
ception of their needs. 
My second point is that wants have a history; they come from some- 
where. A person may come to realize that his wants are impoverished 
and were induced in a life that he imperfectly understood. In a 
straightforward phenomenological sense, we can come to see that our 
wants were falsely our own. From the 'inside' we feel cheated and 
wonder how we could have been taken in by such wants. Furthermore, 
our perceptions of ourselves may fit us for subordinate positions in 
society and what we want from our lives are adjusted to such perceptions. 
Our self-depreciatory images are reflected in what fulfils us- 
If we wish to talk about wants directed at the accummulation of 
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;"4 commodities, we might say that our wants were artificia-I'lly ty 
advertising. Commodities can become Ifetishized' in a non-, ý-- ý -rxistý 
sense. They become, to quote Charles Taylor: 'endowed magica1l'Y 
with the properties of the life they subserve: as though a car m4c`-'_ 
actually make my family life more intense and harmonious! ' (7-avicr 
1985 P 281) John Berger has listed many such dreams that shape our 
aspirations to own commodities and live the good life. He subs=,, es 
the dreams under the dream of later tonight, the skin dream and t-he 
dream of far away places. All our dreams will come true as antici- 
pation turns into reality. Our jet plane is drawn to the exotic and 
nostalgic attraction of the Mediterranean and we are invited to drive 
off in our new car with a happy family for ever satisfied. This is 
to say nothing of the induced wants for electric toothbrushes and the 
fiftieth television channel, the latter no doubt controlled from an 
easy chair by a channel selector. Who would scorn the claim that 
'You want what you are going to get'? 
We have to be careful we do not make too much of the distinction 
between imputed needs and induced wants; both can be equally insidious. 
The difficulty is what kind of tests do we have for our discriminations 
of worth. Can we have true and false wants and genuine and spurious 
needs? What Ignatieff says about needs can also be said about wants. 
He writes that politics can be a dangerous business because in the 
mobilization for change we 'raise expectations and create needs which 
lead beyond the confines of existing reality'. When we extend and 
increase needs, we must take care 'not to conjure up the fierce and 
bitter emotions of disillusionment?. Ignatieff says that Rousseau 
'rewrote the history of human needs as tragedy, as the story of how 
man had mastered nature only to enslave himself to the upward spiral 
of his own needs'. (Ignatieff 1984 p 22) Are these observations also 
not true of wants? We only need to substitute commerce and industry 
for politics. 
If needs in general are not infinitely contestable, some appear 
to be. Ignatieff observes: 'We are the only species with needs that 
exceed our grasp, the only species to ask questions about the purposes 
of our existence which reason is unable to answer. In the realm of 
metaphysical meaning, we are 'utterly unreconciled to the limitations 
of our ignorance. (p 19) But that many people need the assurance of 
ultimate meaning must be disputable. Ignatieff does in fact recog- 
nize this. He shows that Hume was without the need of religious con- 
solation, even on his death bed. 
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will pursue these thoughts a little ",.,, rther ty re .- Cý -- -- e--, - 4- ý- '- - Simone Weil. In her book Need for Roots she writes abo-ýzý the needs 
of the soul. The metaphor of roots in the titIe of the book 4; 3 
important. Above I spoke briefly about the -, etaphor of growt'n. 
we want to exploit the metaphor taken from natural history, we 
find it helpful to recognize that trees have roots. The tree needs 
ga4 S good roots in fertile soil if it is to thrive. Just as a tree 
its sustenance from the soil, a human being finds his nourishmen- in a 
human world saturated with tradition. Deprived of such a world, and 
the cultural inheritance that defines it, a human being is harmed just 
as surely as if he were physically injured. A human being's plight 
is desperate when he is culturally rootless. Simone Weil writes: 
The first thing to be investigated is what are those needs 
which are for the life of the soul what the needs in the 
way of food, sleep and warmth are for the life of the body. 
We must try to enumerate and define them. 
They must never be confused with desires, whims, fancies 
and vices. We must also distinguish between what is 
fundamental and what is fortuitous. Man requires, not 
rice or potatoes, but food; not wood or coal, but heating. 
In the same way, for the needs of the soul, we must 
recognize the different, but equivalent, sorts, of satis- 
faction which cater for the same requirements. We must 
also distinguish between the soul's foods and poisons 
which, for a time, can give the impression of occupying 
the place of the former. (1952 p 9) 
She then enumerates the needs of the soul: we need order, liberty and 
obedience; responsibility, equality and hierarchism; honour, punish- 
ment and freedom of opinion; security, risk and private property; 
collective property and truth. I shall comment on such needs later 
in my argument. Here, I want to mention that needs of this kind are 
contestable. They are contested in--two ways: first, that many are 
not considered to be needs and second that the content of the needs 
can be interpreted differently. Yet, having said this, the needs may 
turn out to be the most profound of our needs. The problem is, of 
course, how we know we have such needs and who is to be the authority 
in the identification of them. If we do come to recognize the needs 
as our own, their satisfaction is inseparable from an understanding of 
who we are. It does not seem helpful to ask of' the needs 'what for? ' . 
An answer is quite simply we are the people we are. We could be dif- 
ferent but the question 'what for? ' might be similarly inappropriate. 
When we try to elucidate educational practice in the language o- 
needs, we must make our distinctions in detailed specifications of what 
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it is we are calling needs. Such specifications will a`=, st nece-z- 
sarily involve a context of thought and judgement. _n an art: _-__e 
about Preparation for Life courses, Richard Pring(l 986 p 36) s_-Y -- as '-, a' 
any interpretation of such phrases as Preparation for L4. `ý= __ L be 
against a background of ideas and values, and ultimatel-v against -ý 
philosophical view of human nature and of quality of life, which are 
themselves rooted in different traditions'. We might say the sa7, e of' 
needs insofar as they are used to interpret a curriculum adequa'ýee 
the requirements of our pupils and students, especially if this curri- 
culum is meant to serve personal development. I said above that the 
word relevant does not refer to a property of a consideration. 
Relevance does not stand in the same kind of relationship to such a 
consideration as does that of weight to a solid object. If a so-called 
transferable skill is relevant to the job market, it is educationalists 
amongs others, who judge it to be so. They may be wrong. But they 
can always plead that'they said 
- 
relevant rather than it would lead to 
a job. They may also advise that the skill is relevant in order to 
create a motive in reluctant students but by the time that the enablers 
and the facilitators are to be brought to account, a new generaation of 
students will be in place. (I might mention, here, that if students 
can be induced to want transferable skills, motivation will be built 
into the want. Needs and felt needs are similarly motivating. 
Furthermore, as we know all too well, there are many skills that have 
no relevance to anything, least of all to the self-respect that they 
once occasioned in those who possessed them. 
Again, to bring out the point that relevance is intepreted in a 
context of judgement, we might decide that certain developments in 
science ought not be relevant to anything, save that the only thing 
about the developments that is relevant is that we ought not to have 
anything to do with them. We can always find some relevance in the 
morally obscene, if we want. We might remind ourselves, toot of the 
fact that skin colour and gender are still thought relevant as grounds 
for discrimination. I know that some people will interpret this last 
remark both negatively and Positively. However, in the case of skin 
pigmentation relevance disappears when we become 'colour-blind'. I 
hope I have shown, too, that needs require a context of interpretation, 
even though certain needs seem to have a self-evidence about them. 
The needs do not identify themselves in a wide range of cases. Think 
of the interpretation of needs in a Marxist framework of thought. e 
are reminded of our really human needs, our essential human needs and 
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our truly human needs that are lexpressive of the hur-, ar essence' 
needs of a 'species being', it may be anticipated, will alfzet re 
'an association in which the free development of each is "he 
of' the free development of all'. (Marx 1975) Thirý<, too, o' '. -e ---S-- 
famous formulation of the human condition in the communist societ-,, o-ý"' 
the future: 'From each according to his ability; to each accordinýz 
to his need'. 
To pick up Ignatieff's thoughts again, he goes so far as to say 
that a context for the interpret, -ton of needs may be absent alto,: ý: ether; 
for there may exist no adequate language for the expression of needs. 
Under such conditions, needs 'do not simply pass out of speech: they 
may cease to be felt'. (p 138) A claim of this sort would need to be 
backed up, because we do feel vague rumblings of unarticulated longings 
and feel dissatisfied until we give some shape to them. Ignatieff may 
respond by saying that intimations of the needs are still within the 
resources of language. He does not so respond and the difficult ques- 
tion remains. But we might say in anticipation of the discussion 
later that 'nature' might be a source of self-expressive possibilities 
for the individual but if this is so it needs arguing for. 
Needs as a Language of Personal Development 
I wish to ask now whether the idea of needs can provide a framework 
for understanding what personal development, PSME and all the other 
varieties of Social and Life Skills programmes might be after. Can 
'what is relevant to needs' or'what needs are relevant! give us an organiz- 
ing idea to bring together much of what is central to the rather indeter- 
minate areas of learning that we are discussing? An affirmative answer 
does not mean that we shall then have some determinate content. it 
means that we possess a framework for addressing what the content of the 
needs might be. I have already said that the additional terms 'social' 
and 'moral' constrain what 'personal' means in the general headings of 
PSE, PSME etc. But in the other areas I have mentioned, Life Enhance- 
ment Studies, Values and Lifestyles and so on, it is difficult to know 
what would constitute a constraint on the possibilities. These areas 
collect more items than an organizing idea can cope with, except that 
they all address 'life'. But even here we can see a multiplication 
of possibilities. If we are concerned with life, we should also face 
the reality of death. Bereavement 'skills' and counselling now form 
part of what falls under these general headings. We need mourning 
and grieving skills as a preparation for what brings life to an end. 
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It is true that there has always been children who need special counsel- 
ling when misfortune hits them. Pastoral Care has usually met these 
needs. In spite of the multiplication of items in all those PSL-1-_-, 
Social and Life Skills etc. areas of the curriculum, it still might be 
said that there is always a moral dimension to much of these areas. 
We cannot consider what it is to mourn and grieve without indicati ng 
what it is appropriate to think and feel about the dead and what a 
proper relation to 'them' might be when they are dead. Bereavement 
skills, then, can be and are taught across all the boundaries, ? ýOwever 
we define them, between PSME and its cognates on the one hand and 
Enhancement Studies and Social and Life Skills on the other. it 
might take a life-time, of course, and we still might be deficient in 
a mature response in these matters. 
But it must be said that all these areas cover more than what 
might be construed as moral even on a broad understanding of the term. 
More maverick approaches to such areas create a certain centrifugal 
tendency. If is perceived as relevant or needed, it should 
be included so the reasoning has it. Many schemes are made up of 
disparate detail and discrete items of concern. 'Life' then becomes 
the general constraint and that could take us anywhere, with the rider 
of course that whatever is undertaken should not physically or morally 
endanger the pupils or students. We have ample evidence in fact that 
many students are endangered on vocational schemes. And there are 
some odd notions of what constitutes 'moral'. 
A very general characterization of what is relevantly needed in 
all the areas I have mentioned (from PSME to Life Enchancement Studies) 
might be what serves as a preparation for adult life. The concern is 
with what an individual needs to survive, adjust, cope, function, 
succeed or perhaps even flourish in life. Now, in one sense, this 
would include as many qualities, attributes and properties of human 
beings as they generically possess, subject to the constraint of what 
they should legitimately possess. We need all manner of major and 
minor capacities and capabilities to survive, cope or succeed 
in life. 
We need a lot more to flourish. 
Education in general fosters the acquisition of such generic dis- 
positions and they are intended to serve young people 
in the conduct 
of their lives. This includes what is learnt for the 
intrinsic worth 
and pleasure of it. As I said earlier, music and literature may 
be 
what are needed for a job but they also can be constitutive of satis- 
f ying complex wholes in our lives such as I mentioned when 
I spoke about 
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the ways in which means and ends are mutually implicatec-4 e-, ---', oý_? ýer. 
They become needs, without the satisfaction of which our lives te=e 
poorer or even meaningless. We are transformed for tne worse as 
persons. And what it is to be transformed for the better is --voa' P 
idea in personal development in some writers. 
These points about its being educations's job, right across 'ýhe 
curriculum, to foster dispositions of knowledge, underst -anding and 
character are often made when PSE, Social and Life Skills etc. are 
mentioned. It is argued that these latter areas provide watered-dcxn 
versions, for the bottom forty per cent, of what goes on in subject- 
centred learning. There are serious educational deficiencies -in young 
people, so they need to be topped up with what might help them to cope 
more effectively in life. This might be thought of as the deficit 
model of PSE or Social and Life Skills. The recipients of such 
education or training have to be decently socialized and made occupa- 
tionally functional. Such approaches to the education and training 
of these young people is ad hoc. One might say that it has to be 
ad hoc because it is not as though there are well established vocations 
and trades that await them. Just as it might be said that some of the 
materials in such areas of learning are watered-down academic subjects, 
it might be said that some of the material is watered-down material 
from what were vocations and trades in earlier times. Added to which 
are discrete bits and pieces from all walks of life in the adult world. 
But when we look at official documents, the literature in general 
and the practices in schools and colleges, Personal Development, PSE 
(and insofar as Social and Life Skills, Enhancement and Enrichment 
Studies and so on can be delimited sufficiently to parallel PSE etc. ) 
tend to be meant for all pupils and students. We might then try to 
get some order into what is recommended, when the terms relevance and 
needs are used as curriculum guidelines, by attempting to construct a 
framework of interpretation or model. With a little ingenuity one 
might be able to tease out a central core that is concerned with 
conduct in our relationships with each other. Almost antiquely, we 
could say that this core is concerned with morals and manners. It is 
difficult to use the term moral on its own, as even the most broad 
characterization will not be quite sufficient. This is not to say 
that what is moral is not a major condition on anything else we do. 
There are five interrelated points about what is relevantly needed 
for a person to be adequate to the demands made on him in the areas 
morality and manners. We are, then, not talking about unsatisfie, '- 
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states when we talk about needs but capacities and abilities we d1c, no'. 
possess, or only imperfectly possess, yet need to have if we are to 
tolerably function with our fellow men and women. When we asked !. e 
question what we need them for, this is not to ask what is needed' 
4 satisfy pre-existing states but what the needed capacities and capabj_ 
lities are for. 
A summary of such a framework or model is as follows. 1. We 
have to know what the relevant capacities and capabilities are for. 
They are needed it is suggested so that an individual can live (survive 
or cope) with other people within a value-mediated human setting. 
2. These capacities and capabilities fall under general terms of human 
personality (in the generic sense) such as character and sensibility. 
These are then finessed in terms of virtues and character traits and 
so on. 3. Such personality systems express themselves in systems of 
conduct. 'System' is too compartmentalized a term but it is used simply 
for analytical purposes. 4. The human personality with its qualities 
and attributes needs a human setting. These settings are the final 
reference for what capacities and capabilities are needed, for they 
provide the sense of what is needed and the conditions for their reali- 
zation. 5. The capacities and capabilities are needed to help satisfy 
our needs, amongst other things. Once acquired, of course, the capa- 
cities and capabilities' become needs to be satisfied too - not states 
but dispositions. 
1. The personal ( that is, what focuses on the individual person) is 
constrained and given intelligibility by the terms moral and manners. 
The concern is with what an individual needs to survive, adjust, cope, 
function, succeed or flourish in the social, interpersonal and moral 
dimensions of life. The needs are concerned with what is required in 
an individual's life with other people. It is our embroilment with 
our own kind rather than with the material world. It does include 
work insofar as we engage with other people. In work we may need 
poise, charm and politeness, especially in what might be called the 
people-intensive areas of employment. Furthermore, young people them- 
selves often talk about the skills they require to be able to socialize 
with their peers. What is needed then are capacities and capabilities 
to be reasonably at home in the human world. 
The concern is with what is needed to survive or flourish in the 
value-mediated human relationships that people find themselves in. 
The talk then is about life values - moral, aesthetic, political, 
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social and spiritual values. These terms need i- -I -. L 
terpre ing co,, ýrse. 
These values pervade all our conduct in life. 
2. What is needed in this respect has to be relevant to an inc'-4vidual 's 
engagement with or preparation for life lived with others in tee various 
circumstances and conditions of life. What an individual needs becomes 
constitutive of his make-up - his character, personality, sensibiliýy , 
temperament, disposition, structures of feeling and emotions and so on. 
These general characterizations of what goes into an adequately or 
appropriately contituted individual are then broken down into what is 
needed by way of moral virtues, character and personality traits, indi- 
vidual moral and aesthetic dispositions. The details are a matter of 
morality and style. Some writers speak of 'mind-sets' here and break 
them down into reified 'selves'. Cognitive, conative and affective 
mind-sets express themselves in 'bodily selves', 'sexual selves', 
'moral selves', 'parental and familial selves', 'civic and citizen 
selves' and 'political selves' and, in fact, as many selves as can be 
correlated with separately identifiable contours of culture and society 
as one might discern. I am not sure what hangs on this way of talking 
except that there may be an unspoken assumption that what we do and say 
may owe more to the circumstances and conditions of our fragmented 
lives than to enduring dispositions of a unified personality. On this 
view we are not self-present to ourselves in any coherent way. 
However, these different selves, if we want to use this language, 
mediate our relationships with each other. With these reservations, 
we are constituted as more or less enduring systems of habits, impulses, 
responses, intentions and dispositions and it is in terms of these that 
we inhabit a common human world. 
3. Another way into the question of what is needed in respect of 
morals and manners is in fact to look at all those systems of conduct 
that we need to be able to express ourselves in. These dimensions of 
our lives are concerned with morality, manners, etiquette, graces, 
codes of honour and cultural norms and values in general. Our virtues, 
character and personality traits will be partly constituted out of' the 
detailed dispositions of personality implied in these areas of conduct. 
For example, we might exhibit independence of mind and spirit in obedi- 
ence to the demands of the pieties and duties in our lives. To be 
courteous and considerate is not to be servile; to be accommodating 
is not to be bidable; to be civil and solicitous is not to be obsequious; 
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to be needed is not to be putty in the hands of' those who are 
4. But everything depends on the individual in relation to hi s hu-an 
setting. What a knight needs to function as a knight in medievý`_' codes 
of honour is not what a muscular Christian gentleman or priest needs 
them to function in their ambience. I have often thought that personal 
development is the democratic version of the well defined reql, ýrement_ 
of 'character types' of the past. The personally developed hum---n being 
is the vague analogue of the complete human being of past myths. What 
constitutes the fully-integrated adult will depend on what the human 
setting expects or permits. Of course, we may possess no such concept 
as the fully integrated adult in a rich sense. Or rather, we might 
possess such a concept but not know what it is to be realized. On the 
other hand, the more limited the expectations of a code the more an 
individual might meet the required standard. As we know all too well, 
there are limiting cases of attenuated human lives in restrictive human 
settings. George Orwell presents one such fictional picture. The 
Thought Police finally reduce personal differences to nothing in a 
completely dehumanized setting. More expansively, we might ask whether 
an ethic of courage, self-discipline, self-reliance, initiative, work, 
common sense, loyalty and fidelity has ever been exemplified fully in 
an individual. In contrast we might think of those anti-heroes of 
Tom Gunn's poetry who don 'impersonal' personalities and manufacture 
identities out of leather uniforms and the impersonal energy of motor- 
bikes. 
What we need to cope or flourish, then, will take its sense from 
what it is to be a person in relation to a human setting. The social 
correlatives of an individual who wishes to maximize his consumption 
of utilities will be different from that of the individual who wishes 
to maximize his powers of mind and body. The one setting will approxi- 
mate to a hyper-market; the other (dare I say it in a time of the 
pervasiveness of enterprise) a school or university. It can work both 
ways; the setting may be too rich for us or we too rich for it. 
5. It is difficult to draw the distinction between what I have called 
exercise-concepts and f ulf ilment -concepts. I have distinguished 
what we need by way of capacities and capabilities to do or act I rom 
what needs require 
_satisfaction 
or fulfilment. We need to learn how 
to talk and walk and we just need food to survive. But we would not 
survive for long if we did not learn to talk and walk, or at least i-, " 
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we did it would only be in an attenuated sense. Neeýle3S --: ý 
nothing is implied here about those resourceful people ... 'ho -. ana. c-- to 
exhibit the most remarkable human characteristics in disablement. 
14 In the one case then the satisfaction is in the talking and ,, a_k_ 
(if we were deprived of these acquired capacities, it would be JJst as 
much a lack as in other unsatisfied needs); in the other it is ncý-- 
necessarily in the eating but in the hunger satisfied. It is li-ke 
the distinction between means and ends in the latter case; means can 
become satisfying ends. One way of making the distinction between 
the different senses of needs is to say that we can use it either as a 
verb or a noun. What we need is something we must acquire; we must 
be able to do or act in certain ways to get on with living. Some of 
these acquired capacities and capabilities may become needs to be 
satisfied or fulfilled alongside other established needs. Again, 
dispositions can be frustrated and this can lead to misery in extreme 
cases. In other cases one, simply becomes less of a human being. 
Charles Darwin says in his autobiography that his pursuit of 
natural history atrophied his capacity for friendship and his love of 
the arts and literature. At times he found it difficult to return 
love when it was given. Darwin, then, acquired what was needed to 
become a good natural historian but in the process certain needs 
withered. On one occasion after one of his children had died he 
found himself quite involuntarily interpreting the death in terms of 
natural selection. He stopped himself as it obviously caused his 
wife great pain, and himself too when he collected himself. This is 
not to say that Darwin's decency declined. He also needed qualities 
of character to live with other people but certain lacks in his life 
were not unfulfilled needs. He could objectively observe that certain 
previously felt needs no longer entered into his experience. 
The framework of interpretation or the model I have just presented 
is meant to be a framework or model of morals and manners. These 
morals and manners are needed to live in some kind of reciprocity with 
our own kind. We might formulate this model as follows: X is an 
item in Personal Development etc. if X is perceived as needed or is 
relevantly needed for an individual's engagement or prospective engage- 
ment with the conditions and circumstances of life insofar as 
these 
have implications for how we comport ourselves in morals and manners. 
Or we might put it: P needs XYZ etc. to survive, cope, 
flourish etc. 
in life in these respects. 
It will be obvious from an inspection of the detail and 
implied 
- 67 - 
7) 7 detail in this attempt at delimiting what can be an item X in I. -H 
that morals and manners is too narrow. As I have said, some kiný of 
constraint as to what it is to develop as a person can be extracte- 
from the terms social and moral in PSME. But when we find Ilifen' in 
the general headings as the governing idea it becomes di, ý fficult '--- ýicld 
the items in some kind of unity. But social on its own is too ,; ide 
also, unless we have in mind the Oakshottian distinction between 
socialization and education. 
But, it might be argued, why seek a unity in the disparate items? 
Is it not enough, when needs are mentioned, to assume that there is a 
relevant background of intelligibility? Life is a code word for those 
sectors and departments of life that an individual will find himself 
embroiled in. The needed capacities and capabilities take their 
utility from the sector or department in question. Some of the capa- 
cities and capabilities may also be transferable from one sector or 
department to others. When we ask what capacities and capabilities 
are needed in an established subject, the nature of the subject tells us. 
If one wants to be a good physicist or economist, specific conceptual 
capacities and skills as well as more general intellectual virtues are 
needed. The form of the need-statements are: If subject X then needs Y. 
In response one might say that life is a very big project indeed and 
other things are departments of it. The needs of a physicist or econo- 
mist as physicist or economist are circumscribed by the disciplines. 
They need a lot more moral and intellectual virtues when they step out- 
side their respective disciplines. What we do or wish to do within the 
disciplines of physics or economics are determined by the disciplines 
themselves, even though these disciplines 'develop in unexpected ways. 
The question 'What for? ' in respect of the needs internal to subjects 
is rather pointless. This is not the case when one is dealing with 
areas that may include extremely controversial items of concern and 
where there may be no obvious connection between what is learned and 
the application of it. There is, then, a need to have a conception of 
what one is doing and to be able to justify it. Morality is something 
and we collectively need it, although an individual tough guy might 
think he does not. Whether morality can be taught and to what ages 
it may, with conscience, be taught is a matter of dispute. But we do 
know what it is. And, importantly, it is a condition on all the other 
things we do. 
One of the controversial areas is that of politics. And what is 
said in it has important implications for how we are expected to behave. 
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It is argued that many needs may remain unsatisfied unless certa4-n 
needed capacities and capabilities are acquired. To possess these '-s 
to help provide oneself with the means of satisfying them. Some -I ýi t 
go further and argue, and perhaps Flew is one of them, that if one d-es 
not acquire these capacities and capabilities one does not deserle 1, to 
have ones needs satisfied. The argument continues that if the Wel-fare 
State satisfies too many needs, this may disable people and thereb,, ', 
frustrate the possibility of their acquiring the needed capacities and 
capabilities. One becomes dependent on the State and one thereby 
loses the will and the motivation to acquire what is needed for oneself. 
Some writers on personal development etc. emphasize the necessity 
of people to take charge of their own lives - to be self-propelling 
agents who can get up and go. The personal is, then, the political 
in that we should learn to make our own choices and take our own deci- 
sions. Increasingly we should learn to take responsibility for more 
and more in the particularities of our lives. Such sovereignty in 
the detail of our lives sends currents throughout the economic and 
political systems. Rights should be less, and personal responsibility 
more, prominent in our lives. 
But we cannot escape the fact that the political is the personal 
too. We can take more responsibility for our personal health and 
hygiene but things happen at the macro level in society that we f ind, 
difficult to take responsibility for. As one junior health minister 
found to her cost, the assumptions of perfect knowledge and mobility 
in a perfect market belong to economic textbooks. It is in the 
newly emerging curriculum area of Active Citizenship that such issues 
are considered. But everything depends on just what is discussed 
and practised that is the concern. The important point is just what 
conceptions we are working with and how we might justify them. And 
this is why we need some ideas of the respect in which something is 
personal. 
To say that something is relevant or needed is to imply that 
there exists a reason for it. A skill is relevant to something 
I 
want, perhaps. I need love to fulfil me as the person 
I am. But in 
both cases it is possible that someone else says something 
is relevant 
for me or something is needed by me. And then the question of whose 
reason it is arises. Industry might need human resources 
but the 
people who might be classified as these resources do not see why what 
is needed by industry should become what they need. 
I understand 
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that theology is now the most oversubscribed degree course in Cxfordý 
The powers of the mind and the impulses of the heart that are neede, _1 for its proper pursuit may have no relevance at all to the needs of tl'-e 
economy and may be foreign to the enterprise culture. its desired 
pursuit may be a reaction against what is relevant to or needed by the 
enterprise culture. The qualities of mind that led to the desire to 
read theology and the qualities of mind fostered by its pursuit may be 
part of needs that cannot be satisfied in such a culture. But if . ^,, e 
are talking about what qualities of mind are needed to cope or succeed 
in life, students may well have their own ideas about what it is to 
cope or succeed in life. 
This is the difficulty when we discuss what is relevant and what 
is needed in life. In one way or another, the complete stock of possi- 
bilities in a culture or society can enter into relevance or needs- 
, statements. And it is from this stock of human possibilities that we 
draw upon when we help to shape what is considered to be a well- 
constituted person. The exercise-needs and the satisfaction-needs 
are just some of these total possibilities. Furthermore, what is 
relevant to something else can change as our perceived needs change. 
What is relevant to something else is a wider notion than needs, unless 
needs itself is used as a general utility word. But it is the term 
needs that I now focus on. 
In more reflective moments, a person may ask himself how he has 
become constituted as he is and what he might do to change it in a 
desired direction. He can have second-order desires to be constituted 
as having desires other than the ones he now has. He can also desire 
that he cease to have the needs he does have or have those he does not 
have. This can occur when he has needs that it would be better if he 
did not have, or when he needs abilities that he has failed to acquire, 
or when he considers that his life might have been more fulfilled if 
certain needs had been nurtured. He could regret their absence in 
the last case, even though he knows that to have had them may have led 
to sorrow. At least he would have lived. Marriage and children 
create needs that only they can satisfy but as they are hostages to 
fortune, they may be the cause of terrible lacks in our lives. 
Salman Rushdie has said, for example, that there is a great 'God-hole' 
in his life but would it have been better had he not been exposed to 
religion in the first place? It might have been better if his tormen- 
tors had not been so exposed. Such a statement assumes that religious 
needs are not somehow resident in us completely independent of our 
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nurture. Apart from our basic biological needs (and even 'ý-iese are 
culturally shaped) most of our needs are conventional. '; i e ab s ý7, rn 
them from life and later discover that they are ours. What ot'ner 
people think we need to live life well enter our natures before , ý-e 
begin to ask 'what for? ', when it is said that certain capacities an-4 
capabilities are needed. The question 'what for? ' when asked fr= a 
first person perspective already presupposes that this perspective 
exists. Each one of us does not ask 'what for? ' ex nihilo. Culture, 
in the shape of those people who are responsibile for our nurture7 has 
already constituted us in some ways rather than in others. 'What for? ' 
implies that something is already held stable in our make-up for the 
question to be intelligible. A great deal of habituation needs to 
have taken place before we are ready to ask what something additional 
might be for. Some of the stock of possibilities has already entered 
into the constitution of who and what we are. 
For many needs there is an internal connection between how the 
person is constituted and what he cannot do without. But needs may 
have once been mere whims or desires. The most obvious example is 
that of drug dependency. Personal development in schools addresses 
such issues as addictions. Our more human needs may also be too pain- 
ful at times. A lover may have come to need another person when that 
person ceases to need him or her. The source of the"fulfilment may 
be external to the person but the need is so deeply seated within a 
person that the need is interpreted in terms of that source. A neg- 
lected grandmother may say she needs to be needed when other people no 
longer need such needs. This is a difficulty when love and care help 
to constitute who we are. Again a person may have come to yearn 
greatly for religious consolation when no religion is able to satisfy 
him. The"intellect takes a person one way and his heart the other. 
There are many such cases of the dissociation of the sensibility. 
This is to be contrasted with the case of an evangelist from the Bible 
Belt in America who tells us that we need religion so that he then can 
be the source of its satisfaction - to the great cost of our pockets 
too. What we needed to function in society would then be at his dis- 
posal. Again, it is a different thing to say that we need moral 
virtues to succeed in life than to say that we have been nurtured to 
care about other people no matter what we need. Some writers speak 
about the need for moral virtues in much the same way as other people 
talk about functional skills. 
Furthermore, we might ask whether we ourselves want to come to 
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experience certain proffered needs as our needs. As parents we as'k 
this of our children too. Here we might reflect on the list o :'n ee ds 
that Simone Weil presents. Do we want to come to experience some or 
all of these needs as our needs? We might need some of them t -o func- 
tion in society but we may not want them as our needs. Some people 
are always wanting their favoured needs to become ours, just as they 
want their desires, preferences, intentions, reasons and so on to 
become ours too. Muriel Spark's Jean Brodie wants her pupils, who 
are thelcreme de la creme', to make their own those favoured disposi- 
tions of hers. 
Does, then, a language of needs provide us with a language of 
personal development? As I have said, if certain needs are not culti- 
vated in us, we will not measure up to what it is to be a well consti- 
tuted person. But there is no agreement about which fulfilment-needs 
should be nurtured in children. The question is do we need certain 
needs? There is much dispute about religion as a part of the curri- 
culum, or rather what it might consist in if it is. What exercise- 
needs do we require? We need all manner of capacities and capabili- 
ties to function in the various sectors and departments of life. 
I have said that we have normative needs that are constitutive of 
who we are. We need to be loved as part of our thriving. These 
needs are non-elliptical. They are not instrumental for bringing 
about something else such as petrol is needed to get the car going. 
A child needs to be cherished otherwise it would fail in its humanity 
in important ways. Our identities are formed by such loving and 
cherishing. We then need to be in contact with what confirms and is 
expressive of who'we have become. At times in my life I may feel 
that I need to climb mountains and contemplate natural beauty. These 
are not as peremptory as the needs for love and food in young children 
but they are sufficiently part of who I am for me to be poorer as a 
person if they are not satisfied. 
Other needs are elliptical and instrumental. I might need to 
socialize for its own sake but also to refresh me for other pursuits. 
To this extent I need skills to help me to get on to terms with other 
people. I need these other people to confirm who I am and to help 
meet my need for companionship. But I also need to equip myself with 
many capabilities to function with other people in different aspects 
of life. 
Having made these points, we need as teachers to reflect on what 
goodness, desirability and worthwhileness there is in things and what 
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is worthy of our pursuits. But if it is inappropriate to ask t'-, P- 
question 'what for? ' of constitutive needs, it seems singularly 
inappropriate to ask of obligations, duties, fidelities, love, trust 
and so on whether we need to nurture them. We might have doubts 
about some particularities in these broad areas but these human capa- 
cities are needed to keep us human. By the time we ask 'what for? ', 
if things go well, we will already be constituted as persons of cer- 
tain kinds. We will then ask this question from a decently consti- 
tuted centre. This does not mean that we will not need to ask, or 
that somebody on our behalf needs to ask, what capacities and capabi- 
lities we need in the various sectors and departments of our lives. 
As I have said, morality is a condition on many of our pursuits but it 
is not so pervasive in our lives that we always need to look at the 
moral underpinning of many capacities and capabilities. We just need 
functional know-how to get on with living. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Needs in the Language of Curriculum Recommendations 
As is the case with all education, Personal Development, PSME, 
Social and Life Skills etc. take as their object an incomplete 4 ndi- 
vidual who needs to be finished according to some conception of what 
it is to be educated or trained in the required sense. But it is 
also the individual as a person who is the object of our educational 
endeavours. We should not overlook, of course, the fact that the 
very young have to be nurtured into being persons. This observation 
reminds us that our 'person-making' endeavours should always have a 
proper conception of the nature of the individual who is the object of 
our concern. Often in the literature of personal development etc. 
scant attention is given to the ages and stages of development of the 
young people for whom the educational schemes are designed. For 
example, it has been said that the care of the very young in some 
creches and schools fails to respond to the young according to their 
needs as persons. - They are not introduced soon enough, or are intro- 
duced too late, to important formative experiences. Education, then, 
is the process whereby the individual is brought into a human inheri- 
tance. He acquires, and needs to acquire, beliefs, values, desires, 
feelings and intentions that are informed by the relevant standards of 
appropriateness to their objects. As soon as we introduce such traits 
of personality7 we imply that there might be different conceptions of 
the completed person of which these beliefs, values etc. are constituent 
parts. Once we begin to think in these terms, the temptation might 
arise to put our own slant on what is needed to complete the person. 
And the temptation is greater when we are reflecting on what might be 
needed for a person to get on to terms with life. 
Some writers talk as if' personal development etc. were promoting 
an egalitarian version of what goes on in expensive finishing schools - 
something to be added on at the end of an individual's normal education. 
Other writers feel that these areas should principally be a pervasive 
part of a school's ethos. Yet others feel that the whole project is 
misconceived for 'academic' young people and should be reserved for the 
so-called bottom forty per cent who are incomplete in their special ways. 
Yet, again, others argue that if personal development is concerned in 
part, or perhaps largely, with moral education7 then all pupils and 
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students should have it as part of their curriculum. For example, a 
musician may be complete by the standards of musicianship b ut still be 
incomplete as a person. We say of people that they measure up týlo the 
standards of what it is to be a good musician or mathematician but `fýey 
f ail to measure up to what it is to be a person. We use person in 
this context as a moral or quasi-moral category. 
As I have said, some educationalists feel that we have entered in- 
to disputed areas when we mention moral and similar terms. However, 
personal development, PSME etc. have their various specifications of 
what, is needed to transform the incomplete person int.. what is conceived 
as a relatively complete person. When the word needs is mentioned, it 
is assumed that an incomplete person is the object of what is needed to 
remedy this incompleteness. 
When the word needs is used, then, two contexts are implied. The 
first is the background to a person's life. The most pervasive back- 
ground is life it1se lf. As we have seen, in the curriculum areas we 
are discussing, the criteria for what a person needs are drawn from the 
social and moral dimensions of life and life itself. What we need for 
the various departments of our lives is finessed from what is thus 
drawn. Secondly, the most pervasive good of an individual's total 
condition is wellbeing or happiness. We need what contributes to this 
wellbeing. (That wellbeing is the most pervasive good is questioned 
of course. ) But the prospects for an individual may only approximate 
to well'being and when it does there is a shif t to what is needed to 
survive, cope or function. An important question here is who makes 
such assumptions about a person's prospects? However, in all cases, 
individuals need to be constituted in certain ways (and will be consti- 
tuted with or without educational intervention in their lives, for 
better or worse) such that they have a chance to get on to terms with 
life as it presents itself to them. 
If one inspects lists of recommendations for what might be included 
in Personal Development, PSME, Social and Life Skills schemes of work, 
the word needs features prominently. Needs precedes such expression 
as; 'to be able to 'to acquire the capacity to ... 1, 'to develop 
the ability 'to be capable of ... I etc. To this extent needs is 
a utility word which comprehends all those satisfactions and fulfilments, 
qualities and attributes, and capacities and capabilities that might or 
should feature in an individual's make-up. All these are either 
thought to be a part of a person's overall good or support some limited 
good in his life. It could be said here that we tend to give the word 
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needs too much work to do. 
Nevertheless, the word needs is used in this context to me_, -n '-'-a' 
either an individual will cease to survive, cope or flourish wit 
what is needed or he will not start to do so unless he acquires wlýat 
is needed. He needs all those human characteristics that contribu'-e 
to his surviving, coping or flourishing and all those objects external 
to him that match these characteristics. The individual needs 'Ic be 
decently constituted in respect of needs, desires, intentions and so on 
and he needs the proper objects of these characteristics. Whether he 
acquires the characteristics and comes into contact with their proper 
objects is another matter. 
The important question is what does personal development etc. 
pick out from our generic qualities and attributes that is distinctive 
of their approach to what is needed by the incomplete individual? I 
wish to present what I think is a reasonably representative picture of 
these contributions from the literature in the areas we have been dis- 
cussing. Whether a distinctive picture emerges is another matter. 
Before I present the detail I am tempted to ask just what percentage 
of the material, including whole books, is simply a matter of lists or 
disguised lists of items that take 'social', 'moral' and 'life' as 
their references. There are exceptions, of course, but they are rare. 
In what follows I tend to use personal development in a more or 
less inclusive sense, though some writers intersperse PSE with personal 
development. I use personal development because the writers them- 
selves tend to use the term and because, as I have argued, personal 
development does not mean anything on its own. The term implies that 
a reference to social, moral and so on is required 
for the term to 
have sense. For example, self-knowledge and self-control 
keep 
cropping up but these reflexive powers of the mind and will require 
that there is some content to the self that is the object of 
these 
powers. We examine ourselves in respect of our ability or 
lack of it 
in academic subjects as well as in our dealings with each other. 
The 
self that is examined or understood has what 
is academic, social or 
moral as its content. Because I have mentioned 
these reflexive powers 
here I tend to exclude them from my selections below. 
Where there are 
more substantial efforts to say what 
these areas might be about, i make 
some observations myself. 
A Mere Catalogue? 
If one explores a wide variety of sources in which personal 
develop- 
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-1 t-e 
ment is mentioned one notices a fairly predictable rehearsal of _' 
same qualities and attributes to be acquired by or instilled in pupils 
and students. Look in any D. E. S., F. E. U. publications and Local 
Authority curriculum guidelines and so forth and we find roughly the 
same desired qualities and attributes. I now wish to mention the-, 
myself in a general way, perhaps duplicating the rehearsal. I r, 
addition, though, I look at more reasoned contributions. 
Richard Pring in his paper Personal Development (1985: p 130) 
presents us with the widest possible entry into personal development. 
He states that: 'Education is about the development of persons'. We 
find in his paper that we need to: develop initiative, self-reliance, 
self-confidence, intellectual curiosity, perseverance, determination 
to achieve high standards, confidence and courage, cooperation, honesty 
and integrity. We are told that the young person needs to develop 
self-esteem, personal values and a sense of fundamental purpose. 
Pring in his book Personal and Social Education in the Curriculum 
(1984 p. 4) presents a list culled from a variety of publications. 
The list of what is needed is: 'an acceptable set of personal values', 
'moral attributes19 'capacity to participate actively within society 
and to contribute responsibly to it', 'social competancel, 'skills of 
good personal relationships', 'spiritual awareness', 'career guidance,, 
'self-esteem and self-confidence', 'respect for animals', 'appropriate 
attitudes towards sex, parenthood7 smoking, drink and exercise' and so 
forth. It will be noted that many of these expressions need a great 
deal more content before one knows what to do with them, apart from 
simply exchanging them with other curriculum leaders and so on. 
The Inner London Education Authority in its Improving Secondary 
Schools (1984: p 2) stresses; 'The capacity to communicate with others in 
face-toýface relationships; the ability to cooperate with others in 
the interests of the group as well as the individual; initiative7 
self-reliance and the ability to work alone without close supervision; 
and the skills of leadership'. The Report continues: I ... achievement 
involves motivation and commitment; the willingness to accept failure 
without destructive consequences; the readiness to persevere; the 
self-confidence to learn in spite of the difficulty of the task'. In 
the White Paper Better Schools (1985: p 2) we learn that the best 
secondary schools' ... turn out young people with self-confidence, self- 
respect and respect for others, who are enterpising, adaptable, and 
eager and well equipped to face the adult world'. 
Kenneth Baker in a Proposed Curriculum (1986) for his City 
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Technical Colleges says that such colleges 1... will off er a broat' 
curriculum with a strong technical and practical element which -; s 
essential preparation for the changing demands of adult work4ng 14'e 
in an advanced industrial society. Personal development in suc-n 
colleges will I ... seek to 
develop the qualities of enterprise, self- 
reliance and responsibility which young people need for adult lie 
and work and citizenship'. The Proposal continues: 'Self-discipline 
and positive attitudes (will be) strongly emphasized (and combined 
with) business understanding, moral and health education'. For Baker 
personal development is strongly connected with business'studies and 
enterprise education. 
Personal development is of ten integrated in more general aspects 
of the curriculum. A sample of such aspects would be as follows: 
The Domestic Sphere, including the practical, financial 
and aesthetic aspects. 
The World of Work covering the whole range of work that 
people do. 
Leisure - opportunities for recreational and creative 
activity outside work. 
Continuing education research/ explo ration, either for 
defined practical ends or open exploration into unknown 
fields. 
Neighbourhood and Community: our local social, political , 
legal, economic and physical environments. 
Our wider social, political, legal, economic and physical 
environments including regional, national and international 
contexts. 
Family . 
Personal relations in other contexts, formal and informal. 
Self personal reflection, the spiritual dimension. 
To be more specific in the book The Preparation for Life 
Curriculum 
Brian Wilcox et al (1984: pp, 40-41) we find the following breakdown of 
what constitutes a curriculum in four Sheffield schools. 
The contents 
are on page 78 overleaf. In similar fashion, we 
find in the T. E. S. 
(1988 p 17) a PSE scheme of' work from the London 
Borough of Croydon: 
see page 79. 
But probably the most comprehensive catalogue of 
items is in 
Curriculum Matters 14 in the HMI Series. In the preface we are 
presented with a framework which PSE as well as other 
curriculum 
studies should take into account. Maintained 
Schools should provide 
'a balanced and broadly based curriculum that: 
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Personal and social education 
Age 7 Agell Age 14 
1 Recognizes that choice is available 1 Thinks carefully before choosing a1 Takes responsibility for decisions and 
when decisions have to be made. course of action. actions taken. 
2 Knows that every action has a 
consequence. 
3 Recognizes the links between 
different groups in the community. 
4 Describes the work of people who 
care for them. 
5 Values the local environment and its 
upkeep. 
6 Knows the value of sharing and 
giving. 
7 Recognizes that relations, hips exist 
among family and friends. 
8 Keeps healthy. 
9 Recognizes the difference between 
fact and fantasy, and what keeps you 
safe. 
10 Shows consideration to all living 
creatures, 
2 Recognizes that actions may affect 
others. 
3 Describes how different members of 
the community have different needs. 
4 Describes the work of various 
occupations. 
5 Takes responsibility for own actions 
in the local environment. 
6 Is capable of understanding other 
people's f eelings. 
7 Evaluates the motives of friends and 
the media. 
8 Knows how actions now can affect 
health in the future. 
9 Takes responsiblity for own safety. 
10 Knows of other religions and cultures 
2 Is involved in a community project. 
3 Has a personal development plan. 
4 Recognizes how environment might 
allect social behaviour. 
5 Shows respect, compassion and 
honesty within relationships. - 
6 Shows maturity towards other people. 
7 Takes responsibility for maintaining a 
healthy lifestyle. 
8 Appreciates the need for rules that 
ensure the safety of others. 
9 Recognizes that religious beliefs shape 
attitudes and behaviour. 
- 8o - 
a. promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and phys4cý7 development of pupils at the school and of society; ant 
b. prepares such pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities 
and experiences of adult life'. 
(198? : i,; ) 
After which, we are presented with an overview of what PSE consists of. 
Personal and social education is concerned with qualities 
and attitudes, knowledge and understanding, abilities and 
skills in relation to oneself and others, social responsi- bilities and morality. It helps pupils be considerate 
and enterprising in the present, while it prepares them 
for an informed and active involvement in family, social, 
economic and civil life. It plays an important part in 
bringing relevance, breadth and balance to the curriculum. 
(1989 p 1) 
Thereafter lists of items are introduced in the barest linguistic 
settings. 
PES should promote 'a sense of achievement, confidence and compe- 
tence, by focussing as appropriate on particular relevant issues I. What 
is needed are: 'Mutual trust and a sense of shared purpose I; pupils 
have to be encouraged Ito come to terms with their own emotions and 
behave with consideration to others' needs'; pupils should learn better 
from a teacher who is 'concerned to explore his or her own self - 
understanding' in that the pupil will develop 'self-esteem', when they 
are taught by such teachers. Pupils should have the 'opportunity to 
experience leadership as well as membership of groups I. All subjects 
should promote the personal qualities of 'independence of mind, respect 
for truth, persistence, flexibility and imaginativeness'. One is then 
invited to inspect a list of desirable personal qualities: 'self- 
confidence and consideration for others, self-reliance, self-discipline'. 
An interim conclusion states that PSE courses should be 'flexible 
and responsive to the needs and interests of pupils, and take account 
of changing social and educational priorities I. (1989 p 10) But as 
one would expect the distinction is made between what are proper 
requirements for social living and with what can be an individual's own 
concern. The Report continues: 'However, it is always easy in prac- 
tice to try and establish an unnecessary degree of social conformity, 
and to neglect the need of individuals to develop, within reasonable 
limits, in their own way'. Presumably, teachers themselves have to 
attempt to adjust external demands to private projects. 
The final section (pp 13-15) is divided into three broad areas. 
The first is that in which we find lists of those personal qualities 
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and attributes that are needed by all pupils. At the ris; < of 
tion, we might enumerate some of these qualities and attr-itutes -. ', -, us: 
independence of mind, self-reliance, self-discipline and self-respect: 
an enterprising and persistent approach to tasks and challenges; 
consideration for others; a sense of fairness, together with respect 
for the processes of law and for the legal rights of others: respect 
for ways of life, opinions and ideas different from one'sown, provided 
they are based on consideration for others: a commitment to promoting 
the well being of the community through democratic means; and concern 
for conservation of the natural world and the physical, includinc), '_ý, e 
built, environment. 
The second area enumerates what knowledge and understanding is 
required for appreciating just what kinds of people we are in relation 
to each other and in relation to the surroundings that people find 
themselves in. I put it this way because it is not clear what this 
area is really after. Nor, is it obvious how we distinguish between 
what are called personal qualities and attributes and what is called 
knowledge and understanding. However, here is a selection of what is 
mentioned; students should gain knowledge and understanding of: their 
own personality, needs, abilities and interests, together with a grow- 
ing awareness of their particular strengths and weaknesses; human 
growth, together with some awareness of the nature of emotional, psycho- 
logical and social development; similarities and differences between 
themselves and others in biological needs, physical characteristics and 
cultural background; together with awareness that these differences 
have implications for the way people relate to, and treat, each other; 
the nature of relationships in families, peer groups, friendships and 
work; and how to react if they are bullied or abused. 
The third area of concern is with social responsibility; but 
again these responsibilities have already been covered to some extent 
in the preceding areas. There is no distinction, either7 between 
what knowledge the individual needs as a precondition for responsibility 
and the dispositions of responsibilities themselves. Some of the 
listed items are: the nature of rules, why they exist and how they 
differ from law; sources of legal information and advice; the legal 
and moral aspects of sexual relationships and marriage; 
the nature of' 
work, involving understanding of career opportunities, and 
how these 
relate to personal aspirations; ways in which social groups are 
structured economically, politically and socially; the rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship; and decision-making in a 
democratic 
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society. 
An explicit attempt to incorporate all the items in PSE scne-es 
into a needs-model is to be found in Lang. (1988 pp 17) '1 1 'his -odel 
focusses on two continua. One continuum is from what he calls posi- 
tive developmental needs to what the writer terms crisis-orientated 
needs. The other continuum stretches from utilitarian needs to higher 
order needs. He suggests further that other continua may be intro- 
duced as more needs begin to be thought relevant to PSE. These might 
range from 'quasi-psychological' concerns such as 'drug misuse or 
child abuse' to concern about an individual's self-image such as we 
find in terms like 'self-esteem'. Another continuum might include at 
one end what promotes 'effective study and cognitive development' and 
at the other end what promotes laffectivel development. The basic 
model is presented thus: 
A model of the range of needs which underpin personal and social 
education 
POSITIVE 
DEVELOPMENTAL 
(proactive response) 
Personal Needs of 
autonomy employers 
Ability to Needs of 
empathise transfer to 
secondary 
school 
* 
m(; IfER ORDER 
UTILITARIAN NEEDS 
(M a slo%, v/ m orall ty) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Assertiveness 
* 
NEGATIVE CRISIS 
/PROBLEM ORIENTATED 
(reactive response) 
Coping with 
family break up/bereavement 
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This model is an attempt at classifying needs and indica+ -e -1-o' ' 
context in which they might find their expression. It is diff--cuIt 
to know whether the model is adequate to the detail and complexity of 
what is required by an individual in his life. And the question for 
whom he requires it arises. We collectively require capacities and 
capabilities and these may not always have a justification for each of 
us as separate individuals. What I need may not be to the advanl-age 
of everyone else, or anyone else. Once again it is difficult to know 
why certain items feature in the quadrant just where they do. For 
example, crises appear in all aspects of life. Employment, and cer- 
tainly unemployment, can be sources of crises in an individual's life. 
Personal autonomy and the ability to empathize are dispositions that 
find their expression in a multiplicity of contexts in life. It is 
important to realize that we cannot compartmentalize most of our 
qualities and attributes that are needed in life. We need a fitting 
setting for their proper expression. Again, some might want to query 
the whole idea of having. a continuum with higher order needs at one end 
and utilitarian needs at the other. This may entail a false dichotomy, 
depending on how one interprets the needs concerned. If the higher 
order needs are disguised utilitarian needs, the continuum is faulty. 
One might just as well simply list the needs and see what they 
amount to in each instance. It is not obvious that Maslow's hier- 
archy of needs should come at the higher order end of the continuum. 
It has been argued that there is too much Iselfism' in his characteri- 
zation of needs. It is not the fact that one might list needs in the 
way Maslow does but rather what one might say about the character of 
them. As a matter of fact pupils and students do react against a 
language of needs when the focus is on the needs of each individual 
himself. They appear too self-serving. I have seen students recoil 
from the 'me, me, me' of some Social and Life Skills schemes on these 
grounds. 
I might present such a 'module' from a college of my acquaintance. 
Students are encouraged to reflect on their needs after a process of 
self-examination, guided by certain categories that are thought to be 
central to an individual's make-up. The idea of the self is recruited 
to stimulate a student's responses. The objective self is revealed in 
the self-descriptions in the listed categories. The subjective self 
is in the tone of the 'I-experiencel. The other self is what students 
believe others think of them and the ideal self is a projection of an 
ideal that students might try to reach. As I have said, some students 
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tend to react against the 'me, me, me' implied in such exercises. 
Here is the list of categories then: 
1. Physique: 'I'm tall'; 'My skin is poor'; 'I'm fatter than you'. 
2. Skills: These are motor, cognitive, social and integrative. 
Examples are, 'I'm good at sport'; I can't learn quickly'; 
'I get on well with people'; 'I can manage my problems mysel-fl. 
3. Feelings: 'I get angry very easily'; 'I'm usually happy 
4. Traits: 'I'm reasonab-Ij co-operativel. 
5. Attitudes: 'I'm easily biased against foreigners'. 
6. Interests: 'I'm interested in reading and gardening'. 
7. Values: IId regard myself as an honest per-son 
8. Motives: 'I want to do well at work'. 
Philosophy of Life: 'I'm the kind of person who's thought about 
the great problems that face men - suffering, good and evil and 
so on. ' 
Some of the needs that are thought to -arise from such self -scrutiny 
are assertiveness, though not aggression, confidence, self-worth, 
responsiveness, self-expression and honesty. Now, of course, what 
such self-scrutiny might achieve is the opposite of what is expected. 
Much damage may be done to the self-images (this word is part of the 
same package) of the students concerned. Teachers have to be sensi- 
tive to a degree that the conditions in schools and colleges may not 
allow. 
Richard Pring presents his own recommendations for a PSE curriculum 
(1984 pp 114-115) which I present on page 85. 
In a much quoted book by K. David, Personal and Social Education in 
Secondary Schools (1983 p 18) we find the much quoted definition of PSE. 
David says: 
Personal and social education includes the teaching and 
informal activities which are planned to enhance the 
development of knowledge, understanding, attitudes and 
behaviour, concerned with: oneself and others; social 
institutions, structures and organization; and social 
and moral issues. 
This view of PSE has surely influenced a great deal that has come later. 
But we might say that it is more or less a neutral overview of what PSE 
tries to promote. In the following passage we begin to see a more 
committed view, although it is presented in general terms. We might 
see it then as an introduction to what I present below. Braun and 
Torkington write as follows: 'The emphasis in personal, social and 
moral education is on enabling pupils to acknowledge and fully under- 
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stand their own value position in relation to the values of society, 
and of other pupils in the class'. (Brown et al 1986 p 1,88) 
More Committed Views of Needs in Personal Development 
As I have indicated, personal development in the context of Social 
and Life Skills and Preparation for Life is a concern into which every- 
one wants to 'chip'. In much that is said, even if it is only in 
lists of desirable qualities and attributes, one can detect more general 
social and political outlooks and proposals for action. We m-ight con- 
sider the following statement in Hopson and Scally: 
Self-empowerment begins with oneself and spreads to others; but self-empowered behaviour is most effectively developed 
in systems that are structured to encourage, reinforce, and teach it. 'Social action or self-empowerment' is a false dichotomy. People can become more self-empowered by learn- 
ing lifeskills, by teachers modelling growth-oriented values, 
and helping students become more aware of their internal and 
external worths, by giving them information, by helping them 
develop goals and commitments, but also by working to change 
our schools and other institutions into empowering rather 
than depowering places to live and work; (1981 P 79) 
In this passage personal development is a species of self-empowerment. 
Certain qualities and attributes are valued and in self-empowerment one 
is encouraged 'to increasingly take greater charge of oneself and ones 
life'. Self-creation is suggested too in that we need to be self- 
empowered to develop what we have it within ourselves to become. The 
implied liberal/radical stance would concentrate the mind of nec- 
conservative educationalists - and other educationalists for that matter. 
Caroline St John-Brooks in her paper 'English: A Curriculum for 
Personal Development' (1983 pp 38,57) says that: 'From a rationalist 
perspective, education is training for work and schools are responsible 
for equipping children with skills to sell in the market place. 
Romanticism sees education as personal development. ' In the notes to 
her paper she continues: 'I distinguish between a rationality, which 
represents detachment, clarity of thought and analytic powers, and 
rationalism which is, rather, an uncritical assent to the hierarchic 
structure and demands of society outside the individual. Rationalism 
can be seen as a debased form of rationality. Romanticism ... is a 
mixture of individualism and social idealism perhaps best defined by 
T. E. Hulme'. She then quotes the almost obligatory passage from 
Hulme in Speculations: 
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Here is the root of all romanticism: that man, the individual, 
is an infinite reservoir of possibilities; and if you can so 
rearrange society by the destruction of oppressive order then 
these possibilities will have a chance and you will get Progress. 
(Hulme 1960 
What she fails to say is that Hulme discloses the root of Romanticism 
to condemn it. We might consider the next paragraph: 
One can define the classical quite clearly as the exact 
opposite to this. Man is an extraordinarily fixed and 
limited animal whose nature is absolutely constant. it 
4 is only by tradition and organLsation that anything decent 
can be got out of him. (Hulme 1960 p 116) 
For Hulme, Romanticism is Ispilt religion'. We retreat into it when 
we have lost genuine religion. St John-Brooks does say the following 
but neglects to elaborate on it and it may, in fact, take her where 
she does not want to go. She says: 'The root conflict is between the 
individual and society, which is itself a Romantic construct I. (1983 p 57) 
However one interprets the conflicts between the individual and 
society, there is a tension in New Right thinking in this respect. 
Graham and Clarke in The New Enlightenment (1986 pp 86-87) quote Irving 
Kristol to point up the conflict between the individualism of an enter- 
prise culture and the hierarchical stability of traditional institutions 
and pieties. Capitalism does not produce the morality needed to sus- 
tain it. 'Neo-conservatives adopt an attitude that is not 'economic'. ' 
'We are not bourgeois' says Kristol. He continues: 'It is bourgeois 
society that produces the kinds of people who make a free market work 
and who make capitalism acceptable. ... The first job of a civilization 
is to produce a certain kind of person, ' . Graham and 
Clarke then quote 
Kristol more fully: 
What we are looking for is an intellectual way of connecting 
the free market with an attitude towards life that is not 
economic but derived from religion or at least from tradi- 
tional values. **" A free market, 
in and of itself, doesn't 
tell you what kind of' person to produce. A free market 
involves only the exercise of self-interest within a limited 
sphere, namely the economy. But you need an ethos that 
tells you how to raise your children, whether you should 
marry or stay married, whether you should be loyal to your 
friends or to your government. I don't like the contra- 
diction between individualism and collectivism. In fact, 
most Americans are both individualist and communal, rather 
than collectivist. We all belong to communities of some 
kind, religious, fraternal, professional. These play an 
important part in our lives. 
- 88 - 
I might mention here that the Hillgate Group in Whose 
(1986 pp 1-4) are concerned with the kind of people needed for ýheir 
envisaged society. The scene is set by showing what the writers are 
against. They quote A. H. Halsey who said in 1965 (rather a lon-7 t_Jme 
ago one would have thought) that --- some people, and I am one, 
to use education as an instrument in the pursuit of an egalitarian 
society ... 1. They attack child-centred learning and relevance, as 
opposed to subject-centred learning. Personal development would 
centre on 'lore and the literature of our country'. The manifesto 
includes a recognition that 'Children need a firm moral and spiritual 
basis, which will engender the values on which their future happiness 
depends: honesty, industry, charity, respect for others and the law. 
Children need to be instructed in religious doctrine, in accordance 
with the wishes and faith of their parents., In part such a curriculum 
would replace the present 'politicization of the curriculum'. Their 
fashionable enemies are 'anti-racism, anti-sexism, peace education 
(which usually means C. N. D. propaganda) and anti-hetrosexism (meaning 
the preathingrof homosexuality combined with an attack on the belief 
that hetrosexuality is normal)'. 
Kristol, as we have seen, - is concerned with the way in which 
children become persons of the sort who honour certain pieties and 
fidelities. But, I need to mention here, there is a perspective on 
personal development which is concerned with how children acquire 
sufficient cultural resources before they begin a journey into the 
human world. I have discussed this issue throughout the above pages 
but here is a passage from David Armstrong in New Directions in Pastoral 
Care. He says: 
The aim of such research (taking up a role) would be to 
understand the processes through which children learn to 
take up the pupil role and own it for themselves. The 
underlying hypothesis is that children who can do this 
are better able to manage themselves in school, to take 
responsibility for their learning, to make choices, and 
to maintain working relationships with adults as teachers 
or tutors. An important corollary is that these young 
people will be better able to manage themselves outside 
school, even under far from favourable circumstances. 
(1985 p 97) 
We may have seen often enough, in the literature of personal develop- 
ment, the desire to slough off roles to reveal some truer self. The 
aim here is to absorb enough 'social clothing' to function in society 
at all. 
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In a short section on what is needed for personal development, 
R. S. Peters (1972 PP 511-515) distinguishes between such essential 
social clothing and what he calls human excellences or ideals of per- 
sonal development. What I have referred to as the minimum Isoc-4al 
clothing' for aperson to function in society at all, Peters cal-'s a 
'kind of L. C. M. 1. The way that Peters describes this 'kind of L. C. 'ý',. 
is as a kind of minimum general understanding. Peters is more con- 
cerned though with what he calls a 'kind of H. C. F. of personal develop- 
ment, to use a facon de parler, which cuts across the distinct modes 
of experiences'. -Peters acknowledges that differant traditions o-f 
thought will have their own human excellences. - For Freud an ideal of 
man would be 'a cautious egoist, a prudent devotee of the nicely cal- 
culated more or less in the realm of satisfactions'. A more Greek 
type of approach would single out human excellences that evoke admira- 
tion rather than approval. An example from our time might be a sneak- 
ing admiration for the Great Train Robbers. No doubt they developed 
certain excellences to. a high degree in those universities of crime we 
call prisons. All of us can think of our own 'real' men. Peters 
enumerates some ideals of human excellence but stresses they need not 
be normative - that is, they may be objects of admiration rather than 
objects of emulation. 
An example of an ideal would be I ... thinking critically, being 
creative and autonomous: displaying foresight, strength of character 
and integrity. To clarify his point he says that: 'In the moral 
sphere we approve of straightforward virtues such as courage, fairness, 
benevolence and the like. But we admire people who display higher- 
order traits such as strength of will in persisting in some virtue 
like honesty in the face of temptation and ridicule. We might also 
admire people for their integrity when they are impervious to corrup- 
tion and double-mindedness, for their autonomy in proceeding with a 
course of action in the f ace of social pressure I. Peters continues 
'Being a person ... 
(is to have) an assertive point of view with 
evaluation, decision and choice and with being ... an individual who 
determines his own destiny by his choices'. Human excellence for 
Peters is to develop ordinary human capacities to a considerably high 
degree. He says that 'Critical thought is a development of evaluation, 
autonomy of choice, creativity of the attempt to launch out on onels: own 
and to impose one's stamp on a product; integrity is shown 
in sticking 
to one Is principles in the face of temptations and strength of will in 
holding fast to a policy that has been adopted as one's own. 
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If we want a picture of Peters' own philosophy of -7*fe we mj1c, '-'1- 
turn to R. K. Elliott who says that Peters': 
... (P)hilosophy of life is founded on the Stoic precept 
that one should remedy such ills as can be remedied and 
accept without complaint those that cannot. More than 
this, his work is pervaded by Stoic moods, attitudes and 
values: individualism, for example, universalism, faith 
in truth and reason, respect for autonomy, distrust of 
Utopianism, a keen sense of the human predicament, com- 
passionate detachment, the advocacy and practice of self- 
control, reverence for the world and for the individual 
experiencing it. What in Peters we superficially take 
to be Kantian is often more profoundly attributable to a 
temperament of the same general kind as Kant's, and to a 
mind which was nourished directly by the classical past. 
(Elliott 1986 p 46) 
If education is a concern about the whole man, then we might say 
that an educated man is a man with a point of view from which he takes 
in the whole world. From his perspective he aspires to grasp things 
in their totality. (See J. Pieper 1952 p 45) Peters as the Stoic 
occupies such a perspective. If personal development is a concern 
about what values enter a person's life, we might say that those values 
come together in such a perspective as that of the Stoic. But this is 
not the only perspective. We need only think of the Christian, the 
Marxist, the Christian or atheistic Existentialist and so forth. Some 
writers see personal development being just such an initiation into 
these types. of perspective. 
We might contrast this with a 'thin' idea of personal development 
in which the person should have sufficient private space to be, or to 
do, his own thing. In that private space a person might fashion him- 
self into a Stoic or Christian Existentialist. How these turn out as 
ways of being persons in the world is another matter. 
However, it is one thing to list desirable qualities and attributes 
and present pictures of the developed person; it is quite another to 
know how to give them an actual individual shape. For example, if we 
accept that a Stoical philosophy of life makes sense as both a coherent 
set of beliefs and values and a view that can actually be applied 
to 
life, we still need to know what it can amount to in a person's life and, 
prior to that, how we might begin to get it into the individual person, 
if that is the task we set ourselves as teachers. Of course, it might 
be part of our philosophy that we are disinclined to get anything into 
anybody without his reasoned consent. It hardly needs saying that 
this 
last condition cannot be met in small children, for reason itself has to 
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find a way into them. 
We might come down to earth by looking at what a sample o-: ' res, -=- 
dents had to say about personal development in their working lives. 
In Contrasting Values in Western Europe, Harding, Phillips and 
(1986 ppl55-159) analysed fifteen job characteristics for their rela- 
tive weightings in an individual's working life. Their table lists 
three categories - personal development (intrinsic worth), pleasantness 
(extrinsic worth) and security and reward (extrinsic worth). T I) e 
respondents assessed each work value for its intrinsic and relative 
importanc6 on these three scales. The table appears overleaf on page 9". 
The researchers draw several conclusions from the full data. 
Qualities associated with personal development are given greater weight 
by non-manual workers than they are by professional and managerial 
workers. Semi- and unskilled workers are more concerned with extrinsic 
qualities. Those who have spent longest in education, especially 
higher education, are significantly more likely to give personal develop- 
ment priority. Both men and women in general give priority to security 
and reward aspects of work. Women in part-time work still put security 
and reward top of their ratings but pleasantness of the work comes close 
behind. The researchers rehearse many other obvious conclusions. As 
one would expect we find correlations between home background, income, 
wealth and culture and such conceptions of personal development as fea- 
ture in the table. The researchers tend to fall back on the platitude 
that lower order needs have to be satisfied before higher order needs 
assume relevance as motivators in people's lives. We need to ask many 
questions about their whole enterprise. Why do we want to call 'an 
opportunity to use one Is initiative I, Iaj ob you can f eel you can achieve 
something' and a 'responsible job' personal development? What interpe- 
tation do we put on such qualities of jobs? What do they entail and 
how do people perceive them in practice? Moreover, we cannot choose 
personal development as a characteristic of jobs if the possibility of 
personal development is not an aspect of the jobs. It all comes 
down 
to what is meant by personal development in the context of 
the research. 
The researchers do not say. We might intuitively construe 
its meaning 
as that some intrinsic sense is given to what one 
is doing and there is 
some opportunity to exercise one's characteristic 
human attributes. 
There is present in the respondents some aspirations to give expression 
to those qualities and attributes exhibiting those essential charac- 
teristics of human beings catalogued by Quinton. We value some things 
higher than others when we are given proper choices and those things 
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are exhibited in our humanization of anything. Of course, we 
what shape an opportunity to use one's initiative' takes in most 'obs. 
What is more important is what it could mean. 
Everyone in a sense is for personal development. It is one of 
those 'pro, expressions that is questioned only on the condition that 
it is overridden by a higher order I pro I word or expression. But 
interpretation is important here. We might say that everyone (or 
almost everyone) is for honesty, personal values, spiritual awareness7 
self-esteem and so forth but what are the 'cash values' of those 
qualities and attributes? Several people might share honesty as a 
personal value but might want to know what its content is in the lives 
of people differently related to political power or the dealings in 
the City of London. I am not arguing for a 'relativism' inall things 
but there can be genuine disagreements about the content of 'fairness' 
for example. I have said that interpretation is important. What I 
mean by this is that people hold different values and give them a 
different interpretation. The interpretation in its turn will be in 
terms of further values. I wish to situate personal development in 
the domain of values because the argument is about the sorts of people 
we can and ought to be and that where there are differences these 
differences will be constituted by a vocabulary of values. We not 
only hold values but put values on different things. The values we 
hold are, of course, bound up with what we value. We find both ways 
of putting it in our attachments to certain intellectual virtues, 
practical competancies, contours of personalities, moral beliefs and 
virtues, character traits and personal values. 
It is no revelation to know that some people put more emphasis on 
the development of character than on the development of intellectual 
virtues. Again, personality may be valued over character, although 
one may need character to persevere with one's personality development. 
(This is the case if there is a mature choice. In connection with 
some super stars, it has been said of them that they have developed 
personality before they become persons. ) One may value character 
because not to have character is to be easily led, weak and to respond 
to the immediacies of pleasure. To have no personality is to be a 
shrinking violet. Today, of course, in schools the language is that 
of wets and whimps. Character, on the other handq is a matter of the 
will. It is exhibited in control, perseverance and consistency in 
seekings to realize long-term ends, amongst other things. Character- 
building involves training in sticking at things in the face of every 
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Impulse to do otherwise. Personality-building is sai--i to be a mcre 
'cosmetic art' , more aesthetic in contrast with the morally sterner 
stuff of character. But both character and personality refer to the 
more persistant and enduring fabric of our desires, tastes, inclin5---tions, 
aversions, sentiments, values and habits which constitute the core of 
the individual. Character is what the person actually has; personal-ity 
is what is witnessed in public display. I mention this contrast in 
some detail because when much of the vocabulary of personal develo, --Men-- 
is translated into practice it is with the 'cosmetic' that it is con- 
cerned. We may value such developments but we need t. - be clear in 
respect of what they are. 
R-S. Peters (1974 pp 400-401 ) presents a brief typology of character 
and personality traits. He says that character traits are regarded as 
virtues or vices. As virtues they have an executive role in that they 
are exercised in the face of undesirable inclinations. But we may 
mention in this context that certain features of our temperaments are 
neither the product of our wills nor manipulable features of our per- 
sonalities. They tend to be part of the structure of our selves. 
Because they are not a product of, nor easily controlable by, the will, 
this does not mean that they are not morally assessable. To have a 
placid disposition might be a blessing in certain circumstances that 
are forever precipitating conflict. It can be a blessing for the 
person who is placid as well as the more irrascible in the situations 
of conflict. Peters mentions too, those underlying motivations in our 
make-up which determine our goals in life. 
Personality traits such as 'friendliness, cheerfulness, shyness, 
awkwardness, alertness ... I develop or flower rather 
than result from 
'decisions or by the internalization of rules'. We could say here 
that cheerfulness might be a temperamental disposition and not some- 
thing cosmetic. However, Peters summarizes his position as follows: 
For7 whereas our character bears witness to the choices 
which we have made and suggests some sort of personal effort 
to make something of ourselves, our personality is very much 
the mask or appearance which we present to us. A man with 
a strong character is a man who has made efforts with himself 
and who exhibits virtues such as courage and integrity that 
are connected with the will. But we do not naturally speak 
of a man having a strong personality. Rather we speak of 
personality being forceful, dynamic and hypnotic. These 
terms draw attention to his influence on others. 
(1974 p 401) 
I mention these points briefly because a language of needs has to 
cope with such comQexities of character, personality and so on if such 
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a language of needs is to be any use. 
It can also be said that we are strongly or weakly related to 
ourselves and to our human setting. If we are only laccidentalyl 
attached to 'our' qualities and attributes as is Musills Man ', 1itho--ý, 
Qualities, we have no solidity on which to build our personal, social 
and cultural bonds. We might be free but in what does our fre-ed= 
consist? If the fit between personality and environment is too tight, 
the individual may be closely identified with his qualities and attri- 
butes but he would have no. room to breathe. In the latter case, what 
does it matter if he is happy? That depends on whether happiness is 
our highest value and upon what the happiness supervenes. Again would 
we sacrifice truth for happiness? In the interest of personal harmony 
or social solidarity, some thinkers would want to instill certain 
beliefs and values in the population at large, although they themselves 
would decline such attachments. To conclude I want to bring out these 
points in a little more detail. 
Some conservative thinkers want to introduce moral and religious 
dogma- into the school curriculum in an attempt to produce identities of 
a certain sort. In specific areas, foregone conclusions are accept- 
able because to question them is to bring in dubious liberal and demo- 
cratic ideas from the start. The liberal appears to be the real enemy. 
Roger Scruton in The Times (Nov 11,1986) asserts that 'The liberal 
argues that all values are inherently unjustifiable and therefore that 
none have a right to prevail'. There are no intrinsic values for the 
liberal because each person chooses his own values. Majority values 
(presumably these do have intrinsic worth) are linherently unjustifiable 
because oppressive'. The liberal, leftists and egalitarians are run 
together and are the collective enemies of the 'elitist culture that 
has been entrusted to us'. These people enter their natural home, 
which is the state educational system, and 'constantly seek new ways of 
breaking down the distinctions by which our society is governed'. 
Scruton wants people to absorb values according to their station and 
duties and become people with certain sorts of identity so that an 
elitist, hierarchical and authoritarian society can flourish. As we 
have seen the Hillgate Group want the lore and literature of our 
country in the curriculum. Presumably this lore and literature already 
has. r_eceded into the mists of time and gained certain sanctity thereby. 
One may not wish to look too closely at such 'institutions' for 
fear they will not bear the weight put on them. What is old was once 
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new and it -is unlikely that it was as we should like it to have been. 
One is reminded of what that archetypal 'white hat', John Wayne, sai, t 
about American Western lore. 'If that was not how it was then tý. ýt 
is how it ought to have been. ' How it ought to have been is captý_ireý 
in John Ford Westerns. I might say that Wayne had condemned the film 
High Noon as unAmerican because it perhaps did say how it was. One, 
therefore, develops an identity or social self that proclaims the 
'truth' of the 'myth'. As in most things, the image may well not 
match the reality of one's life. 
Scruton's targets, whoever they are, are portrayed as people who 
want to shatter the scheme of things entire and shape and reshape 
things, themselves included, nearer to the heart's desire. The heart, 
on this reading, if it has reasons of its own, is a spurious semblance 
of desire, appetite and inclination - all abstractions fabricated by 
the liberal cast of mind. The emancipated urban intellectual sets 
the pace. Our fulfilment they tell us is to satisfy as many choices 
as short time permits. Self-fulfilment is the free satisfaction of 
desire. The liberal is detached from all unchosen aspects of himself. 
But freedom, for the liberal, isolates man from all those inherited 
traditions and institutions that give one substance such that one's 
choices repose on something that makes choice other than arbitrary. 
One example of this something is 'natural piety' which gives the 
individual the core of his moral identity. In piety we recognize the 
transcendental significance of filial bonds - transcendental because 
they are not contracted. One does not have to be a neo-conservative 
to accept this. It is what is done with it and other things like it 
that is the difficulty. However, Scruton tells us that our joy and 
happiness is to be found in the inheri-t, -e7d laws and customs of our 
homeland. In The Times (December 16,1986) Scruton attacks the 
triumph of the half-educated, who have infiltrated all the major insti- 
tutions of our society. These again are presented as the true enemies 
of his brand of what is the Right Wing. By 'Right Wing' Scruton means 
'the appreciation of true achievements, obedience to authority and to be 
firm against obstreperous demands for 'equality' and 'liberation'. ' 
In a similar vein Scruton and his colleagues (1985 pp 45-46) argue 
that both established morality and religion are needed as ingredients 
in an individual's happiness. Morality and religion are characterized, 
once again, as 'foregone conclusions' - that is they are not arrived at 
by argument or critical reasoning. Theseforegone conclusions are con- 
trasted with those that are not legitimate and have a political intent. 
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Liberals and the radical left want to indoctrinate their pupil and 
students with educationally suspect foregone conclusions. We ,n av e 
then, to accept morality and religion as given and absorb them as ; art 
of our inheritance. They are, these writers claim, articles o-, '-" 
Aristotle is recruited to give his stamp of approval. Scruton an, -' 
his colleagues say: 'Children ... enter the palace of reason throug'n 
the courtyard of habit, and in morality and religion it is habit, not 
the reason, which counts'. Morality and religion are presented as 
needs without which children would fail to thrive. 
The question is, for whom are the foregone conclusions intended? 
It is true that we have to be built up as persons before we can begin 
to reason about morality and religion. But at what point in our edu- 
cation should be begin to develop critical powers in these areas? 
Scruton and his colleagues give the impression, at times, that these 
foregone conclusions are foregone for the rest of an individual's life 
- at least for many people in society. Hyper-intellectuals bear a 
heavy burden in knowing more than the rest of us can cope with. They 
have insights into the truth of our condition. The world as an entity 
independent of our ways of perceiving it is a world without meaning. 
Meaning resides in the human world interpreted as. a veil of Maya - 
that is our cultural Leben3welt. I (Scruton 1987 p 616) This is the 
world we have to inhabit to remain human. It is a world of meanings 
and value and not of causes. The human world, then, is a 'reflection 
of ourselves, but a reflection made objective'. There*is a certain 
justice in saying of Scruton that he is a Romantic Nihilist. I shall 
return to these points later in the discussion. 
Scruton's charge against liberals- and the left is one that has a 
long pedigree. The pedigree is that what you value has its conditions. 
If you undermine those conditions, you lose what you have and what you 
value, although what you value, if you are a liberal or a leftist, is 
only imperfectly understood and is always underdescribed. Freedom has 
its conditions. Joy and happiness have theirs too. The liberal and 
his close allies abstract from what we have, then set these abstractions 
up as criteria for the better life. The charge is that it is all self- 
defeating. This is the best construction that one can put on Scruton. 
The worst is that one can make the consequences of non-compliance with 
the favoured institutions of society so bad that prudence would make it 
advisable to honour whatever is handed down as 'transcendentally obliga- 
tory'. Strong attachments pay. 
Neo- conservatives argue then for a strong communitarianism of an 
H /7 
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extremely authoritarian kind. The individual, whose developmenL should 
take a clearly defined direction, is the product of society not 
premise. If society creates him, there is a dubiety about his 
rights against it. But why should one accept this reasoning? One -an 
accept that the individual is not a natural creation but still reslistfý 
the neo-conservative solution to our problems. Why cannot the poten- 
tialitites of the community, given its different spheres as Walzer (1983) 
argues, enlarge the possibilities for the individual? Walzer's kind o-" 
communitarianism is more generous in its implications for personal 
development and identity creation. -People can have attachments to 
socially defined qualities and attributes and a strong attachment to 
their community and have an enlarged conception of freedom. 
A communitarianism of a more egalitarian character would expect 
persons of a different sort to emerge. Participatory democracy enables 
people to develop self-esteem and encourages them to grow towards a 
fuller expression of their personalities. There is a certain self- 
developmental process in participatory democracy. Such democracy is 
not so much a means to an end but an intrinsically worthwhile activity 
in which people are agents in their own development. Actually partici- 
pating in self-government creates citizens with the individual qualities 
and psychological attitudes to make such participation possible. A 
participatory system becomes self-maintaining because the qualities and 
attributes essential to its support are brought into being in the act 
of participation. Those educationalists who stress political literacy 
as a chief component in personal development hope that a school or 
college can become the type of community in which particpation and the 
acquisition of desired qualities and attributes reinforce each other. 
They may have in mind Sandel's constitutive conception of community. 
(Sandel 1981) In 'such a community people are in harmony with them- 
selves and this is reflected in the right kind of harmony in the com- 
munity. This is not incompatible with disagreement7 however. There 
is no loss of self-esteem if one loses an argument or a vote. Anyway 
this is how it is seen. 
It is clear that certain qualities and attributes of character and 
personality are suited to some social arrangements more than others. 
It is equally clear that these social arrangements are constituted in 
part by those qualities and attributes that are possessed by people. 
We might not want to go as far as Schumacher in Small is Beautiful 
(1974 p 24) when he says that: 'The modern economy is propelled by a 
frenzy of greed and envy, and these are not accidental features but 
/ 
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the very causes of its expansionist success'. But we need to identify 
those motives that drive people in a society that sanctions behaviJour 
,j 
that can so readily be described as greedy and envious. Greed and 
envy in themselves cannot hold a person together, although gree, 4 has 
been used as a virtue-term by our more success orientated 'non-members' 
of our society. A person with these vices as motives, so this line 
of thinking continues, would simply be precipitated into incohoate 
action. He would scarcely have an identity to which he could be 
attached. Or rather he would scarcely be a 'he' in an identity struc- 
ture. The 'he' is not contingently related to the identity. I 
could equally have said 'she' but some writers might want to resist 
this identity 'mark' and use 'subject' whatever minimal specification 
it has. A person with a minimal identity structure would barely hold 
together as a person and he would have little to bind him to other 
people. Greed and envy then are expressed in the dimension of a person. 
Such a person may have all the qualities and attributes fitted for 
success in a modern Western society. It is these qualities and attri- 
butes that mediate his relations with other people. Robert E. Lane in 
Capitalist Man, Socialist Man (1979 p69) has enumerated some of those 
traits that I seem to be a- product of Western type education They are: 
(1 ) the capacity for innovative thinking, implying cognitive 
complexity and -the -ability to imagine conditions contrary: to 
f act; 
(2) an evaluative support of novelty and change implied, for 
example, in disagreement with the standard personality 
measurement question, 'If you try to change things very much, 
you will usually make them worse; ' 
(3) characterological autonomy such that one is not at the 
mercy of either conventional authority or public opinion, 
that is, lack of conformism or an obedience orientation; 
(4) tolerance of ambiguity, of heterodoxy, and a willingness 
to entertain and 'play along with' a discrepant idea, and 
(5) to make these capacities and attitudes and values effec- 
tive, a belief in the effectiveness of one's own actions, 
the absence of powerlessness/helplessness syndrome. (1979 p 69) 
If Schumacher is right, greed and envy would have these traits as 
their instruments. But these qualities would be accompanied by other 
qualities which together constitute the person. Just what qualities 
and what kind of society they serve, and in their turn are served by, 
is what we need to be clear about in personal development. Societies 
will be on a continuum from strongly communitarian to thinly or weakly 
instrumental. People will be well suited or ill suited to the demands 
that they need to or ought to make on themselves and to the demands that 
issue from the social arrangements which constitute their lives together. 
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The qualities and attributes that Lane lists cannot be detached 
from the practices and institutions of certain kinds of society. S 
is true of all the values, qualities and attributes I have discusseý 
above. Whatever shape personal development takes it will reflect 
those values that interpret, or are associated with, those personal 
qualities and attributes that we think desirable in people. The 
strength or weakness of the relation of those qualities and attributes 
to the person himself and, through those qualities and attributes, the 
relation of the person to the kinds of community in which he lives 
will be the subject matter of any description of how a person engages 
with society. The question of how we justify a particular programme 
of personal development will depend upon the values to which we appeal. 
Many values will not be justifiable ultimately. It is in those values 
that we discover the criteria for what we feel to be in need of justi- 
fication. It might not be satisfactory but perhaps the most we can do 
is lay bare just what our values are. What we recommend as the content 
of a personal development programme will be closely related to our values. 
These values, however, do not preclude, or ought not to preclude, an 
appreciation that others may have different values from ourselves. 
Many of the values in a pluralist society will be values that encourage 
a recognition of difference. We will no doubt have to take a stand on 
the kind of society we desire, what we consider to be the good life and 
what qualities and attributes serve that societyand good life and how 
these iIn turn provide the conditions for the qualities and attributes 
that are needed for that society and its constituent good life. The 
terms strong and weak need not be wholly value-words, although they 
need to be embedded in contested pictures of what it is to be properly 
constituted persons within desirable human settings. They describe 
the nature and limits of our attachments to our qualities and attributes 
and through them to the possibilities in the communities in which we 
live and the aspirations which we have for those communities. if 
communities are on a continuum from strong to weak, the sorts of people 
who flourish or perhaps merely survive in them will display those values 
that are desired7 tolerated or condemned, depending on the perspective 
from which they are viewed. 
Concluding Remarks about Needs-Statement 
All the above listed items in the various areas of personal develop- 
ment can be made objects of needs-statements. Such needs-statements 
- 101 - 
imply a background of intelligibility and a sense of what goods are t- 
be satisfied or achieved. At their most comprehensive, such list-s- of 
needs focus on what is required to bring an individual into his full 
humanity. What this might consist in is disputed. Taking a RoF-etls 
Thesaurus view of the ascending importance of words that enter inuo the 
definition of our human condition, we might say that at the top of the 
ascending scale are those moral and religious words that are crucial in 
our self-interpretations. Such self-interpretations, if not intinitely 
contested, are at least contested. Needs-statements might, then, have 
as their reference a picture of what a certain fullness of being could be. 
They might, on the other hand, have as their reference what is needed 
just to carry on in life. If we are speaking of a fulfilled life, it 
has its conditions. What we need to cope in certain departments of 
life may provide the conditions for a more fulfilled life in general. 
It might be a matter of just surviving or coping across all dimensions 
of an individual's life. We need to get on to terms with one depart- 
ment of life to create greater possibilities in others. Social and 
Life Skills may well focus on certain elementary functioning skills 
that are necessary, though not sufficient, for a fuller life in general. 
In this case the background and the goods are narrowly conceived. But 
it does not mean that a person' s life as a whole is attenuated. On 
the other hand it might. 
If needs-statements are definitive of what is required by people 
to get onto terms with life, no matter what degree of fullness or attenu- 
atedness, then we need to give a proper account of them. At one 
extreme are those states of our nature that have an urgency about them 
if they remain unsatisfied. They are bound up with our physical well- 
being. But there are many culturally defined needs that have a press- 
ing tone about them. We cannot easily do without our higher-order 
moral and religious satisfactions. If theyarenot exactly urgent, 
they are persistent aspects of our second nature as it were. There 
are those areas, then, in which we need to think about how what it is 
to be a person is bound up with our physical nature. 
Very broadly, we should also distinguish between what we need for 
ourselves as each individual and what we need for our collective living 
- that is, we need to distinguish between what serves our needs and 
interests as individuals and what serves our needs and interests as 
members of communities and collectivities. This contrast between the 
individual and society is one of the permanent themes in personal and 
social education. These needs and interests that belong to us as 
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social beings are not to be conceived as disguised conditions for our 
individual well-being. 
In addition we need many capacities and capabilities to actively 
engage in life. Our lives should not approximate to the passivity c" 
lotus eaters, or at least as educationalists, we cannot recommend such 
a condition to our pupils and students. We need to get on -to terms 
with other people in the rich complexity of human reciprocity and on to 
terms with the stuff of material reality. Also, our lives are mediated 
by institutions in our organized living. We need social and cultural 
equipment to-find our way about in such departments of life. We need, 
then, capacities and capabilities to be on terms with all the contours 
of our physical, social and cultural settings. 
We not only need to know about the world but we need to form 
attachments to it. We explore the world and our human setting with 
our intellects; we also become attached to both in various ways. Our 
sensibility attaches us to other people and objects in the external 
world. In both these respects we become constituted as persons such 
that there is an internal connection between who we are and the people 
and external objects we need to be in contact with to remain unimpaired. 
We are undermined as people if we lose contact with them. The ques- 
tion 'what for? ' in respect of needs is redundant here. But there are 
other needs-states and needs- capab il i ties where the question 'what for? ' 
is not redundant. For example, we need mental and physical skills at 
our disposal and these may not be central to who we are and they may 
not be obviously needed. We could be without them and not much hang 
on it. The point here is that needs-statements require different 
kinds of justification. Some might argue, of course, that we are 
better off without many of the things that are said to be needed. 
Many of our satisfaction-needs, so it may be argued, are only artifi- 
cially induced and, not only would we not notice were these not 
developed, but we should be better off in that they tend to deflect us 
from more authentic living. Such might be the message from those 
influenced by Rousseau. Often the more frivolous our needs, the more 
urgent the desire to satisfy them. We should, then, stick to our 
uncontaminated natures and abjure artificial -needs. 
If we use the word needs in this encompassing way, it is difficult 
to know what the word does not cover. When it is used in this encom- 
passing way, it does not give us a separate language to interpret what 
personal development etc. might consist in as contrasted with something 
it is not. Often the words needs and desires are contrasted so that 
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we can get some purchase on what each might mean. But on the atove 
interpretation, what we need may include properly constituted desires. 
For example, Roger Scruton in his book Sexual Desire (1986) has written 
about sexual desire and arousal and has argued that they need to be 
given a proper shape if we are to live our lives at their fullest. 
His whole argument is that we need to establish the proper nature of 
what something is, and then create the conditions for its realization. 
In this particular case, it is sexual desire. The upshot of Scruton's 
argument is that we know ourselves best when sexuality is expressed 
between two people of the opposite sex in a stable marital relationship 
and when each partner perceives the other as a proper intentional sub- 
ject. Our highest fulfilment, in this respect, is when each person is 
present to the other in fully aroused flesh. The conclusion is that 
we need to realize this ideal of sexual fulfilment as part of our 
highest fulfilment as persons. So desire needs to be educated as part 
of our expressive fulfilment. There is no simple dichotomy on this 
interpretation between expression and repression. It is not a matter 
of liberating what is repressed; it is a matter of shaping desire into 
a proper human end. 
Although we had desires, wants, preferences and inclinations long 
before they had been given an appropriate human shape, it may be said 
that they are not just given a human shape by the accidents of conven- 
tion but need to be given such a shape if we are to realize our highest 
possibilities. To use need in this sense is to express a judgement of 
value. It is not simply to say that certain satisfaction-needs are 
given; it is to say that certain desires need to be constituted in 
appropriate ways. But in another sense the proper shape of these 
desires may come to be given, if we can arrange our culture so that 
alternatives are automatically ruled out. This is, in fact, 
the aim 
of many Romantic neo-conservatives such as Scruton himself. 
They 
would like to create an enveloping veil of maya -a seamless 
Lebenswelt 
- in which everything is given 
its proper place and appropriate shape. 
When we speak about satisfaction-needs and exercise-needs we often 
disclose or implicitly suggest interpretive value-categories. As I 
suggested above, certain constitutive needs are part of what we con- 
ceive to be our humanity. And this is, in a sense, 
to say that in an 
important way we are not as persons interpretation all the way down. 
We assume that there is a certain boney structure to our 
humanity, 
without the expression and fulfilment of which we 
lose this humanity. 
But putting it in such a way is to suggest that there are competing 
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interpretations of what constitutes our human good. A boney str, _; c-_,,; re_ 
in this sense does not necessarily mean that it is uniquely descrip-i-le. 
Thus some of our needs-statements, used in a broad sense, are explicit 
or disguised value-assessments. Also, what is said to be our needs, 
or said to be what is needed, are subject to value appraisal. '.,,, e 
raise, here, the issue of the extent to which needs can be the founda- 
tion of some of our values. And, as I have already said, we raise the 
question of the extent to which needs themselves are open to evaluation. 
Given the possibility of the contested intepretations of which 
satisfaction-needs are worthy of our pursuit, and of which exercise- 
needs should be developed, we enter the realm of values. We ask of 
satisfaction-needs which ones are indefeasible and which ones are con- 
tested. Similarly we ask of exercise-needs which ones are indisputably 
required and which ones are disputed. In raising this. question of 
which ones, we raise the questions of 'who says so and what is the basis 
of the authority for saying so. In a range of uses of the words needs 
and relevance, judgements of value are implicated. Since, over a 
range of some of our values, we do not agree, then what it means to be 
a well-constituted person will be disputed. 
over a range of the uses of the words needs and values, there 
appears to be a certain mutual translation. We can translate some 
of the language of needs into the language of values. When we say we 
need something, we often imply that we value it highly. But it works 
in reverse too. We value what we need. But often what we need is 
already interpreted in value-terms. We value love, in its many forms, 
highly. Some people might say it is the one absolute in the surround- 
ing dross. Once love, though, becomes a vital part of who we are, it 
is then a need without the fulfilment of which we are impoverished as 
persons. Yet, as we have seen, needs are of different kinds. 
So too 
are our values. What is of worth, what is esteemed, what 
is thought 
desirable and good vary depending on what dimensions of experience and 
departments of life we have in mind. Value attaches to many different 
aspects of experience and properties of objects. We value 
things on 
moral, aesthetic, religious and economic grounds. 
Some needs are 
valued on the grounds of biological necessity. 
But if these latter 
needs are satisfied easily, as a matter of course, we 
fail to value 
them highly or sufficiently seriously. We certainly may have 
insuffi- 
cient respect for the world that sustains us. The 
thought that God 
looked upon created things and saw that they were good is a 
thought we 
may not be able to do without, not simply on 
the grounds of utility, 
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although that is important enough, but on the grounds our -, ------rcy 
as persons is dependent upon having a proper respect for things. The 
Ancient Mariner found his humanity when he blessed the water snakes 
unawares. But we, again, raise the question of which needs and values 
and whose authority. 
In what I have said in this concluding section, and in the rest of 
the above discussion when I have not directly referred to the various 
personal development curriculum recommendations, I take it to be read 
that I have been drawing on material in the itemized topics within such 
personal development recommendations. I have implicitly referred to 
what might fall under religion, moral, sex, sexuality, environmental 
and work components of personal development schemes. I have wanted 
to discuss these items in situ as it were. What I also hope has 
emerged is that much of the material might be classified as practical 
knowledge, understanding and reason. Teachers should foster, so it is 
proposed, the acquisition of relevant practical knowledge, understand- 
ing and reason. An individual should learn how to act, respond and 
feel in the appropriate ways in the various departments of life. Not 
all the appropriate ways of behaving and feeling are moral; so the 
moral has to be seen as a condition on other forms of practical know- 
ledge, understanding. and reason. Personal development in schools and 
colleges is seen by some as a replacement for what used to take place 
within the chapel or the home. Young people have to learn how to love, 
feel, respond, work and conduct themselves in the appropriate ways. 
If moral values are a condition on other values and practices, does 
this mean that moral values have always to be seen as placing conditions 
on what other values and practices are learnt in the various areas of 
personal development? If the answer is 'Yes', it is no more so than 
in all the other areas of the curriculum. We need, then, to look at 
what we mean by values and how these enter into what it is to be a 
decently constituted person, or more strongly, what it is to be a 
person per se. But f irst I want to look at the idea of essentially 
contested concepts. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Essentially Contested Concepts, Normative Terms and Justification 
What I have said in the preceding pages is meant to point to the 
question of how values and our relation to them set the parameters of 
personal development. Within these parameters we can discuss the 
limits on the direction that personal development can and ought to take. 
At this point I need to return to two concepts that I left mainly 
undiscussed - the notions of the essentially contested nature of certain 
central words in educational language and of the justification of the 
use of these words in our reflection on and in our determination of the 
school curriculum. 
The question of which of our educational conceptsare essentially 
contested arises from the claim that the meanings of many important 
words in our educational vocabulary, including the word education itself, 
have become so stretched that the conditions for the application of the 
words are irreconcilably disputed. The words are interpreted in such 
ways that they apply to the realization, or the longed for realization, 
of, the aims and ideals embodied in them. For example, if the word 
education is interpreted in one way rather than another, it will pick 
out some ranges or contours of the world of educational thought and 
practice rather than others. If the interpretation of the word varies, 
so will the conditions for the word's correct application. When the 
meaning or the interpretation of a word is essentially contested, the 
application of the word is also inherently a matter of dispute. Think 
of the words democracy, freedom and equality. The interpretation of 
these words i's meant to fit often very different political realities. 
Yet there must be sufficient distilled meaning in the words for them to 
be recognized as the same words. 
The essentially contested nature of certain words is not like the 
situation in 'Alice in Wonderland' when Alice says to 
Humpty Dumpty 
"But 'Glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument"'. Humpty Dumpty 
replied, "When I use a word ... it means what 
I choose it to mean - 
neither more nor less". To which Alice replies, 
"The question is ... 
whether you can make words mean so many different 
things". Even in 
this case, sufficient meanings of words are held stable 
to allow Humpty 
Dumpty to speak meaningfully to Alice. liow could he make 
the point 
about his proprietary right over the meaning of words unless enough 
words were mutually understood? In the case of essentially contested 
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Concepts it is groups of people, with shared understandiný- anýý co-on 
aims and ideals, which compete for the different interpretations of 
words and not the individual in his private spaces. In addition, for 
groups to compete for the interpretation of a word implies that it is 
sufficiently the same word for the competition to make sense. Some 
writers argue that when the meanings of a word (f or example, If reedom 
diverge significantly, it is better to say that two or more concepts 
are present within the one word. Even here there are enough recogniz- 
able connections in the uses of the word and the uses of its partners 
and cognates in more or less acknowledged situations that it is not 
misleading to say that it is the same word, unlike the word 'bank' with 
its many different meanings and with no obvious connections amongst 
them. Homonyms are simply separate words that happen to be identical 
in form. The word freedom is not a disguised homonym. 
A concept is essentially or interminably contested when there is no 
likelihood of a settled interpretation of a word's meaning. Different 
groups of people want the proprietorship of the word with their own 
construction put upon it. Features of life thought desirable would be 
in the word's construal and when those features are mentioned or 
realized these would be what the word referred to or meant. These 
essentially contested concepts are usually such that they imply value- 
assumptions. For example, if something is called education, democracy 
or freedom, it is assumed that it must be the sort of thing we want, 
need or is good for us. That a practice or an institution is named by 
any of these words makes its acceptance easier. Difficulties return, 
however, when we ask what is the nature of that to which we want to 
apply the word-education or democracy or freedom. We then might want 
to say 'If that is what you call education, democracy or freedom, you 
are fooling yourself and trying to fool us into the bargain. 
It may be said that in my summary up to now there has been an 
illegitdmate sliding from concept to word and from concept to term. 
Concepts do not have uses but words do. Concepts do not have different 
ranges of meaning but words do. How can a concept be contested when 
it has only one meaning? Furthermore, if words have different ranges 
of meaningg how can we contest ranges of meaning? A contest is over 
something. Concepts, words and meanings are not the sorts of thing 
one can contest. An attention to distinctions undermines the idea of 
a contest. A concept is nothing apart from its meaning; meaning 
attaches to words; and the meaning of words is in the words' uses. 
It might be concluded that all one is after is a certain clarity in the 
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use of those words that tend to be ambiguous or open-textured becau-se 
of the change in context of their use or because of their being embedded 
in different traditions of thought and practice. It is not then that 
a single concept, word or meaning is being fought over in the way tha'ý 
one might fight over -a possession but rather that words have different 
ranges of meaning and that one has to be clear as possible about this 
fact. (I have been helped in my thoughts here by Wilson 1986 pp 41-59. ) 
All this might seem a quibble. What the idea of an essentially 
contested concept stresses is that words can take on different ranges 
of meaning through their multifarious uses and that people want to give 
favoured prominence to one or more ranges of meaning rather than others. 
The competition is amongst people who want to wrest words from one 
another for their own purposes. People select from existing ranges 
of meaning of words or build into the words their own ideals or ideo- 
logical commitments. If the meanings of words are stretched too far, 
an acknowledgement of this fact would be reflected in the use of 'real' 
or 'true' to qualify the word in question. Education, democracy or 
freedom become 'real or 'true' education, democracy or freedom. We 
might say that true or real education is education as a preparation for 
life or for the needs of industry. Of course, the attachment of the 
words I real I or I true I to the words I education' 1 democracy I, or 'f ree- 
dom, might signal that these latter words are becoming so stretched 
that they run into other words and in consequence cover realities that 
cannot prima facie be covered by these words. So'called persuasive 
definitions of justice or freedom may run into meanings more properly 
attached to or covered by equality. The motive behind such persuasive 
definitions is to ease people into transferring the value of one thing 
to the reality of another. Justice and freedom sound good and are 
more likely to command adherence than equality. If the words justice 
and freedom can be partially redefined in terms of meanings that 
properly fall under the word equality, the value traces of the former 
are attached to the reality of the latter. We call something justice 
or freedom when its reality is more nearly that of equality. On the 
other hand, one might want to denegrate the fact of something by sub- 
suming it under one category-heading rather than another. 
On a recent B. B. C. Radio News programme a reporter said that 
Monsignor Bruce Kent, as he was at the time, had resolved the tension 
between being a priest in the Catholic Church and being a spokesman for 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament by resigning his priesthood in 
favour of his political role. The reporter presented the conflict as 
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I polit4 -4 one between being a man in the service of God and being a 
The catego ry- heading of politician had the effect of casting a certain 
slur on the quality of his decision. That Bruce Kent may be equally 
or more truthful to his religious or moral convictions in working for 
nuclear disarmament is made dubious or even ruled out by calling his 
decision 'political'. The fact that his decision may have been reli- 
gious or moral is lost by using the category-heading of political to 
describe his decision. All these words - 'political', 'religious', 
and 'moral' - are contested but the reporter chose the word 'political' 
under which to subsume a range of -meanings and in doing so gave the 
meanings an unfavourable ring. This is not to say that the word 
political always has this ring. The context helps to determine the 
whiff that certain words have, as it does the meanings of the words 
that are contested. Most of the time moral or religious reasons are 
more substantial, more important or more sincere motives for doing 
something. 
I have already discussed the notion of needs. 'Needs' is one of 
those words which carry sufficient normative force such that if one 
called something a need one implies that a person with that need has a 
prima facie claim to its satisfaction. Moreover, any social arrange- 
ments that are necessary conditions for the satisfaction of the need 
have a prima facie justification. It is similarly the case with 
interests. Unlike 'mere' wants, desires and preferences which are 
'subjective', interests like needs are 'objective' and again prima facie 
demand satisf action. Wants, desires and preferences are subjective 
because it makes little sense to say that people have them but do not 
know they have them; whereas needs and interests are objective because 
it makes a certain sense to say that people have them but are unaware 
that they have. . If the words 'needs' and 'interests' are contested, 
it is in respect of what are said to be needs rather than in the meaning 
of the words. There might be agreement about what the words 'needs' 
and 'interest' mean but not about what are called needs and interests. 
However, all the words I have mentioned are normative and it is in their 
normativeness that some writers see the stable part of their meaning. 
A constant evaluative or commendatory 'meaning' is co-present with a 
variable descriptive meaning' within the one word. The word education, 
for example, is normative in that its non-inverted commas use prescribes 
practice, regulates conduct and connotes what is desirable and worth- 
while. Yet just what is prescribed, what conduct is regulated and what 
is thought desirable and worthwhile is contested. 
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I think too much can be made of the claim that two types of 
separable meaning are contained within the one word. It is enouc`n 
that we know the direction of our valuations and the nature of that on 
which we take our stand. We need to know also just what our words 
can mean, which determines what we want them to mean, and what realities 
or hoped-for realitites we want to assent to. In all these matters we 
confuse ourselves if we stretch the meaning of words beyond what they 
can bear. 
Essentially contested words, with their normative implications, 
enter into descriptions of who or what we are as persons and imply at 
the same time the shape of our personal, inter-personal and impersonal 
relationships. This is true, of course, of all our value words. 
Some writers, it must be said, would resist at the outset the thought 
that certain contested words have normative implications, if these 
words are taken to be descriptive of factual states of affairs; though 
this is not to say that they would challenge the claim that the norma- 
tive helps define who or what we are and how we stand in relation to 
other people. (There is a difficulty here of whether it is only words 
involving value- as sump tions that are essentially contested. Descrip- 
tive words having purely factual application might be thought not to be 
essentially contested. They have an appropriate factual use or not. ) 
It is further said that if the evaluative is somehow present within 
such words it is an abstractable layer of additional meaning. These 
points raise questions about the fact/value distinction. But fact and 
value is often fused in the one word -a so-called thicker value word. 
If the normative is not strictly derivable from the factual or the des- 
criptive, the normative and the factual in our daily commerce tend to 
be strongly connected. To say that the connection is conventional 
and not logical or conceptual does not speak of a flimsy connection 
that is broken by personal choice or decision just as the attachment is 
formed in the first place by an equally improbable choice or decision. 
(It might be remarked here that this whole way of speaking about the 
conventional or logical connection between the content and value within 
the same word is misconceived. ) 
We might bring out the force, or lack of it, of what is being said 
by an example. In the film 'The Elephant Man', John Merrick, the 
grotesquely disfigured and brutally maltreated Victorian side-show 
attraction, whose external appearance gives the title to the film, 
gradually exhibits many fine human qualities. An intelligent and 
sensitive spirit is entombed in a shape that prompts disgust and inhuman 
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responses. On one occasion in the film the surgeon, Frederick T -reves, 
who takes on Merrick's rehabilitation, attempts to persuade h_Js superfor 
at the hospital of Merrick's rationality and refined sensibility. Bot. - 
men are ultimately convinced of Merrick's remarkable human qualit'ies and 
attributes. The recognition that he is a person with a high degree of 
intelligence and sensitivity leads to a warmth of human response. One 
of the most poignant incidents in the film is when he is hounded into a 
public convenience by a mob after accidentally knocking over a child in 
an attempt to escape from other inquisitive and tormenting children. 
In his struggles he loses his protective head sacking and reveals his 
hideous abnormalities. He is easy game and is cornered. In despara- 
tion his piteous voice cries that he is a human being. He is trans- 
figured, as he is on the first occasion when beautiful accents come 
from what has to be taken for a mouth. 
In this brief account of John Merrick and his tribulations, I have 
used words that may be construed as descriptive and normative. Merrick 
displays reason, feels wounded, wishes things were otherwise, expresses 
gratitude, accepts the inevitable, exercises choice and hints at self- 
respect. As he says, he is a human being. In his qualities and 
attributes are exhibited the most general categories distinctive of the 
nature of persons: rationality, agency, freedom, responsibilitiy, 
intention, purpose, choice, affect and the capacity for self-improvement. 
But these general terms are implicit in the details of the more finely- 
grained language. 
Anthony Quinton (1973 p 103) captures a certain idea of normative 
neutrality when he writes of a nature exhibiting such distinctive 
features enumerated here. He writes 'The nature of man is a set of' 
defining characteristics in virtue of having which things are identified 
as . being men. These characteristcs are in fact empirical and so no 
conclusion about what men ought to be allowed to do can be extricated 
from the concept itself'. We might add to what men 'ought to be 
allowed to do', a moral disposition such as I responding with sympathy' 
and a moral reaction such as 'expressing love and care'. 
Quinton is 
characterizing a view which would reject the claim 
that many listed 
distinctive human characteristics have normative import. The norma- 
tive may presuppose the existence of persons so 
defined. To that 
extent the notion of person and the distinctive 
features definitive of 
that notion enter into the constLtution of the normative. 
But person- 
hood and its distinguishing characteristics are background conditions 
for the meaningful application of moral and normative 
language. if 
- 112 - 
men were not rational, responsibile and free and so o. -., a moral' ý_-d 
normative vocabulary would have no conditions for its proper applic--tion. 
John Merrick then is recognized as a-being to whom a set of ýuman 
defining characteristcs can be ascribed but this fact is a condition 
for the correct application of moral and normative terms and not a fact 
that in itself enjoins or prohibits certain responses. 
Quinton is stating that the concept of human nature is captured in 
a catalogue of distinctive features and that no moral or normative 
implications flow from such a concept and its definition. However, 
words are meant to be used, or rather words have no sense other than in 
their use. And this goes for concepts, which have their life in the 
use of words. The words and descriptions distinctive of human beings 
are found to be applicable to John Merrick when he begins to exhibit 
typical human traits. The words and descriptions are not, of course, 
separate from their identified application. Merrick becomes the 
proper subject for the instantiation of the concept of a person and for 
the ascription of distinctive human predicates. Underlying the recog- 
nition that certain words have application is the reality which justi- 
fies the application of the words. The question is how do the norma- 
tive aspects of words (if we grant that words can be said to have norma- 
tive aspects) or simply the normative words themselves enter into the 
lives of human beings? In the case of John Merrick, as soon as certain 
descriptions were recognized as applicable to him, even when one des- 
cription (that he was a human being) initially came out of his own 
mouth, some types of response become appropriate. These responses, it 
must be said, are under descriptions - such as sympathy, warmth and 
understanding - and indicate, no matter how 'primitive' in the scale of 
human reactions the responses are, that they are what they are because 
human beings are socially embodied. Merrick was brought into the 
community of human beings9 from which he had been excluded by people 
who scarcely qualified as human beings themselves. 
It hardly needs saying that Merrick was not a Cartesian man solely 
responsible for his own refined sensibility. As he grew older he was 
increasingly marginalized into a freak. What was the cause, then, of 
the change in response in Treves, and more radically in his superior, 
to Merrick's plight? It must have been in the recognition that he was 
a human being of a particularly rare kind. The properties that Merrick 
displayed as a person prompted a compassionate response. But these 
properties were rationality, agency, sensibility and purpose. There 
14 seems to be 1. ttle wrong in calling these properties normative because 
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their instantiation in a person urge, prompt or at the very leas'- 
people into an adequate response. 
But what about the many 'normal' but dispossessed people in 
Victorian society? Why the selective response to John Merrick? Why 
does the presence of rationality, agency, choice and purpose count. in 
the case of Merrick but not in the case of all those other Victorian 
dispossessed people? Several answers suggest themselves. Perhaps 
there is not enough goodness or resources to go round or that Merrick 
exhibited more distinctive qualities in a more developed form. But 
was it more likely to be Victorian sentimentality? We have come to 
recognize that sentimentality is very close to cruelty. As I have said 
previously, the focus of sentimentality is the person's own feelings not 
the assumed object of those feelings. The sentimentalist entertains 
his own feelings and in so doing is responsive so long as the feelings 
last. The object, in this case a person, is not seen as an end in him- 
self but the occasion for wallowing in the glow of one's own emotions. 
We know the consequences of the instability of emotions. The senti- 
mental easily tips over into the cruel and both can exist alongside each 
other. This is the hidden reality of Victorian values. I am not say- 
ing that Treves was not genuine in his response. He does reflect on 
his motives for helping Merrick and asks of' himself, at a traumatic 
point in the film, whether he is a good man or a bad man. It may be 
that the film itself treats the subject sentimentally. 
We might reflect here on the way that national politicians compete 
for who feels most distressed in national tragedies. We often wait in 
vain for them to say something about the folk whom the tragedy has hit. 
We are all too aware of the fabrication of images by these people. - 
What may be genuine feeling is readily seen as so much grist to the mill. 
Perhaps it is all unfair but this is the climate of the times. 
Do these thoughts tell against the view that the distinctive cate- 
gorial terms applicable to human beings are normative? We have seen 
that to recognize someone as a rational and sensitive agent is to occa- C) 
sion a human response. The recognition is under a description and the 
description prompts conduct. The only question is how does a descrip- 
tion occasion conductq if the descriptive is not implicated in normative 
values? The mistake is to think that words stand on their own and can 
be singularly separated into a descriptive and an evaluative element in 
each word, if it is one of those thicker evaluative words. But words 
in use is prior to such a dissection. We can suspend the background 
for certain purposes but we have to recognize that this is just what we 
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have done. Both descriptive and evaluative terms are . 4, -molicated in 
skein of language. It is a matter of what connections we make within 
language and between language and the world. Our forms of life and 
cultural settings may be restrictive or expansive in respect of tl'., ýOse 
people who are included or excluded from skeins of discourse in which 
descriptive and evaluative terms flow into one another. 
There is then an intimate connection between description and evalu- 
ation. This is not to say that values are always omnipresent. In 
certain contexts it would seem to be nearly so. C. B. MacPherson says, 
in the context an explication of what can be correctly said of man as 
such, that "the very structure of our thoughts and language puts an 
evaluative content into our descriptive statements about Imanl". (1973 p 53) 
Such language enters into our self-interpretations and these interpreta- 
tions mediate our relationships one to another. What we say about one 
another and ourselves will have implications for our interpersonal con- 
duct. Terry Eagleton in his 'Literary Theory' gives a much stronger 
account of the omnipresence of values. He writes: 
Statements of fact are after all statements, which presumes 
a number of questionable judgements: that those statements 
are worth making, perhaps more worth making than certain 
others, that I am the sort of person entitled to make them 
and perhaps able to guarantee their truth, that- you are the 
kind of person worth making them to, that something useful 
is accomplished by making them, and so on. ... All our des- 
criptive statements move within an often invisible network 
of value- categories, and indeed without such categories we 
would have nothing to say to each other at all ... 
Mithout 
particular interests we would have no knowledge at all, 
because we would not see the point of bothering to get to 
know anything. Interests are constitutive of our knowledge, 
not merely prejudices which imperil it. The claim that 
knowledge should be 'value-free' is itself a value-judgement. 
(1983 p 14) 
Eagleton writes as a Marxist and sees value, no matter how circuitously 
established, as reflective of material interests. Our interests and 
concerns are materially founded. Value is in the material basis of 
things. The point I want to bring out is that description and evalua- 
tion are part of the same skein of language, even though we may make 
purely descriptive statements that are faithful to the facts. We 
might choose the words 'description' and 'evaluation' rather than 'fact' 
and 'value' because it may be useful to suggest that facts are concept- 
dependent. Facts do not identify themselves as though the world could 
be the source of its own descriptions. Eagleton is right to say that 
Istatements of I fact are after all statements'. It is human beings who 
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make them. And it must be in respect of something that they ma-ý-e 
So it does not mean we have no notion of the world as existing incepen- 
dently of human beings. The world is 'out there', so to speak, bj'-- 
sense, meaning and significance are internal tolanguage, althougýý i-- is 
human beings that give sense, meaning and significance to words. 7acts 
are the mode in which the world is represented. But representation is 
not the only nor indeed the pr-ý. imary function of language. I want to 
conclude that the human perspective is indeed a perspective. 
This though is not to be confused with a more extreme post- 
structuralist one, which argues that nothing is given to provide a 
foundation for language practices. 'Everything', so the argument goes, 
is encapsulated in language and since all meaning is internal to langu- 
age and language is in a constantly shifting relation to itself, things, 
have a different sense as they are encapsulated in language differently. 
For example, the sense we give to sexuality is in a shifting relation 
to itself'within the changing possibilities in language. What is 
given then is given in language and since language is in an unstable 
relation to itself what is given in language changes with language. 
This view finds its expression in the deconstruction of 'realities' that 
are only 'realities' insofar as they are encapsulated in subvertable 
language practices. As I have just said, sexuality is not something 
in itself, especially as confined to established sexual identities, it 
is what it is as it is deconstructed and reconstructed into new mani- 
festations. Whatever is said seems to leave open what the I it' is. 
Is it 'desire'? But what is desire? 'Deconstruction' and 'reconstruc- 
tion' are words that suggest building and building in turn suggests 
materials and foundations. If language is decisive in what something 
is, does this imply that there is nothing to which language attaches, 
except the merest 'material' and physical promptings? If sexuality is 
a crucial determinant of the ways to be persons, and if sexuality is a 
product of the meanings internal to language, save for the merest 
organic promptings, sexual identities are not just contestable 
but 
greatly variable. 
The essence of what kinds of' things are possible in the language 
of post-structuralism is seen in the de-mystified sexual contact 
between 
Man as Enterprise and Woman as Deconstructivist in David 
Lodge's comic 
novel 'Nice Work'. Robyn Penrose has been seconded 
to a local firm as 
her university's contribution to Industry Year of 1986. 
When she and 
Vic Wilcox, the boss of the firm, eventually find themselves in bed 
together, Robyn, in response to Vic's declaration of love, says that 
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she has shed such notions. Once she had allowed hersel. 'L' to be 1----ns- 
tructed by the discourse of romantic love ... ' but now she is si-1ply a 
body with physical needs that are not extensions of an 'individual 
essence prior to language'. All the stuff about 'two unique individual 
selves who need each other and only each other and cannot be ha-. Dpy wi'-'-- 
out each other for ever and ever' is the rhetoric of a discourse 
centred on the 'bourgeois fallacy' . (Lodge 1989 pp 292-293) 
There is nothing 'out there', in this case, but biological urgencies 
and their satisfaction - the rest is language and 'we' are inscribed in 
them. We are what the discourse says we are. There are different 
discourses and codes that encapsulate these minimal realities. Even a 
factory chimney is not a practical utility but a projection of the preda- 
tory male psyche. This is yet another code that has to be interpreted. 
The world we inhabit is a projection of such sub-terranean pushes and 
pulls. All our ordinary language can be shown to be constructed out 
of hidden drives and impulses to domination. As is language, so are we. 
But there is no end to the play of language, so there is no end to the 
ways to be persons. Our development as persons (if we have not already 
deconstructed the category of person that helps to interpret our reality 
and substituted for it the word 'subject') can be expressed in whatever 
discourses can be invented once we have decontructed the ones we have. 
This was all part of their personal development as conceived by each 
in Industry Year. I must say here that during Industry Year, in the 
college in which I taught, the teaching staff were encouraged to help 
students become people as enterprise. 
It is also worth pointing out that this language has found its way 
into personal development programmes in education - personal develop- 
ment as a by-product of certain relevant studies. I just quote one 
example from current curricula development literature. It is that of 
Women's Studies. Germaine Greer quotes, rather appropriately7 Robyn 
Rowlands, an Australian Feminist, who says that the purpose of Women's 
Studies is 'to find, reclaim and rename ourselves; to consider all 
issues and knowledge with women reintroduced; to create women-centred 
knowledge; to understand power and its relation to gender; to search 
for the origins of women's oppression and therefore to develop strategies 
for changing that oppression'. I do not know what goes on under such 
curricula pronouncements but certainly what we have discussed here from 
Lodge will not be too far out. It is also worth pointing out that such 
pronouncements filter down into personal development schemes in schools 
and colleges. What I say here, I hope, will be taken in the same 
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spirit as the one in Lodge's novel. 
My discussion of essentially contested concepts is meant to 
anticipate my claim that personal development is situated within the 
domain of values. That the interpretation of words distinctive o- 
human beings are contested and that the words tend to involve value- 
assumptions (often not recognized or at least not made explicit) must 
bear on what we can meaningfully say about persons, what we want to 
say, what we ought to say, how we select from what can be said ant how 
we think about the background which gives us our criteria of relevance. 
The further we move away from stable meanings, because of incommensurate 
and incompatible values; because of disagreement over the interpreta- 
tion of so-called essentially contested concepts; because of true or 
untrue theories about the nature of man, the language men use and the 
way that language is thought to attach to people and the world - then 
the more difficult it is to pronounce on the adequacy of our conceptions 
of the ways it is possible to be persons. The idea of personal develop- 
ment is unintelligible outside conceptions of what kinds of person it is 
possible to be, even if we want to draw a distinction between being a 
kind of person and being the person who is oneself. The ways it is 
possible to be persons is inseparable from the ways that persons stand 
in relation to one another. One could put it the other way round, of 
course, and say that our relations shape the ways it is possible to be 
persons. 
Eagleton tends to give value-categories a certain omnipresence. 
There is a suggestion too of how language, saturated as it is in value, 
enters the world. It is brought into the world like other things of 
human productive endeavour. In Marxist theory man is essentially a 
being who produces things. Marx says that men 'begin to distinguish 
themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means 
of subsistence'. He continues, 'As individuals express their life, 
so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production' 
(1973 p 237 ff) To trace value-saturated language to material founda- 
tions, let alone material foundations construed in a theoretical way7 
is fraught with extreme difficulties. 
In Dennis Potter's 'The Singing Detective', to which I shall 
return later, we are presented with an image of how value-categories 
enter into the lives of children born into a world already 
interpreted 
in value-categories. This image of how values, or corrupted versions 
of' them, come into the lives of the children is a variation on 
the 
theme of The Fall. A knowledge of Good and Evil gives us the freedom 
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to choose; thereafter there are no limits to what we can get u, -, 4. --. 
Nevertheless, the Good still provides us with a check on what it is 
permissible for us to get up to. But the trouble with theories of 
value or language which neither serve reality nor respect truth is *-., ýai. t 
the notion of limit is unknown to them. I spoke earlier of the 
parameters which set limits on what can be said intelligibly about 
persons and their development. Certain view on the nature of value, 
language and persons considerably expand those parameters. As educa- 
tionalists we need to address whether these parameters provide genuine 
possibilities for ways to be persons or whether it is a kind of play 
acting or striking of attitudes. 
If all is unstable as some writers suggest, justification becomes 
impossible. Justification appeals to something independent but 
there has to be something relevantly independent. The process of 
justification demands that firstly we give an adequate account of the 
meaning of what is said to be in need of justification and that secondly 
we provide a specification of what is relevantly independent in terms of 
which the justification is undertaken. We say that something is a 
justification of something else when that which is the justification is 
more important or more significant. That which is in need of justifi- 
cation is given additional significance or sense. Education is often 
thought to be in need of justification but what could be more important 
or more significant than education that it could justify education? 
I said earlier that because 'education' is a normative term, the 
term is expressive of value-assumptions. As we also saw, it is one of 
those terms whose interpretation is essentially contested. If dif- 
ferent practices are called education and there is no agreement about 
the range of practices to be included in education, or the value of 
them, justification is then thought to be necessary. For example, we 
might want to say that education is justified if it leads to personal 
development. This may not be the end of the story; for personal 
development itself may need to be justified as an aim in the curriculum 
of schools and colleges. In addition to this receding or deepening 
attempt to justify something, we need to recognize that the justification 
is relevantly independent. Not just anything that is independent of 
that in need of justification will do. 
I recall the attempts to justify punishment as imprisonment when I 
worked as a teacher in a prison education department. If there was 
agreement on the meanings of deterrence, prevention, retribution and 
rehabilitation as the grounds of justification and agreement on the 
I 
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meaning of punishment as that which is in need of justification, the 
problem was still unresolved about the relevant independence of those 
considerations which were to do the justifying. For example, if 
punishment is interpreted as the deprivations resulting from imprisýý, n- 
ment, how can rehabilitation stand in a proper relation to the punish- 
ment? If rehabilitation is what is important and imprisonment an 
impediment to it, how does rehabilitation justify this type of punish- 
ment? The most that can be said is that the deprivations are amelior- 
ated by such benefits as education and so on. 
That we feel that education is in need of justification says some- 
thing about how education is viewed in a particular society. One 
would have thought that education is one of those benefits that requires 
of the alternatives that they be justified if they are competitive with 
education. The problems of meanings and justification are central in 
education at present and the question of value is inseparable from both. 
Lying behind the thought that concepts or words can or cannot be 
irresolvably contested is the further thought that different ways of 
life, moral practices, ways to be persons, views about the nature of 
man and perspectives on the world can be in conflict. The claims we 
make for and about them may be contested too. Since our claims are 
in words and our words can be interpreted differently and can carry 
different value-implications, this leads to questions about what words 
have to mean as opposed to what we might wish them to mean. The idea 
of the essentially contested nature of certain concepts, if this is how 
the issue is presented, is about what it is possible to mean and about 
what it is intelligible to say. ' 
There is always the possibility that both parties to a dispute 
wish to use words with their own construction put upon them. In many 
of our disputes, and not all of them and that is the trouble, we might 
be after a truth-status to our claims that certain pursuits and ways 
to be persons are intrinsically worthy of us as human beings. But 
people can disagree fundamentally. 
The Islamic Fundamentalist possesses a different language from 
Salman Rushdie and even when both parties to the life and death struggle 
start to use key words such as religion, there is no agreement about 
the 
content and the values put upon the content. Rushdie may 
feel that 
there is a 'God-hole' in his life -a certain spiritual emptiness - 
but 
what might fill the hole, if anything, would not be 
the content internal 
to at least one interpretation of what it is to hold religious 
beliefs. 
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It is, then, not so much what individual words mean, extracte, -4 
the contexts in which they are used, but rather that words are de-s- 
criptive of different orientations to the world. 
We might present as an example the idea of self -realization. 
know that there are difficulties with this expression because it does 
not seem to have a natural home in ordinary language. However, be 
that as it may, what it is to attain a certain perfectability according: 
to our own kind or according to the nature of each of us is fundamen- 
tally -contested. And it is not only about what values need to be made 
real in our lives: it is also about whether there is sense in talking 
about such perfectability and what it is to reach our highest good. 
Furthermore, there is the question of the status of self -realization in 
relation to other human pursuits and requirements. Kant, for example, 
gives prior claim to moral duty. Self-realization is not something 
that can be categorically commanded as can moral obligations. Kant 
says: 'There are in humanity capacities of greater perfection which 
belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in our- 
selves as the subject; to neglect these might perhaps be consistant 
with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the 
advancement of this end'. (1949 p 47) 
For Kant it is not a matter of whether needs, wants, wishes and 
hopes spring from our natures and whether it is these that our greater 
perfectability is to be founded in. It is a matter of what is cate- 
gorically enjoined in the sphere of moral duty. We may, of course, 
argue that it is in what is categorically required that we find our 
greater realization and fulfilment. But this would go against what 
Kant says about happiness crowning our lives as a whole in the fullness 
of things. 
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CHAPTER 
Personal Development, Self-Development and Self-Realization 
In Chapter 1, I wanted to argue that there are two aspects t, -_ý ,; hat 
it is to develop as a person. As I said, I did not want to suggest 
that there are two processes and two products. The person, at le--s- 
in this respect, is indivisible. He grows into the possibilities in 
the different dimensions of experience and in the different departments 
of life. He may, too, grow into having a perspective on the world as 
a whole. Such perspectives are the stuff of religion and ideologies. 
On the other hand, he can grow into deeper friendships; on the other, 
he can see himself within grand narratives or redemptive life-styles. 
The two aspects, then, are some construal of what it is to be an indi- 
vidual and some interpretation of what it is to be person-like. it 
is about what an individual comes to appropriate as his own, what he 
sees as belonging to himself, what he has made his own and what is 
internal to his orientations to the world and the various departments 
of it. It is, too, about what the content of what it is to be a per- 
son and is thus part of him. 
In that chapter, I wished to argue that on any view of personal 
development, its cognates and extensions, both aspects of an individual's 
development have to be addressed. When we think of these two aspects, 
we might be reminded of John Stuart Mill's ideal of an individual's 
pursuing his own good in his own way. Mill, in fact, used the term 
self-development to characterize this individual project. But, even 
if only in an attenuated form, an individual will develop in some res- 
pects and in his own way. We might contrast Mill's ideal of self- 
development with this attentuated view of an individual's progress 
through life. Much, as I said above, will depend on the prevailing 
setting in which the individual matures. There are 
limiting cases: 
on the one hand, our development may approximate 
to pure egoism; on 
the other, to some notion of strong communitarianism. 
At this stage 
in my discussion, I will not comment on whether self-development 
is 
better linked with the limiting case of pure egoism or 
the limiting 
case of strong communitarianism. Individual 
development, then, must 
be in accordance with some person-like qualities and attributes, even 
if these tend to be against what many people think are our most person- 
like properties. As I have indicated, an individual may 
fall outside 
any conception we may have of what constitutes what 
is person-like. 
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A limiting case in this respect is that of the complete psychoca-tn. 
An individual, then, grows into the various dimensions of experi- 
ence and into the various requirements within the departments o" life. 
What is person-like is internal to these dimensions of experience and 
departments of life. For example, if moral experience is a c=fition 
on other forms of practical understanding and reason, we should expect 
this experience to be part of most departments of life. And, as I 
have said, practical understanding and reason cover a great deal of 
what falls under personal development. 
When the term personal development is used on its own - that is, 
without the benefit of the terms social, moral and so forth in the more 
general headings spoken about above - it is difficult to know just what 
content is peculiar to it as distinct from what it might be contrasted 
with. It is true that some of the other terms in the general headings 
are too wide to tell us what we should exactly be engaged in within 
these curricula practices. Nevertheless, there is some limit on what 
personal development-itself might be. Even within the general head- 
ings, though, personal development might refer to something separate 
from social and moral development rather than something complementary 
to, or something dependent upon, what is contained within the terms 
social, moral or health etc. 
Personal developmentg as a separate term, might take its sense 
from the various traditions that emphasize self -realization, self- 
fulfilment, self-creation or self-discovery. These various terms 
refer to those disclosed or imperfectly disclosed individual poten- 
tialities that needs to be actualized if a person is to be the indivi- 
dual he truly or really is or to be what he should become according to 
his own nature. It is to become what we might call a beautiful person 
and to be such a person might be in conflict with what is morally or 
socially required. Such a contrast is caught in the distinction 
between individual and society. The individual wants to go one way 
and society requires that he go another. 
Personal development mightý then, mean what these other terms 
mean. It is merely an alternative expression for what form, direction 
and content and individual's life should be expressive of, as are dis- 
closed within these other terms. Obviously, we are concerned with 
what conceptual possibilities reside within such terms as self- 
realization and so forth - that is, with what it is intelligible to be 
as a person. I say conceptual possibilities because what is intelli- 
gible should impose some constraint on what a person can become. What- 
lu 
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41- 4- is intelligible, of course, might not be what is acceptat- i- _L; 
I e. 
not just that self-interest might give personal development an unaccept- 
able twist; it is also that certain motivations that are continuous 
with self-interest such as malice might shape an individual's response 
to other people. Certain types of evil that have been perpetrated in 
the name of self-realization may be beyond belief but they are not 
beyond human possibility. I am not thinking just of the Marquis de 
Sade here. I am rather thinking of someone like Charles Manson, who 
may be in some respects rather like de Sade. Some might find a cer- 
tain perverted intelligibility in what Manson and his followers perpe- 
trated. (I might say in this context that I once team-taught a 
Crime and Punishment module in General Studies - General Studies might 
in some ways be seen as a forerunner to Personal Development - and the 
question arose, when we needed to refer to such incidents as the Manson 
crimes, whether we might be morally harming our students. ) 
We need to distinguish, then, between what is intelligible and 
what is appropriate for human beings. When we reflect on personal 
development, we need to determine what is conceptually possible, what 
is humanly possible and what is morally appropriate. The question is, 
then, do we interpret personal development as something separate from 
social and moral development7 but constrained by what is deemed appro- 
priate by reference to the terms social and moral or do we interpret 
personal development as something conceptually dependent on such terms? 
Is personal development socially or morally constrained or conceptually 
constrained -a matter of decency or sense? Now, in an important way, 
personal development, taken as individual development, is not concep- 
tually, ' naturally or historically prior to social, moral or cultural 
development. Our individual development has its social, moral and 
cultural conditions. Even though we have our Charles Mansons, they 
are deviations from what we take to be well constituted )personhobd - 
We should even say that they arewicked deviations. We is a little 
word that has enormous implications. It is not just a matter of 
counting heads as it were. We have to consider it as humanity speak- 
ing through us. It has to be considered inconceivable that Manson's 
notion of self -realization or self -f ulf ilment, or however we put it, 
is an acceptable possibility for human beings. How one makes such a 
claim good is another matter. In an important sense7 we have to 
accept that it is our values that are our reasons rather than reasons 
providing the foundations of our values. 
If we look at personal development on its own, as it were, we 
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will find that the criteria of what it covers is far wider than ,,, e can 
entertain on educational grounds. I take it that the term, is used 
sometimes as a cognate of self-realization. And it is, after all, 
its meaning and criteria on educational grounds that we are considering. 
Personal development on its own has to have a meaning and have crilterLa 
for its application. I have mentioned that an individual's development 
implies that there is a form, direction and content to it. I equally 
need to mention that one needs to consider the source of all three 
constitutive aspects of a person's development. This is a question of 
who. is the-agent of the development. On educational- grounds, the 
source of the form, direction and content of an individual's development 
cannot be wholly his own. He has to be initiated into various forms of 
knowledge and life. For example, no matter how much a teacher values 
and draws upon experiences children bring with them to school, there 
will be educational limits on what is acceptably extracted from these 
experiences for educational purposes. This is not to say that home and 
background has- not already limited what are acceptable possibilities in 
a child's development. In fact, as we know, depending upon strength of 
voice and commitments, parents often want a say in what is taught in the 
more controversial aspects of the curriculum. And this is not to for- 
get that what is considered controversial is disputed. Without drawing 
on examples near to home, we need only think about what limitations are 
demanded on what is taught in schools in the Bible Belt in America. 
However, as I said much earlier in my discussion, some wilder 
notions of personal development may find their way, tangentially, of 
course, in personal development schemes in schools and colleges. So, 
we might say, education has its own criteria of what is appropriate in 
those areas that personal development and so on cover. This is 
another way of saying that no matter what criteria self-realization 
may provide for the possibilities of personal development, education 
puts additional constraints on what normally might morally constrain 
what is acceptable in an individual's self-realization. 
The question still remains whether personal development as a 
separate term receives its criteria from the other terms in the general 
headings or whether personal development provides some additional 
criteria of its own. Two questions are implied here. The first is 
what do PSE, PSME, PSMHE etc pick out as distinctive in their contri- 
bution to what is educationally worthwhile? The second is what does 
personal development on its own pick out? At this point I want to 
make two preliminary observations. Firstly, education will not remain 
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uninfluenced by what exists or develops outside education, especially 
in our chosen areas of discussion. What is thought personally, morally 
or socially important outside education will begin to in-fluence the 
curriculum. It is platitudinous to say it at a time when the needs of 
industry and what is relevant to the economy are meant to guide curricu- 
lum practices. We have had examples earlier to illustrate this point. 
Secondly, the notion of personal development within education has a 
hisL. ory. I am not saying that it has only one history but I am saying 
that part of its history is that what it covered in schools and colleges 
had to be enlarged or modified. It had to be enlarged or modified 
because it covered certain things only too well or it failed to cover 
other things adequately. In short, personal development was thought 
to be too self-serving. Personal development centred on what I pre- 
viously referred to as 'Me, me, me'. The dimensions of social and 
moral experience had to be introduced into personal development - hence 
PSE, PSME etc. - because young people had to realize that they were 
social and moral beings as well as self-interested agents. One can 
see the changes as personal development becomes 'enriched' by 'personal 
relationships, in certain schemes in schools and colleges. 
I do not intend' this second point to be taken as a claim about a 
general chronological development from personal development to FSE or 
PSME. There was not personal development first and then social and 
moral development following to offset a one-sided development. One 
found in some'schools and colleges that personal development was con- 
ceptually and practically restricted and that more social and moral 
content needed to be added. Some would argue, rightly, that in many 
MSC schemes and such like, personal development is still conceptually 
and practically impoverished. It is a matter of inducing young people 
to shape their self-concept to a restricted opportunity structure in 
the economy. The taunt at such schemes, is that they dignify with 
high-sounding headings curriculum practices that are meant to provide 
fodder for industry and for the skivvying jobs in the service sector. 
It is, then, a matter of young people adjusting their self -interpretations 
to an attenuated human setting. It is also argued about such schemes 
that even when they try to be more expansive they get it wrong. They 
either promote self-empowerment which misses the reality of the lives 
of the young people or promote identity development and self-expression 
in terms of the young people's current values which fail to appreciate 
that these values may be insufficiently rich to be the basis of such 
identity formations and self-expression. 
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I might summarize these immediate points as follows. PS7 1 1-- 
and PSMHE pick out what the terms other than personal cover as their 
contribution to what is educationally worthy of pursuit. What is 
personal needs to draw its content from the terms social, moral and 
health. If the term personal draws its content from what is wider 
than what these terms cover, there is a requirement to indicate what 
areas of human thought and action is providing the content. As I have 
said, the term social can be extremely elastic in what it might cover. 
All manner of practical understanding and functional skills are caught 
in its net. The needs of industry and the economy are easily emtraced. 
But if the term social is elastic, it will be said that the term per- 
sonal is elastic too. What is person-like is pretty protean in its 
scope. I said above that the Human Potential Movement has been drawn 
on to provide content for what might feature in an individual's per- 
sonal development. Nevertheless I would maintain that the terms social, 
moral and health are the relevant constraints on what is personal in 
the educational curriculum. 
When the term personal is used in such headings as PSME etc. we 
need to note carefully just what content is implied, if it is not made 
explicit. What is person-like, then, is too wide to furnish the con- 
tent for PSME etc., because everything else in the curriculum would be 
encompassed by the term. But the important point is that we do not 
smuggle into PSME etc. what is less than personý-Iike. When I said that the 
personal is not a category like the terms social and moral, I meant 
that it is these latter terms that are person-like in the relevant sense. 
When personal refers to what is individual in a person's life, we need 
to know in what content area the individual finds its expression. 
When our thoughts rest on the individual person, we are not concerned 
with numerical individuality but with person-like individuality. 
Personal development is constrained by and takes its content from 
whatever additional items are included in the general headings of 
PSME 
etc. Am I treating such a suggestion as a hypothesis, a conceptual 
remark or a recommendation? If the suggestion is a hypothesis, 
then 
all items in PSME etc. lists should, in fact, display social, moral and 
health content, without remainder - without, that is, personal adding 
something of its own. This may be too strict, of course, 
but there 
needs to be some limits on what is included in such curriculum areas. 
I think, to all intents and purposes, the items do. I know personal 
qualities such as independence of mind and will and self-reliance 
appear in a monotonous regularity in the lists but I would suggest, 
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though,, that - these so-called personal q, _, Lal! _J-, 
ies are 
content-areas they are expressed in. In physics or econc. 1-cs, 
dence of mind will be encouraged when students halie bec 
the sull. 14 -ýorr ect, -, are about. They w411 be abl u 
within these areas of the curriculum. `e e Similarly, Z", -- 
and self-reliance will be interpreted within the content areas -::: -., ýed 
4 by social, moral ana health. Ae miý7h, - call these ýýenera_' =. -; e---- 
the mint . -general bu.. -, - they do not exist inaleepentently cf -. '--e area-z 
w -h they are exoressed. h i, have in fact mer-jone, ý ý'-ze Do-'ntcz 
previously. 
The difficulty with treating the claim as a conceptual -re-, a--k Is 
that we might simply be making a verbal point. lhino-s ma-i be i- or 
out by stipulative fiat. i- - 
We might simply say t, -, a4- person says 
that such and such is personal development, then we are not prep-ared 
to do so. If the stuff in MSC schemes is supposed to be personal, 
development then good luck to them or rather '--; ad luck cn, the 'placements'. 
3ut we should be saying more here. We imply that such stl_fff is not 
worthy of human pursuit. It is not sufficiently person-like to be 
classed as personal development. The claim would be t, -, a-,. the youno' 
people concerned are simply being- prepared for dehumanized or deper- 
sonalized forns of work or life, though it may be the case that we 
the wherewit'Inall Lor richer forms of litr7e in instrumental occupations. 
-ed -; -*'-n the claim is treated as a recommendation, it is connect 
the conceptual remark. I would, in L act, argue that if PSMEE etc. make 
Jcul a distinctive contribution to the school or college cur-r- um, it is 
in the moral dimensions of experience. I would want to -_i-ie moral a 
broad meaning but it. is in the moral that personal development is 1-0 te 
crucially found. This is not to take anyth-1 nE away what so-- 
health and so on contribute. Personal development is f 41- 1 led out by 
what is -social but I would suggest that it is in the mora; 1L 'r, . r. at P-S"4E' e'---. 
is grounded. But personal development as moral development need not 
simply be an additional subject in the time-table. On my -iiew of' what 
constitutes mora17 other subjects and the whole school ethos woul A make 
their contributions. The moral is a dimension of experience tn. a--_ ca-n- 
71- not be omitted in our lives. This is a conceptual remark. can 'Ile 
done badly, of course. 
The Self and Degrees and Kinds of Worth 
There is a tradition of thought, or rather several traditions of 
thought, that emphasize that there are higher, fuller or more developed 
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states of individual being inherent within the make-up of each 
4! -, z, 
_4-1 i "t , -I a'-, 
There is the possibility of progress from potentiality to actuality in 
a process of becoming what a person truly or really is. A person caýn 
become what he is not at present and this becoming is towards a personail%, 
higher or fuller condition. Now, such a characterization does not take 
us far in itself. It is a fact of life that under most cultural condi- 
tions most human beings mature into better examples of what they were at 
earlier stages of their individual development. Implied in the varieties 
of self-realization is the idea that there is the possibility for each 
individual of a better fit between what the individual is in his essence 
and what he might become as he moves through life. This essence may 
not be realized - that is, made real - in his life through various 
internal and external impediments. He may be deflected from becoming 
what he truly is as a distinct person. These may be psychological 
deficiencies or social and cultural shortcomings. 
It is difficult to give a neutral account of what self -realization 
consists in, because there are several different traditions which inter- 
pret the term in their own ways. The difficulty is compounded by the 
fact that there are several cognates of the term self-realization. 
Often self -development, self -fulf ilment, self -actualization - individua- 
tion, self-creation and personal development are used more or less 
interchangeably with self -realization and each other. I say more or 
less because each expression may bring its own nuance to the general idea. 
The question is not, then, what makes the individual the individual 
he is or to what an individual owes his individuality. It is rather 
what conditions are necessary for an individual's true self or real self 
to be made actual. In conditions of diverse cultural possibilitiesq an 
individual will achieve individual difference but this difference may be 
a very attenuated version of what he could become. Apart from which 
there might be a query against mere difference. What merit is there in 
the fact of individual difference, if the difference is not of inherent 
significance? Not much hangs on mere difference. Much 
individual 
difference is not even captured significantly in language and where it 
is it is the minor differences of an impoverished narcisism. It might 
be said that such minor differences are celebrated in and exploited 
by 
certain interests that make the idea of personal 
development serve 
their purposes. In most versions of self-realization, personal 
indi- 
vidualitY is taken as a datum. 
The question is, what is required to 
make the individual the individual 
he truly is? He is essentially 
something and this something 
is good and it needs to be brought out, so 
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the argument has it. We find these thoughts expressed in such 'ýD, -jla- 
tions as follows: A person should live his life according to his c. ý; n 
nature; A person should be encouraged to bring out in himself what - he 
has it in him to become; A person should develop his own pattern 
his own way. 
Underlying most of this talk is the idea that a person has resJdent 
within him an ideal of his own selfhood that would complete him in its 
realization. It is a question about the source of what should be the 
self-directed form and content of a person's life. Now, such an indivi- 
dualistic account needs modifying immediately, ,f or, there are those 
theorists who wish to make self -realization a collective achievement. 
Each individual realizes himself within a communal human inheritance. 
This inheritance can be interpreted in different ways. For example, 
it can be given a Romantic conservative interpretation or a Marxist 
revolutionary one. And these are not the only possibilities. I have 
already commented on these interpretations in Chapter 3. 
The crucial question here is that although I may impose some 
measure of some form and direction on my life, I seem unlikely to be 
the source of the content of my life. What, in fact, is the source of 
all those possibilities I can become? Just what can the disencumbered 
individual be the source of? Descartes thought that he was the source 
of his own self-presence, self-possession and self-clarity. It is 
true that he ultimately thought that he was not the source of his own 
existence. After rummaging through the contents of his own conscious- 
ness, he found the idea of God for whom he could not be the source of. 
We find this idea of an individual's being the source of his own self- 
identity recurring in various writers. That quintessential individual, 
Kierkegaard, claimed that 'Subjectivity is the truth'. (1941 ChIIP 182) 
Such subjectivity includes everything that each individual locates as 
immediately his own. (I have said that this immediacy is one aspect 
of what we mean by personal. ) It consists of all those Cartesian 
though t- contents of 'doubting, understanding, conceiving, affirming, 
denying, willing, refusing7 imagining and feeling'. (1954 Meditation II) 
But for Kierkegaard the ultimate content of a personts consciousness is 
God whose proper recognition by the individual is the foundation of 
individual fulfilment. It is the proper proximity to God that gives 
each person his maximum self-recognition and his eternal blessedness. 
Gerard Manley Hopkins, too, captures this fact of self-presence as follows: 
... When 
I consider myself being, my consciousness and 
feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of I and me above 
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and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste 
of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutlea-' 
or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man 
(as when I was a child I used to ask myself: What must i"I be 
to be someone else? ). Nothing else in nature comes near 
this unspeakable pitch stress of pitch, distinctiveness, a-., -' 
selving, this selfbeing of my own. (1976 p 139) 
Hopkins elsewhere uses a disguised Cartesian argument to show that 
this thisness, this haecceitasq points to a divine ground of it. An 
individual is not the ultimate source of this haecceitas of his own 
being. He experiences his self-identity in its immediacy but the fact 
of it is created by God. The fact of self-identifying consciousness 
has its conditions ultimately in God. There is nothing in the material 
universe, nor in the spiritual universe if we mean by this man's self- 
consciousness, that can account for personal being, except God. 
We might derive an idea of personal development from this intuitive 
understanding of the self which is disclosed in self-reflective presence. 
The development would consist in progressively disencumbering oneself of 
those accumulated false accretions that blind oneself to one's own 
haecceitas and the divine ground of it. It is a reciprocal process. 
The more one understands oneself, the more one understands God and vice 
versa. There is not meant to be blasphemy in such a statement, for 
God is much greater than we can conceive. The consequences of this 
process is that proper self-knowledge presupposes a knowledge of God 
and one's proper relationship with Him. Central to this relationship 
is the recognition that one is totally dependent on God and that one is 
essentially a sinner. This would be Kierkegaard's line of reasoning. 
Such a characterization of Christianity suggested to Kierkegaard that 
the rest of Chri stendom was in a state of self-misunderstanding. 
However, such a refined conception of selfhood would not be broad enough 
to encompass the fact that a person is a person only amongst his own 
kind. What is person-like is wider than a self-disclosed proximity to 
God. Yet such an achieved proximity would be a crucial determinant in 
the case of Kierkegaard of an individual's orientation to the rest of 
human experience. It would be a way, perhaps the way, of getting every- 
thing else in to a proper perspective. 
Pure individuality or pure self-presence is a kind of achievement. 
The assumed insight is that this pure individuality can know itself 
when it is empty of all other content. In Descartes 
the thought is 
about the status of the content. Until 
God is established, there is 
no guarantee that a posteriori knowledge is safe from doubt. 
But what, 
- 131 - 
in fact, does such a self -identifying consciousness amount to wit---uz 
its being intentionally directed on to some content, even if con- 
tent is etherial as God? (It might be said that God is not etheral 
if he is the God of Abraham and Isaac and so forth. It is the God of 
the philosophers who is unperson-like. ) However, I am not concerned 
here with the Wittgensteinian treatment of the notion of logical 
privacy attributed to Descartes. Such a logical privacy is incoherent 
for Wittgenstein. For the sake of argument I assume that the i, `- of 
self-identifying consciousness - the idea of a first-person present 
contentless 'I-experience' - is, possible. It is a limiting ca-e of 
pure self-presence. My point is that such an essentially contentless 
'I-experience' needs some content to be that of a person - that is, to 
be person-like - as the word person is understood within language. 
It is empty until some content is received from beyond itself. For 
Wittgenstein, until there is some publically defined content, and that 
includes the very idea of 'I-experience' the class of personhood is void. 
My point is simply that we need to 
-fix 
the term person-like so that we 
have criteria for what it is to develop as a person. 
My questions were, then, from whence does the self receive the 
content that forms its substance and what is that, out of which the 
self is made real when one is thinking of self -realization? If the 
self is all but a tabula rasa at birth and if experience "is the ulti- 
mate source of what is the content of ourselves, must the impulse to 
self-realization search the world of experience for its content? 
Some writers have spoken about going deep into the self for what would 
be the content of one's self-realization. There are two versions of 
this idea. One is scarcely intelligible, for it suggests that it is 
in the depth that we find the content, without, as it were, a reference 
to the public world of our collective cultural achievement. The other 
version is that we go deep to find our most authentic impulses and then 
search for a phenomenal form of experience or life in which we can give 
this depth expression. There are obvious difficulties in the distinc- 
tion between the 'deep self', if the idea is interpreted thus, and the 
phenomenal self. Is not the phenomenal self all there is? There 
might be aspects of it that an individual finds truer to himself but 
such a way of putting it might suggest a metaphysical true or real self. 
I will return to this point shortly. 
I will just say at present that Mozart did not create his beauti- 
fully original music in a cultural vacuum. And presumably, insofar 
as he was realized as a human being, he was realized in his music. 
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His music was a significant value in his life and he found par', of his 
fulfilment in it. Certainly, Gerard Manley Hopkins found meaning and 
fulfilment in a kind of 'enchanted' natural beauty, at least unt. -il his 
vitality failed him in his dark period. PThere lives the dearest, 
freshness deep down things; ') This last qualification does not add 
much, for we all cease to find meaning and fulfilment in nature and in 
human artifacts when we are too ill to respond to them. 
We might take some of the mystery out of self-realization by 
reinterpreting the terms real and true when they are applied to the 
self or properties of the self. I would suggest that we can redescribe 
what is meant by I real I and I true I in terms of degrees and kinds of 
distinctions of worth or as qualitative distinctions of worth as Charles 
Taylor puts it. (1985 p 9) If the terms real and true trade on the 
metaphor of depth, we need to stress that depth means that some values 
are more important or significant than others in our lives. Some 
values have a categoric or unconditional importance for us and these 
are our fixed points of reference in how we measure other things. 
For example, in the novel Odd Man Out by F. L. Green the mortally 
wounded IRA gunman reflects on his life and realizes that a false self 
has overlayed his more authentic self. There was a time in his life 
when there was afforded to him the possibility of a complete expression 
of his intellect and spirit. We might also say that his early 
Catholic upbringing had some influence on the kind of person he was. 
Green writes: 
He saw himself as he had been in the days of his boyhood and 
youth and early manhood, beyond an intervening gulf pre- 
occupied with foolish, material ideals that had no connection 
with the wonderful forces which had always excited his soul. 
10hP he lamented in himself, !I have squandered years 
upon foolish fancies! I have wasted my life! I have never 
given my real strength to anything worthwhile! ' 
But he knew, too, that he had done only as the rest of 
mankind had done. 
'We are all alike, ' he thought. 'There are beautiful 
forces in us, truly glorious things, but we lack faith in 
ourselves to accomplish the full expression of those things. 
Indeed, we squander our power in trivial affairs, trivial 
and bitter pursuits. ' 
Then his soul regretted its lost opportunities, and he 
tried to find the strength wherewith to tell the three men 
in the room of the miraculous, abundant powers that resided 
in their souls and bodies and which could be rendered to 
exquisite purposes if they would only have sufficient faith 
in themselves. (1945 p 230) 
// 
- 13.1 I 
These powers of the mind and soul, of course, would need a conten-- 'or 
their expression. Similar thoughts to these occur several pages later. 
The gunman had been pursued by the police and he was now cornered. He 
is proud, defiant, fearless in his soul: 
His shout was loud, clear, a cry of triumph over all the 
baseless fears that had ever beset him and influenced his 
life and rendered it small and viscious and stupid. it 
sundered the bonds that had constrained his emotional 
spirit, casting away the foulness of them and releasing him 
at last, so that he saw the sordid garments and felt a 
strange pity for his futile life. The pity was contrition; 
and. his heart held it until it faded as the echo of his 
shouts soon faded. (P 255) 
His reflections on the wasted years is again interupted by the police 
closing in. The narrator continues: 
From the last ripples of his life as a renegrade in conflict 
with governments and the Police, the old impulses of self- 
defiance moved him. The cunning, the sly ruses, the 
bluffing and threats, all impelled him. But now, for the 
first time and the last time, he was without the strength 
to obey them. 
He knew it. He knew that this was the end. Another 
hour at most would have sufficed for the little flame of his 
life to sink and expire in peace. He knew that, too. And 
with immeasurable regret he realized that his death was to 
be characteristic of his violent life. (p 255) 
I would suggest that when we use the terms 'real' and 'true' to 
characterize what is real and true in us, as opposed to what is mereiv 
apparent even though we attach ourselves to self-delusory appearances, 
what we are doing is making qualitative distinctions of worth. if 
we are required to say what we mean, we should redescribe such words 
as real and true, when they are used in the above constructions, in 
terms of what is properly worthy of our pursuit. Of course, earlier 
in the novel, the gunman spoke about the discipline and honour in his 
life as an opponent of the government and the Police. (It needs to 
be said that the incidents in the novel took place long before the 
current troubles in Ireland. ) He contrasts this discipline and honour 
in his own life with the values that his lover lives by. It needs to 
be said that this woman who loves him also dies with him at the end of' 
the novel. However7 for him, his lover is a beautiful and sensuous 
woman, who is pledged to her own sensuality. In her sensual nature 
there is no room for his conceptions of discipline and honour. Whereas 
his identity is bound up with what he requires to be a patriotic fighter, 
.. / 
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her identity is bound up with her sensuality. He comes to realize 
that he is wrong about his own deepest impulses and he is wrong, 
he realizes it or not, about his lover's impulses and feelings. ',,, 'hat 
makes it wrong in both cases is that he misidentifies what values are 
and should be operative in both their lives. We might say tha-,, such 
novels have large elements of anti-B il dungs roman formative experiences 
in them. The question is whether, after all the tribulations of the 
gunman, there is a certain human fullness in the denouement of the novel. 
My point is that when we speak about real or true selves, we are talking 
about what values are the touchstones in peoples lives and how people 
measure themselves, too, in terms of them. Such values are bound up 
with our self-knowledge, because the measure of us is how we stand in 
relation to the values we genuinely hold, even when these values are 
hidden from us in self-deception. It may be years before we are self- 
clairvoyant about the values we hold. 
Personal Development and Self-Realization 
As a bold statement I would say that we realize ourselves in what 
we value. But we need to interpret value as what is good rather than 
what we simply desire or prefer. We do, of course, desire and prefer 
what is good as well as, perhaps, what is not. It is what is good 
that orientates, or perhaps what ought to orientate, our desires and 
preferences. I would argue that it is in the different degrees and 
kinds of worth in which our values reside. If 'betterness' is the 
fundamental insight, our values are on a scale from better to worse 
and are in what is intrinsically better. As I say this is a bold 
statement and I shall return to give a fuller account of it. But it 
is clear that we fulfil ourselves in what is of value. So when we 
talk about what content is furnished by our real selfhood or true 
personhood for us to achieve our fuller and higher realized states, we 
talk about those qualitative distinctions of worth that are internal 
to our values. 
When the gunman in the novel Odd Man Out locates himself, if only 
briefly, in what he thinks to be his true nature, he returns to values 
with which he identified in the earlier years of his life. Under 
threat, though, he found himself attempting to respond in terms of a 
self, that is, a configuration of survival responses, that were fashioned 
when he took on new commitments. The disposition to respond in terms 
of 'cunning, sly ruses, the bluffing and threats' failed him. It must 
be said, to return to my earlier discussion, that for some people this 
/ 
- 135 - 
is what surviving or coping amounts to in the ordinary world of exper-4- 
ence. As teachers we are perhaps helpless when it comes to an indiv-'- 
dual's personal development as a whole, especially when moral and educý- 
tional values go against the grain of a whole way of life. 1ý; e might 
tly 4_ f say here that personal development does not occur significan a 
person is not moving onward and upward in accordance with certain stan- 
dards. We may here simply be making a verbal point. 
We begin at this point to ask a series of questions about the 
nature of' self -realization and its close relatives. Which values do 
I reaiize or actualize myself in? How do-I tell whether I am realized 
or actualized? These questions are about what it is to be realized 
and about how we know. We ask further questions: what is the nature 
of the self that is made real?; and what is the nature of that which 
realizes it? I have said that a publically unconstituted self cannot 
provide the content for its own realization. In self-creation we do 
not create ourselves as though we bring ourselves into existence. We 
do not bring ourselves exnihilo into existence nor do we create our 
exact doubles. To put the worst construction on it, it is not as 
though we are our own Dr Frankensteins. As ongoing projects, though, 
we are self-creative. We must take self-creation to mean that we 
constitute ourselves, as developing persons, by trying to live in 
accordance with what we identify as our affinities. We create, realize 
or actualize ourselves by attempting to fulfil ourselves, to find mean- 
ing in, to be at home in and to find ourselves in those dimensions of 
experience and departments of life that strike cords within us - we 
might say, educated cords within us. We flourish, if we are fortunate, 
in those values in which we find affinities. The self and what it 
finds fulfilment in are strongly connected. I have not forgotten that 
the term values is often*difficult to handle. Some pursuits are 
worthy of us and others not and other values might be overriding. I 
have already said that what we consider to be moral values are a con- 
dition on other values. 
We also use other expressions when we try to capture what our 
fuller or higher satisfactions might consist in. We say we know our- 
selves best when we actively pursue what we consider to be intrinsically 
worthwhile or we feel most alive and real when we are nourished by our 
cultural artifacts or when we are engrossed in our work or vocations. 
David Wiggens captures some of the spirit of these points when he 
argues that it is in metaethics that we find the best way for us to 
understand ourselves better. He means by the statement that it is in 
/ 
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this second order discourse that we can best elucidate what are 
values that fulfil us best. We understand who we are most fruit-fulli-y 
when we find meaning in those activities that are intrinsically wort, ý- 
while. Furthermore, what we say about these activities have a 'Lruth- 
status, that is, we can say of those intrinsically worthwhile activities 
that they have an objective status. Wiggens says that the 'questions 
of truth and the meaning of life really are the central questions of 
moral philosophy'. (1976 p 331) He does consider what he calls the 
Icasuisty of emergencies' - the question of 'What shall we do? ' - but 
it is in the meaning of life and the truth-claims we can make about 
this meaning that our good is to be found. (pp. 331-2) Although 
Wiggens queries the certainty of purpose that attached to human pro- 
jects in ages when certainties could be held with better conscience 
than today, he does indicate what we mean by truth and the meaning of 
life. He quotes from two letters sent by Mozart to respectively 
Padre Martini and his father: 
We live in this world to compel ourselves industriously to 
enlighten one another by means of reasoning and to apply 
ourselves always to carrying forward the sciences and the 
arts. (p 332) 
I wish you as many years as are needed to have nothing 
left to do in music. (p332) 
It is a question, then, of how we know ourselves best in what values 
and how we discriminate amongst these values. 
Often the expressions personal development, self-realization, 
self-actualization, self-creation and self-development are run together. 
It is not certain what they independently pick out as those values that 
should be developed, realized and so forth in our lives. However, if 
the source of the content we realized or fulfilled in does not come 
from within ourselves in any fundamental sense but comes from culture, 
we still need to consider what ranges of cultural experience is appro- 
priate for our realization or fulfilment. When I said above that there 
are natural affinities between us and what we are realized or fulfilled 
in, it might be thought that these are a source within ourselves after 
all - namely the source of our uninhibited response to what is outside 
US. I would wish to say here that at this level our affinities are 
intuitive. By intuitive I mean that we have reached some ultimate 
responsive orientation to what is valued and that this orientation does 
not owe its justification to anything more ultimate. 
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It might be that an individual can be shown that his fulf--lment 
does not lie where he thinks it does but corrections cannot go on for 
ever. It is hard to believe that Mozart's fulfilment in music co, ýld 
be corrected. There might though be a conflict between his absorbtion 
in Music and his responsibilities and affection to his family. Some 
people might argue here that morality is not a condition on the pursuit 
of excellence in music. We need only think of Gauguin. However, my 
point here is that there may be an explanation of our intuitive res- 
ponses to what is good at other levels in our natures but at the sur- 
face level, as it were, there are no further justifications for these 
responses. Another example is that we may feel that there is an 
ultimacy in the meaning and value of the thought that God looked upon 
the great whales and saw that they were good. It is in such meaning 
and value that we find our good. 
If self-realization and its cognates, (and, as I have said, I 
take personal development in some of its uses to parallel self- 
realization) mean that each one of us is enjoined to beýcome the person 
one potentially or truly is, the person needs to consider what such a 
realization might be expressed in. John Stuart Mill, of course, had 
no transcendental sanction to make good his claim that one should pur- 
sue higher pleasures. He simply characterized as higher those 
pleasures that were experienced as better in the light of a full and 
complete experience of these as compared with those pleasures that 
were then classed as lower. Puskin is better than pushpin, because 
those who have experienced both assent to the former as higher. 
Each thinker will pick out those goods that he thinks we are 
realized in and which are expressive of our higher humanity. But 
when each thinker is pressed he will deny that he can identify our 
best good in the latency state. It is only after we are realized 
that we can say wherein our self-realization consists. The 'hidden' 
potential is retrospectively said to have been the individual's true 
self, when the individual is now in his realized state. Carl Jung, 
for example, no matter what he said about his inner precipitations 
towards his vocation and therefore towards his individuation, can only 
say retrospectively that he realized his 'self'. This is not to say 
that an individual does not feel frustrations and arrested development 
in his efforts to realize himself when he has some understanding where 
he thinks his fulfilment lies. I am speaking about those conceptions 
which use the metaphor of the self's being like the finished sculp- 
ture already present in the block of stone. 
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But what about all those people whose lives may have gone one . 1; ay 
rather than another because of inner or outer obstacles. It is true 
that they may have found something in their lives to be glad about. 
Yet what may they have achieved if things had gone otherwise? T he 
point is they may not know, or at least they are not presented with two 
pictures before their minds - the picture of what they could have 
become juxtaposed against the picture of what they are. Is the test 
of the realized condition that we now judge that we feel fulfilled in 
what we now judge to be our good? The Marxist will respond immediately 
and remind us that there is such a thing as false consciousness. We 
are capable of conniving at our own impoverished condition and fail to 
identify our real interests. It is at this point, too, that Antony 
Flew will argue that interests are like. needs; others can claim that 
they know better than we do where our interests lie. 
In the last few pages I have indicated how some writers would give 
content to the idea of self-realization. Most writers on this subject 
state that there is a preferred setting for what they conceive to be 
the good life. Those who do not state it imply it. As human beings 
we occupy different 'environments' and hope to find fulfilment in them. 
I include those 'metaphysical' environments in which religious writers 
try to locate our highest or final good. We know or feel ourselves 
best, so the thought proceeds, in certain social or cultural settings 
rather than others Or when our lives fall under rich self-interpretations 
rather than those thought to be'less rich. A multiple reference is 
made to what values are judged to fulfil a person, to a setting in which 
these values can be realized and to ideas about what may go wrong or 
what has gone wrong to prevent these values being realized in an indi- 
vidual's life. We are speaking then about what a person essentially 
is and about what setting he properly belongs to. I have redescribed 
such talk in terms of what values are worthy of our pursuit and in what 
settings they are brought to fruition. What is really or truly our- 
selves is interpreted in those values. In the immediate pages that 
follow and in the following chapters I assume that something like this 
frame of reference is at work in those writers and thinkers that to 
whom I refer. I should now like to look at five traditions of thought 
that incorporate self-realization as an organizing idea. These five 
traditions are in no way exhaustive of the interpretation of self- 
realization but they indicate the general drift of how we might inter- 
pret the term. 
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1. Romantic Self-Discovery is the tradition that emphasizes what tne 
individual's true self consists in. This tradition would repuýiate 
any attempt to characterize the good for the individual in general 
terms. The individual is unique and falls outside any universal c-, ara--- 
terization. An innate pattern belongs to each individual and he is 
driven to go within himself to discover it. I use the metaphor above 
about the completed piece of sculpture as already being present within 
the stone to present a picture of what the ideal is in this conception 
of self-realization. Each person is his own piece of sculpture. The 
individual is not self-created or self -constituted in the sense that he 
explores the external world for his good. He explores what is within 
himself and attempts to reveal its contours. There is some kind of 
distinctive telos inside that awaits realization. Each person is 
special and a 'real me' awaits each individual in his future, provided 
the appropriate nursery is identified for the realization of what is 
within. An extreme type of individualism would suggest that the nur- 
sery is also within the nature of the individual himself. On the 
other hand, a headmaster in his brochure for his newly 'opted-out' 
school would say it is his school which is the proper nursery. 
There is a strong affective aspect to this tradition. We do not 
know ourselves best in reason or choice but in feeling. Feeling 
directs us to what we are realized in and tells us when we have got 
there. The Human Potential Movement, that epitomizes the Me-generation, 
has carried on this tradition to some extent insofar as people are 
encouraged to reflect on their hopes, fears, joys, anger, frustrations, 
pain, trust, mistrust7 guilt, sexual promptings, sexual phobias and so 
forth. By thus dwelling on and scrutinizing them, people come to 
recognize, differentiate, appropriate and own the ones that go with 
the grain of who they think they basically are. There is less emphasis 
on disavowing these inner urges, feelings and so on. The philosophy 
is let it all hang out. I can recall examples of such self-discovery 
sessions within education. A self-discovery component was part of a 
personal development programme at a college of education. 
One person 
came to 'recognize' his true sexual self and 'appropriated' 
it. it 
led to the break-up of his family and a sex change. It hardly needs 
saying, again, that such notions filter down in one form or another 
into personal development programmes in schools and colleges. 
What Schleiermacher said is often quoted to characterize the idea 
of romantic self-discovery. I take the quotation from 
Lukes: 
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(I)t became clear to me that each man ought to represent 
humanity in himself in his own different way, by his own 
special blending of its elements, so that it should reveal 
itself in each special manner, and, in the fulness of 
space and time, should become everything that can emerge 
as something individual out of the depths of itself. (1973 p 6-) 
It is interesting in this passage, that the writer speaks about the 
individual's representing humanity in himself and blending its elements 
in him. I take it that the depths are in humanity, in the generic 
features of what is person-like, rather than in the pre-human indivi- 
dual. 
It is obvious that I will come back to my claim that no matter 
how much this tradition emphasizes the uniquely inscribed pattern and 
telos within each individual, it is in terms of the content of the 
public world that individual difference finds its realization. it 
can take odd forms though. We might say that theorizing about self- 
discovery, including educational theorizing, helps to create the 
phenomenon of self-discovery that it seeks to characterize. 
Expressivism is characterized by Charles Taylor in the following 
manner: 
The conception of human life which I call lexpressivist' ... 
is part of a reaction to (associationist psychology, 
utilitarian ethics, atomistic politics of social engineering, 
and ultimately-a mechanistic science of man). It is a 
rejection of the view of human life as a mere external 
association of elements without intrinsic connection ... 
Expressivism returns to the sense of the intrinsic value 
of certain actions or modes of life ... and these actions 
or modes of life are seen as wholes, as either true 
expressions, or distortions of what we authentically are. 
(1975 p 539) 
The idea is that there is an internal connection between what we express 
and the vehicle of its expression. There is a pull towards 
the harmony 
between inner feeling and outward expression. An impulse may exist 
within me to express something in words or paint but I progressively 
know that the nature of what I have the impulse to express will be in 
the expressing of it. As an individual writer or painter, or simply 
as a language user in the everyday world, I make manifest what 
I want 
to say in the chosen vehicle of its expression. There are not 
two 
processes though - one finished in the mind and the other made 
to match 
it. I partly come to know what I want to express only by means of the 
medium of its expression. The individual is firmly resident 
in the 
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modes of expression and forms of life that are expressive of who -- is. 
Some writers want to argue for a strong version of express' vism. 
F. H. Bradley, the English Idealist philosopher, argues that the c---- 
munity is the only proper vehicle of the individual's expressive 
behaviour. There is an internal expressive relation between t, ne 
individual and the social institutions that regulate his moral life. 
For all of us, it is in our station and duties that we find out who we 
are. Everything hangs on just what the vehicle is of our expressive 
behaviour. An individual artist is expressively active in his chosen 
medium. Except in those extreme forms of self-expressive activJty 
where an attachment to standards within a tradition of art is explicitly 
rejected, an individual artist or thinker will consciously draw on the 
resources within a tradition. Where an artist or thinker does not, he 
defines what he creates against this or that tradition. Dada is an 
example of a movement in art that consciously defines itself against 
all previous art forms and against all those values that were supposed 
to d_efine our humanity but yet precipitated us into the horror of the 
First World War. 
But where an individual draws on a tradition it does not mean that 
he is engulfed by that tradition. We might say that in Bradley's 
interpretation of tradition the individual is engulfed within it and 
that is a merit. The community, and the State for that matter, is 
that in which the individual is who he is. In this sense the indivi- 
dual has no independent access to alternatives to that tradition. 
Where he appears to have such an alternative, he is either under a 
misapprehension or it would be better if the alternative were absent. 
His mode of access to his human setting is what the human setting pro .- 
vides for that access. The expressive relation between him and his 
community is strongly communitarian. 
Expressivism is a reaction against the disenchanted, atomistic 
world of instrumental rationality. The main charge against expressi- 
vism in its strong form is that there is a pull towards authoritarianism 
or even totalitarianism. The self and the community is in expressive 
congruence but the cost is freedom and individual inventiveness. The 
self in an atomized and instrumental society may not be underwritten by 
a world that reflects back to him his own image but he lives authenti- 
cally, truthfully and freely in such a disenchanted world. Further- 
more, if this is how reality is, we cannot without massive self- 
deception or political manipulation pretend that the world or our part 
of it is enchanted. We might discover separate expressive media in 
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which we find a measure of expressive reciprocity but these mecia-, - 
not themselves expressive of the nature of things. 
We can readily see that expressivism is far removed from what is 
; -k4 called child-centred self-expression. The latter notion is more __ 
to romantic self-discovery. Within this self-expressive educational 
movement expressive activity is meant to be independent of what tradi- 
tion imposes. But expressivism centres on what traditions or com- 
munities we are expressive within. And to this extent an indiviýual 
may not know what he wants to express until he is within a tradition 
that provides him with the means of expression. He is on a voyage of 
self-discovery but he discovers himself in an independently existing 
cultural content. An example would be one in which an individual tries 
to capture the nuance of an unarticulated feeling. He needs an inter- 
locutory context in which to bring it to expression. A new situation 
with unfamiliar people may prompt undefined responses. It may only be 
later that he comes to know what he felt when other people help him to 
identify these feelings. Was the unease embarrassment, fear, admira- 
tion or something else? 
Education is both personal exploration and the initiation into an 
unknown intellectual or artistic territory. We do not necessarily 
mean to tally unknown. There are connections between ordinary experi- 
ence and academic or formal learning. However, it is still debated 
at what stage in an individual's development a constitutionally pro- 
gramMed pattern of intellectual or artistic response begins to be 
effectively informed by cultural traditions of different kinds. It is 
difficult to talk about what is constitutionally programmed, whether it 
be in terms of biology or genetics, because it is not easy to know what 
and individual owes to his nature and what he owes to his nurture. 
Some writers speak about our collective nature in contrast to our 
collectively achieved culture. I mention this anthropological debate 
only to return to my point that self-expression means little if we do 
not begin to express what is absorbed from culture. But, as I have 
also repeated, individual exploration counts for something. In our 
culture, at least, individual difference is constitutive of what it is 
to be a person. 
Having said this, I want to return to expressivism because it 
leads into the idea of personal development within the tradition of 
the Bildungsroman novel. Isaiah Berlin captures what expressivism is 
after in the following passage about Vico, the Neapolitan writer ot' 
the Eighteenth Century. Vico saw that human history: 
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Vid not consist merely of things and events and t*, -ir 
consequences and sequences (including those of human 
organisms viewed as natural objects) as the external world did; it was the story of human activities, of what men did and thought and suffered, of what they strove for, 
aimed at, rejected, conceived, imagined, of what their 
feelings were directed at. It was concerned, therefore, 
with motives, purposes, hopes, fears, loves and hatreds, 
jealousies, ambitions, outlooks and visions of reality; 
with the ways of seeing, and ways of acting and creating, 
of individuals and groups. These activities we knew 
directly, because we were involved in them as actors, not 
spectators. There was a sense, therefore, in which we knew more about ourselves than we knew about the external 
world ... (1980 p 95) 
The important point to notice is that Vico is writing about what I 
previously called the Lebenswelt. There is then an internal connec- 
tion between Lebenswelt and what it is to be a person. I(T)hings 
and events and their consequences and sequences' belong to the natural 
world and this world is not habitable by persons. If our lives 
approximate to one-thing-after-another, without any significance attach- 
ing to what happens, we lose a sense of ourselves. A handshake or a 
kiss can be expressive of love, friendship, affection, camaraderie, or 
the bonds of honour or honour betrayed in the Mafia- Without culture 
there can. be no such expressive behaviour. I mention the last expres- 
sive behaviour because it would be better for many people were such 
behaviour not culturally extant. This is a moral judgement and these 
judgements have no place within nature. Language, of course, is the 
supreme expressive medium. 
But we are shaped as persons by such expressive behaviour. The 
Bildungsroman novel is about what we need to undergo if we are to grow 
up. The word Bildung captures both what we need to undergo culturally 
in order to grow up and what kind of individuals we grow into. We 
need to be reared into our prejudices as Burke would say. Our mode 
of access to the human world is to take on the properties of the human 
world. Without these prejudices we should be the inhabitants of a 
world of events and causal sequences. But we need to ask which pro- 
perties and which prejudices? 
The term Bildungsroman applies to those novels about the formation 
of an individual's personality. It is exemplified above all in 
Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship. In English, Tom Jones 
would be an example of the Bildungsroman novel. In its ideal form the 
novel tells a story of an individual's gradual initiation into his 
cultural inheritance. The initiation is meant to bring about a con- 
/1 
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gruance between his inmost self and outside reality. T--- central 
figure passes through the years of adolescence and early manhood in a 
variety of situations that are meant to enhance, heighten and transform 
his make-up so that he can reside in his human world as a mature adulý_. 
He proceeds to adulthood through inner effort and guided outside 
influence. The novel is developmental in the sense that the individual 
takes on the qualities and attributes of his culture and then finds 
expressive fulfilment in what culturally matches these qualities and 
attributes. 
The tradition owes much to the ideas we find *in the religious 
quest or vocation. Christian soteriology is about the ideal at the 
end of time, about universal judgement. There are secular versions 
of this idea of salvation. Marxism posits a unitary line to a utopian 
conclusion. However, in the Bildungsroman novel the end tends to be 
adulthood. An individual has been shaped to get the most out of his 
historical situation as possible. Fulfilment is imminent in culture 
and not transcendent in Heaven. Our hero/pilgrim does not progress 
to a world outside this one. The virtues he acquires are part of what 
he needs to live well in his human world and not to help him strive to 
leave the rake behind, at least not in a theological sense, as he moves 
onwards and upwards. It might be argu-ed though that the Bildungsroman 
novel is dependent on the theological concepts of status viatoris and 
status comprehensoris. The individual is on his way to his fulfilment 
in the Beatific Vision. (See Pieper 1986 pp 11-21) Perhaps it is no 
coincidence that the word Bildung is said to have its roots in German 
mystical literature in which the image of God in man is to be made real 
in actual men. 
The following is an extract from a Thomas Mann lecture on the 
Bildungsroman tradition. The quotation is in Louis Dumont's Essays on 
Individualism: 
The finest characteristic of the typical German, the best- 
known and also the most flattering to his self-esteem, is his 
inwardness. It is no accident that it was the Germans who 
give to the world the intellectually stimulating and very 
humane literary form which we call thenovel of personal culti- 
vation and development. Western Europe has its novel of 
social criticism to which the Germans regard this other type 
as their own special counterpart; it is at the same time an 
autobiography, a confession. The inwardness, the culture 
(Bildung) of a German implies introspectiveness; an indivi- 
dualistic cultural conscience, consideration for the careful 
tending, the shaping, deepening and perfecting of one's own 
personality or, in religious terms, for the salvation and 
justification of one's own life; subjectivism in the things 
/ 
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of the mind, therefore, a type of culture that might be 
called pietistic, given to autobiographical confession ant 
deeply personal, -one 
in which the world of the objectiie, 
the political world, is felt to be profane and is thrust 
aside with indifference, "because, " as Luther says, "this 
external order is of no consequence. " What I mean by all 
this is that the idea of a republic meets with resistance 
in Germany chiefly because the ordinary middle-class man 
here, if he ever thought about culture, never considered 
politics to be part of it, and still does not do so today. 
To ask him to transfer his allegiance from inwardness to 
the objective, to politics, to what the peoples of Europe 
call freedom, would seem to him to amount to a demand that 
he should do violence to his own nature, and in fact give 
up his sense of national identity. (1986 pp 138-139) 
Mann came to see that there were many dangers in setting German 
culture against civilization, community against contractual society, 
hierarchy against equality and liberal democracy, the soil against 
reason and the absorbtion into prejudice against the responsibility of 
choice. Mann works these ideas out in his own Bildungsroman novel, 
The Magic Mountain, but there is no easy transition to the adult world 
in which the individual finds his harmonious destiny. Hans is preci- 
pitated onto the battle-fields in the First World War, after a very 
uneven education. 
The important point is that there is no obvious world in which we 
can find that inner peace that reflects our harmony with external 
reality. We are just as likely to find our fulfilment within the 
institutions of democratic politics as in the certainties of the 
inwardness of German culture. 
Lying behind a great deal of what is implied in expressivism is 
the thought that some things are more expressive of our natures than 
others. Atomistic, disenchanted and disengaged liberal society robs 
us of our belongingness, so it is thought. And it is presupposed that 
belongingness is superior to disengagement. 
3. Autonomous Self-Development singles out choice as the important 
organizing concept in self-realization. In its Existentialist version, 
we create ourselves by our choices. 
we exercise our capacity to choose. 
We are not truly anything until 
Choice is fundamental and in the 
Sartrean view of Existentialism there is no attempt to elaborate a 
bridge between volition and rationality. 
Here I am not so much concerned with choice in this sense as I am 
with John Stuart Mill's idea of self-development. Mill gives choice 
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a prominence in his notion of self-development but, - choice is nct 
less. Human beings have natural faculties that can be cultivate--ý ant 
unfolded. But these faculties are embedded in traditions of 'ýInouL-ht 
and practice. It is a matter of human beings realizing their h=,: n 
endowment in conditions of opportunity and choice. Mill says, dra-xTinE 
on Wilhelm von Humboldt, that: 
II(T)he end of man, or that which is prescribed by the 
eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested 
by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most 
harmonious development of his powers to a complete and 
consistent whole; " that, therefore, the object "towards 
which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, 
and on which especially those who design to influence their 
fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality 
of power and development; " that for this there are two 
requisites, "freedom, and variety of situations; " and that 
from the union of these arise "individual vigour and mani- 
fold diversity, " which combine themselves in "originality. " 
(1972 pp 115-116) 
It can be seen that reason is important- in self -development. But 
man's endowment, for Mill, is more than reason in a narrow sense. 
Self -development demands that individuals have the right to pursue 
their own good in. their own way. There are a stock of possibilities 
in society that an individual can draw on for his self-development. 
It is interesting that Mill in his concern for the cultivation of the 
best that is found in human reason, feeling and imagination should find 
a place for those impulses that are the foundation of religion. Mill's 
Essays on Religion, which appeared postumously, brought this response 
from Halevy: 'There are hints in Stuart Mill of an original nature 
which was sentimental and almost religious, and which was not made for 
the purely intellectual and abstract system imposed on it since child- 
hood'. I take this quotation from J. 0. Urmson (1967 p 272). 
The emphasis on autonomous self-development is on the freely 
chosen development of individuality based on how generic humanity works 
its chemistry on us. If we interpret personal development as self- 
development, in the Millean sense, all aspects of the school curriculum 
are part of personal development. We are enjoined, given the oppor- 
tunity, to develop our powers in manifold ways. 
4. Rational Eudaimonia stresses that man is essentially a rational 
being. Eudainonism has been resurrected in recent times as a kind of 
self -realization in a general sense, similar to Mill's notion of self- 
/ 
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development. It has been taken up as a quasi-moral, quasi-aes-,. ýet` 
and intellectual ideal of human development. Here I want to stress 
the rational nature of man in the Aristotelian tradition, because -f'or 
ýý 4, 
_ some contemporary writers it is reason which is the distinguis. nýl 
feature of man's make-up that gives him his unique distinctiveness. 
Man is endowed with a specific nature, a distinctive ergon, a proper 
telos to which he naturally progresses. Man's highest achievement, 
his summun bonum, is to realize his rational faculties. Aristotle 
argued that there are two aspects to reason. One is-theoria, the 
faculty of rational contemplation, the highest object of which is God. 
Theoria is concerned with abstract, intellectual knowledge. In Plato 
it is developed to its highest degree when we achieve the intuitive 
grasp of the 'intelligible, eternal Forms'. A charge against Aristotle 
is that he makes all endeavours converge on the dominant aim of theoria, 
that is, the contemplation and apprehension of God. It leaves all 
other human pursuits in a subordinate position. 
But reason also guides action and feeling. We share many non- 
rational features with animals but it is in reason that we achieve our 
fullest being. Reason, then, can be practical. It interprets all 
else in our make-up. To realize the best possible life, reason should 
order human goods into proper relationships with each other. Some are 
superior and some are subordinate. Bentham, for example, gave 
pleasures no particular order. They had no meaningful relationship 
to each other. But reason should be used to impose coherence on an 
individual's life. Reason, then, is the key idea in this version of 
self-realization. But reason tends to be universal and it detracts 
from the uniqueness of individuals as conceived by romantic self- 
discovery. 
5. Homo Faber - Man-the-Maker highlights the 
fact that man is a 
producer above all else. He finds himself in his labour. In Marx, 
man's 'species being' is grounded in his capacity to produce artefacts. 
He makes himself in his productive activities and consciousness 
itself 
is produced thereby. We know ourselves best when we create, 
invent 
and produce. There is a should in Marx. Men should produce 
those 
artefacts that reflect back at him his own nature. 
He should not 
produce all goods for exchange and in the process become alienated 
from his best nature. Marx was, in these respects, at one with the 
Utopian Socialists such as William Morris. In other respects, though, 
he thought these socialists to be mere pamphleteers and sermonizer3. 
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However, in the respect of work, Marx agreed with them that men -4 .. 
produce beautiful objects for their own sake, that is, for the sa-ke of 
creativity. 
Labour should not, therefore, be seen as a cost of production, a 
disutility that makes men external to themselves. Labour should be 
seen as expressive of men's essential nature. It should be an expres- 
sive externalization of his creative impulses. My point, here, is to 
present a picture of that tradition of self-realization that emphasizes 
work as distinctive of man. Man is a tool-maker and makes himself in 
the process of making tools. He makes himself also in what the tools 
create. Reason and choice are located in the wider context of man's 
embroilment with the stuf f of the material world. 
Self -realization and the terms that tend to be used interchange- 
ably with it stress that individuals have potentialities and capacities 
that tend not to be made real in many conditions of life. It is 
obvious that we cannot r_ealize what we have not the potentialities and 
capacities to realize. So self-realization refers to what we can in 
fact realize in our lives if we create the conditions that makes such 
self-realization possible. It goes without saying that we should not 
realize nor encourage others to realize those possibilities for ill. 
I know when I say this that some will say that I beg many questions, 
because what we conceive ill to be may well be contested. However, 
when we reflect on self-realization, self-development and so forth, we 
might bear in mind pictures of the unrealized state of men. I quote 
the following from a book of essays by Stuart Hampshire. This is what 
Schiller says in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. In 
the sixth letter he wrote: 
With us moderns the image of the race is scattered ... in a 
fragmentary way, so that you have to go the rounds from 
individual to individual in order to gather the totality of 
the race. With us, one may be inclined to assert, the 
mental faculties show themselves detached in operation, as 
psychology separates them in idea, and we see not merely 
individual persons, but whole classes of human beings, 
developing only a part of their capacities, while the rest 
of them, like a stunted plant, show only a feeble vestige 
of their nature. ... It was culture 
itself that inflicted 
this wound upon modern humanity. As soon as enlarged 
experience and more precise speculation made necessary a 
sharper division of the sciences on the one hand, and, on 
the other, the more intricate machinery of states made 
necessary a more rigorous dissociation of ranks and occupa- 
tions, the essential bond'of human nature was torn about, 
and a ruinous conflict set its harmonious powers at 
variance. ... Man 
(now) never develops the harmony of his 
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being, and instead of imprinting humanity upon his nature, 
he becomes merely the imprint of his occupation, of his 
science. ... And so gradually individual concrete life is 
extinguished, in order that the abstract life of the whole 
may prolong its sorry existence. (1969 pp 190-191) 
Hampshire rightly says that Schiller did not confine himself to the 
denunciation of the way that our lives are fragmented under certain 
OM4 social and econ LC circumstances. Hampshire, then, continues to 
quote Schiller: 
Partiality in the exercise of powers, it is true, inevitably 
leads the individual into error, but the race to truth. 
(1969 p 191) 
I am reminded here that Edmund Burke said that the specimen is foolish 
but the species is wise. This wisdom for Burke was embodied in our 
political and social institutions. He meant that when men attempted 
to order their affairs by appealing to the abstract principles of 
equality, liberty, justice 
' 
and so forth without reference to the accu- 
mulated wisdom in their institutions, they would cause social, economic 
and political chaos. 
But since Schiller's time, cognitive growth and its technological 
spin-off has been huge. Humanity has gained by much of this know- 
ledge and technology but our moral wisdom may not have kept pace with 
such developments. Goethe has said, for example, that 'Truth is what 
it befits a man to know'. When the first atomic bomb was exploded in 
New Mexico in 1945, one of the scientists remarked, when he saw what 
power had been released by the bomb, that he had beheld Evil for the 
first time in his life. When I speak of moral knowledge I mean that 
knowledge that enters into our self-interpretations - that knowledge 
of ourselves which says who we are. 
If' we move along in years and place alongside the quotation f rom 
Schiller the following passage from H. G. Wells' novel, The First Men 
in the Moon, we shall see one possible picture of what the outcome 
could be of fragmented knowledge and lives. I am recalled to this 
passage by Mary Midgley, who uses the quotation to make her own obser- 
vations about wisdom. Midgley says, 'that the human explorer (to the 
moon) finds that the native lunar creatures vary greatly among them- 
selves in shape, size, gifts, character, and appearance. Though they 
all belong to a single ant-like species, each one has been modified to 
fit its place in life exactly'. Midgley continues and leads into 
Wells, 'in each, some single organ is enlarged at the expense of all 
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the others: 
'Machine hands' indeed some of them are in actual nature - it is no figure of speech, the single tentacle of the mooncal-f- 
herd is profoundly modified for clawing, lifting, guiding, 
the rest of them no more than necessary subordinate appendages 
to these more important parts. ... The making of these various 
sorts of operative must be a very curious and interesting 
process. ... Quite recently I came upon a number of young Selenites confined in jars from which only the forelimbs pro- 
truded, who were being compressed to become machine minders of 
a special sort. The extended 'hand' in this highly developed 
system of technical education stimulated by irritants and 
nourished by injection, while the rest of the body is starved. 
... It is quite unreasonable, I know, but such glimpses of the 
educational methods of these beings affect me disagreeably. 
I hope, however that may pass off, and I may be able to see 
more of this aspect of their wonderful social order. That 
wre tched- looking hand-tentacle sticking out of its jar seemed 
to have a sort of limp appeal for lost possibilities; it 
haunts me still, although of course it is really in the end a 
far more humane proceeding than our earthly method of leaving 
children to grow into human beings and then making machines 
of them. (1989 pp 3-4) 
Self-realization, self-development and indeed personal development 
have been a persistent protest against such diminutions of men. All 
writers in the traditions of self-realization and so forth have assumed 
as a background to their writing the fact that people have fallen well 
below, or have never had the chance to realize, their potentials for 
intellectual, moral, emotional, aesthetic and imaginative development. 
These writers have different pictures of what this development might 
consist in. But Wells captures in one picture what a limiting case 
of non-self-realization might be. 
I want to conclude this section with four points about self- 
realization and its cognates. 
1. When we speak about self-realization, the self refers to the 
individual human being whose powers and potentialities are to be 
realized. He will be developed, realized, actualized and so on to 
the extent that he seizes what opportunities there are for his intel- 
lectual, moral, emotional, aesthetic and imaginative development. 
2. The self needs to be an agent in its own transformation. The 
individual proceeds to develop in accordance with his reason, choices 
and interests. He expresses and finds himself in his natural affini- 
ties and affections. 
3. There are many different values that an individual can find his 
fulfilment in. He might f ind his well-being, amongst other things, 
in music, friendship, the ordinary life of the family, religious con- 
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templation, meaningful work and so on. He can come to appreciate 
beauty as well as create it. It is, then, those things in whicýi he 
finds himself, fulfils himself, expresses himself etc. that his self- 
realization consists in. 
4. We not only realize ourselves in what is of value but we also 
realize ourselves in our own eyes. Midgley needed to bring out not 
only that our lives, when things go badly, can approximate to the con- 
dition of those Selenites in Wells' novel but also that our self- 
interpretations can match this impoverished state. We neither want 
science to shape us for limited functions nor give us the picture of 
ourselves. Cognitive growth gives us greater understanding of the 
natural world and can be part of our self-development in the Millian 
sense, for example, but such cognitive growth could give us false 
pictures of ourselves. Self-realization is also concerned with self- 
interpretation and self-identity. To live well we need a sense of 
who we are. Some would say that we are the children of God. Such 
a statement is not simply a statement of fact. It is meant to be 
part of our self-interpretations. This is how we see ourselves and 
we live in accordance with it. What kind of a picture does science 
throw back at us such that we can say in its terms who we are? We 
need, then, to be confirmed by our own kind in the richness of our 
self-interpretations. 
Michelangelo, for example, was wonderfully fulfilled in his art 
but there was a shift in his self-understanding when he rounded on the 
Pope and said that he himself was an artist whereas the Pope was merely 
a pope. Michelangelo was saying that he was someone and that he had 
intrinsic worth as an artist and a man and was not merely the servant 
of the Pope. This is the way to hubris, of course, but the point is 
that we fulfil ourselves in what is of value and reali ze ourselves in 
our self-interpretations. They go hand in hand, it needs to be said. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Persons, Personal Development and Values 
In what follows I continue to use the word personal in the expres- 
sion personal development in a wide sense. I said above that the word 
personal in the sense individual needs its meaning completing by refe. r- 
ence to what is person-like in the relevant sense. In PSMHE etc. the 
meaning of personal is completed by the content supplied by the words 
social, moral and health. In my subsequent discussion, I said that 
what is person-like can have a much wider meaning than is covered by 
the educational content in such headings as PSMHE. But the sense of 
the words social, moral and health are thought by some to be too open- 
ended to constrain the word personal in an educationally acceptable way. 
But can it be the other way round? Is it what is educationally accept- 
able that constrains the content of the words social, moral and health? 
It is obvious that there will be mutual constraint. And, again, it is 
the details of PSMHE that are authoritative. The most authoritative 
of all in this area of the curriculum is what is moral. It is true 
that we do look for more general formulations in this area to guide us. 
But here we return to that oscillation between general idea and the 
confirming or disconfirming particular instances. - 
Our case is a little like the problem that Peter Winch mentions 
when he argues that it is not human nature that determines what we can 
or cannot make sense of. It is rather what we can or cannot make 
sense of that determines what we can ascribe to human nature. (1972 p 84) 
Similarly I would suggest that it is what moral sense we can ascribe 
to what is person-like that makes it a guide to the educational prac- 
tices in PSMHE etc. This is not to overlook the contributions that 
the other words in the general headings make in giving meaning to 
PSMHE. Nor is it to overlook those other areas of the curriculum 
that are deeply implicated in what is person-like in their various ways. 
Just as the concept of human nature has often been appealed to as 
a touchstone for the explanation and justification of how we do and 
might organize human affairs, so the concept of person has tended to 
be cited as the basis for what personal development might consist in. 
We are concerned7 then, with the connection between what it is to be a 
person and what an individual's development might amount to. The 
features of personhood and what it is to be person-like are the refer- 
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ences of personal development. We need to say that included in -.., ", -, at 
it is to be a person is what it is to be socially and morally properly 
constituted. What else might we be talking about in personal develop- 
ment? I am very much aware, too, that it is not enough to ask in what 
personal development might consist. We have to look and see the 
term stands up to its application in particular cases. But in all 
cases, we are asking what kind of a reality a person is; we are asking 
too what the logical limits are to this reality and how we tell in the 
fine-grained texture of life what this reality amounts to. 
It is considered by many writers that personhood is a moral status 
in itself - There are disputes, many in dubious contexts, whether cer- 
tain human beings belong to the class of persons and, if at all, at 
what point they enter or fall out of the class. An example to illus- 
trate the point is one where the human being is intact but because of 
brain damage the person is irrecoverable. For some this distinction 
has moral import and it still may not be permissible to switch off the 
life support machine. To give a further example, I once recall hear- 
ing an elderly man who was made redundant before his time lament that 
he himself had built-in-obsolescence. The mechanistic metaphor, if 
humourous, points to a self-interpretation, the significance of which 
is that of falling out of a class or to be no longer in a certain 
category. In this case, that of a person. One still functions as 
a human being though. In this context there is also the sinister 
connotation in the idea of a 'useful life' being over. 
There is a difficulty in drawing the distinction between an 
individual's being both a human being and a person. What would it be 
to dispossess an individual of all the properties of his personhood to 
reveal pure human beingness? Is personhood the most pervasive phase 
sortal term applied to a human being? Many phase sortal terms apply 
to a human being, or person in this context, at different times in his 
life. A person has not always been an engineer, for example, and in 
the case of the redundant worker he ceases to be one. But when a 
phase sortal term ceases to apply to a person he does not lose his 
personhood thereby. Many properties remain, unless we have in mind 
the vegetable on the life support machine. But we might say here 
that he is scarcely a human bein if we wish. He might still be an 
object of neurophysiological enquiry but this is at the level of 
events and causal sequences until, if at all, these sub-personal 
processes begin to show 'life' again. I would suggest that it is 
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false to say that such a distinction between the term human being and 
the term person is a distinction without a difference. 
Whatever the range 'person' covers, persons are thought to possess 
an unearned and morally undisputed standing in a human setting and to 
have an indefeasible right to marks of respect. They should not be 
used as a means to an end, except benignly. The utility of the term 
personal development also covers the search for what is a relevant 
education for present and prospective needs of pupils and students. 
There is a danger, of course, in the employment of the term personal 
development in that its vagueness can readily become a catch phrase. 
One might make, as I have suggested, some kind of beginning by 
stating that the term personal development is situated in the domain 
of values. Applied to human beings, the terms personal and develop- 
ment are'strongly moral (involving distinctions of worth) or normative 
(setting and meeting standards) and the extent to which human beings 
disagree about values, controversy will be involved from the start. 
Even if all values are not contentious or sufficiently important to 
warrant conflict, people disagree sharply in the values they hold, 
though for the most part they manage tolive together. Values, there- 
fare, characterize our divisions and fashion our bonds. Whose divi- 
sions and whose bonds are questions central to this thesis. People, 
then, are constantly viewing the world differently, exhibiting different 
orientations in what is considered living well or badly, assessing 
people or situations one way or another and evaluating motives and 
actions this way and not that. Values enter into our judgement, shape 
our aspirations, constitute our conduct, reveal our preferences, inform 
our choices and commitments, and find expre I ssion in our likes and dis- 
likes. 
A person is, then, in his values and deeds. Though a person is 
a member of a group, part of a community and shares in a life with 
others, he nevertheless sees things differently from other people, and 
to the degree that this is true, the direction of his development will 
be his own. Care has to be taken in making this last point and has to 
be earned, for there are many difficulties in the nature of the relation- 
ship between the individual with his personal beliefs and values and his 
human neighbourhood which is the source of these beliefs and values. 
That the beliefs and values issue from the individual is not the same as 
to say that he is the ultimate source of them. Personhood, then, 
enters into the reality of the individual human being. He embodies 
values as a person and gives expression to them as an agent. 
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Values are pervasive in our lives. They are the element in which 
we move. This is not to suggest that we do not inhabit a materiall 
world with its own necessities and which cannot be identified indecen- 
dently of our concerns. Nor does it mean, for analytical purposes, 
we cannot separate out facts about people and their situation from what 
evaluative constructions we put on them. If we describe this distinc- 
tion as consisting of two realms - that of fact and values - we then 
face the problem of the nature of the relationship between these two 
realms. Is there always a gap between facts and values such that the 
gap has to be bridged by sentiments, prescriptions, choices or prefer- 
ences? Do we respond to this world of facts and give a human shape to 
it in these very responses? Is there a further gap between these 
personal responses and more objective standards for the evaluation of 
these responses? Alternatively, are facts always evaluatively inter- 
preted? Do these facts provide the light of their own moral illumina- 
tion? Put simply and contentiously, as an example, the fact that 
people have different intellectual endowments and realized abilities is 
related to the fact of different levels of material wellbeing. This 
connection, and it is one of many, is justified or more correctly, for 
some people, excused on the grounds that intellectual effort and 
realized ability must be rewarded. The further move is that this is 
right and proper. But even for the most achievement-inspired people, 
it does not follow that it is right and proper no matter what the cir- 
cumstances. It is, nevertheless, right and proper and not just 
expedient that effort and achieved ability is rewarded. The facts, 
then, have evaluative consequences. We might even say, in this example, 
that there is something natural about the ability rewarded and the 
rightness of it. We might, though, see things differently. 
It is not so much'that facts generate values but rather that values 
give the facts a different significance. We find our reasons in our 
values and not reasons in the facts. Were cooperation and welfare to 
inspire our perspective on human affairs, achievement and ability may 
be perceived as gifts to be put to the general good more generously. 
According to this picture, it would be seen as right and proper by the 
people who possess the gifts to give of themselves in this spirit and 
not, it may be stressed, because they had been seduced into compliant 
service by the weak and the poor in spirit in a Nietzchean fashion. 
I wish to take up again the difficult question of how an individual 
is related to what I call his human neighbourhood. It is difficult 
because an individual absorbs his human characteristics from the human 
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world but he is not thereby absorbed into it. He has a life ot his 
own, if things go well, and can take up a stance against this human 
world, but not all at one go. The ideas of living an individual human 
life and living the life of a human being in a human world go tcS--etýýer. 
The individual does not build up a human conception of himself, of who 
and what he is, by his unaided resources. He is not a Cartesian man. 
Such a conception of man is one of an autonomous, rational, dimension- 
less consciousness, said to be truly revealed when the inessential is 
stripped away. The inessential is absorbed from the individual's 
human neighbourhood. Since his actions, desires and convictions fall 
under cultural and social descriptions, he needs to disencumber himself 
of these to disclose his real self to himself. Obviously this picture 
of a disengaged ego when pressed to this kind of limit can appear as a 
caricature. This limiting case, though, does capture a certain kind 
of picture of man in relations to or in isolation from his culture and 
society and it contrasts with the one where man and his human world are 
intimately bound up together. 
To elaborate my point I shall quote from Peter Winch's Understand- 
ing a Primitive Society: 
Unlike beasts, men do not merely live but also have a 
conception of life. This is not something that is 
simply added to their life, rather, it changes the very 
sense which the word 'life' has, when applied to men. 
It is no longer equivalent to 'animate existence'. 
When we are speaking of the life of maný we can ask 
questions about what is the right way to live, what 
things are most important in life, whether life has any 
significance, and if so, what. (1972 p 44) 
According to Winch it is men who have such a conception and not 
the individual man. The meaningful possibilities for the individual 
and what it is for the individual to find himself within his own pers- 
pective on the world, come from a shared form of life. Winch would 
then argue that this shared form of life is constituted by language. 
In his paper Moral Integrity, Winch makes his point more explicitly. 
He agrees with Jean-Paul Sartre that the moral agent is not someone who 
simply deliberates, finds his reasons and then acts, if there is no 
f ailure of nerve. When a man comes to "deliberate - to consider 
reasons for and against doing something - Iles jeux sont faits' (the 
chips are down')". In considering a situation which has moral impli- 
cations, he already occupies a perspective on the situation. Winch 
goes further and says that 'the agent is this perspective'. This 
. 
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entails that two men may confront the same situation and disagree abou-. 
what reasons are relevant for its moral assessment. More importan'-1y, 
they may disagree about the very description of the situation. ( fne 
extent to which we are then talking about the same situation raises 
difficult conceptual problems. ) Winch says 'For one man, for instance, 
a situation will raise a moral issue; for another it will not. '. 
The important move for my purposes is when Winch continues: 
I think he (Sartre) is lead badly astray by his failure to 
see clearly that the possibility of there being a certain 
perspective on a situation cannot be lead back to any 
agent's choice. It depends rather on the language which 
is available, a language which is not any individual's 
invention - though again Sartre often talks as if it is. 
(1972 p 178) 
In the light of Existentialist freedom, of course, the agent's 
choice would be criterionless. The idea that a solitary agent could 
make a criterionless choice is in the same family of ideas as that of 
the Cartesian solitary consciousness. Both ideas are foreign to the 
view that an intelligible conception of an agent with his ideas and 
choices must necessarily start from an already established public world. 
In passing we may observe that beasts, to use Winch's term, would be 
untroubled by any of these problems. Whether they are satisfied we 
need not trouble to ask. 
That we have beasts around to give us the contrast to sharpen up 
a conception of ourselves might seem yet another example of their 
convenient presence. Such a contrast may point to truths about our- 
selves and beasts but, since we are addressing personal development, 
one might extend comparisons and argue that human beings have something 
to learn of a moral nature from beasts. What the status of such a 
claim amounts to, given my assumptions about the logical priority of 
the human world in individual self-understanding and development, must 
makes us pause. I have not argued that there is no non-anthropocentric 
truths about the world. I would maintain that the sense of the human 
world is not derived from the sense of an independently existing material 
world nor from the sense (if it has sense) of the isolated Cartesian 
consciousness. The human world is our world and much that we would 
give independent existence is comprehended within our categories. As 
I have said, the case of animals is a difficult one because we realize 
that much we say about them is a projection of our own categories. 
Yet we resist the idea that their reality is totally comprehended within 
/ 
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that of ours, and it is, perhaps, only within philosophical polemics 
and scientific excess that we find such extreme suggestions. I wi1l, 
nevertheless, exploit the contrast between man and beast to bring cult-. 
a point that seems both factually and intuitively obvious. 
We hear stories of the odd child raised by animals in the w'ld. 
Whether the accounts of the feral child are true or apocryphal, a 
thought experiment could devise similar accounts. The child, although 
recognizably human, lacks personhood and given the background details 
of his 'upbringing' , and the absence of human contact in a human setting 
being critical in this respect, the child must therefore become what he 
is through his own native resources or through that of the animals. 
Neither could be educative in the required sense. If language is 
characteristically human and its presence a precondition of personhood, 
the feral child is not in possession of what is needed to be a person, 
except, and this could not be more important, we extend the category 
of person to the extremely young and the senile. Even though such a 
child develops it would not be personal development. We might put it 
that a person is culturally and socially emergent. 
A deeper way of showing that the individual person in an alien 
setting is not the source of his own human identity is to show that it 
is not only factually or empirically implausible but logically or 
conceptually incoherent. The Cartesian account of human self-identity 
begins by deconstructing the inessential and once the essential is 
found in self-identifying consciousne . ss this consciousness proceeds to 
reconstruct the world. The objection to this account is that the so- 
called inessential is hidden in unacknowledged presuppositions. The 
public or human world provides the criteria for our self -understanding. 
If what it is to be rational, autonomous, a centre of consciousness 
distinct from other senses of consciousness and a being able to identify 
thoughts of its own, if these are first dependent upon being an indivi- 
dual member of a human form of life, the central personal attributes 
mentioned here cannot have conceptual priority in the constitution of 
a person amongst other persons. 
This argument takes nothing away from the claim that the concept 
of a person is primitive in the sense that there is nothing logically 
more fundamental in terms of which this concept is to be explained. 
Whatever view we take of the material world, which includes our bodies, 
and whatever science may find out about behaviour and underlying 
explanations to it, persons, that is beings to whom the concept of 
person can properly be applied, are irreducible realities in the world. 
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SOC4 The view I have presented is that a person is a cultural and 
being emergent from a previously established human world. Persons 
are persons because they have been nurtured by their own kind. 
It is often an important move in philosophical reflections --o 
notice where the conditions for the proper use of a concept has been 
implicitly denied and when a concept has been reintroduced in a dis- 
guised form. A Cartesian view neglects the conditions for the proper 
use of the word person and therefore cannot account for the realitLy of 
personhood. In addition, the concept of person is reintroduced in the 
guise of the cogito and consequently assumes what has to be made good. 
Some time ago, in a religion education broadcast, a scientist 
giving a personal testament to his religious belief thought that time, 
space and causality were categories not relevant to an understanding of 
God's creative presence in the universe. It was not necessary for a 
belief in God that He did or did not, as he quaintly put it, 'light 
some celestial blue touch paper' to get the whole thing going. He is 
not a God of the gaps-in our scientific understanding. Having nothing 
to do with these categories, he went on to talk about God sustaining 
and upholding the universe in his ever present creativeness. Normally, 
to sustain or uphold something is to do something which involves space, 
time and causation. The fundamental categories had been denied to be 
reinvoked in a disguised form. But it might be said in the scientist's 
defence that the words sustain and uphold were used metaphorically. 
His thought cannot be captured literally. In that case, what is the 
nature of the thought that evades literal expression? How did he know 
that it was the thought he thought it was? We are concerned here, 
with nothing less than the issue of what it is for a thought to disclose 
meaning and how this meaning approaches reality. In our example the 
. thought hides in language and may not have the sense we thought. it 
is not that the thought is mischaracterized because of the inadequate 
resources of language. Rather it should be said that the language 
suggests the thought and the thought cannot be identified independently 
of the language in which it is inscribed. 
. William James cites an example of a 
deaf mute who, having acquired 
language late in life, said that he was then able to give expression to 
thoughts of God which were present before his acquisition of' language. 
But how did he know they were thoughts of God or indeed the same 
thoughts as before, or for that matter thoughts at all? 
I introduce the last discussion in order to bring out further the 
difficulties in using basic categories of thought. It is instructive, 
ýWplll 
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too, in that it points up the problem of whether reigious education 
should be confessional or critical. It is relevant, also, be-Cause it 
is contended that personal development be pursued in the context of 
religious education. I shall return to these issue in the course of 
the thesis. 
Gathering up my thoughts presented so far, I have said that the 
phrase personal development is situated in the domain of values and the 
values themselves are constitutive of a form of life. I suggested 
that values are not on the same level. We distinguish between moral 
values and (mere) preferences. Although the terms are difficult to 
use, we might say that moral values are in some sense 'objective' 
whilst preferences are 'subjective'. The repudiation of one's former 
shameful action is not on the same level as the taste for one flavour 
of ice-cream over another. The one enters into the very conception 
of who we are; the other exhibits a preference and nothing more. I 
further showed that values need not be all of one piece and different 
perspectives on life involve different configurations of value. Also 
the individual person is not the ultimate source of his values but 
neither does he lack a certain personal authority in holding and expres- 
sing these values. If he is not the source of value in the required 
sense, he is himself of ultimate value insofar as he is a person. I 
have argued that a certain picture of man does not work because it 
envisages him as a rational, autonomous and essentially isolated Centre 
of consciousness and that this picture belongs to the same family as 
the one which presents man as the focus of criterionless choices. 
Whether this picture works logically or not, it still might 
identify an individual mode of thought distinctive of modern Western 
culture, which embodies Cartesian and, for that matter, Kantian language. 
In quoting from Steven Lukes' concluding essay in the volume 'The 
Category of the Person', I hope to bring out the implications of this 
individualist mode of modern thought. It may also 'show up', according 
to some people's taste, my repeated use of masculine personal pronouns. 
Central to this mode of thought is a distinctive picture of 
the individual in relation to his role and to his aims or 
purposes. To the former he exhibits role distance: con- 
fronting all possible roles, he may in principle adopt, 
perform or abandon any at will (though not all, and probably 
not even many, at once). Over the latter he exercises choice: 
as sovereign chooser, he decides between actions, conceptions 
of the good, plans of life, indeed what sort of a person to be. 
The will, choice, decision, evaluation and calculation are 
central to this picture; and the individual to whom these 
features are essential thinks and acts as an autonomous, self- 
directj---- who relates to others as no less 
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autonomous agents. Other men, that is: for the indiviý--a--,, 
in this picture is exclusively (or virtually so) male. ý- -,, r as Mary Midgley has well said, the 'whole idea of a free, 
independent, enquiring choosing individual, an idea central 
to European thought, has always been essentially the idea of 
a male ... taking for granted the love and service of non- 
autonomous females (and indeed often of the less enlightened 
males as well)'. (1985 p 299) 
This account of modern consciousness does not undermine my argu- 
ment that the Cartesian picture is incoherent. That such a life can 
be lived might show true independence or bad faith but not incoherence. 
My point is that a person can emerge from a protective and beneficent 
society and having once absorbed sufficient for 'maturity' he can be a 
person who exhibits what are called the distinctive marks of modern 
Western culture. My argument is that once the world had been dis- 
mantled in Cartesian fashion, no resources would remain to reconstitute 
it. There is no way back from an unburdened world and disencumbered 
self to the world or, more to the point, the human world. The one is 
a thesis in logic; the other is descriptive of a form of life. 
Lukes distinguishes between the individual in relation to his 
roles and in relation to his aims and purposes. He distances himself 
from the former and exercies choice over the latter. The individual 
is not disencumbered in the Cartesian sense. He may, though, be in 
some such relation as irony to his roles and choices. He knows what 
the possibilities are but he is detached. Such thoughts give rise to 
the idea of a bare self, shorn of enough attributes and qualities to 
give the necessary detachment but retaining sufficient for some notion 
of self-identity, with some measure of consciousness, agency and auto-- 
biography. 
Certain uses of 'person' and 'self' in philosophical literature 
suggest that although the individual human being is a person or self, 
he is also a being to whom these words are applied. The individual 
person is not inscribed within discourse but the word person is ascribed 
to him. That the person or self is the moral identity of the indivi- 
dual may suggest that there is something left over which can be a pers- 
pective on this identity. Such a distancing may find its ground in 
the latin term persona which refers to a mask worn by an actor. The 
visual presentation or face is put on or taken off just as is the grease 
paint of a modern actor. We speak also of a poet in the guise of his 
persona. The same distancing is found in the usage of 'legal person' 
in Roman Law or in our idea of a 'social self'. We seem, then, to be 
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able to view ourselves under the aspect of such descriptions but not 
absorbed into them. Too much of this stepping back is, of course, 
play acting. It is like those people who sometimes profess to be 
'beyond good and evil'. 
Having located the term personal development in the context of 
values and suggested that values are contested, I am committed to the 
implication that the term personal development is contested. That 
certain central concepts in educational discourse are essentially con- 
tested is a familiar claim that I have already discussed. But first 
I wish to consider again the terms personal and development. 
The use of the term personal, as I have stressed throughout my dis- 
cussion, is so diffuse that little would be gained in the search for a 
definition. Its use is associated with such terms as private and 
intimate and to give emphasis to the idiosyncratic. It contrasts with 
the public, the impersonal and the functional. Schools and colleges 
offer personal services such as counselling and profiling and matching 
personal qualities with job requirements alongside themore public and 
impersonal standard curriculum. It is used as a term of intimate 
emphasis in the pride and assurance or excitability of personal f riend- 
-ship. We do find suspect or deviant uses which trade on the clearness 
of their normal ones. 'Personal' is often used and assumed in contexts 
where manipulation defines the real relationship. At times most 
counsellors, social workers, career officers and teachers may easily 
find to their own disgust that confidential discussions in an atmosphere 
of friendship are being manipulative. Banks and other impersonal 
institutions use personal in an attempt to re-personalize indifferent 
relationships. Such personal services thinly disguise the fact that 
people are units in commercial transactions. The human face is a kind 
of rhetoric. The impression management is a device of accommodation. 
The Listening Bank is very selective in its listening. Hopefully the 
central uses of 'personal' retain their innocence. 
Personal development assumes that the person as such develops. 
Above, I spoke of the individual person emerging to maturity from his 
human world. Mature, like adult, is a normative word. It presupposes 
standards of assessment. To be mature or adult is to meet criteria of 
a fairly indeterminate kind. We speak of a person as being mature or 
adult but if we withdraw these descriptions, the person would still 
remain the subject of other descriptions. It looks on this showing 
as if 'person' is a sortal term. A sortal or classificatory term 
picks out a distinct entity. This 'count noun', another expression 
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for sortal term, identifies something that can be counted. T? ý e 
something has a real and independent existence and cannot be broken 
into further parts without irreducible loss. A dog or a tree cannot 
be separated into distinct parts to be counted and then reassemblec' 
into its former unity. We may say that the dog or tree is an orEanic 
whole. Other natural phenonema such as a river or forest can be 
demarcated in different ways, producing two or more different rivers 
or forests, if it suits human purposes. An animal, though, remains 
the same animal throughout change. An animal is a living thing that 
reproduces its own kind, merely exists or flourishes and grows old and 
dies. A human being is, too, a natural kind. It is disputed whether 
person is a sortal or count noun and consequently a word of a natural 
kind. 
In referring briefly to the history of the term person, I said 
that persona was a mask. By extension we speak of a theatrical 
character. A character is assumed by an actor for his performance. 
After the performance he clears his mind of his part and wipes off the 
grease paint. We refer, also, to a person of good or bad character. 
Obviously, there are degrees of attachment or detachment in the 
relation of a person to his parts or descriptions correctly applied to 
him. I said further that in Roman Law 'person' was a legal entity, a 
collection of rights and duties attached to the individuals in a court 
of law. The individual was distinct from his 'person'. For us, 
however, person seems to capture our identity. We are persons and 
the reality of it is irremovable. Or so we think until we are 
reminded of what can happen to human beings, even in not so extreme 
conditions. People are stripped of their external identitities and 
begin to have a precarious hold of who they are for themselves. 
It is, in fact, argued that 'person' is not a sortal or count 
noun, which would imply that we cannot ask 'how many' when referring 
to the number of persons in a count. Such a state of affairs would 
seem counter-intuitive, especially when Russian landowners seemed to 
have no dif f iculty in ref erring to their serf s -as I souls I. Bernard 
Williams in his book Ethics and the Limits of Philosphy puts it as 
f ollows: 
The category of person ... is a poor 
foundation for ethical 
thought, in particular because it looks like a sortal or 
classificatory notion while in fact it signals characteristics 
that almost all come in degrees - responsibility, self- 
consciousness, capacity for reflection, and so on. It thus 
makes it seem as if we were dealing with a certain class or 
type of creature, when in fact we are vaguely considering 
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those human beings who pass some mark on a scale - To 
make matters worse, the pass mark for some purposes is 
unsuitable for others. If person implies something 
called 'full moral responsibility' , the lowest age for 
entry to the class that has traditionally been enter- 
tained is seven, but anyone who has lived with a six 
year old or a two year old, has vivid reasons for think- 
ing of them as persons. (1985 p 114-115) 
Williams has written this in the context of resisting an argument 
to the effect that 'if duties are owed just to persons' and if we 
define certain human beings as falling outside this favoured class 
nothing need stand in the way of our getting used to the idea of 
infanticide. The definitional problem is who belongs to what class. 
The moral problem is one of differential duties. To give 'person' 
this foundational status in moral decision making does not work for 
Williams, because the category of person is a generic expression, 
under which is subsumed those distinctive human characteristics which 
when instantiated in a human being come in different combinations and 
degrees. This characterization of 'person' is reminiscent of Gilbert 
Ryle's concept of mind as of a different categorial kind from that of 
body. The mind is not picked out as is that of the body. The mind's 
analogue is that of Oxford University. The University is not an 
additional identifiable building or institution amongst other buildings 
and institutions. It consists rather in just those colleges and 
institutions that fall under the description of Oxford University. 
The mind in a parallel way is just all those dispositions that find 
their expression in certain bodily behaviour, that is under the aspect 
of speech and actions. Mind is a generic term for all such expressive 
behaviour. 
(One hears echoes of Hume's Bundle Theory in this account, where 
a person just is those discreet inner impressions lacking no more 
cohesion than remembered contiguity and succession. The contentless 
Cartesian self -identifying consciousness collapses 
into an absent self 
paradoxically replete with impressions and sensations. If 'person' 
is such a generic term, it is presumably, an attribute of a human being. 
Whatever Hume failed to detect in his search for an impression of self, 
he hardly convinces us that we have no sense of self. The difficult 
thought is not so much in our distinctions of aI sense of self", 
'person' and 'human being' but in that person in some way seems 
detachable from a sense of self and both are somehow resident within 
or pervasive throughout the human being. The problem will remain. 
;... 
/ 
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We need the distinctions, though, for the purposes of our discussion. ) 
To bring out Williams' claim quickly for the moment consider what 
Julia confides to Charles on two separate occasions in Evelyn Waugh's 
Brideshead Revisited: 
"You know Father Mowbray hit on the truth about Rex at once, that it took me a year of marriage to see. He simply 
wasn't all there. He wasn't a complete human being at all. He was a tiny bit of one, unnaturally developed; somethinc- 
in a bottle, an organ kept alive in a laboratory. I 
thought he was a sort of primitive savage, but he was some- thing absolutely modern and up-to-date that only this 
ghastly age could produce. A tiny bit of a man pretending 
he was the whole. " ... 
"Rex has never been unkind to me unintentionally, " she said. 
"It is just that he isn't a real person at all; he is just 
a few faculties of a man highly developed; the rest simply 
isn't there. He couldn't imagine why it hurt me to find 
two months after we came back to London from our honeymoon, 
that he was still keeping up with Brenda Champion. " (1986 p 293) 
Even though Rex Motram has the good qualities of 'geniality and 
impetuosity' at least for Charles, he is, I would suggest, a fixer 
with no sense of transcendental bonds between people. He could fix 
the Pope or even God given the right angle on Them. He is a man who 
calculates finely, even if at times naively when confronted with a 
moral universe foreign to him. Contract mediates his relations with 
people, save where the immediacy of mutual attraction sustain such 
relations. However, he has a few highly developed faculties, even if 
he is a fragment of a man. If the pass mark is high on a scale of 
these faculties he would pass no doubt with flying colours. But he 
is not a real person, we are told. He would seem on this account a 
poor specimen, just as some writers feel would be true of the whole 
bunch of characters in the novel. I recently heard a member of the 
intellectual New Right in British political thought dismiss the lot as 
decadent and parasitic. Their betters were the bourgeois middle 
classes whose enterprise culture and self-improvement ethic ought to 
be our example. To say that some people are poor specimens, that 
they are not real, is to bring them under a moral description. It is 
to blame them for their shortcomings. Or if it is not, it is to say 
something about the society that produced them, as Julia said about the 
absolutely modern and ghastly age in which they lived. Nevertheless, 
they are still persons and treated as such. Yet it is to recognize 
that something is missing or only exists in an insufficiently human 
degree. No limb is atrophied or missing. What is missing is a 
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moral dimension we have a right to expect if our relationships ý, a,; e 
pretensions to be one kind rather than another. What would be proper 
in the relationships would be proper according to its kind. One 
could have a functional relationship with Motram, based perhaps on t_', e 
convenience of shared property as is the case at Brideshead. 1: 1ut sucýl 
a relationship may, too, be subject to moral assessment. 
Rex Motram like the rest of us emerges into or becomes a person 
per se and exhibits the most general categories applicable to a human 
being: self-consciousness, agency, autobiography, intentionality, 
purposiveness and so on. He develops into a person of a particular 
kind as demonstrated in the passages from Brideshead Revisited. He 
also becomes the person he actually is in himself. Whether Julia, or 
Lady Marchmain for that matter, approach the reality of Motram is a 
matter of judgement and not necessarily theirs. It might be that 
their own reality is more easily comprehended within Motram's perspec- 
tive than that of his in theirs. They can be seen as part of his 
story as he is part of theirs. They tell us as much, if not more 
about themselves in what they say about Motram than what they do about 
him. When I make the distinctions between personhood per se, the 
kind of person one is and the unique person one actually is in oneself' 
I would not want too much to hang on a construal of these distinctions 
as a process of evolving individuality. Insofar as the distinctions 
are meaningful, I use them, at least initially, as analytic distinctions. 
The notion of development in personal development will need to encompass 
these distinctions. 
'Development' as used in the phrase personal development has 
normative or valuational force. In some of its central uses it has 
the same structure as the word progress. Change is implied in both 
words but change for the better or to a higher degree. We have our 
standards and they may or may not be met. Would it were so easy! 
That people change and this change is evaluated is commonplace. 
People change imperceptibly over time but enchantingly so. They may 
change dramatically into parodies of their former selves. They can 
be unrecognizable after wars; or virtually the same after a lifetime 
of peace and security. Equally commonplace is that few would predict 
outcomes, no matter what is known of formative or present conditions 
and experiences. 
My claim has been that personal development is situated in the 
domain of values. It follows, therefore, that the nature of that 
development will be interpreted in terms of those values that can 
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properly centre on persons. To put it so boldly makes it difficult 
to know what to exclude. One might make a Wittgensteinian move, here, 
and not say what personal development and the values appropriate to 
its intepretation consists in. We do not attempt to say what the 
development is. Rather we attempt to show it in its context of use. 
In addition, the employment of such indefinite concepts as personal 
development are brought down to earth if we try to say that personal 
development has taken place insofar such and such has been achieved or 
in respect of so and so being brought about. And, of course, we have 
to say in terms of examples. This is difficult as so much of curri- 
culum development makes use of the Roget's Thesaurus approach. So 
many words and phrases sound good and are mentioned in lists but never 
used in informative propositions. 
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CHAPTER 
The Realization of Values in the Human Setting 
have said that if sense is to be made of personal developýnent, 
that sense would be found in the domain of values. Another way of 
putting it is that the expression personal development finds its sense 
within a skein of language constituted by value words. I would main- 
tain that the fact, if it is a fact, of personal development 
-supervenes 
upon the development of qualities and attributes of persons in a ýiuman 
setting or, with qualifications, in a non-human setting. Personal 
development must be development in respect of something and that some- 
thing is in those distinctive human characteristics of reason, of 
informed or disciplined independence of mind, of a perspective on the 
world as a whole and so on. If these characteristics are at the ideal 
end, laughter at jokes and cooking food might be at the other end. 
A fuller understanding of these latter possibilities would mention that 
appraisal enters into them and that appraisal involves reason. These 
considerations would equally be true of emotion and feeling. For 
example, we see the point of jokes, acknowledge the skills of cooking 
and recognize the appropriateness of emotions. Jokes depend on how 
we see and receive the incongruities in the circumstances of life; 
cookery on techniques that meet standards of taste and nutrition; 
emotions on the cognitive adequacy of their intentional objects. 
Thought is inseparable from all three of these human characteristics. 
At this stage I do not want anything to hang on my examples; nor on 
the apparently implied hierarchy of importance. Work might be put at 
the centre of human endeavour. It is in labour that our distinctive- 
ness finds expression and it is through labour that our humanity is 
transformed. 
Whatever sense can be given to it, some educationalists talk as 
though personal development could be direct. Just as it is thought 
that a person could be the source of his own personal identity, it is 
thought that personal development could somehow give birth to its own 
actuality. There is a certain spontaneity or originating creativity 
within the constitution of the person himself. That a person has 
potentialities as the conditions of development hardly needs mentioning. 
But they do not occasion their own realization. Spontaneity and 
creativity have their conditions too. The words spontaneity and 
creativity are essentially adverbial in force and indicate the manner 
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in which something is done. Moreover, what is done is done by a pe-- 
son and the doing of anything is an action which belongs to the human 
order in contrast with a happening which belongs to the causal order. 
It is difficult, indeed impossible, to believe that an unschooled or 
untutored individual in the shape of someone approaching the condition 
of the feral child could exhibit spontaneity and creativity, both of' 
which are dependent upon being able to do things like tell jokes or cook. 
The life of our envisaged feral child is that of an animal and in conse- 
quence is unschooled and untutored. To this extent the life approaches 
that of a happening-rather than that of an action. Spontaneity and 
creativity and therefore the presence of these in people are not the 
beginning of anything in a foundational sense. A person is not built 
up from any such precipitating conditions. Personal development 
supervenes upon the development of ordinary and perhaps extraordinary 
human qualities and attributes and these in their turn are given sense 
in a human form of life. 
What a person learns, undergoes, experiences and lives through will 
help shape his developing awareness, sensititivity, emotional respon- 
siveness and volitional control. In his commerce with other people, 
he will acquire habits of mind and character, develop virtues that 
regulate his conduct and find unexpected resources within himself to 
deal with emergencies. Whatever a person acquires, develops or finds 
within himself depends on a variety of learning situations and experi- 
ences in a human setting or if not in a human setting then in a non- 
human one plus what the person carries about with him derived from such 
a setting. Nor is a person passive in his experiences. Once the 
process of learning has begun, a person, to a greater or lesser extent, 
becomes an agent in his own development or perhaps more dramatically 
in his transformation. 
It is an interesting thought that Robinson Crusoe has been des- 
cribed as the first bourgeois man and may be celebrated as an agent in 
his own development or transformation. Yet who or what he becomes on 
his desert island is intimately bound up with who or what he became as 
a citizen of York. This is not to deny his special blend of self- 
reliance, strength of character and self-possession. His virtues of 
patience, industry, fortitude, prudence, courage, faith and hope may, 
as the cliche has it, be an inspiration to us all in attempts to create 
or refurbish an enterprise culture. Nor is it to deny that he is a 
paradigm example of self-help in its most solitary exemplification. 
It is to deny, though, that he is some kind of originating source of 
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these virtues. All his virtues were acquired in their exercise 
amongst his fellows in York. (I say nothing of the imperfections of 
their development in Crusoe or his fellow citizens, nor of the obstacles 
to their proper exercise in his society, nor of the rel. ative weight of 
some over others in men's daily dealings. ) One would need to think, 
too, of all those useful artefacts salvaged from the wreckage and the 
knowledge and skills necessary for an adequate employment of them. 
If Crusoe develops and not degenerates on his island, it is in 
terms of what he already is as a person. Terrible suffering can be 
educative, if not -exactly redemptive as some people might claim. 
Truths about oneself are disclosed in one's reactions and responses to 
normally taken-for-granted natural phenomena. Self-knowledge may 
develop from a greater understanding of the Bible, reinterpreted in the 
light of the extremities of one's condition. The conditions may, too, 
disclose meanings normally hidden in the routine of daily life. if 
one may be allowed a little fantasy to make a point, had Crusoe a sample 
of any of those works. by Dostoevsky or Beckett at hand or in addition 
to his Bible, he might find his virtues tested differently or develop- 
ing unexpectedly. In such writers we find a discrepancy between how 
one might like the world to be and how it actually is. The question 
is how much of one's confidence is sapped in the recognition of such a 
discrepancy? 
If sub specie aetenitatis there is no sense in the nature of things, 
independently of what men put there, Crusoe may approach the absurdity 
of it all with irony, defiance or heroism. Given that Robinson Crusoe, 
the book, is a celebration of self-made independence despite all the 
ills that befall a man, the world of Crusoe would meet Crusoe's expec- 
tations of meaning and that is why his world is perhaps different from 
ours. What I have said, here, is to repeat again that a person is 
culturally and socially emergent. Nevertheless, personal development, 
if that is what it is, is genuinely individual and can be a person's 
own. An interesting and additional question to ask is what does a 
person owe the world that has nurtured him, even when he forgets in the 
flush of success, that he would be nothing without a world shared with 
others. (Of course, we could read Defoe's novel as a picture of 
society itself as a desert island or, if it is one's taste, a wasteland. ) 
In reflecting upon this discussion, one might consider Sir Keith 
Joseph's eulogy on the virtues a modern man might make his own. In 
his Introduction to Samuel Smiles' Self-Help, (1986), Joseph evokes a 
scene in Leeds during the Victorian era. Smiles had built his book on 
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a series of talks given to about one hundred young 'artisans who had 
formed in Leeds an evening school for mutual improvement' - Litt. le was 
expected of government at this time but much expected of individuals. 
Smiles himself said that 'The spirit of self-help is the route of all 
genuine growth in the individual; and exhibited in the lives of the 
many, it constitutes the true source of national vigour and strength. 
Help from without is often enfeebling in its effect, but help from 
within invariably invigorates. 1 Joseph's curriculum for personal 
development gathers pace. He says "What Smiles hymned was not so much 
success itself as the moral character which lies behind it; in tune 
with the religious professions of the age, he celebrated patience, 
courage, endeavour, and the perseverance with which worthy objectives 
were pursued". Individualism was a "path to independence and to self- 
fulfilment. 'It is not ease but difficulty - not facility - that 
makes men, I he wrote. 11 Smiles was not so much concerned with money 
or social status but with the "fullest use by each individual of every 
quality, skill and talent he possessed". Self-help, self-improvement 
and self-cultivation were ideals that have nothing to do with snobbery 
or social climbing. Smiles always took, says Joseph, the "side of the 
moral against the narrowly 'social' values". Smiles "gave the 'crown 
and glory of life' to character - the idea of the gentleman - attainable 
by all regardless of birth or means; to independence, integrity and 
dignity". ' The lesson for us all, especially educationalists, is that 
given that "our low average productivity is one of the realities behind 
our high contemporary unemployment" we ought to recognize "our own 
failure to exhibit those qualities of effective industriousness, perse- 
verahce and self-discipline that Smiles celebrated". We have our own 
desert spaces and the deliverance is sought in the development of our 
personal qualities. 
That certain experiences might more properly be described as 
happenings point to an arrest in development. A person remains the 
same in spite of what happens to him. We might distinguish experiences 
from happenings by saying that the former affect how a person under- 
stands the world, himself and his life. On this view experience has 
learning built in to it. Happenings leave the person much as he was 
before. Raymond Williams uses the expression "structure of feelingit 
to characterize a person's general orientation to the world and hence 
as a way of responding to subsequent experience. Such a response may 
be imprisoned within a stable structure of feeling, and experience may 
approach that of a happening. 
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Some years ago I saw a television interview in which several 
winners of the football pools were gathered together to relate how 
their big wins had altered their lives. Vivian Nicholson with her 
husband had won a big dividend. In the programme she said that on 
winning the money she had decided to "spend, spend, spend". 'r ý, _L_ s., ýe 
had been irresponsible it was because she had been young and had had 
plenty of life in her unlike the rest of the gathered company who were 
staid in their middle-age. Their lives had not changed much nor 
would they. Safe investment of their winnings coupled with a quiet 
satisfaction in their good fortune was some kind of good life. Their 
lives did not speak of the feeling that 'Most lives are lived in quiet 
desperation' or that wives are often 'pushed to the side of their own 
lives'. Vivian thought she knew better. Jack Rosenthal in his play 
for television aptly called 'Sp end, Spend, Spend' chronicled the 
'progress' of her life. It was a life enclosed within a structure of 
feeling conditioned by early poverty, sex and violence. The implica- 
tion in the play was that no subsequent 'experience', no matter how 
many foreign holidays were 'taken in', appetites indulged, new houses 
or cars bought and so on, occasioned any change in who she or her hus- 
band were. New consumer goods and clothes were dispensed with as soon 
as the glow of 'feeling good' in the possession of them diminished. 
More are needed with stylish variations to cheer them up. The same 
abusive language accompanied every falling short of expected happiness. 
Old family rows and mutual recriminations were lived over again. What 
they needed to get 'off their chests' was repeated endlessly. Old 
scores were never settled but remembered in the same old language. 
Denis Donoghue took up this theme in his 'Ferocious Alphabets'. 
(1981 pp 17-18) No matter what happened to Vivian, the same meanings 
were disclosed. She was a 'product of her subjectivity and her 
environment' ... 
(and) locked in her feeling as in her language,. 
Donoghue goes on to assert that 'The test of an experience is that it 
alters the structure of feeling' and as such it contrasts with a happen- 
ing or a circumstance. In this context he referred to the happenings 
that men lived through in the trenches in the First World War. The 
soldiers were numb and their lives were more of a drift. There was an 
arrest, then, in Vivian's life because of an inability to live through 
an experience. Donoghue, later in his book, felt he had been wrong to 
assimilate the quality of a man's experience with a man's style. 
Sensibility is not necessarily reflected in a man's language. Previ- 
ously, he had in mind Gadamer's notion of intentionality as a perspec- 
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tive on the definition of an experience. Donoghue does not spell out. 
the meaning of intentionality. 
Since I have mentioned the notion of intentionality earlier, and 
since I will need to come back to it again, I will give a general out- 
line of its meaning. When experience takes on the aspect of a happen- 
ing or an occurrence, no meaning goes out to meet it. Intentional 
mental states and actions are directed towards some real or imagined 
object of consciousness. So purposive actions, beliefs, emotions and 
desires are intentional in that they are the modes in which experiences 
are captured. What we make of what we are involved in implies an act 
of consciousness focussed on events. As I mentioned above, Donoghue 
felt he had misjudged Vivian's life by confining it within a view of 
sensibility in which the 'words we speak testify to the quality of the 
feelings that provoke them'. If we accept this point, it makes it 
difficult to know whether we are reading a person's sensibility properly. 
If we are careless, what we say might testify to a certain hubris on 
our part. 
What follows from this discussion of Vivian Nicholson is that we 
have the notion that a life can be arrested, even if it is untrue of 
Vivian's life. I deliberately use the word arrested because that may 
not be the end of the story. A certain wisdom may begin to inform a 
life that at one time was in ruins. That we want to call such intima- 
tions of a sense of disclosed meaning 'personal development' may be a 
travesty of*what is understood in such experiences. Sense can be 
found when nothing seems to remain in a person's life. Even if we are 
unconvinced by Gadamer's theory of intentionality, something similar 
can be seen in ordinary, or perhaps extraordinary, experience. 
Frankl in his book The Doctor and the Soul (1965 pp 12-13) reminds 
people of meaningful possibilities in the direst circumstances of their 
lives. Frankl survived Auschwitz and Dachau and was later a practis- 
ing psychotherapist in the United States. Even when all is lost, or 
so it seems, one can go out to meet situations in life. 'Men can give 
meaning to their lives by realizing what I call creative values, by 
achieving tasks' he writes. He has in mind what can be meaningfully 
done in the most extreme circumstances - that of carving bits oL wood 
in a concentration camp. He also talks of realizing experiential 
values, 'by experiencing the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, or by 
knowing one single human being in all his uniqueness. And to experi- 
ence one human being as unique means to love him. ' 
Even in great distress, an individual can give his life meaning 
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by the way he faces his fate. Although Frankl does not say it, t, J-s 
can be difficult in unexpected ways. One can go through life thin', 
ing that one's own fate is different from that of others. The crreater ý: D 
the distance between oneself and other people makes it so much easier. 
However, granted a little grace one may realize what Frankl calls 
attitudinal values. He says 'The right kind of suffering - facinE 
your fate without flinching - is the highest achievement that has been 
granted to man'. He gives an example of a nurse who became terminally 
ill. and who was in despair because she could no longer work. He 
reminded her that she had spent her life administering to people who 
had been in* the same condition that she now experienced. She had 
tried to develop in them attitudinal values and her work was meaningful 
when these were realized in them. Her patients did not exist for the 
realization of values in her life, although that might be part of it too, 
but only as a consequence of how she was able to help them. She must 
now be like them. It hardly needs saying that Frankl is not recommend- 
ing extreme situations so that one can realize extraordinary values. 
That would be absurd: he also catalogues the hideous waste and despair 
in the lives of people. He is concerned with a reorientation in pers- 
pectives, when other values can find no expression. 
A difficulty for educationalists, and for the rest of us also, is 
how what has been learned can find expression in our society. Educa- 
tional literature is full of examples of mismatches between the sorts 
of knowledge, skills and attitudes acquired in schools and colleges and 
the opportunities for a proper expression of them. Some writers have 
seen hope in personal development as a curriculum aim in that it might 
help bring pupils and students into a more acceptable agreement^with 
the shape of society as it is at present. Again, the literature is 
quite properly strewn with examples taken from the world of work. I 
wish to take an example from a less urgently economic area of concern. 
We may reject the use of the term mismatch and simply say that society 
fails young people. Many young people who get caught up in dubious 
religious sects or groups do so because they want to demonstrate 
their 
Christian convictions in such a way that there could be no misunder- 
standing about the sincerity in the way in which they express 
their 
values. This has always been a problem, even for saintly people; 
for poverty may hide pride. Eileen Barker in her contribution 
to the 
collection of essays entitled 'Reductionism in Academic 
Disciplines' 
gives a portrait of the sort of people who are converted 
to the 
Unification Church, the Moonies; 
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They were not the drifters, but the 'doers' - idealistic 
young people (at an average age of 23 and with well above 
average educational achievement) who wanted to achieve 
something, not just for themselves, but for others. 
They had frequently been brought up in happy families 
where value was placed on the concepts of responsibilit,,, 
service and duty. (1985 pp 58-75) 
They tended to find answers to problems in religion rather than politics. 
But their society did not afford the opportunity for them to 'fulfil 
many of the values it had instilled into them'. The Unification Church 
provided a context for the life of the spirit and good works denied by 
'A modern, bureaucratized welfare state (which) tends to make it diffi- 
cult for your people to contribute or give of themselves' . Given that 
the fathers of the young people were 'more likely to be medics or in 
the Colonial Service I, the young people were lucky not to need a welfare 
state but that does not alter their disenchantment. The attributes and 
qualities of the young people were absorbed from society and then became 
their own (even though their Christian denomination was different from 
that of their distressed parents) but society found it difficult to 
provide the conditions for an adequate expression of them. Whether we 
consider the Unification Church as properly belonging to that society, 
it 'offered them a chance to be of value, a chance to sacrifice them- 
selves for a worthwhile goal - the building of the Kingdom of Heaven on 
earth'. Although there are more tragedies in society than conversion 
to the Moonies, that fact does not console distressed parents or loved 
ones. Yet it may be one more example of what Michael Ignatieff has 
characterized as 'a tragic gulf between what human beings need and what 
their collective wisdom is able to provide'. 
I have tried to indicate what personal development might mean when 
we entertain thoughts about what it might mean to be a 'developed person' 
in the circumstances of life. It is only in the business of living 
that sense can be given to conceptions of the developed, mature or adult 
person and his meeting or falling short of the demands such living makes 
upon him. I am not thinking of some lend state' consequent upon a 
developmental process when I use 'developed person'. In this sense a 
person is not a natural kind like an oak tree or a butterfly. 
He is, 
of course, a natural kind in other respects. He learns and may 
be a 
different person as a result of what he learns. I have wanted to show 
that personal development, if the expression is adequate to the often 
elusive changes in people and their lives, is supervenient upon 
the 
growth of those distinctive properties contitutive of persons. 
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'Personal development' need not be a general term for the singular 
development in those distinctive properties. We do not develop in 
respect of just this quality or just that attribute. We may discern 
a growing unity in our lives, or grope for a sense of our lives as a 
whole, or begin to have a conception of the world as a whole and our 
place in it. Personal development supervenes upon the growth of our 
distinctive human characteristics but may consist also in a greater 
unity amongst those characteristics. Nevertheless, our greater con- 
ceptions or wider visions are to be found in our reason, our imagination 
and perhaps in our feelings. Our values will enter into the descrip- 
tions of all such development and our varying perspectives on them. 
There will be disagreements over the interpretation of these values and 
over whether some values merit the name. It is such considerations 
that make much in the curriculum controversial or, for those of a more 
belligerent disposition, make the curriculum a battle-ground. I now 
want to begin a discussion of how personal development enters into 
educational discourse and becomes an aim of educational practice. I 
might add that our guide will not be Sir Keith Joseph who, whe. n 
Secretary of State for Education, seemed to be preoccupied with a 
Robinson Crusoe model of personal development. The implications for 
those other than the protagonist ought not to be lost on us. Joseph 
said, in speaking of the headteacher's job, that it 'is demanding and 
often lonely and one that requires rare qualities of resourcefulness, 
tact, vision, dedication and staminal. (This was said on a BBC'Radio 
News broadcast after the programme Desert Island Discs. ) 
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CHAPTER 8 
Persons and their Relationships to Values 
need now to be a little more explicit about what it means to 
situate personal development within the domain of values. The expres- 
sion personal development is value-loaded and it, -s use implies that 
values are instantiated or realized in a person's life. What we value 
we value in different ways. We value things about or in a person. 
We appraise what a person is like, what he does and what he entertains. 
How we are appraised by others enters into how we appraise ourselves. 
Personal development is a general assessment which gathers up the 
several ways in which values attach to what we are, what we do and what 
we entertain. 
The word development is normative and when combined with the word 
personal indicates the kind of standards we attain or fall short of. 
The criteria for the kind of development at issue derives from what 
construction we put on the notion of personal. 'Personal' qualifies 
the kind of development in question. Whatever criteria reside in the 
term personal, these criteria come together in the concept of a person. 
And as I have said, some people say that this concept is the highest 
category in our self-understanding. Distinctions of value and worth 
are pervasive in our lives and our lives are those of persons. We 
come up to or fall short of the mark in as many ways as it is possible 
to display distinctive human characteristics. Changes in a person in 
respect of qualities, attributes, sensitivities and awareness may 
remain superficial or go deep in a person's make-up. In the values 
of what we possess and in toe values we hold, and the manner in which 
we possess or hold them, is our mode of existence in the world. The 
several changes in a person may not be simply additive but amount to a 
change in a person as a whole. The language of value in respect of 
persons is one of multiple layers of appraisal. 
The appraisals we make of each other and the situations that 
define our existence are constituted by words that confer value and 
worth. Human beings do not merely engage in actions, do deeds, claim 
the means of life and entertain thoughts and feelings. Appraisals of 
the fittingness of such human properties enter into an understanding 
of them. Values attach to the qualities and attributes of people, to 
the way that people conduct themselves in relation to one another and 
to the states of affairs in which they place or find themselves. What 
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is thought to be worthy of human endeavour or pursuit will find i--s 
ground in moral, religious, political or aesthetic realms of meaning. 
What it means to be a person and what worth attaches to the development 
of human qualities and attributes will be characterized in the apprecia- 
tive and critical language of values. 
We may remind ourselves of how values are inseparable from cur 
lives by some familiar examples. Firstly, it is not sufficient for 
their exercise that people possess personal attributes and qualities. 
We need to know the grounds for their proper exercise. It is not hard 
to find examples of the mis use of knowledge and skills. That we 
possess knowledge and skills can give us greater facility in deception. 
Think of the sophistication with which we can be 'economical with the 
truth'. But knowledge and skills also ameliorate the human estate. 
People put their knowledge and skills to the common good and that 
obviously says something about them as people. Secondly, we are 
familiar with the way in which people gain, hold, use and lose power. 
But we distinguish factual accounts of the possession and use of power 
from the conditions of its legitimate exercise, Thirdly, developments 
in medical and b io technological research give us greater command over 
the processes of life. Yet we are concerned over the permissible 
limits to intervention in such processes. Fourthly, sexual impulses 
are shared by us all and are the stuff of tragedy and farce. But no 
more pressing than today is the need to reflect on the conditions for 
the proper expression of sexual desire. Finally, work is necessary 
for the creation of the means of life but we cannot avoid an interpre- 
tation of such commonplaces as a 'fair day's work for a fair day's pay'. 
Is I the consumer always right' 'in the first or last instance and if in 
the last instance is this because his wants need interpreting by 
experts? We also reflect on the acceptable conditions of employment 
in the production of wealth and the appropriate principles for how the 
resulting wealth is shared out. 
It is, then in our exercise of judgement, our sensitivity to the 
needs of others, our appreciation of the limits on our behaviour and 
what we owe to other people as well as what we can reasonably expect 
from them that we find indices of personal development. We develop 
qualities and attributes but part of their development is an under- 
standing of the context of their desirable and rightful employment. 
We develop in what we learn or acquire but also in how we conduct our- 
selves. Although virtues can turn into vices and the virtues them- 
selves be not recognized as such, normally approval attaches to virtues 
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non-contingently. Intellectual powers may be admired in themselves 
but their completion is in the worthwhile life of a person. The 
thoughts and feelings we entertain may be informed by fantasy and thus 
diminish us, and perhaps other people, in our own eyes. The gift o: ' 
imagination may subserve trivial pursuits and therefore require redirec- 
tion by a disciplined mind. We will, then, assess and be assessed? 
not least by ourselves, in all these matters. What kind of people we 
emerge as in our entanglements with other people will inform judgements 
about what direction personal development has taken and might take in 
our lives. 
We have other modes of existence apart from our entanglements with 
other people. We engage more or less directly with the world in our 
work and vocations. We have our labours of love in our leisure time 
too. Fulfilment is found in the life of the mind, body or spirit. 
We develop as craftsmen, artists, workmen and sportsmen and may not 
remain unaltered as persons as involvement in our trades, arts and 
skills help to shape our perceptions of ourselves. As I have said 
previously, the development of personal qualities and attributes super- 
vene on our embroilment in these activities and pursuits. On the 
other hand, we may develop our talents and remain uninfluenced as persons. 
Again, a limited detachment from other people may be a condition 
of development of certain kinds. We may retreat from the world to 
live a life of renunciation and contemplation and hope to leave behind 
what is normally thought tobe part of our personhood. But in solitude 
the world may not be habitable in the way we thought. Consider the 
words of the Trappist monk, Thomas Merton: 'Do not go into the desert 
to get away from the world or you may find yourself living with a legion 
of devils but take the world with you into the desert and pray for it' 
(1956 p 49) Once again, we may be consumed by some ideal of physical 
achievement or endurance, which involves other people only as embodi- 
ments of statistics to give us our measure. This does not mean that 
we do not delight in the isolation of the mountains or gain in self- 
knowledge in the wilderness. 
In these respects9 then, value attaches to our gifts, talents and 
skills but they also attach to the products of these gifts, talents and 
skills. We value human creativeness and endeavour and also 
human 
creations and achievements. We find joy in our powers and meaning 
in 
the abiding presence of our works. Nature too is seen under the 
aspect of value. We may become better people as we learn 
to appreciate 
the beauty of the natural world. In these several areas of individual 
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involvement, we may feel that development takes place to some degree. 
A more appropriate description might be individual development rather 
than personal development. Even if we want to resist such general 
characterizations in the changes in people and settle for more singular 
descriptions of what people attain and achieve, we still need to say 
that our various modes of human life are infused with value. As we 
live our lives we may come to appreciate new values or deepen the ones 
we already hold. To the extent that these changes inform our lives, 
we become different persons. 
That values are pervasive in our lives is impossible to deny. if 
there are problems it is in the status of the values and how the values 
attach to a world that can be described independently of value-categories. 
What would a world, and our lives in it, look like if it were bereft of 
values? The various sciences may give us some kinds of picture. 
However, this is not what I have in mind. I want to present a picture 
of our world but without values and attempt to see how values might make 
an entry into it. We need to. distinguish between the question of how 
values enter the world and our lives as a whole and the question of how 
values enter our individual lives. As I have said before, we are born 
into a human world and we absorb our values as we learn to be human 
beings. People are born into different worlds and the values they 
hold will, to a greater or lesser extent, be a reflection of the value 
possibilities in those worlds. There are all manner of value possi- 
bilities in the lives of people. We hold inconsistent values, values 
that override other values and values that are reserved for special 
categories of person. Certain values may be supressed or distorted in 
our lives. We may hold values ambivalently or corruptly. In some 
societies, or in certain circumstances in our own society, elaborate 
manoeuvres may be made to strip people of their values and then, perhaps, 
efforts made to induce new ones into them. Values enter our lives 
individually and together but that they do presupposes their prior 
existence in a human world, no matter how impoverished in values that 
world may be. How the values come to be in this world in the first 
place is a question that philosophers have addressed for a long time. 
Earlier I quoted Peter Winch to help with the thought that men, 
unlike beasts) have conceptions of life and that these conceptions are 
constituted by values. Men do not confront a world bereft of values 
and then each one in his own way gives the world a transfusion of value 
significance. A view, or more properly a cluster of views, begins 
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from such a position of how values enter the world. Non-cogn-ýti,: ism 
is the thesis that there is no cognition or knowledge of values. 
Values are always cognitively non-determined. Judgements of value lack 
truth status and can make no claims about intrinsic values. Such a 
theoretical account of the status of values is associated with 'ýhe 
1 iberal- individualist idea of freedom as the condition in which people 
cannot order one another about - people may have the power but the power 
would be without authority unless each person gave his stamp of approval 
by a choice firmed up by commitment. 
An objection to such a thesis is argued by David Wiggins in his 
1976 British Academy Lecture, 'Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life,. 
Wiggins wants to show that phenomenologically - or from the subjective 
side, 'from the inner point of view' - we cannot inhabit a world with- 
out objective values. A non-cognitivist position may be advanced 
intellectually but a theorist in such matters cannot 'put his mind 
where his mouth is' (he cannot really think what he says) because a 
human being 'picks and chooses, deliberates, weighs concerns. (He) 
craves objective reasons; and often (he) could not go forward unless 
(he) thought he had them. ' Wiggins illustrates his argument by citing 
the life of Sisyphus who meaninglessly rolled stones up a hill without 
end. No matter what positive impulses, attitudes, sentiments and so 
on he may have, meaning would not thereby emerge in his life. Wiggins 
goes on to present a picture of what life would be like in a world 
without intrinsic value of sense. Wiggins had been watching one of 
those 'appalling documentary films about creatures fathoms down on the 
ocean-bottom'. The creatures spent their lives eating one another in 
a world without rest. He writes: 
The thought the film leads to is this. If we can project 
upon a form of life nothing but the pursuit of life itself, 
if we find there no non-instrumental concerns and no interest 
in the world considered as lasting longer than the animal in 
question will need the world to last to sustain the animal's 
own life: then the form of life must be to some considerable 
extent alien to us. Any adequate description of the point 
we can attach to our form of life must do more than 
treat our 
appetitive states in would-be isolation from their relation 
to the things they are directed at. ' (1976 pp 344-345) 
If there are no lasting ends in an objective world, we are 
imprisoned in our own subjectivity. We cannot construct a 
habitable 
world from our own appetitive or attitudinal states. 
The thought does 
cross our minds that some lives do seem 
to approach such a condition. 
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I am not 30 Much thinking of the fictional account of a state of 
nature given by Hobbes where life is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish 
and short'. But I am thinking rather of an account of consumer 
society where the connections between the acquisition of commodities 
and the achievement of happiness in a situation where things have some 
lasting significance is uncertain. One may, of course, say that 
Hobbes was merely projecting into a state of nature what he found to 
be endemic in his own society and that we are the heirs to such a 
society. I have already addressed such a world when I discussed 
Rosenthal's play about Vivian Nicholson. In the play Vivian and her 
husband, Keith, had bought all that money could buy but they were not 
happy. In one of the scenes when they were throwing recriminations 
at each other Keith shouts "Why aren't you happy? " Vivian shouts back, 
"Why aren't you? " 
Wiggins argues that there is the possibility of a life that is 
intrinsically worthwhile and we possess a vocabulary that captures such 
a possibility. There is a class of evaluative propositions of which 
it is false or senseless to deny that they refer to aspects of an 
objective world. The propositions have the form of X is Y. They 
are verdicts with no restrictions on the category of X. He lists what 
he has in mind - IX is good', 'bad', 'beautiful', 'ugly', 'ignoble', 
'brave', 'just', 'mischievous', 'malicious', 'worthy', 'honest', 
'corrupt', 'disgusting', 'amusing', 'diverting', 'boring', etc. He 
contrasts these evaluative propositions with practical judgements and 
general judgements of a strongly deprecatory or commendatory kind which 
do not quite measure up to full truth-status. They are cognitively 
under-determined. Wiggins has in mind judgements such as 'I ought to 
do ZI , 'I must ZI and 
those judgements about virtues and vices of the 
form 'such actions are ignoble or inhuman or unspeakably wicked. (1976 
pp 338-339) 
The words embodied in evaluative propositions have been described 
as 'thicker' or more specific ethical notions. Value words like 
ignoble, brave, courageous and rude are said to contain a unity of fact 
and value. The use of these words is determined by what 
the world is 
like yet at the same time the words evaluate states of affairs, people 
and their actions. Charles Taylor says of these types of word 
that 
they are 'strongly evaluative' and that they define an inter-personal 
life in an objectively existing public space. For Wiggins the fact/ 
value distinction is eroneous but the is/ought distinction 
is not. 
Practical judgements (he also calls them directives or deliberative 
w 
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judgements) are cognitively under-determined and allow sufficient 
logical space for invention in judgements of value. 
The picture that Wiggins presents of the world as bereft of value 
is a limiting case and it is, of course, alien to us. But I have 
wanted to make the point that we can envisage lives approximating to it. 
We might also think of those inhuman worlds that Marx tried to capture 
in his notion of 'alienation' and Durkheim in lanomiel. Marx says of 
the alienated condition t-1yat it ' perf ects the worker and degrades the 
man'. '(The) relationship of the worker to the product of labour (is) 
an alien object which dominates him'. The more he expends himself in 
his work the more his inner life is impoverished. The work itself and 
the product of the work are external to the worker. Man is alienated 
from I his own body, external nature, his mental life and his human life 
He is alienated from other men whose natures are reified productive 
roles. Man in such a world 'does not fulfil himself in his work but 
denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than wellbeing, does not 
develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically 
exhausted and mentally debased. The worker, therefore, feels himself 
at home only during his leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless. 
His work is not voluntary but imposed forced labour. It is not the 
satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying other needs ... 
(Marx 1961 176 ff) 
Durkhein's picture of the anomic condition is reminiscent of that 
of Hobbes. Durkheim says 'that each individual finds himself in a 
state of war with every other'. When the individual's life is not 
regulated by society he suffers from the 'malady of infinite aspirations' 
and his 'unregulated emotions are adjusted neither to one another nor 
to the conditions they are supposed to meet'. A man's life is lived 
in 'weariness', 'disillusionment', 'disturbance, agitation and discontent', 
'anger' and 'irritated disgust with life'. Durkheim goes on to say 
that 'Those who have only empty space above them are almost invariably 
lost in it'. When appetites have become freed of any limiting 
authority' and where 'from top to bottom of the ladder, greed 
is aroused 
without knowing where to find ultimate foothold' nothing can calm 
life 
in such a world. (Giddings 1972 173ff) In their own ways 
both Marx 
and Durkheim identify the remedy for such conditions; 
but the above 
descriptions are descriptive of a falling short. 
It is relevant here to mention that Marx distinguishes between 
moral and non-moral values. 
Marx tends to pooh pooh moral values, 
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although he displays enraged indignation against Capitalism. Social-ism 
is not derived from the concept of justice. Concepts such as justice 
are irretrievably compromised in Capitalist society. Kant's founda- 
tional ideas that each individual is infinitely valuable and should 
never be treated as mere means to other people's ends are for Marx at 
best Utopian in a perjorative sense and at worst a screen of cliches 
hiding greed and self-interest. 
To simplify, Marx's position is three-fold. Firstly, we can 
identify the ills that befall men in a Capitalist society independently 
of moral categories. Health for example is a non-moral value. When 
we are attacked by disease, no injustice is perpetrated on us nor are 
our rights violated. We would be better without the disease and the 
non-moral value of health would be realized. Capitalism is an economic 
and social disease that severely incapacitates us as human beings. 
Secondly, Marx had the remedy in socialism which inevitably follows 
from the collapse of Capitalism. We are offered an explanation of how 
we got here and where we are going from here. The cause of the non- 
moral ills is diagnosed as a Frapkenstein monster out of control. The 
Capitalist system is an accumulation of unintended consequences of the 
actions of men and is thus an arrangement of affairs that has turned 
against its own creators. Thirdly, the condition of health in a 
Socialist society is also a condition of freedom. Non-moral values 
cannot be realized fully in Capitalism. It is not just the economic 
and social conditions that prevent the realization of non-moral values. 
It is also the condition of alienated consciousness. We are in a 
state of false-consciousness and to this extent we blind ourselves to 
a remedy for our ills. We take what is alterable as natural. I 
have wanted to bring out the distinction between moral and non-moral 
values and to suggest how they might be present in our lives. 
Wiggins does not write as a-Marxist and would not see values as a 
smokescreen hiding class interests. Values exist out there, as it 
were, and the principal enemy is the non-cognitivist who hides behind 
his own screen of projected appetites and attitudes. Nevertheless, 
many values making for the good life are not, or are only imperfectly 
realized, in people's lives. I want to consider another case where 
things do not go well and where values are suppressed or screened-out. 
But first I set it against a background in which things appear to go 
better. 
I have said already that the notion of personhood is a moral status 
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in itself. Value attaches to a person in respect of being a person. 
This is apart from his holding values and being in possession of 
qualities and attributes that are valued. He is also entitled to 
social goods that are valued in use. But equally important these goods 
are valued because they signal membership of society. Michael Walzer 
states in his book 'Spheres of Justice' (1983 pp 7-10) that material 
goods as well as others 'have a moral and cultural shape ... The argu- 
ments for a minimal state have never recommended themselves to any 
significant portion of mankind'. Material goods are incapsulated in 
moral and social values and have claims to a greater or lesser extent 
written into them. Walzer, of course, is speaking about what one 
would hope are 'normal' conditions. But where are they realized? 
He has in his sights, when speaking of the minimal state, someone like 
Robert Nozick in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia who argues for less 
state help for the deprived. Walzer claims that people have concep- 
tions of the good as it is thought to exist in the different spheres 
of life and that the principles for the expression of this good are 
imminent in those conceptions. People have ideas of what it is to 
participate in a common good and they find the tests of a better order 
within the as yet unrealized notion of justice present in the different 
spheres of life. 
People enter into each others lives for better or worse and their 
relationships are mediated by different degrees of concern and indif- 
ference. It is in this setting that I discussed the notion of need 
earlier. I spoke about the commerce amongst people based on the 
expression and acknowledgement of needs. These needs may be embodied 
in the shared expectations that reside in social roles and institutions. 
Some writers, like Ivan Illich, are sceptical of the presumed bonds 
expressed in social roles and institutions and feel that more care 
would be shown if people dealt with one another face to face, unmediated 
by expectations built into roles and institutions. Of course, every- 
thing depends upon the kind of social roles and institutions one has in 
mind. Ignatieff in 'The Needs of Strangers' presents a picture of a 
situation where a structure of decency, in which need and entitlement 
are bound together, is absent from the lives of people. We have a 
world in which human beings with power face those without it. 'The 
nightmare of the powerless is that one day they will make their claims, 
and the powerful will demand a reason, one day the look of entreaty 
will be met with the unknowing stare of force. ' Such a world would 
be scarcely human. Values do not mediate relationships in that world. 
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We find an example of a world without human bonds in a 'culture 
of silence' described by Brian Wren in Education for Justice: 
A peasant in Allende's Chile was once asked why he hadn't 
learned to read or write before the government's land reform. "Before the agrarian reform, my friend, " he replied, "I 
didn't even think. Neither did my friends. " "Why? " he 
was asked. "Because it wasn't possible. We lived under 
orders. We only had to carry out orders. We had nothing to say. " This peasant had lived under an authority so 
oppressive that his capacity for critical consciousness had 
been silenced. He had literally been forbidden to think 
for himself. Other people, his landowner in particular, 
would do his thinking for him. In the closed world of the feudal landholding (latifundium) he. had grown up utterly 
dependent on his master, and had absorbed the attitudes of 
submission, passivity and self-depreciation imposed by that 
culture -a culture dating back hundreds of years to 
Spanish colonial times. To emerge from this state of 
mental slavery was like a rebirth. His emergence was made 
possible by a combination of political change (land reform) 
and an educational programme aimed at developing not only 
literacy but critical consciousness and self-respect ... 
- Mhen the Chilean peasant emerged from his 
enforced silence we could say that he became more of a man, 
more fully human. that he was before. From being the 
object of his master's decisions, he became a subject. 
He found his voice, and discovered that he had something to 
say. (1986 pp 5-6) 
It hardly needs saying that we find such political, moral and 
economic conditions duplicated throughout the world in one type of sys- 
tem or another. There is a tenuous hold on what it is to be a person 
and on the rights that a person needs to bear simply in respect of 
being a person. We are familiar with the slick responses to people 
who claim that they are human beings or persons after all and have 
rights to certain decencies: 'Who says you are a human being etc? 
You were nothing until I raised you from the gutter etc' - the stuff 
of the fate of 'reclaimed' prostitutes in Victorian literature. By 
and large in such situations people have no chance to develop 'recog- 
nized' personal qualities and attributes. Of course, people hold 
values but their expression is confined to the extreme privacy, if 
they have any, of immediate face to face relationships within the 
family or within groups of people of their own kind. 
If a 'culture of silence' suppresses or screens out the possession 
and expression of many distinctive human values, we also find a with- 
drawal of values from or a refusal to extend them to people who are or 
become our enemies. Part of any military training involves attempts 
to dehumanize our real or potential enemies in the eyes of the soldiers. 
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The enemy become 'gooks' and so on. The categorial and the moral get 
mixed up. If there is a certain slippage in the human status o. 
people, the unthinkable becomes thinkable. We comprehend the reality 
of the enemy in categories appropriate to their nature as gooks or 
niggers. It is almost indecent to discuss extreme examples of intended 
dehumanization where the inconceivable becomes reality. Indoctrination 
in these cases strips the intended objects of their typical human 
sympathies and creates in them a blank gaze or worse in their confronta- 
tion with the enemy. In the current education debate, indoctrination 
is hot envisaged to take on these proportions but the language in which 
the debate is conducted may suggest that fears are inspired by such 
pictures. 
A person may be related to values and actions ambiguously, ambiva- 
lently, inconsistently or corruptly. I have already said that some 
years ago I was a full time lecturer in a prison education department 
for prisoners. What I want to bring out is the moral 'schizophrenia' 
that is generated in a prison environment. Teaching is probably the 
most difficult job in this environment because one is compromised 
immediately in having to be all things to all men. To be familiar 
with prisoners is suspect and alienates the uniformed staff. To be 
too accommodating to the 'establishment' is to distance oneself from 
prisoners. Next to a 'nonce' or a 'grass' one is respectable enough 
but perhaps a little untrustworthy. I use the term 'schizophrenia' 
loosely to describe the ways that one's mind is constantly split between 
one set of values and role-expectations and another. It is true that 
one can get caught up in certain kinds of evil but not those dramati- 
cally portrayed by Simone Weil in Gravity and Grace: 
The apparatus of penal justice has been so contaminated 
with evil, after all the centuries during which it has, 
without any compensatory purification, been in contact with 
evil-doers, that a condemnation is very often a transference 
of evil from the penal apparatus itself to the condemned man; 
and that is possible even when he is guilty and the punish- 
ment is not out of proportion. Hardened criminals are the 
only people to whom the penal apparatus can do no harm. 
It does terrible harm to the innocent. (1952 p 65) 
There may be some of this but it is only in moments of desperation 
that one feels it. What I have in mind is a pervasive double-mindedness 
or much worse endemic corruption. Every prisoner entertains 
the thought 
of release, even those who know in their hearts that their recommended 
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sentences are extremely long. Rehabilitation is permanently in t-, e 
atmosphere and the prospect of release as a result of perceived re', -, a'S_'- 
litation shapes inmate behaviour. Prisoners are reminded by profes- 
sional rehabilitators that prison handbooks and rules contain phrases 
about the 'good and useful life' to be prepared for in conditions of 
'human containment' and that prisoners are expected to 'live better 
lives on release' than those they lived before imprisonment. Some 
kind of personal development is promised in conditions approaching that 
of squalor. Admidst this everyone is told that convicted people are 
sent to prison 'as a punishment not for punishment'. The deprivations 
of liberty and the other deprivations that follow from the loss of 
liberty are the punishment. The splits in the mind continue. 
The serious difficulties for the teacher are that he is part of 
an educational service and part of a penal system. In addition to 
teaching he attends Long Term Training Boards where the prison careers 
of prisoners are discussed. He learns of their prospective fates 
based on details of their offences and their observed behaviour in 
prison. Often knowing the worst, knowing that many of them will not 
see the light of day for years if at all, no matter what rehabilitation 
programme has been completed, he then has to motivate the prisoners to 
undertake their studies. One equivocates and misleads. This is only 
the beginning of the intolerable 'tolerance of ambiguities' -a nice 
phrase from the language of personal development. All intrinsic 
values are turned into instrumental ones. The goods internal to educa- 
tion are as much a matter of calculation as the impression management 
of the rehabilitators - chaplains, social workers, probation officers 
and educationalists - on the one hand and prisoners on the other. 
Prisoners want to get out; staff have to get from one day to the next. 
All, or mostly all, is mutual manipulation. It would be interesting 
to know what social and life skills and personal qualities and attri- 
butes are acquired in conditions that foster yet one more quality, 
namely 'tolerance of ambiguity'. Just as tolerance is assumed to be 
dependent on meeting contradictions and ambiguities with equanimity, 
so other personal qualities and attributes are meant to arise from 
facing deprivations with resignation. In spite of what I have said 
some good does emerge, even if one would never dare to predict outcomes. 
It might be instructive to mention again that one of Simone Weil's 
needs of the soul is punishment. She writes: 
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Mhe most indispensable punishment for the soul is that 
inflicted for crime. By committing crime, a man places 
himself, of his own accord, outside the chain of external 
obligations which bind every human being to every other one. Punishment alone can weld him back again; fully so, if 
accompanied by consent on his part; otherwise only partially 
SO. Just as the only way of showing respect for somebody 
suffering from hunger is to give him something to eat, so the only way of showing respect for somebody who has placed 
himself outside the law is to reinstate him inside the law 
by subjecting him to the punishment ordained by the law ... 
... Punishment must be an honour. It must not only wipe 
out the stigma of the crime, but must be regarded as a 
supplementary form of education, compelling a higher 
devotion to the public good ... 
... Just as the musician awakens the sense of beauty in us 
by sounds, so the penal system should know how to awaken 
the sense of justice in the criminal by the infliction of 
pain, or even, if need be, of death. And in the same way 
we can say of the apprentice who injures himself at his 
trade, thatis the trade which is getting into him, so 
punishment is a method for getting justice into the soul 
of the criminal by, bodily suffering. (1952 pp 20-21 ) 
The obvious question to ask is under what conditions and when? Even 
more important is that such purity can occasion its own special types 
of corruption. Simone Weil, it must be said, is against any kind of 
revenge and against punishment which is not motivated by purity of 
intention. But that may not be good enough. She says elsewhere 
I The art of punishment is the art of awakening in the criminal ... the 
desire for pure good' and the purpose of punishment is to 'procure good 
for a man'. We have heard these or similar words before. Who is to 
decide what is the good for man? An inquisitor may be one such bene- 
factor in his concern for our eternal souls. If his theological 
principles are suspect, hismotives may even be more so. The words 
'good' and 'needs' can have the same ring about them, especially when 
used by people less compassionate than Simone Weil. The passages are 
interesting in that odd phrases may serve curricula aims and objects. 
Punishment may well be regarded again as a 'supplementary form of 
education'. We may think too of the unfortunate Manpower Service 
Commission's 'placement' who is injured in the process of getting a 
trade into him - if it can go by the name of the trade. 
Punishment can also precede an offence. A moral educator might 
hold a child responsible before he is responsible in order for him to 
become responsible. It is not only children who are punished before 
they understand the nature of their offence. Many indiginous peoples 
in the Colonies were brought to 'voluntary' responsibility with the gun 
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and the Bible. If these people failed to acquire the necessary 
personal or group respect for private property they were slaughtered. 
They were punished for taking items of 'property' until they latcLIed 
on to the notion of Itheft'. They were to be re-socialized into a 
voluntary acceptance of the rules of private property. Nietzsche 
observed 'Men were treated as 'free' so that they might become guilty'. 
This thought anticipates what Michael Foucault has said about the 
formation of modern personal identity. The boundaries of self are 
socially defined and the unity of the subject is artificially cons- 
tructed. Ideas that people have of themselves and their world are a 
complex of devices for the domination of people in the service of amor- 
phous power. Language is infused with power and shapes possible ways 
of being persons in its own image. A sense of self, whether it be a 
sexual sense of self or any other, is socially constructed. The 
individual person is not some monad, 'a sort of elementary nucleus, a 
primitive atom', whose boundary and unity is naturally constructive. 
The individual is 'one of the prime effects of power (and) certain 
bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to 
be identified and constituted as individuals'. Discourse and institu- 
tions are repressive and find their most infamous expression in total 
institutions such as prisons and asylums. Steven Lukes says that: 
For Michel Foucault, the modern conception of the 
individual is an artificially constructed unity, naturally 
associated with the language of morality and law, with 
notions of sovereignty, rights, rationality, responsibility, 
sanity and sexuality. In his genealogies of epistemes, 
medicalisation, madness, punishment and sexuality, Foucault 
deconstructs the modern subject by investigating the 
institutions and norms that have formed it, which include 
apparatuses of discipline and control, of confinement, 
treatment, rehabilitation and therapy. The autonomous, 
rational and normal self is sustained by how society deals 
with unreason, madness, delinquency and perversity ... 
(1985 p 294) 
By separating people into those who are free and responsible and 
those who are defective, 'new identities' crystalize into self-contained, 
atomized agents on the one hand and into inadequate, indeterminate 
inmates on the other. The persistence of these identities is sustained 
by Panopticon-like institutions of surveilance. Society generates 
roles whose occupancy is arranged by anonymous power. In a society 
informed by devices of surveilance, such values as there are distort 
self-understanding. Personal identities, defined in terms of autonomy, 
rationality and responsibility and different degrees of their absence, 
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are artifices and are, therefore7 effects and not data af- social 
zation. Whatever we make of the thesis that everything is artif 'ý'ice in 
the service of power, we still need our distinctions to reflect on how 
we face each other in personal and social relationships. 
When I was discussing my own experiences in a Foucaultian institu- 
tion of domination, I spoke of the 'spirits' occasioned by role con- 
flicts and tensions attendant upon deception. Another cause of stress 
is in the uncertain mix of what P. F. Strawson has called objective and 
participant attitudes in one's dealings with other people. In his 
paper I Freedom and Resentment', (1974 pp 1-26) Strawson draws the con- 
trast between those attitudes in which we express praise, blame, resent- 
ment or forgiveness and those detached attitudes in which we see another 
person 'as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a 
wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something ... to be 
managed, or handled or cared or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided ... 
If your attitude towards someone is wholly objective, then though you 
may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to 
him, even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him' Those 
attitudes in which we make demands on and have mutual expectations of 
each other within an agreed moral framework, Strawson-calls participant 
attitudes. Such attitudes may be inhibited by another person's abnor- 
mality, immaturity or deficiency of moral sense. We might also men- 
tion the role distances defined by official expectations within a total 
institution. To be so inhibited is to perceive another person as 
'posing problems simply of intellectual understanding, management, 
treatment and control'. 
At times we can adopt detached or objective attitudes even towards 
people with whom we normally participate unself-consciously. 'We have 
this resource and can sometimes use it: as a refuge, say, from the 
strains of involvement; or as an aid to policy; or simply out of 
intellectual curiosity. Being human, we cannot, in the normal case, 
do this for long, or altogether. ' Strawson concludes for my purposes: 
'But what is above all interesting is the tension there 
is, in us, 
between the participant attitude and the objective attitude. One is 
tempted to say: between our humanity and our intelligence. 
But to 
say this would be to distort both notions. ' 
The difficulty for the 
teacher in a prison is that one is in and out of these two attitudes 
all the time. 
What I have wanted to do is to show the different ways in which 
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we are related to values. Such relations to values are expressed 'n 
our relationships with other people. I have suggested that we are 
related to values, and, through them, to our fellow human beings, 
indifferently, uncaringly, ambiguously, ambivalently, falsely, o, -, por- 
tunistically, corruptly and so on. But this is-only to say that when 
a person treats another person brutally he brutalizes him, when he 
treats him inhumanely he dehumanizes him, when he treats him deceit- 
fully he makes him cynical and when he treats him with ambivalence he 
confuses him. If we want examples of relationships that go well with 
people, we remind ourselves of the reverse of what is described here. 
What kind of people we are is expressed in our values and in our vary- 
ing attachments to them and is revealed in our encounters with other 
people. 
Often, of course, it is not easy to understand the nature of our 
attachments to values. We need only reflect on the intricacies of our 
self -understanding or'self -misunderstanding and the intimate ambiguities 
in our relationships with other people. Recently one of my students 
told me that she was a sinner but she knew that the Lord Jesus cared 
for her in spite of this. It is difficult to deal with declarations 
of this kind without indelicacy either at the time of its utterance or 
in a discussion of it. I was uncertain whether she was making a 
theological statement about man's fallen condition that she had p icked 
up at an evangelical meeting or whether she was presenting herself 
with a picture that gave embodiment to values that she had fallen short 
of. These are not independent of each other, in any case, for many 
people. 
I recall here what Wittgenstein said about his representing his 
life under the aspect of the Last Judgement. It was not a state that 
he and the rest of us would reach in the fullness of time. It was not 
a forecast of an event in so many years time when a resurrected 
Wittgenstein would meet his Maker. The Day of Judgement was a picture, 
embodying values, that was a constant reminder of his falling short. 
It was a way of interpreting his life that was imminent in that life 
and not transcendent of it. If my student had fallen short it is 
difficult to believe that sin was appropriate to characterize it. 
She did not talk or behave as though she were a sinner. What 
the 
nature of the transgressions was I have no idea but 
the vocabulary 
seemed out of place. 
My point is that it is often difficult to know what we want to say 
about ourselves. A certain vocabulary may suggest rather 
than capture 
- 193 - 
what is an adequate way of talking about ourselves and this, of coirse, 
raises the question of what is a test of such adequacy. Ultimately, it 
might not be a decisive distinction but our factual way of comprehendin7 
the world may seem firmer than our evaluative way of assessing it. -r"n 
objective world stays in place even when our values shift. The 
here is that certain vocabularies in human self-interpretation may 
become marginal or even disappear. If the test of a vocabulary's 
adequacy is not in a world out there, so to speak, but in a continuing 
conversation amongst people, what is the status of that vocabulary when 
the conversation begins to flag? Above I tried to show that we can 
stand in different degrees of imperfection to our values. But we can 
also be in the process of losing a certain vocabulary of values. 
Indeed, we may have lost it to all intents and purposes. Such a vocabu- 
lary may be one constituted by words such as sin. It is in situations 
such as the one described above between teacher and studentthat we feel 
that we are irreclaimably talking past one another. We do share other 
vocabularies but perhaps ones which do not go deep with us. 
This talking past one another can be interpreted in two ways. 
One is that we do not share beliefs about the nature of the universe or, 
ontologically speaking, we disagree about what there is. The other is 
that there is irreducible conflict in our value commitments. This is 
probably an artificial separation anyway. Beliefs, if they do not 
reduce to values, have very strong value implications. What I want to 
look at is the claim that there has been a great moral transformation 
in our inter-personal moral universe. Alistair McIntyre in 'After 
Virtue' (1981 ppll-14) asserts that we have been witness to a gradual 
disintegration or degeneration of our moral vocabulary. This degenera- 
tion or 'scheme of moral decline' is exhibited in the triumph of emo- 
tivism - the view that all judgements of value are merely expressions 
of personal preference. Emotivism is not the official morality of our 
society but it captures the nature of our moral condition. Values 
pretend to have an objective sanction but are really disguised personal 
preferences. Our values have no coherence and are mere fragments from 
disintegrated larger totalities of theory and practice. There are two 
parts to the thesis. The first is that surviving ethics cannot be 
underwritten by any unified picture of the nature of things and second 
that any occupancy of such ethics is based, whether one recognizes it 
or not, on personal choice. The degeneration consists not simply 
in 
the inability to settle moral disputes but in the use of the fragmented 
survivals of older moralities to mask the pursuit of self-interest and 
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private gain. We cannot settle the competing claims of the Sermon on 
the Mount and an ethic of manly conduct. We cannot resolve disputes 
about the rights and wrongs of abortion, about whether modern wars can 
be just, about whether justice implies greater or lesser government 
intervention in the distribution of the community's wealth and so on. 
If reason, sentiment or whatever other human resources we have, are 
helpless here, what prevents a decline in our moral vocabulary? io 
live in a shared world in which it is possible to settle disputes we 
must have 'objective' points of reference. 
McIntyre tries to repair our moral vocabulary by a return to 
Aristotelian virtues. At this stage in my discussion I do not want 
to argue whether McIntyre has been successful or not. I want to 
raise the issue of whether it is helpful to talk about a degeneration 
in our moral vocabulary. Lying behind McIntyre's characterization of 
the state of our moral resources is Max Weber. Weber writes: 'The 
ultimately possible attitudes to life are irreconcilable and hence 
their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion I. (1961 p 152) 
He continues: 'According to our ultimate standpoint the one is the 
Devil and the other God and the individual has to decide which is God 
for him and which the Devil. And so it goes throughout all orders of 
life'. Our fate is 'characterized by rationalization and intellec- 
tualization and above all the I disenchantment of the world Weber 
says again: 'precisely the ultimate and sublime values have retreated 
from public life either into the transcendental world of the mystic 
life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations'. 
(1961 P 155) The realm of the private is the last refuge of our 
undisfigured values. The bleak images of our condition are added to 
in the notion of instrumental rationality. Rationality only attaches 
to means ; our ends are individually chosen and cannot be rationally 
grounded. We live in a depersonalized and mechanized public world 
and even our thought becomes, to quote Arnold, 'mechanized and external'. 
The picture that remains in our mind is painted by 'Weber in these words: 
It is horrible to think that the world will one day be 
filled with nothing but these little cogs, little men 
clinging to little jobs, and striving towards bigger ones 
... it 
is enough to drive one to despair. It is as if 
men were deliberately to become men who need order and 
nothing but order, who become nervous and cowardly if for 
one moment this wavers, and helpless if they are torn 
away from their total incorporation in it. (Quoted in Lewis 
1975 P 87) 
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Weber says that our integrity will be met "'in the demands of the "ay", 
in human relations as well as in our vocation' but: 'To the person 
who cannot bear the fate of the time like a man one must say: may he 
rather return silently to the bosom of the church'. (1961 p 156) But 
just as Weber says that our fate is the 'Polar night of icey darkness 
and hardness' McIntyre says similarly that our is the 'new dark ages 
which are already upon us'. Our protection is 'the construction of 
local forms of community within which civility and intellectual and 
moral life can be sustained'. (1981 p 245) 
My immediate concern is to see what happens to a person's self- 
understanding in the setting of a degenerated moral vocabulary. 
McIntyre argues that in a society where there is no strong sense of a 
telos for man, where a person cannot 'confront the world as a member 
of this family, this household, this clan, this tribe, this city, this 
nation, this kingdom ... I that person's sense of self becomes 'abstract 
and ghostly'. There is no III apart from its 'social embodiments' in 
the social formations just described. In our world, McIntyre argues, 
'the identification of individual interests is prior to, and indepen- 
dent of, the construction of any moral or social bonds between them'. 
The I emotive self I is a, rootless, role-playing entity without essential 
identity. This self is manipulative in its relations with others and 
has no conception of other people as ends in themselves. Ours is 
essentially a managerial society in which the central figures consume 
or use other people in pursuit of their arbitrarily chosen ends. 
Reason cannot pronounce on ends. A kind of Kierkegaardian appetitive 
aestheticism is abroad and our contacts with other people are of an 
episodic experimentalism. Our values are thinly disguised appetites, 
desires and preferences and if we identify ourselves with these values' 
we perceive ourselves to be persons of a certain kind. When we pile 
image upon image in this way our human condition looks desperate indeed. 
What I have wanted to present is a certain idea of the degeneration 
in our understanding of our own value categories and I have attempted 
this in the context of a general discussion of how things go wrong in 
our relations with other people, mediated through the values in our 
lives. I do not underestimate a charge that a different interpretation 
could be put upon how the people and the events in their lives have been 
presented in the writers quoted and my observations on what they have 
said. There is, of courseý disagreement about the facts; and as 
McIntyre has said there is interminable dispute about values. Reason 
has been expected not just to settle disputes about values but to be 
- 196 - 
the source of these values. McIntyre says that it has failed. Dis- 
agreement is endemic in both what ought to be done and how to start to 
decide what ought to be done. McIntyre has tried to repair our moral 
vocabulary in a modified Aristotelianism; but it is difficult to know 
how such a retrieval can withstand a Weberian quizzical gaze. From 
where we stand we have to choose between Aristotle and Weber. Presum- 
ably there are no independent grounds to falsify a choice one way or 
the other. 
Above I referred to the 'thicker' moral notions such as 'brutal' 
and 'rude'. Even though these words fuse fact and value and although 
we can identify their correct evaluative use in factual situations, it 
is still an open question whether we accept these words as part of our 
moral vocabulary. That fact and value are fused and that we can 
identify the conditions for their proper use is not to say that we 
want to own these ways of talking. I have already mentioned the 
notion of sin. This word might be considered a 'thicker' moral term; 
but because the word might presuppose a theological context, it might 
be intermediate between 'brutal', 'rude', 'courageous' and so forth on 
the one hand and 'alienation', lanomiel and 'disenchantment' on the 
other. My point is that people may say they do not wish to use cer- 
tain 'thicker' moral terms. That need not be the end of the matter. 
We might want to say of a person who says that 'sin' is not part of 
his repertoire that he is irredeemably wicked. Similarly of a person 
who wishes to do without the words, 'brutal', 'unjust', 'trust' and 
'fidelity' we would say he is callous. In this too, he would not 
have the last word on whether he was callous, although he may be indif- 
ferent to whether he has or has not. He simply might not care. The 
question then might be a categorial one - he is morally autistic or 
psychopathic. 
It is much more difficult with the terms, lalienation'g lanomiel 
and 'disenchantment', though perhaps not with 'dehumanization' or even 
less with 'health'. (Although some people seem to have trouble with 
'health'. I recall President Nixon, as he was then, saying to newsmen 
on leaving hospital that his health was O. K. 
"The doctors say I feel 
fine", he went on. By this time his personal development was equally 
in the minds of other people. ) Alienation, anomie and 
disenchantment 
do not identify themselves. They are identified within 
frameworks of 
thought, involving assumptions about human nature, findings about 
the 
empirical nature of man and speculations and research about 
the condi- 
tions for the proper expression of this nature. 
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Fact and value are, then, fused in the terms 'alienation', lanomiel 
and 'disenchantment'. But more, these terms are applied to reality 
through theories about man's fallen, disintegrated or impoverished con- 
dition and about the possible remedies for its alleviation. Some 
writers might add that if these theories are genuine, they should in 
principle be falsifiable. If they are, they could then be refuted. 
Even here there are difficulties. If an M. S. C. 'graduate' is contented 
in his job packing shelves in a supermarket is he unalienated or more 
alienated because he does not recognize his connivance at his own 
estrangement from his true or real self? Confirmation or refutation 
is dependent upon a correct identification of the conditions of the 
work and psychological state of the young person. Such identification 
is not independent of a particular framework of thought. How do we 
tell just by looking? This is difficult in any case because we often 
inhabit different universes of moral thought. But we usually share 
enough 'thicker' moral notions to recognize the good and ill in our 
normal transactions together in society. The 'graduate', then, may 
be happy or miserable in his shelf packing, absorbing the requisite 
qualities and attributes for life in an enterprise culture, but we do 
not need a theory to recognize which of the two is a better description 
of his condition, although we may need more than a superficial under- 
standing of the person's life. 
An example of where we do not wait on the facts, even in defence 
or rejection of postulated correlations between initial experience and 
subsequent behaviour is that of pornography. We do not wait for 
evidence about the corrupting effects of the pornographic material. 
We condemn it because it presents a degrading picture of women or 
children, and we identify the degradation in non-theoretical terms. 
In any case, there is more often than not a non-accidental connection 
between the subjection to degrading material and its influence for ill 
in a person's life. I have already mentioned this when I said that 
brutal behaviour brutalizes people. Experience tells us this much 
without sociological or psychological speculative correlations. 
I have discussed, then, the way that the categorial and the moral 
are hard to separate in circumstances where dehumanization is tradi- 
tionally endemic in society, where confusion is deliberately engineered 
and where institutionally defined relationships are superimposed on 
what may usually pass for normal. For example, do soldiers temporarily 
lose their moral sense in conditions of military training and psycho- 
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logical re-education and subsequently of war? The moral sense is 
selectively transformed in that certain categories or sub-categories 
of people take on the aspect of gooks etc. But it is not simply that 
the enemy is objectively redefined and then falls under a category 
other than human or under a sub-category other than 'civilized' or 
'pure'. It is in the process of stripping the enemy or aliens of 
moral attributes that they begin to fall under a different category or 
sub-category. (They are less than human, not human or even animals. 
They do not feel or behave as you and I. ) In a less dramatic way but 
nevertheless just as real, racial minorities in our own society may 
begin to appear less human because of circulated stories about the way 
they live, eat or play. In the case of soldiers or host populations, 
it may be all self-deception brought on by fear - the fear of reprisals 
by senior military personnel or a theatened way of life or unemployment 
in 'one's own country'. I have also discussed objective and partici- 
pant ways of responding to other people in my reference to Strawson's 
'Freedom and Resentment'. 
In addition I have introduced the notion of psychopathy. To wit- 
ness signs of its presumed presence in a person causes yet more 'splits' 
in thought and response in the sense outlined above in my discussion of 
prison education. I have myself had intimate dealings with prisoners 
labelled as psychopathic. However, if there are 'signs' in their 
behaviour it does not necessarily mean that they are signs of that. 
It is enough, nevertheless, that one 'knows' and that one learns to 
'recognize' the signs. And the crucial question is 'signs' of what? 
In a context such as this I have heard the word mad used to describe 
such people and their behaviour. Whatever the suggestions made or 
the words used the people have been redefined. The thoughts begin to 
crowd in: what kinds of contortions are involved in reconciling the 
intimacy of a so-called pastoral and educational tutorial with an arms- 
length distancing from a 'suitable case for treatment19; and in 
reconciling a discussion of fine moral distinctions in character and 
situation in literature with the 'objective' understanding when one is 
confronted with a person who is supposed to be devoid of moral sense? 
Is the person simply getting the right words in the right order in a 
mechanical fashion? 
When one says of someone that he is a psychopath or that he is 
mad, one may simply be abusing him. It is not that he is unfit to 
plead because of diminished responsibility or that his insanity dis- 
qualifies him from normal human exchange. It is rather that one 
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wants to show strong disapproval or that one wants to provoke a re3- 
S-4, ponse so that one can then retaliate. I recall that I once __d of 
Iago that he was perfectly rational in the instrumental sense but mad 
nevertheless. He could calculate and contrive the downfall o-I C)thello 
with brilliant inventiveness and ingenuity. I said this in a class 
of adult students and one of the women, in a moment of illumination and 
obvious bitterness, said that her husband was just like that! We did 
not try to disentangle what was said. Whatever one wants to say about 
these examples, objective and participant attitudes intermesh with each 
other and with categorial and moral distinctions. 
When I was discussing the claim that 'person' is not a sortal or 
'count-noun', I cited the case of Rex Motram who was thought by Julia 
to be a fragment of a man. After a relationship involving strong 
emotions, Julia could not treat him as a redefined natural kind. He 
was not an object that had somehow been misclassified. He had not 
fallen out of the class of person. Yet one has to adjust in such 
cases. He was not worthy of her love but such a recognition is no 
consolation for the broken-hearted. It may help in one's recovery 
though. Wittgenstein said something to the effect that love is not a 
feeling because love is put to the test. Whether or not Wittgenstein 
was right about its not being a feeling, he was right about it being 
put to the test. The fault, though, may not all be in the object of 
one's love. One may be in love with love, with an idea, with the 
mystery attached to a person such as Motram, with devotion or with an 
awakening sensuality. This may, then, be to mischaracterize the 
supposed object*of one's love. 
However, if Julia was not merely telling herself a story about 
Motram's ambiguous human status to cop e with the 'let down' or his 
continued infidelity, she would have been in that indeterminate state 
of mind between objective and participant attitudes based on am ambiva- 
lence between categorial and moral judgements. But in the thick of an 
emotional crisis one would not have the distance to be so clear headed. 
Later one would have to create a distance for reflection and in the 
case of Julia it would have to be in these terms. 
Rex Motram is not a pyschopath, although for some he may exhibit 
psychopathic traits. Whether he is less morally sane then the rest 
of the characters in the novel may depend on the moral or religious 
perspective through which one views him. He is described as a semi- 
imbecile and an idiot child because prayer, the catechism and the 
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nature and works of God mean nothing to him and because he is preparec 
to enter the Church just by 'signing on the dotted line' and to enter- 
tain mildly ridiculous beliefs about the Catholic faith. In the case 
of spiritual values, it is not so much how Rex relates to them but 
rather that the values do not feature in his value universe. All the 
other main characters have a relation to such values because the values 
define a universe of thought and belief that helps to define them, no 
matter how defective the characters are in their response to those 
values. If various universes of value do not meet, the characters do 
insofar as they understand these universes. They share this world, 
if not the next one. In saying this I am not ignoring the thought that 
spiritual values illuminate or give significance to things of this world. 
Although Rex has no understanding of traditional pieties and 
fidelities, he is made use of by the Flytes to run errands or to fix 
things in his greater knowledge of the ways of the modern world, only 
the like of which could produce him, so we are told. It is interesting 
that if Rex is placed outside the religious and moral universe of the 
Flytes, he too knows who is excludedfrom his. One of the reasons why 
Rex wants to be received into the Catholic faith is that he desires an 
ostentatious wedding, which is precluded if he remains a Protestant. 
Talk of a 'mixed' marriage alerts him to such a preclusion. Before he 
understands what is meant by 'mixed', he protests that he is not a 
Inigger or anything'. Rex has his values but it is not so much that 
he relates to those values but that he is an embodiment of such values. 
Or rather the character who is Rex is a cluster of values, alien to a 
world in which Grace subordinates relative ends to Divine Purpose. 
His world is a world of shadows; it is the Cave. It is a loveless 
world and love is the highest value. Although Charles Ryder says "to 
know and love one other human being is the root of all wisdom", this 
love, as Charles ultimately recognizes, is a Dantean love, though, of 
course, he does not say it. The profane is a channel for the sacred. 
The fullest maturation (the fullest personal development) is in an 
acceptance of Grace. Rex is the furtherest point from this. This 
explains the sub-human imagery, of which Julia is the main vehicle. 
Ortega y Gasset in I The Revolt of the Masses I (1951 p 51 ) says 
this of modern man: 'He wishes to have opinions but is unwilling 
to 
accept the conditions and presuppositions that underly opinions. 
Hence his ideas are in effect nothing more that appetites in words, 
something like musical romanzas'. If Waugh had this passage 
in mind, 
and I have no reason to believe he had, when he was creating 
Rex Motram, 
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so MacIntyre may too have used it as an epgraph to his 'After Vir tlue' - 
Some-thing of this is caught when Father Mowbray says of modern educa- 
tion typified by Rex: 
"The trouble with modern education is you never know how 
ignorant people are. With anyone over fifty you can be 
fairly confident what's been taught and what's been left 
out. But these young people have such an intelligent, 
knowledgeable surface, and then the crust suddenly breaks 
and you look down into the depths of confusion you didn't 
know existed. " (1986 p 222) 
Rex calculates and uses what resources are adequate to the task. 
But he has no cohesion in his life which might be brought by a religious 
tradition. Mowbray asked Motram. what he meant by prayer. The answer: 
"I don't mean anything. You tell me. " A few words from Mowbrary and 
that was "so much for prayer". In answer to a question about whether 
Our Lord had more than one nature, Rex said: "Just as many as you say, 
Father. " If the Pope said it was going to rain and it did not, Motram 
had learnt enough casuistry to--. say: "I suppose it would be sort of 
raining spiritually, only we were too sinful to see it. " When Rex was 
troubled by doubts they were about the Pope who made one of his horses 
into a Cardinal and about the sacred monkeys in the Vatican. He had 
been duped into entertaining these beliefs by Cordelia who exclaimed 
when Mowbray had related these details: "What a chump! Oh, Mummy 
what a glorious chump! " Lady Marchmain responded, "Poor Rex ... You 
know, I think it makes him rather loveable. You must treat him like 
an idiot child, Father Mowbray. " 
A less engaging and banal man who is perhaps ultimately more 
dangerous is Hooper, Charles Ryder's platoon-commander. He observes 
the universe through. a 'general, enveloping fog' and through the effici- 
ency of a modest commercial experience. But for Ryder, the madmen in 
the municipal lunatic asylum near the army camp, who sauntered and 
skipped among the trim gravel walks and pleasantly planted lawns, were 
"happy collaborationists who had given up the unequal struggle, all 
doubts resolved, all duty done, the undisputed heirs-at-law of a century 
of progressq enjoying the heritage at their ease". 
Hooper, however, 
begrudged them their "life of privilege", says Ryder. But Hooper 
speaks for himself: "Hitler would put them in a gas chamber ... 
I 
reckon we can learn a thing or two from him". 
If we suspend the 
thought that these characters are players in a metaphysical drama and 
consider them as people in the quotidian world, we may 
find that we do 
not possess categories to resolve 
the tension between the categorial 
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and moral dimensions of our human relationships. 
The problems are these. What something is has implications for 
how we respond to it in moral or value categories. But equally our 
moral and value categories shape the aspect under which we perceive 
things. That someone is a psychopath, an idiot child or mad will 
influence how we respond to him but, allowing that we need to protect 
ourselves and other people, our response may be that of pity, care or 
love instead of their opposites. If the madmen are sufficiently 
redefined for Hooper that he finds Hitler's solution acceptable, we 
would want to condemn him morally for his pitiless response to them. 
In the case of Motram, is his lack of many distinctively human qualities 
and attributes something for which he can be blamed or does the lack of 
these qualities and attributes diminish his responsibility for the 
inadequate moral outlook he occupies? After all, Julia did say, if 
we accept her judgement in such matters, that Rex was "something 
absolutely modern and up-to-date that only this ghastly world could 
produce". If per impossibile Rex had been born in another age, he 
would have been different and not culpable. in the same way. Given 
that Rex is the product of a faithless, utilitarian world, how respon- 
sible is he for what -he is? Since he has not fallen out of the class 
of persons clinically - if 'clinically' is not a pseudo-category in 
this context - he has choice and some resources in terms of which the 
choice can be made. But what resources? Julia seems to have doubts 
about his resources. 
A much debated forerunner of a character, at once under-developed 
and over-developed, like Rex Motram is Gerald Crich in Women in Love. 
We might think of him in the context of Max Weber's metaphor of men as 
cogs in a machine. Gerald is a distorted person in whom all attributes 
and qualities are subservient to the will. His car pushes through a 
"solid mass of human beings ... who were all subordinant to him 
Mhey were his instruments. He was the God of the machine ... His 
vision was suddenly crystalized. Suddenly he had conceived the pure 
instrumentality of mankind. There had been so much humanitarianism, 
so much talk of suffering and feeling ... The sufferings and feelings 
of individuals do not matter in the least. They were conditions like 
the weather. What mattered was the pure instrumentality of the 
individual. As a man as of a knife: does it cut well? Nothing else 
mattered. Everything in the world has its function, and is good or 
not good insofar as it fulfils this function more or less perfectly. 
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Was a miner a good miner? Then he was complete. Was a manager a 
good manager? That was enough. Gerald himself, who was responsible 
for all this industry, was he a good director? If he were he had ful- 
filled his life. The rest was by-play-" Gerald is a more complex 
character than is suggested in this passage. He is a type none'l -heless, 
just as Rex Motram is a type. Both are one-sided characters but are 
recognizable types because of the social settings which give some kind 
of authentication to their identities. 
As we have seen, it is said of Motram that he is modern and up-to- 
date and a product of the ghastly age which provides him with a setting 
for the expression of what he is. Lawrence describes the setting 
which legitimizes Crich's mode of existence. Industrialism is both an 
economic system and an attitude of mind. "The industrial problem 
arises from the base forcing of all human energy into a competition of 
mere acquisition". The urge to possess consumes people in such a 
society. All reduces to "something I've got: something that embel- 
lishes me", save for intimations of beauty in the colliers. In the 
midst of ugliness which "betrayed the spirit of man in the Nineteenth 
Century", colliers display a "real awareness of the presence of beauty". 
Ugliness distorts everything. Men live in "meanness and formless and 
ugly surroundings, ugly ideals, ugly religion, ugly hope, ugly love, 
ugly clothes, ugly furniture, ugly houses, ugly relationships between 
workers and employers". Then Lawrence declares: "The human soul 
needs actual beauty even more than bread". 
Crich embodies energy directed at acquisition - the acquisition 
of more instruments in the service of further instruments. He lacks 
a conception of true ends. That includes human beings as ends in 
themselves and whatever we can contemplate as beautiful. Crich would 
be at an extreme distance from Lawrence who says "that no man shall 
try to determine the being of another man, or any other woman". Crich 
is all determination. Gudrun says of him that"Certainly, he's got go 
... In fact 
I've never seen a man that showed signs of so much. The 
unfortunate thing is, where does his go go to, what becomes of 
it? " 
Ursula responds "Oh I know ... It goes in applying 
the latest appliances. " 
The important question is that if we begin to see ourselves in these 
terms either because a vision crystalizes in us or because someone 
else's crystalized vision is projected onto us and we accept 
it, do 
certain moral categories lose their hold on our moral 
imagination and 
hence re-fasion our moral self-interpretation? 
I have said that Rex Motram is not a psychopath. He would appear 
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to have cognitive, emotional and volitional impairments in the sense 
that he has an immaturity that is peculiarly modern. His impairments 
are of deficiency or excess in how he thinks, feels or wills. A 
psychopath is typically not cognitively or volitionally impaired. 
One has to be careful not to equivocate in the use of cognitive. 
Rex's cognitive impairment is that he does not see the moral or reli- 
gious world as others see it. He lacks any real attachment to intrin- 
sic values. If we want a hard case of psychopathy, that is one that 
is 'clincicall and not one based on circular reasoning from observed 
wrong-doing back to observed wrong-doing, we must enumerate the distinc- 
tive characteristics of the condition of psychopathy. A perso n in this 
condition is said to be morally dead. He is 'incapable of kindness and 
consideration for the rights of others and he is lacking in gratitude, 
affection or compassion'. He does not register humiliation or remorse, 
though he may express regret that he is in the position of an inmate 
incarcerated in an institution. Santavana said that "Perhaps the true 
dignity of man is in an ability to despise himself". The psychopath 
in this sense would be without dignity. He has no delusions in the 
way that a psychotic may have them. He has no guilt or shame but 
because he has no cognitive nor volitional impairments he may deceive 
people through a semblance of them. He has no conscience but may talk 
as though he has one. 
An image of a generalized psychopathic condition is that of a 
Hobbesian state of nature, to which I referred earlier. Having no 
sense of justice or other moral sentiments, men in such a condition 
would not possess the personal characteristics to effect the transition 
from a state 'of nature to civil society. If we grant a knowledge of 
contract, such a knowledge would not be enough. Such knowledge would 
be mere knowledge. Karl Jaspers, living in Nazi Germany, thought 
himself to be in such a society, or rather state of nature. To do yet 
another disservice to animals, Jaspers responded towards the psycho- 
paths who were running Germany at the time as though they were animals. 
"To me there seemed nothing left beyond at least being at all times 
clear about what I was doing and intending to do, and to act accordingly. 
What we had to do was to act naively, to pretend no interest in the 
affairs of the world, to preserve a natural dignity ... and if need be 
to live without scruples. For beasts in possession of an absolute 
power to destroy must be treated with cunning and not as men and 
rational beings". (Quoted by Scott 1969 p 58) 
If we keep Rex at arm's length it is not in this sense. The 
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difficult thought is how we encompass psychopaths or those approac'ý'-'ino' 
such a condition in our moral scheme of things such that ours is 
-a correct, objective perspective on not just how things are but how they 
have to be. When we are on top, so to speak, psychopaths have claims 
only in the sense that any sentient beings have claims. If we exclude 
the insane as described by Charles Ryder, and those human beings who 
are not currently persons - potential or former persons, such as 
infants and the senile - psychopaths seem to be the hardest cases of 
those who fall outside the category of persons with all that that 
implies about the moral status of persons as such. But we may go too 
far; the hard case may be a limiting case. If so, we can never fully 
escape the ambivalence in response between the categorial and the moral. 
The difficulty then is how the values in a plural society pronounce 
on a person and his life when those values are not his own? I have 
said already that this is not a question of how a person relates to 
what might reasonably be said to be his values. It is a question of 
how values which cannot be construed as his values or cannot be said to 
capture his moral residence in the world can pronounce on him or his 
life. There seem to be values that we cannot escape without forfeiting 
what it means to be a person or fully human. I have discussed the 
phenomenom of psychopathy in respect of this. Kant may have the last 
word on a life bereft of values in which no worth or dignity attaches 
to persons as such: "No man is entirely without moral feeling, for 
were he completely lacking in capacity for it he would be morally dead. 
And if ... the moral life-force could no 
longer excite this feeling, 
then humanity would dissolve ... into mere animality and be mixed 
irrevocably with the mass of other natural beings". (Quoted in Ezorsky 
1972 P 117) Both Winch and Wiggins owe something to this thought. 
But what about truth, which seems universal enough, as one of 
those values we cannot escape without violating our humanity? Even 
here we can stand in different relations to the truth. For example, 
a person may speak the truth, or if one prefers, give the facts, but 
he may be falsely related to both. Gossip may be amusing and have 
some socially cohesive function but it may be motivated by meanness or 
malice. There is the additional difficulty too that the bare facts 
may only approximate to the truth. So one may tell the 
truth as far 
as possible or give the facts as far as one knows them but still 
be 
related to both deviously. Anthony Blanche has a good nose 
for the 
truth and not just the facts. He knows that Charles Ryder's work is 
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false in that he paints imitations of illusions. "My dear" he say-s 
"let us not expose your little imposture before these good plain 
people ... We know you and I that this is all t-t-terrible t-t-tripe. " 
He also tells the truth about the character and personality of 
Sebastian but does so with jealousy and malice and that he does is an 
objective fact about him. Whether we have the moral right to say it, 
though we recognize it, is another matter. The last remark should not 
be taken as a universal plea for tolerance. 
The question has now to be raised of the authority by which we 
speak when we appraise another person's life with values that are not 
that person's own nor can properly be said to constitute a moral world 
that he would recognize as applicable to him. This is complicated 
further when we may relate to our values with less than moral scrupu- 
lousness yet feel nevertheless that our values can be extended to the 
appraisal of another person and his life. Rex Motram is outside the 
Catholic tradition even though there is a pretence at some kind of 
relation to it in his willingness to undertake instruction in the Faith. 
He did so with the falseness of the opportunist. If one was to say 
that Motram was related to the inessentials of the Faith or that he 
was related superstitiously or related hypocritically, would this 
entitle a Catholic to pronounce on him and his life from within the 
Catholic framework of thought and belief? There is always a short 
way with closed systems of thought, if this is a proper characterization 
of Catholicism. Non-believers are fools, knaves or lapsed believers 
because of weakness. The same has been said of Marxism and Freudianism. 
Anyone who rejects the system of thought is comprehended within the 
system as a victim of the very condition that the system diagnoses. 
Those who reject the system are a mere 
_sympton 
and therefore confirm 
the system of thought. I am not concerned with such sh ort ways with 
dissenters. It is rather that in a plural society such as ours, where 
we do genuinely understand opposing ways of thought and belief, how do 
we pronounce on one another's lives with authority? Perhaps as 
educationalists we can only be aware of the question, when the question 
is meant seriously. 
I have just been speaking about telling the truth and giving the 
facts and that means that there are truths to tell and facts to give. 
There are some truths or facts about the human condition that are 
inescapable. Winch in 'Understanding a Primivite Society' says "that 
the very conception of human life involves certain fundamental notions 
- which I should call 'limiting notions' - which 
have an obvious 
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ethical dimension, and which indeed in a sense determines the let'ri--al 
space', within which the Possibilities of good and evil in human life 
can be exercised ... The specific forms which these conceptions 
(notions) take, the particular institutions in which they are e=,, ressed, 
vary considerably from one society to another... 11. T. S. Eliot's 
trinity of "birth, copulation and death" is what Winch has in mind. 
These facts about our condition are saturated with values. As matters 
of fact our births were the results of sexual relations and our death 
is the inevitable end of all things. But these facts are surrounded 
with moral truths. 
In an Anglican Report on 'The Family in Contemporary Society', 
(1966 pp 340-381) we find a discussion of the moral conditions of 
sexual relations. The Report says thatlcoitus, considered in itself, 
comes within the category of indifferent acts, such as walking and 
eating and is therefore morally neutral'. But before anyone gets the 
wrong i dea, the Report makes it clear that coitus can never be seen 
under the aspect of a morally neutral act. It always has its moral 
conditions. I(T)he morality of an act are its object, its circum- 
stances and the agent's intention'. As one would expect 'coitus must 
occur within a context of a certain ki nd of responsible sexual relation- 
ship, which may be defined theologically as the common life of one-flesh 
and institutionally as 'marriage' ... People who do not agree with 
a Christian perspective on coitus, to use the Report's term, would have 
their own interdictions on certain sorts of sexual conduct. Some may 
use 'harm' as the limiting moral category. Some may think that the 
'thicker' moral categories of disloyalty and inf'idelity are the con- 
straining notions. Most people feel that coitus is an intimacy for 
selected people and a departure from this intimacy would be a violation 
of something sacred. 
It is not difficult to think of people for whom coitus is an 
indifferent act7 at least in the hours of business. But one hopes 
that other people would feel a certain sadness that this is the case. 
It might be more useful though to employ the expression indifferent act 
not as an ineliminable given upon which we place moral interpretation 
but rather as a condition to which society is moving. An interesting 
thought is that our society is increasingly beset by indifferent acts 
and unimportant moments. Many occupations are constituted by indif- 
ferent acts; and the waste in commuting to them are so many unimpor- 
tant moments. When leisure and consumption are an escape from such 
meaningless acts and moments, we might picture society as losing its 
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fitness for human habitation. If we include meaning in our moral 
categories, we could argue that even Winch's 'limiting notions' are 
losing the fullness of their ethical dimension. So too, then, we may 
shield ourselves from the reality of death and lose a sense of the 
preciousness of birth. If we use spiritual categories, we would talk 
about the mystery and sacredness of both. In doing so we rule out 
certain ways of behaving in respect of these, even taking into account 
that people have perpetrated wickedness in the name of mystery and 
sacredness. Insofar as we want to talk about the 'limiting notions' 
in terms of truth and the realities that truth is about, ' such talk may 
cease to evoke an adequate response in us. 
A writer who explores the indeterminate religious and moral land- 
scape in which modern man tries to recapture some measure of spiritual 
significance is the television playwright, Dennis Potter. When a 
world descends into so many indifferent acts and unimportant moments 
and a spiritual vocabulary declines into the trivial language of an 
Information Society, it is hard to find resources for a disclosure of 
spiritual insight to match our spiritual yearnings, or at least the 
expectation of something better. But because our resources are 
inadequate, there is a corresponding distortion in the quality of our 
yearnings and expectations too. We are not sure about our yearnings 
nor about the spiritual disclosures which would meet them. 
In 'Pennies from Heaven', Potter uses the resources of Tin Pan 
Alley as vehicles in a degraded spiritual quest. Our longings for a 
better place are met in the lyrics of the popular music of the Thirties. 
An attachment to the sentiments in popular songs takes its revenge upon 
us. 'We might betray not only other people but also ourselves and have 
no resources left to recover either a lost innocence or a sense of a 
proper care of our souls. It may be unrealistic to think that this is 
possible or even that such a recovery makes sense. However, we can 
dream our dreams. 
It needs to be said that Potter is a religious dramatist, although, 
as he himself has said, he may not mention God. He is concerned with 
Grace and Salvation in a world that appears to be bereft of religious 
meaning. Many of the characters in his plays seek absolute good 
in 
the surrounding dross of the world and their lives. The majority of 
us have no authentic spiritual categories to interpret our residence 
in the world, so we have to make do with what may provide intimations 
of such categories. In the lyrics of 
the songs in 'Pennies from 
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Heaven' there may be a language of some kind that aspires to go 1)-_'Yon 
what that language in fact expresses. There is a yearning to firt a 
language that expresses a correspondence between what we feel and what 
lies beyond what we feel. We long for both joy and what might c0rres- 
pond with that joy in reality. There is a human dream for conceptions 
of perfection, Eden or the Golden City. 
As we would expect, there is ambiguity in the lyrics of the popular 
songs in 'Pennies from Heaven'. Do the lyrics hint at a more adequate 
human setting, no matter how distant from us, or do they create the 
reality they express? In Potter's play, there are suggestions that we 
do apprehend higher spiritual states that we could be in but are not. 
As I say, we have intimations of a better place somewhere else that 
would illuminate this place, as it were, but these intimations are 
redirected into what popular songs express. But in spite of this 
redirection, Arthur, the song-sheet salesman, still insists that the 
words in the songs refer to somewhere where the songs are true. At 
the same time, the music and lyrics appear to transfigure Arthur's 
daily world but only as long as the gramophone record lasts. He pays 
the price when he returns to the reality of his life. The trite Ian- 
guage of the lyrics is the only 'religious' language'avail able to him 
in his search for a good that would give him the meaning for the rest 
in his life. 
In the epilogues to both the television play and the novel of 
'Pennies from Heaven' the two dead lovers are mysteriously resurrected 
into a world of popular music. We are told not to switch off the 
music. "The world would go even crazier than it already is if we 
stopped the music altogether. 'There must be somewhere where the 
songs is for real'. " Perhaps the only place where the sun is always 
shining is in one's head, or so it is said on several occasions in the 
novel. We might dwell on the craziness of an Information Society 
in 
the spectacle of a Prime Minister delivering up one of the most beauti- 
ful Christian prayers to journalists and, of course, the television 
cameras in the street. Potter makes a passing reference 
to the incon- 
gruity of this spectacle in his preface to 'Waiting 
for the Boat'. 
(Were it not serious it would be entertaining to linger on the 
spectacles we are treated to by public figures. 
Think of the way in 
which private lives become display in public space. 
The intimacies 
of personal relationships are so much grist 
to the rhetoric of public 
image making. One politican's personal history is brought 
into the 
public domain in an attempt to out-hype 
the public visibility of 
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another politician's private virtues. This is not to forget t? ýat 
private lives are impoverished by taking their significance from com- 
promised public requirements. Nor is it to forget that both private 
and public lives drift in an indistinct region between reality and 
unreality as in the case of at least one public figure. This is what 
the Information Society has become for many people. ) 
The idea of betrayal is an important leitmotif running through 
Potter Is latest six-part television serial ,I The Singing Detectiýie I. 
We betray people through an attachment to the wrong values or through 
a marred orientation to the right ones. * The problem is in what new 
attachments (or a recovery or rediscovery of old ones) or in what re- 
orientations can we be brought into a more truthful relationship with 
ourselves. 
Philip Marlow, the boy, is betrayed and he betrays in turn. He 
witnesses his mother's adultery with the father of a boy in his class 
at school and takes his revenge by falsely accusing the boy of an 
indecency, perpetrated by himself, on the school mistress' table. As 
an adult, Marlow is haunted by this betrayal and a succession of others. 
He is haunted as he lies trapped in a hospital bed and in his own sick 
body. The starkest description I know of Marlow's imprisonment in his 
sick body is in Proust. 'It is in moments of illness that we are com- 
pelled to recognize that we live not alone but chained to a creature of 
a different kingdom, whole worlds apart, who has no knowledge of us and 
by whom it is impossible to make ourselves understood; our body. ' 
(quoted by Hepburn 1984 pp 155-156) 
We are not only caught up in the body's compulsions and necessities 
but also in the thought that the fate of the body is our fate too. 
Marlow gains some measure of release from the body's betrayal and at 
the same time some promise of renewal. There is a certain irony in 
the air, though, as he leaves the hospital, for we hear the sound of 
Vera Lynn sweetly promising 'We'll meet again'. 
On several occasions I have referred to a natural condition or 
our natural condition bereft of value. I also introduced Winch's 
, limiting notions' of the natural circumstances of our lives to show 
that being born, loving and dying demand a recognition in any human 
form of life. We do not live our lives in the irreducible animal 
parts, or functions, of our nature. Nor are we precipitated 
from 
birth through copulation to death without having a perspective on our- 
selves which includes an acknowledgement of these 
facts about our con- 
dition. Values are not superimposed on nature as an afterthought as 
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it were. The natural comes to us already permeated with values. 
This, Of course, does not stop us recognizing the natural as n-: -: itural. Nor does it preclude us from abstracting from such a full description 
to a partial one for scientific purposes. 
Philip, the young boy7 with the rest of the class, is frightened 
as the old school mistress stares at them "almost choking with rage 
and disgust". She speaks: 
'One of you, one nasty dirty wicked little boy - for I cannot believe it was one of the girls, no, not for a 
moment! - One of you boys waited until the end of school, 
waited, then sneaked back in and did this horrible - horrible-filthy-disgusting thing! Right in the middle 
of this table. My table! And I will tell you this. 
I will tell you here and now, he won't get away with it, 
whoever it is! I'll make sure of that! Ab-so-lute-ly 
sure! " (1986 p 137) 
She accuses one child after another with the offence and thencontinues: 
"Cows do it in the fields, and know no better. Dogs do 
it on the road, and know no better. Pigs do it in their 
sties, and know no better. They can't speak. They 
can't reason. They know not the difference between right 
and wrong. They are animals! But 
... But we are not animals. God has given us all a sense 
of good and of bad. God has allowed us to tell the 
difference between the clean and the dirty. And God is 
going to help me now f ind ou. t who did this thing! ... 
... All of you. In a moment you are going to close your 
eyes and place your hands together. We are going to say 
a prayer. (in an awful voice) We are going to ask 
Almighty God Himself. We are going to beseech Almighty 
God Himself. He is going to point His Holy Finger. 
Almighty God will tell us who did this wicked deed. 
And then we shall know. (A beat) Let us pray. " 
(1986 pp 138-139) 
The old school mistress enlists God as her secret agent and demands 
of Him that He suspend all His actions that order and uphold the uni- 
verse until He has pointed His finger at the guilty one. Under the 
old woman's gaze in his attitude of prayer Philip betrays himself and 
is made to stand at the front of the class until he reveals the culprit. 
He then falsely accuses the hapless Mark Binney of the offence. 
These extracts illustrate how values overlay and give significance 
to what is without value or significance in a humanly uninterpreted 
world. These extracts are not thoughts on the theme of dirt being 
matter in the wrong place, nor on the natural kingdom as one without 
distinctions of etiquette. The passages are about how values that 
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sanction behaviour can be the instruments of duplicity. We ca: ý- te 
open or deceitful in our relation to values. The old school mistress 
uses a certain superstitious conception of God to terrify the school 
children. Potter is conscious of how certain childhood-given or 
chapel-given images of God can be corrosive of adult struggles 
develop adequate attitudes to what faces adults in life. The old 
school mistress presents God as though He were an object amongst objects 
in the world and had the omniscience of a Big Brother. He could be 
coaxed into service by the wiles of a Big Sister. The prayers too were 
meant to trap the 'criminal' rather than petition for forgiveness, 
express remorse or contemplate the glories of God. The prayers were 
for a visitation of retribution not for a spiritual awakening. In such 
an atmosphere the children are betrayed into false beliefs and unwhole- 
some values in a process that should be one of intiation into expansive 
values of trust, openness and confidence. Values orient children to 
each other, to other people and to the world for good or ill. 
Philip is caught up in betrayal and learns that he can hide behind 
values as well as reveal himself in them. It is not just that he has 
been harmed by acts of betrayal, albeit in some cases unintentionally. 
It is also that the knowledge of betrayal can then feature in his 
relations with other people. He can betray intentionally and disguise 
it. His fellow pupil vicariously suffers for what he sees as his 
mother's betrayal of him and the 'father' he loves. Philip also 
intended to disgust and offend the school mistress without detection; 
he intended to betray without the consequences. There were many 
unintended consequences of his actions, though, just as there were many 
later cruelties because of his mother's adultery. But an acknowledge- 
ment of the nature of our deeds and the consequences of our actions 
may give us insight into the nature of responsibility. Marlow, the 
adult, is not without his lessons but his relation to them is ambiguous. 
We have here, then, the ingredients of our decline, or development, as 
persons and if personal development means anything it is found in the 
domain of values such as I have introduced in the previous pages. 
We have seen that values are not necessarily commensurate with 
each other. Sets or configurations of values fail to meet or even 
fail to contradict one another. We can stand in different relations 
to our values - in truth or in falsity. Values help or hinder an 
appreciation of who or what we are. They reveal or distort our sense 
of ourselves. Values distance people as much as they bind people 
Th_ I 
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together. We may think that our values capture the reality of other 
people but we find that they blind us to the fact that other peoýie 
exist in a dimension of values of their own. We may believe that our 
values speak with such an authority that the lives of other people 
cannot help but be comprehended within them. A greater understandirc- 
would show us that it is not just that our values have not the univer- 
sality we thought they had but that the thinking so puts us into a false 
relation to those values. This is apart from the fact that we may have 
a certain duplicity in relation to our values. 
No matter what the range of values we hold we still may fail to 
recognize the full reality of other people. It may have been such a 
thought that led Simone Weil to write: "Among human beings, only the 
existence of those we love is fully recognized. " The next thought on 
the page is: "Belief in the existence of other human beings as such is 
love. " (1952 p 56) Iris Murdoch owes a great deal to Simone Weil and 
we can see this in the following thought: "Seeing the reality of 
another human being is a work of love, justice and pity. " (1976 p 23) 
Love has different meanings in. our language. Simone Weil puts a cer- 
tain Christian construction on the word. Love in this sense is an 
ever-receding perspective 'away from our egoistic concerns. Goodness 
too for Simone Weil would give us such a perspective on the world and 
on the reality of other people, as we move away from our selfish con- 
cerns. 
Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch share the view that goodness is the 
capacity to see things as they truly are. It is the generously dis- 
interested awareness of the world outside, and this includes people, 
the distortions of a self-protecting and self-aggrandizing ego. The 
chief enemy of morality is the fat relentless ego; or, it might be 
better put, that when we get the ego out of the way there is little 
left for a morality to do. But a difficulty in Murdoch is that she 
says that morality is pointless, not in the sense that it is without 
meaning but in the sense that it does not serve anything beyond itself. 
Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that Murdoch has 'Quite inadvertently 
made a case out for the pointlessness of morality, not, as our modern 
Neoplatonists maintain, in the sense of a high-minded disclaiming of 
any this-worldly telos, any form of social life as the good life for 
man, but in a way which makes morality appear to be in the end no more 
than an aesthetically engaging and compelling phenomenon'. (1982 pp 6-15) 
I think that Murdoch would say in response to MacIntyre that goodness 
does not serve anything beyond itself. It is the light in terms of 
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which other things are seen as they are and this would include tnee 
aesthetic. 
Power and ambition screen us from other people with cliches. 
Van Gogh too had such an immense love of things that power and ambition 
were inimical to him. "I admire the bull, the eagle, and man with 
such an adoration, that it will certainly prevent me from ever becoming 
an ambitious person". (Quoted by Berger 1982) Reality is such a diffi- 
cult word to use that one is reluctant to introduce it into a discussion; 
but just as Simone Weil wants to meet the reality of other people, Van 
Gogh wants to engage with reality as such. Simone Weil wants to do so 
too in the rest of her work. For both the writer and the painter 
reality lies beyond selfish fantasy. We can begin to approach reality 
in love and begin to see the goodness of it. 
If what I have said is true of the limiting case of the psychopath, 
we might wonder what relevance love has for such a being. Love in 
respect of a psychopath may be expressed as pity; but what would be 
the status of such a response? It would be more an objective than a 
participant attitude but it is just this construal that Nietzsche would 
condemn as manipulative, although in the case of the psychopath it 
would have little influence on him were he on top. But pity is not 
about consequences, even though it has them. One feels pity for some- 
one cut off from a life of reciprocal human responses. Love or pity 
for such a human being is that he is not treated badly; and thus he is 
able to manipulate other people. His world is a world of moral non- 
compliance and has the shape of a Hobbesian state of nature, in which 
for him other people are more malliable because they are morally com- 
pliant. What he can get away with he does. The rest of us keep our 
humanity by encompassing him within our moral world; and that means 
we do not have a licence to do with him what we will. Given that we 
have to protect ourselves, we extend to him what he would not extend 
to us. However, when we come across people in power approximating to 
the condition of the psychopath we try to keep our distance. 
There is, of course, the possibility that psychopathy came into 
existence with a language that gave certain people with power the means 
of 'making up' such human beings. It has been said that positional 
goods which licence the exercise of power or coercion are not unknown 
to give asylum to people who, were they not in possession of the posi- 
tional goods, would easily fit the category of psychopath - that is 
the psychopathic traits are disguised in the sanctioned ruthlessness 
of enterprise and the demands of the job. And certainly such people 
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existed before the diagnostic category of psychopathy. But it T,; as 
not one of the ways for people to be. What we can be is intimately 
connected with our human descriptions. If people absorb descriptions 
of themselves, they become those kinds of people. We may recall 
Foucault who spoke about the 'constitution of subject'. That people 
can be 'made up' changes the possibilities for personhood and, of 
course, our way of describing a falling short of these possibilities. 
Animals are indifferent to our description of them, unless the descrip- 
tion entails greater interference in their lives on our part. Even 
then they would not know that it was our description that brought about 
a change in their condition. Howýwe label people adds to the under- 
standing of who they are, most crucially for themselves. The appalling 
result of Philip Marlow's betrayal of the 'backward' Mark Binney was 
that he later became a Inutterl in a loony bin. Philip sat at his 
desk as a 'perjurer and a charlatan' and watched as the rest of the 
class corroborated his story, equally bearing false witness. The old 
teacher beat an admission out of Mark Binney and together with the 
general betrayal of the class made him believe in his guilt. He was 
labelled and eventually wheeled off to the funny farm, as the play has 
it. 'Labelling Theory I has been incorporated into educational 
sociology for some time to capture the self-confirming nature of the 
use of 'under-achiever' and the rest. This is a kind of 'making up' 
of people. 
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CHAPTER 
Values and the Constitution of Persons 
I have wanted to argue that personal development consists in an 
individual's taking on the properties of what is of the nature of per- 
sons and his being implicated in what is of the nature of persons in 
his own way. There are generic features of what it is to be a person 
and there is the individual who assumes these features in his person. 
A dialectical relationship exists between our becoming constituted as 
persons and bringing this constitution under our own power. Personal 
development refers to that process in which an individual is introduced 
to what is relevantly person-like in certain areas of human experience 
and in which the individual is encouraged to build that experience into 
his personality and to take responsibility for it. As an individual's 
make-up develops, so that individual can become more implicated in what 
it is to be a person and will find that more of what is person-like 
will be refracted through his individual personality. 
We are talking, then, in the area of personal development of what 
it is for an individual to find himself, in his own way, in those fea- 
tures of generic personhood that pre-exist him but are the resources 
that constitute him. There is a content, form and direction to an 
individual's personal development and, to a greater or lesser extent, 
he can be a source of, or implicated in, these features of his 'personal' 
nature. Our development, in this respect, is how we perceive, desire 
or wish it. But it is development and what is internal to development 
is what is person-like. I have also wanted to suggest that the content 
and forin of the self, and the direction in which it proceeds to become 
a fuller reality of its own kind and of itself, - what it is to be a 
rational agent and a unitary personal being - is essentially moral. 
In the process of developing, an individual begins to have his own 
educated wants, wishes, needs, reasons, choices, 
tastes and inclinations. 
The content of these wants, wishes and so forth is the content we 
find 
in the different dimensions of human experience. Some broad dimen- 
sions of such experience are economic and occupational 
life, moral and 
spiritual conduct and social and cultural concerns. 
To the extent 
that an individual is implicated in these dimensions of experience, 
he 
develops intellectually, emotionally, imaginatively, morally, spiritu- 
ally and so on, and as he develops he appropriates, and owns 
in his own 
person, what belongs to these types of development. 
-217 - 
The individual begins to know what fulfils him, what he finds mean- 
ing in and what values he wishes to realize in his life. It is obvious 
that many conditions have to be satisfied before he can begin to express 
himself in such ways. One of the important lessons in life is to know 
what the conditions are for our 'higher' fulfilment. If we are lucky 
we will find our fulfilments in our work and perhaps in our functions 
and civic responsibilities. Whether we do or not, these are, never- 
theless, necessary conditions for much else that we wish to find our 
fulfilment in. We often forget just what conditions have to be satis- 
fied before other possibilities can become realities in our lives. 
Without health and a certain amount of wealth, our fulfilments in other 
respects will suffer. Also we might think of all those macro economic 
and political conditions that need to be satisfied for us to live our 
individual lives at the micro level. So, it might be said, we must be 
careful not to be too ýniffy about preparing young people to find 
employment, even if this employment is in itself less than fulfilling. 
Such employment, of course, is at the micro level just as our fulfil- 
ments are. We must not, though, pretend we are preparing young people 
for work when we are not. Furthermore, as part of our development, we 
need to be aware of what conditions other people are satisfying for us 
to live anything like a decent life. 
However, as educationalists, we want our pupils and students to 
pursue what is worthy of human pursuit and to be fulfilled in what is 
of genuine value. We wish to help to enhance what is best in our 
pupils and students already and foster what will be best for them in 
the future. We wish, too, to encourage our pupils and students not 
only to have their own motivations but also to have those motivations 
that are worthy of them. Yet, as I have said, we need to be realistic 
about what shape their lives will take in the given social and economic 
conditions of their lives. This is the problem in the areas that 
personal development covers. We wish young people to develop their 
individuality but in terms of what is of the nature of persons in a 
full sense. By the same token we wish to resist an attenuated version 
of what is person-like. We, also, want our pupils and students to be 
persons in their own right, pursue their own good in their own way and 
find life plans and projects in which they can be fulfilled and authen- 
tically implicated. Personal development implies that the development 
is the person's own, that it is sufficiently person-like and that it is 
genuinely development. The individual should be transformed as a per- 
son but the content of the transformation should be richly person-like. 
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When a person comes to perceive his development as his own, he 
begins also to have a stake in it. He himself is someone in wha- he 
comes to value. He does not merely represent himself to himself, as 
is suggested in some interpretations of what it is for a person tý,, ýn. ave 
a conception of himself. On such a view our 'self-image' is conceived 
on the model of our looking at ourselves in a mirror. A richer view 
of being someone for ourselves is one where our self-conceptions has 
standards built into it. We measure ourselves in terms of these s--an- 
dards. Things matter and have significance for us in our individual 
lives. And, as I have wished to argue, the things that matter and 
have significance for us are to be located in what it is for things to 
have value. The important point, here, is that the individual begins 
to have a reflexive relationship with himself. Values are the stan- 
dards we live by and they are what we reflexively apply to ourselves as 
self-aware agents. They help to define who we are and it is in the 
definition of who we are that we find our identity. To have an iden- 
tity is to know what a thing is. In the case of a human being, it is 
to know what kind of reality a person is and how this knowledge enters 
into how a person interprets himself. If he views himself as one of 
the children of God, he is a different reality from what he would be 
if he viewed himself as essentially a precipitation of 'matter in 
motion'. What it is to live well, or fall short of such living well, 
will be different in the two cases. 
There are three aspects to personal development as I have des- 
cribed it here. First, an individual absorbs values that are internal 
to which is person-like. He begins to have knowledge of good and bad, 
what is better and worse and what is worthy of human 'pursuit and what 
is not. He begins to perceive what values are possible, what are 
acceptable and what are mandatory. Second, the individual begins to 
make some of these values his own and identifies with them. It is a 
question, as I have argued, of how we relate to values and whether 
they are our values. Third, a person begins to transcend the 1facti- 
city' in life by locating himself in a range of self-descriptions that 
help to define who he is. He becomes an object of his own self- 
awareness and knows what it is to live up to, or fall below, the s'lan- 
dards he has appropriated as his own. Individual difference, then, 
is best seen not as a confluence of different properties of personhood 
but as what an individual endorses as his own amongst those properties 
- that isq what he appropriates as 
his own and in terms of which he 
either measures up, or fails to measure up, to what is proper 
in respect 
of them. 
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Conditions of Personhood 
I want to argue that personal development is about the development 
of an individual's moral identity. There is a strong connection 
between moral values and what it is to be a person. Because o! " this 
strong connection, personal development needs to be located in the 
sphere of moral values. We might say, then, that the content of the 
self is essentially moral. I have given a broad picture of what I 
mean by the term value in my discussion in the preceding chapters. 
Before I discuss value (including moral value) more schematically, I 
should like to look at the conditions of personhood again. 
I have presented an impressionistic view of the conditions of 
personhood in my discussions so far. As in the case of value, I want 
to be a little less impressionistic. I need to say first that when 
people discuss what personal development might consist in they tend to 
focus on the concept of person. Educationalists in the area of per- 
sonal development, PSME etc. fall back on such a scrutiny of the con- 
cept of person, when they seem to be at a loss to find the content of 
personal de velopment etc. elsewhere. By trying to say what it is to 
be a person they hope to extract from this enquiry the criteria which 
could give personal-development its content. If we can say what a 
person is, we can say what it is to develop in terms of it. But 
difficulties are present at the outset. Writers and teachers con- 
cerned with personal development wish to distinguish between an indi- 
vidual's developing into and as a person from his developing certain 
detachable skills. For example, it is said that intellectual, moral, 
emotional and imaginative development cannot help but be a development 
of the person. But, on the other hand, it is said that an individual 
can develop skills and know-how but remain much the same as a. person. 
Yet to develop skills and know-how is to develop in terms of human 
characteristics. Manual dexterity, reason and intentionality are 
centrally involved. Are some types of development a difference in 
kind then? I think what is meant by the distinction is that an indi- 
vidual can develop person-like properties but his self remains untouched. 
This raises the question of how we might distinguish between person and 
self. There are not two separate entities nor two separate configura- 
tion3 Of properties. I shall return to this point shortly. 
I have already remarked that the term person is not a sortal or 
count noun. The term sortal is said to designate those qualities and 
attributes that attach to human beings not in respect of their bodiesf 
although people cannot help but be in their bodies, but in respect of 
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their 'minds'. These qualities and attributes come in different 
degrees and combinations and form some kind of enduring personality. 
The qualities and attributes are individuated in a human body and ',, -he 
identity of the person is just the complex of qualities and attribut-es 
centred on a sense of one's unity and continuity. It must, therefore, 
be in respect of these qualities and attributes that personal develop- 
ment has its meaning. But someone might want to press the point and 
ask the question qualities and attributes of what? Of persons? 
As a way into this question, we might want to say that a 'person 
is someone we meet' or that a person just is the individual human being 
we knock around with or bump into in our daily business. For example, 
we do not teach a bundle of qualities and attributes. Nor do we 
simply encounter a body. (Sometimes we may think we do and pressures 
may make it a survival technique to treat children and students as 
though they were bodies. It is not uncommon to hear children and 
students referred to depreciatively if humourously as bodies. ) At 
least we like to think that we address persons with their individual 
and discriminable characteristics. A person is, then, amongst other 
things a chunk of stuff which exhibits characteristic traits, disposi- 
tions and behaviour, interpreted in categories appropriate to its kind. 
To say this may sound circular but this is all we can say finally, 
since a person is not reducible to something not its kind. Persons 
are irreducible realities and to think and behave as though they were 
not is to invite self-interpretations that may confirm such an attempted 
reduction. 
If a person is someone we meet, a person is also someone each one 
of us is. Whatever may be said of a person in formal definitions, 
said from a third person perspective or simply said because we are 
someone for other people, people also have that peculiarity that they 
are someone for themselves. This is not to say that we are someone 
for ourselves from the start, that is if you like from birth. We 
become someone for ourselves as we develop a reflexive response to 'our' 
distinguishable and distinctive existence. From a third person point- 
of-view people have typical human characteristics; from a first person 
point-of-view these characteristics are gathered up into self-consciousness, 
agency and autobiography. What is personal for other people is the 
same as what is personal for ourselves. But we live it in our indivi- 
dual ways. We have no difficulty in saying that a human being grows 
into or becomes a person. Persons are emergent beings. They emerge 
from flesh and blood and whatever other bits and pieces form their 
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physical and mental constitution and emerge from a characteristical . " -7 
human world whose imprint is inscribed upon that constitution. With 
this difference: we have the capacity, which itself is 'grown', of a 
reflexive relation to this imprint. 
Some people will always see a certain mystery in what it is to 
grow or be grown into a person. If we are bits and pieces, we are 
wonderful bits and pieces. Philip Larkin despairs of our ultimate 
condition but finds a beautifully celebratory image about our coming 
into the world and coming into the fullness of a being for itself. 
his poem 'The Old Fools' he says: 
At death, you break up: the bits that were you 
Start speeding away from each other for ever 
With no one to see. It's only oblivion, true: 
We had it before, but then it was going to end, 
And was all the time merging with a unique endeavour 
To bring to bloom the mill ion- petalled flower 
Of being here. (1974 p 19) 
As I said, we have little trouble in saying that a human being 
develops into or becomes a person. 
up with being able to recognize it. 
In 
And being able to say it is bound 
Anyone who has brought up a child, 
if things go well or at least not badly, recognizes those barely per- 
ceptible changes that gather up into a being with an identity of its own. 
(We know people are 'dragged up' and 'knocked from pillar to post' with 
the almost inevitable ill fortune for themselves as well as the rest of 
US. It is easy, of course, to be simple minded and smug about such 
things. More revealingly, it is easy to be wrong. ) However, one 
notices the little idiosyncracies and suggestions of independence that 
proclaim an emerging personality. Those distinctive characteristics 
of human beings begin to show themselves. Obviously, developing into 
a person and developing as- a person go together. It is a matter of 
different degrees and combinations of those distinctive qualities and 
attributes. 
As Lady Bracknell says of Cecily in the Importance of Being Ernest 
she, that is Cecily, has I... really solid qualities, ... qualities 
that last and improve with time'. She then goes on to say 'The two 
weak points of our age are its want of principle and its want of profile. 
The chin a little higher ... style largely depends on the way 
that the 
chin is worn. These are worn very high, just at present. ' Here is 
an early example of the presentation of self in one's impression manage- 
ment in everyday life. Such qualities and their changing significance 
are acquired through the efforts of others and later through the efforts 
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of ourselves and we improve in respect of them. In the process o.,. O 
developing into and as persons, we also become persons of certafn sorts 
and, of course, the persons we individually are. The extent to which 
these facets of ourselves can be disentangled is one of Ithose persist- 
ing difficulties., in our reflective understanding of ourselves. 
If persons are those whom we meet, we are also persons who do the 
meeting. Boldly, we may say that persons have a unique first person 
perspective on the world, which it should be said, includes other 
persons. Yet we recognize too that we are the other persons in the 
first person perspectives of those other persons. We are persons for 
other persons just as they are persons for us. They are persons for 
themselves just as we are persons for ourselves. In The Nature of 
Things, (1973 pp 103-105) Anthony Quinton says: 
We think of ourselves as primarily and essentially persons 
and only rather contingently as material objects, mammals, 
carnivores, husbands and so forth. Of all-the contents 
of the world it is persons to whom we are connected by the 
strongest bonds of interest and concern. They are the 
proper objects of love and moral consideration. 'We' and 
III after all, are personal pronouns. 
We could stress 'meet' as much as 'persons' , because it is in their 
mutual recognition that persons are said to meet. 
My expression, with its slight variations, 'Persons are those whom 
we meet' has its origin in Anthony Flew (1965 p 10) who used the sen- 
tence 'People are what you meet' to undermine the idea that people are 
really their souls', interpreted in the Cartesian tradition. (I might 
emphasize it by saying it again that using Flew's expression is not 
without its difficulties. How do we meet the first person perspectives 
of other people?. How do we meet what a person is for himself? Yet 
without having met we should not have that first person perspective on 
the world. ) 
'People are what you meet' amounts to saying that persons are 
those with whom one has social relations. As I said previously this 
is not an accidental property of persons; we are what we are, namely 
persons, because we engage in social relations. We might extend this 
idea and say that 'Education is the meeting of persons'. What is 
meant by this is that being is more important than having. It is 
what people are rather than what they possess (including knowledge and 
skills) that is crucial in what is absorbed in educational experience. 
If we only come into contact with people with an attenuated sense of 
their identity in our educational encounters, we are much less likely 
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to develop a 'sentiment of being' of our own. -Tt might be noted 
that we do describe a person as a whole. Think, for example, of hl,,,,, 
we describe people as ladies, gentlemen, cads and bounders. Per, aps 
all these terms are a little quaint nowadays. 
Lionel Trilling has said the following about such a sense of one' s 
integrity involved in 'sentiment of being': 
The sentiment of being is the sentiment of being strong, 
which is not to say, powerful. Rousseau, Schiller and 
Wordsworth are not concerned with energy directed outwards 
upon the world in aggression and dominance, but rather with 
such energy as contrives that the centre shall hold and 
that the circumference of the self keep unbroken, that the 
person be an integer, impenetrable, perdurable and 
autonomous in being if not in action. (1972 p 99) 
The idea that education is the meeting of persons would find support 
in what Michael Oakshott has written of his own formation as a person. 
He writes: 
And if you were to ask me the circumstances in which 
patience,. accuracy, economy, elegance and style first 
dawned upon me, I would have to say that I did not come 
to recognise them in literature, in argument or in 
geometrical proof until I had first recognised them 
elsewhere; and that I owed this recognition to a 
Sergeant gymnastics instructor who lived long before the 
days of 'physical education' and for whom gymnastics was 
an intellectual art - and I owed it to him, not on account 
of anything he ever said, but because he was a man of 
patience, accuracy, economy, elegance and style. (1967 p 176) 
As a way into personal development we might f ind less rewarding places 
to start than in reflecting on such passages. Making the necessary 
changes, we might also say that these passages are not just illustra- 
tive of what we mean by personal development but what we might begin 
to do in relating to children in terms of it. The ways it is possible 
to be a person is, then, not uninfluenced by those with whom we come 
into contact. 
For our purposes then we might resolve the difficulty of saying 
that the word person is not a sortal or count noun and at the same time 
paradoxically of saying that a person is someone we meet by stating 
that when we talk about a person - or rather it is in talking about and 
with a human being that he becomes a person - we do so 
in terms of 
qualities and attributes that come in different degrees and combinations. 
No matter how subtle in its individuating properties, language will 
always seem abstract in comparison with the- person we meet, even 
though 
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it is in the concepts and categories of language that we identify 
persons we meet as persons. Whether we like it or not reality 
tend to have the boundaries that language describes it as havinc. 
Contours of reality, which obviously includes persons, will be contours 
in language. In the case of persons, their reality and the lanSu, ý_, ý, e 
that describes it are inextricably bound together. With a certain 
rough and readiness, we may say that persons together create their 0,..: n 
reality as persons. We must recall though what I said previously 
that each individual absorbs his humanity from the surrounding human 
world and that this human world pre-exists his individual entry into it. 
He does not make himself from scratch. Yet once started as a project, 
he can become the agent of that project and even devise his own. 
The fit between himself and the surrounding world is, then, not 
isomorphic. Our lives are not the ones lived in a Brave New World or 
aspired to in Nineteen Eighty Four, though it is not only in fiction 
that such 'experiments' in living are entertained. However, we might 
think again of some of those New Conservatives, as distinct from the 
New Libertarians, who want to return to earlier experiments in communal 
living or emphasize those practices imminent in selectively chosen 
practices in existing society which bring the community and the indivi- 
dual into a certain rigid harmony. I am thinking of those references 
to moral majorities or model minorities which exhibit respect for 
established and properly constituted authority hierarchically structured, 
attachment to the inherited pieties of family and church, a suspicion 
of collectivist solutions to problems, a commitment to the disicplines 
of the market overseen by a powerfully centralized state, an attach- 
ment to the nation and a selective history of it, involving as it does 
a narrow idea of kith and kin and a willingness to be free and respon- 
sible in respect of certain aspects of one's personal life. All these 
desired commitments of the individual have their embodiment in strong 
institutional form. We find ourselves not in 'selves' in a detached 
liberal sense but in transcendentally objectified 'mind'. I shall say 
a little more later about such a picture. Let it suffice to say that 
some of those who say these things are hypersophisticates, 
to use a 
self -description of such writers, and 
do not believe what they say in 
the way that they present it. The mystification is not of 
themselves 
but those who need authoritarian guidance. 
External practices and institutions in society and the inner 
psychological states of persons do not cohere, 
in spite of the myth- 
making of some writers. Nevertheless, a person's 
human resources are 
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not in any fundamental sense his own, though he can make them s--. 
Once the person is launched, as it were, he can self-consciously set 
about being the agent in his own history. To the extent that .,: ýýat I 
have said here is true, persons are in their language and the lanov-uase 
is that of characteristic qualities and attributes. We may allude 
here to Occam's Razor -a device for keeping entities to a minimum. 
We need to resist multiplying entities beyond what is necessary or 
required. Persons do not exist as extra entities above individual 
human beings. The individual human being exhibits all those charac- 
teristics which come in different 'degrees and combinations. Language 
picks them out and gives them a shape. Person then does not stand 
for an additional entity within the individual human being. A person 
just is all those performances we are able to identify and speak of 
as exhibiting reason, sentience, agency, autobiography and so forth, 
centring on the individual human being. 
We might recall what I said of the shape that I talk' would take 
in certain post-structuralist writings. The person is decentred and 
dispersed throughout 'impersonal' attributes and qualities - dissipated, 
more precisely, throughout what can be said within centreless discourses. 
The 'metaphysics of presence', whether that presence be man or God, is 
the expression for the fact that we are captives of the idea that the 
person is present to himself in a moment of Cartesian introspective 
scrutiny. Rather the person just is a nodal point to which talk 
attaches. Probably a less extreme expression of this general view in 
that a person loses himself in his dispersal thoughout a social life 
modelled on the theatre. Our 'selves' are dispersed throughout a com- 
plex of roles that we learn to play. In almost Goffmanesque terms 
there is no 'self' that is safe from sociology. The self is always a 
'Second self', socially constructedg or more strongly, subjectivity is 
a play, or in the play, of language. 
Certain feminist writers would resist the charge that they are 
doing violence to their natures in rejecting all the normal attributes 
and qualities of womanhood. Identities are cultivated, not given, 
because there are no 'natures' as such. Fresh identities are con- 
structed out of the possibilities within discourses 
that are in con- 
stantly shifting relations to themselves. But can 
they do violence 
to a second' nature? It is true that second natures are 
just as 
persistent as 'first' natures. 
(Another example is from Lord Young 
when he recently said, if somewhat confusingly, 
that enterprise is in 
our first natures and is socialized out 
in our personal development in 
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many schools at present. ) Even if persons are 'artifices' it- is 
4S is difficult to know how we refashion them, since what the artifice 
US. But to know this is to find other ways to be 'subjects' - t'-)is 
term is less loaded than 'women' or 'men' , so it is argued. My saying CD 
all this, perhaps in far too rough and ready a way, is meant to suggest 
a certain way of looking at the constitution of persons and to suggest 
that ways to be persons is now bound up with the construal of personal 
development in feminist ways. Just as personal development is subsumed 
under Social and Life Skills and Education as a Preparation for Life, 
so it is subsumed under Women's Studies and Gender Education. 
Of course personal development needs its setting. In an impor- 
tant sense there have to be boundaries for the self as there have to 
be boundaries of the self. What constraints limit private space is 
partly a moral question. It is a perennial moral question just what 
and how much private space one can claim for its own sake or for 
private indulgences without infringements by other people or the insti- 
tutions of society. If high fences make good neighbours, we have to 
give content to 'high fences'. If the word personal is some kind of 
cognate of private, the realm of the private can be part of the condi- 
tions for personal development' and the circumstances of its expression. 
It might be remarked here that the personal - cum- private presents 
one picture of a so-called developed person. Personal development 
implies conceptions of the developed person, though such conceptions 
may be provisional in that a person is someone who retains the potential 
for further development and is able to transcend limited conceptions of 
the developed person. One powerful symbol of the personal is the 
private motor-car. . Identities are formed and sustained in the owner- 
ship of private cars. Different assessments of people, for example, 
are associated with having a company car. Furthermore, whether they 
are just myths beloved of advertising men, the myths are nevertheless 
potent ones. Associated with the private car, especially the more 
prestigious ones, are images of self-esteem, independence, macho self- 
command -a whole complex of identity-sustaining, self -interpreting 
pictures of a possible way to be a human being. Such pictures may be 
false and in clearer moments a person may see that there is a self- 
defeat in trying to realize such pictures. 
I have already referred to the notion of a 'positional good'. I 
used it to denote a person's occupancy of a scarce status position in 
a hierarchical organization. Such a good is desired on the condition 
that other people are precluded from the possession of it. If all 
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have it, it is not valued, at least as a positional good. (See Holl's 
1987 pp 43-58) It may be valued as an instrumental good which is then 
a condition for the realization of intrinsic goods in our lives. Eli U '- 
certain goods have now been stripped of their identity-forming symbolic 
value. As has been said, a washing machine is a washing machine is a 
washing machine ... However, in the case of a private car, there may 
be increasing signals that it is personally self-defeating. Like many 
things in large industrial cities, one needs to be richer to remain 
poor. The cost of something becomes too high for what one gets out 
of it or what it'does for one. If everyone stands on his tiptoes at 
a crowded football match, everyone is painfully worse off, even taking 
into account the small benefit of seeing something on- one's tiptoes 
rather than seeing nothing as one remains steadfastly flat-footed. 
In the case of the private car, and the car may be taken as representa- 
tive of many other features of modern life, the personal - cum- private 
may be deceptively enchancing for the individual person. The small 
benefit to one's 'self-image' is overridden by things of more importance. 
But, as I have said, we may need a car to remain poor but not as poor 
as we would be without the car. 
Throughout my discussion of personal development I have referred 
to those very general features of persons that enter into an account 
of what it is to be a person as such. It is not a matter of a person's 
being the locus of these general features and then acquiring more indi- 
viduating characteristics. The general features are present within 
whatever one acquires. by way of personal qualities and attributes. 
We also may say if we wish that these are the boundaries of the person 
or the self. (To put the self in a context we need to talk too about 
the boundaries for a proper acquisition of those features and a setting 
for their proper expression. ) Anthony Quinton (1973 pp 103-105) in 
the book already referred to - The Nature of Things - picks out what 
he thinks is a definitive list of those general features of persons. 
As I have said, whatever the chemistry of the individual person or, to 
change the image whatever the texture of his individual life, those 
general features will inform the more individuating descriptions that 
are true of the person. 
Quinton asserts that there are two conceptions of personality. 
He is using personality as I am using person. It is not used as a 
contrast with character (say) as would be the case when we judge that 
a person has plenty of personality but little character. Quinton 
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4 writes 'The first of these (conceptions) is the complete persona, _y 
of an adult, sane, human being; the second is the restricted per- 
sonality of a young child, a mental defective, a higher mammal - ro 
take only actual cases. '. I think we must say, as I have sai(ý often 
enough in the text, that there are limiting cases of human personality. 
We may want to quarrel whether actual human beings can be instances of 
these limiting cases. A psychopath, clinically or morally defined, 
may not be so much a restricted or defective instance of a human being 
but scarcely a human being at all. We may also recall my earlier 
point that certain human beings may have irretrievably lost their per- 
sonality altogether. The comatose and the vegetative may be examples 
here. 
However, Quinton goes on to enumerate five characteristics that 
are found in both the complete and restricted personalities and each 
characteristic is susceptible to a strong and weak interpretation. 
The five characteristics are interrelated in various ways and some 
presuppose others. We might also want to say that there is mutual 
implications amongst some of them. For example, self-consciousness, 
rationality and agency are mutually implicated in each other. Quinton 
lists his five characteristics as consciousness and the closely 
related self-consciousness, rationality, will, moral status and capacity 
for personal relations. Although he mentions love in the context of 
personal relations, Quinton's five characteristics may have been a more 
complete general survey of human personality had he added the emotions. 
Lists are always difficult and to a greater extent imcomplete. 
If the emotions cannot be absorbed into the five characteristics he 
lists, it might equally be said that the range of the 'affective' is 
wider than that of the emotions. What is 'felt of' may include the 
aesthetic too. I think Quinton would perhaps answer that the felt of 
can be included within his five characteristics. Emotions, moods and 
feelings are informed by rationality in the sense that they fall under 
descriptions that we can get right or wrong and that they have objects 
that are either appropriate or not. It may be recalled that I pointed 
out earlier that the emotions are a species of appraisal. Certainly 
some of what is felt of belongs to the realm of the moral such as 
remorse or shame. For example, we may want to say that there are 
moral emotions. And for Hume what is felt of is the foundation of 
morality. Reason slavishly follows the passions. The passions are 
original existences and are the basis of our moral language. 
Of the five characteristics consciousness or self-consciousness 
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is the first on Quinton's list. A being that is aware ol' itse1f ----s a 
continuing identity through time is in this respect a complete per- 
sonality. Possessing mere sentience would be characteristic 0-f res- 
tricted personality. The latter personality would have at best an 
imperfect grasp that it is lanalagous to but distinct from other selves'. 
Rationality, the second characteristic, is strongly present in a 
person when there is a capacity for abstract reasoning, expressing 
itself in generalization, explanation and prediction ... (and) a mastery 
of language'. A complete personality in this regard would also have a 
conception of'reality when it was absent. A restricted personality on 
the other hand can match means to ends but this is no less than animals 
can do 'in those well-judged sequences of ... actions ... based on 
learning from experience'. One might say here that there is a con- 
tinuum from strong to weak in the possession of rationality. How 
rationality is exhibited or not exhibited may be revealing too. We 
might think here of the complete rationality of the scholars being 
instructed in the use of practical sense by the street lad. The lorry 
is stuck under the bridge and the lad tells the assembled scholars -to 
let the tyres down. 
In discussing the will, his third characteristic, Quinton says, 
'A being is an agent in a restricted sense ... to the extent that its 
behaviour is motivated, the outcome of"desire and not wholly determined 
by non-mental causal influences'. Such agency does not meet the cri- 
terion of strong volition in which choice follows deliberation. 
Quinton reminds us of what Kant said about deliberated choice. Kant 
wrote that a rational being is one that I has the power to act in 
accordance with the ideas of law - that is, in accordance with principle 
- and only so has he a will'. I might add here that if Hume said that 
morality is felt of, Kant argued that it was reasoned of - However, 
bearing in mind what he had said previouslyý Quinton writes that 'Full 
self-consciousness of one's own identity as well as will or agency in 
this strong sense, are preconditions of moral responsibility. '. 
Moral statusy the fourth characteristic7 refers to both moral 
agents and moral patients. Of moral principles, Quinton says that 
'they enjoin conduct by all moral agents ... (and) they enjoin it for 
all moral patients'. The former are those to whom 'moral injunctions 
are addressed and who can properly be held responsible for moral lapses 
1. The latter are those restricted or defective beings whose 
'interests should be taken into consideration in the formulation of 
moral principles'. Quinton makes the important point that I have 
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stressed on and off in my discussion of how we are related to our own 
and other people's values. He says that 'although all moral agents 
are part of the total moral constituency, the converse is not true'. 
He wants to argue that mere sentience, that is the capacity to suf fer 
is a 'sufficient condition for moral consideration' yet is not a 
'sufficient condition for responsibility as a moral agent'. Those who 
are proper objects of moral concern are not necessarily proper objects 
of moral praise and blame. The distinction between moral agents and 
moral patients is not a distinction meant to furnish reasons for a 
return to selective Victorian paternalism. It is obvious that the 
total moral constituency includes infants, defectives, animals and so 
forth. For some writers, 'patients' will include an expanding circle 
of sentient creatures, and perhaps even beyond. 
The final characteristic is the capacity for personal relations. 
Quinton's example is love between people. To love someone in a per- 
sonal way is 'to identify oneself with the interests of the object of 
love'. We might recall what Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch have said 
about the close connection between love and the recognition of the 
reality of those who are loved. Before stating what genuinely reci- 
procal love 'involves, Quinton writes that 'only those beings that 
literally have interests, in other words persons in the restricted 
sense, can be loved'. But, we need to say, those who are loved may 
not be capable of returning it. To love we must have a sense of the 
other as being analgous to ourselves. Such a statement would require 
qualification because there are persons in the restricted or defective 
sense who do see others as themselves but their view of themselves is 
n. ot generous enough for us to accept that as a model of other people. 
Unlike infants and animals, these people cannot even like very much, 
as distinct from loving, though as I have said previously they may 
simulate liking very much to manipulate others for their better advan- 
tage. Quinton concludes his reflections on his fifth characteristic 
as follows; 'Genuinely reciprocal love can exist only between complete 
personalities. Similarly only complete personalities can enter 
into 
genuine relations of cooperation ... 
(and) communication ... 1. By 
way of summary Quinton concludes his thoughts on personality with 
these 
words: 
All five of these personifying characteristics are to be found, 
then, in a stronger and a weaker form: consciousness may be 
of one's continuing identity or merely of one's sensations, 
rationality may be abstract and linguistic or concrete and 
practical, agency may be deliberate or merely appetitive, 
moral status may be responsible agency or propriety as an 
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object of moral concern, one's capacity for personal relatic-s 
may be active or passive, a capacity to return love or merey 
to receive and be pleased by it. Where the characteristics 
are present in their stronger form there is a complete per- 
sonality, where in their weaker form a restricted one. In 
either case the essence of personality does not lie in the 
style of its embodiment. 
It is not criticism of Quinton to say that these general features 
of personality may cohere in the individual human being but tha t4 -; - n 
him 
there is still scope for personal development. The fact that they are 
the essence of personality betrays the level of abstraction o'L these 
characteristics. These characteristics, then, are essential to per- 
sonal development but not exhaustive of it. All we want to say about 
a person will imply the presence of these general features in an indi- 
vidual but the finer grain will be missing. This finer grain may 
include the style of each characteristic's embodiment in the individual 
but again style added to the general features will not be exhaustive of 
personal development, unless, that is, style refers to all those pro- 
perties of persons that display those general features. For Quinton's 
purposes, however, (and they are completely adequate for those purposes) 
the complete personality exhibits each characteristic in a strong sense. 
The strong is the complete in each realization of the characteristic. 
Likewise in the case of the restricted personality whose characteristics 
are realized in an incomplete degree and, perhaps even kind, the weak 
comprehends the nature of that personality. These general properties 
or powers of the mind are meant to pick out the distinctive nature of 
human beings from the natures of the rest of the furniture of the 
universe. Personal being is distinct from mammalian being although 
it includes it; it is distinct from botanical being and does not 
include it. Personal being includes everything that can be said 
properly of persons, tautologous as it may sound. 
When we speak of the conditions of personhood we mean that without 
their being satisfied a human being would not be a person. These con- 
ditions need to be satisfied in a strong sense for an individual to be 
a member of the class of persons and not simply a token member. But 
these conditions have their conditions too. The most obvious cond-4- 
tion is that of a public world in which people can identify themselves 
in contrast with others. The reciprocity in a public world 
is the 
condition of our emerging into personhood. Furthermore, 
the actual 
nature of each constituent condition of personhood may not 
be what we 
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think it is. For example, if self-consciousness - that, capaci--y in 
which we and our thoughts can become the subjects of further thoughts 
- is a product of the public world and not a spontaneous disclosure in 
self-presence and self-clarity, then we need to determine what --he pro- 
cess is of our becoming conscious of and for ourselves. I have already 
discussed Gerard Manley Hopkins' account of his own self-disclosure. 
Similarly the infant Husserl records his own self-disclosed 'I-experience' 
in the 'Eureka! I'm a self'. (Harre: 1987 p 100) 1 take it that such 
an experience is not unfamiliar to all of us. We might say, then, that 
the condition of this 'I-experience' is a publJLc world and the nature of 
this 'I-experience' is not an empirical discovery as we think but in a 
sense is a structural imposition. I know there are many difficulties 
in trying to capture the reality of this nature in experience. Do I 
discover I am a self? Do I become a self? Or have I always been a 
self? 
My point is that the conditions of personhood and the nature of 
these conditions are bound up with the conditions of their 'growth', if 
that world captures the nature of their acquisition. But these 
features of personhood are mutually implicated, as I have said before. 
These features are developed together. That I can use language, that 
I can reason, that I am, along with others, a subject of intentional 
ascription, that I can enter into reciprocal relations with others are 
all implicated in what it is for me to be self-conscious. I not only 
use my powers as a reflective being but I use them as a reflexive one. 
Self-consciousness and self-knowledge go together and to be conscious 
and knowledgeable in this sense is to be conscious of and have know- 
ledge of a self that is both conscious and knowing. 
The question is what is presupposed in what? If rational agency 
has its conditions, does our moral nature have its basis in rational 
agency? It is a question of what we need to develop in order 
to 
develop further. I wish to situate personal development, in a strong 
sense, in the domain of values, and more specifically 
in moral values. 
If we want to give an account of moral values we might need 
to draw on 
the other features of personhood. Reason, for Kant, 
is morality in an 
important sense. People might disagree about this of course. But 
reason is not only displayed in moral thought. 
Reason is implicated 
in most things we are engaged in as rational agents. 
A further ques- 
tion is what is imposed on what? For some writers certain central 
categories in our interpretation of 
the world and in our interpretation 
of ourselves are imposed rather 
than discovered. Self-presence, and 
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the self itself for that matter, are imposed on life by false meý-, --- 
physics or bio power, if Foucault is our authority. * (Foucault is 
against something, of course. Individualism is repressive because it 
presents us with a picture of ourselves that serve the interesl - ts of 
other people. If I cannot make my way in the world, I blame mysel-'. ) 
It is not only the categories of 'cause' and 'thing', then, that 
are imposed but also what we considered to be beyond interpretation or 
imposition. The self, and for my purposes the moral self, are said 
by some writers to be texts that are interpreted in situ - that is, 
dispositions become different selves depending on the different circum- 
stances of life. There is no fixed self nor fixed moral self. Both 
are conditioned by what is external to them. And what is external is 
in constant flux. 
For my purposes I need to make the correct distinctions within 
what can be taken as given in what we say about ourselves. We do 
interpret ourselves and our lives in moral categories and we do dis- 
tinguish these categories from others. What we extract from the 
features of personhood is too wide for personal development. We might 
wish to say, though, that what we extract from personhood is the basis 
of self -development in the way that John Stuart Mill would use the term. 
People should be given the opportunity to develop their manifold human 
endowment as far as this is possible, given the limitations of ability, 
time and energy. But education has won this battle in principle. 
(I realize of course that some people use the term personal development 
as a term of protest against the failure of education in practice to 
promote the self-development of pupils and students. ) 
Mill and other writers pursuing the same theme were protesting 
against the absence of the freedom and the opportunity for each indivi- 
dual to develop his abilities and talents in his own way. Education 
now embodies this ideal. All the features that are characteristic of 
human beings are meant to find their expression in the educational 
enterprise. Self-development might be serviceable enough to capture 
this ideal. I wish to use personal development to capture the develop- 
ment of the moral self. These are not two separate processes and 
products. We are not compartmentalized beings. The moral adds a 
different dimension to our reality as persons. This does not mean 
that the other features of personhood are not implicated in this 
dimension. It might mean though that a person can be morally defficient 
but still functional in other respects. Much depends on 
the scope we 
wish to give the term moral. I wish now 
to look at two constituent 
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aspects of personal development as I have suggested it should be used. 
Reflexivity 
iV4 -y Rom Harre in Personal Being (1983 pp 265-268) says that 1`1ýeflex A_t 
is the magic ingredient by which persons are created as self-conscious, 
self -controlling and autobiographically aware beings'. He distinguishes 
between 'powers to do' and 'powers to be'. The first distinction refers 
to the power to act in a world that is often unyielding in its givingness. 
In our individual development we acquire a range of skills, abilities, 
capabilities and capacities so that we can be competent agents in a world 
of other agents. The second distinction refers to one's reflexive or 
second-order powers, the object of which is oneself. Self-knowledge and 
self-control are reflexive 'powers to be'. We turn back on ourselves 
and cultivate character traits that give us greater command over our- 
selves as we are embodied in our skills, abilities and so forth. 
One example is the strength of character to keep ourselves at cer- 
tain tasks, if we are to have greater proficiency in them. Another 
example is the power to- do something about failure of the will. Such 
a weakness of will (something for our reflexive powers to work on) might 
be shown in what is called . 
1perseveration', a variety of procrastination 
- that is, working at a preliminary but easy task and never actually 
getting on with the job in hand. We need second-order powers to 
toughen up our resolve. (Of course, perseveration may be a ploy to 
deceive others rather than ourselves. ) Harre discusses the example of 
'mere body-building as an end in itself ... I which is thought by many 
people ... to be as grotesque as 
the torsoes it produces ... I (p 269) 
But if one's reflexive powers of self-understanding and self-discipline 
I ... grow and are exercised 
this, in itself, is regarded as moral 
advancement in the moralities of everyday life'. Harre's whole argu- 
ment is -that an important dimension of moral experience is neglected in 
much moral philosophy. Endeavour is a crucial second-order power that 
is necessary for one's self-transformation. If we are to make some- 
thing of ourselves and pursue our own good we need 'powers to be, as 
well as 'powers to do'. Of course, 'powers to be' give us greater 
'Powers to do'. It is clear then that personal development is not a 
mere passive accummulation of qualities and attributes. 
We need to be 
active in their acquisition and need to develop reflexive powers 
for 
the transformation of ourselves. The transformation of ourselves 
could be of a quietist kind. We focus our efforts on our 
impulses in 
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order to subdue them. We transform ourselves into fatalistic ', -, ýatientss' 
rather than into active agents. We withdraw from the world rather 
attempt to change it. 
Reflexivity can be linked with self-cultivation. It is a matter 
of a person shaping himself and the course of his life. If the person 
is an object of his own reflexive powers, he also needs both sufficient 
public and private space for his powers to be a reality. I am talk-ML- 
about 'normal' times and not about those extremities of deprivation 
that demand special strengths just to survive or rather not just to 
survive but survive with some humanity intact. Our development, then, 
needs the fulfilment of other conditions. One must have autonomy, 
public space and a certain freedom from interference in one's private 
space. Autonomy here means a good measure of self-direction. A 
person's thoughts and actions need to be his own. 
It should be obvious that I do not mean a complete licence to do 
anything one wants. Self-regarding impulses will always need to be 
balanced by some measure of other-regarding sentiments, if we are to 
live together in some kind of harmony. Of course, this relationship 
between the two may be of a calculated kind and not a spontaneous moral 
part of our second nature. For example, a libertine has precious 
little regard for the autonomy of other people, although in his case he 
may not be autonomous himself. He is not self-governing but rather a 
victim of appetites that he has lost control of. He needs self- 
knowledge and self-mastery. 
We have seen a breakdown of a person's reflexive powers in those 
television warnings about drug abuse. The victim of the abuse only 
manages to tell himself stories about feeling under the weather because 
of the symptoms of oncoming common colds and so on. He has self- 
awareness of some kind but he is no longer part of a moral order that 
gives him standards for more effective self-knowledge and self-awareness. 
Such problems are not the least p art of personal development, PSME etc. 
in schools and colleges. 
In Harre reflexivity is meant to resolve a theoretical problem as 
well as provide us with an insight into our moral nature. He is con- 
cerned with what it is for an individual to conceive himself as 
the 
unitary self of self-presence. Harre does not use 
this language him- 
self but nevertheless for him it is inreflexivity that our unity 
lies. 
Our reality in this sense is not discovered empirically. We construct 
ourselves, as it were, from the resources from which culture grows 
persons. The self, as distinct from the person, is that sense of unit-y 
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and continuity that an individual has of himself. 'It is '-haý 
4 
1, 
is "kept burning" behind our many roles'. (1983 p 38) A person __ 
the publically defined and publically visible entity that meets, and 
is met by, other people. The self is that unity and continuil +- v 
I take myself to be as I emerge from culture. 
For Harre the self is not a thing but a structure. It is a uniýy 
imposed on a flux of sensation and sense impressions. it is what 
Hume looked for but could not find because he looked in the wrong place. 
It is introjected public personhood. We might think, here, of what 
Kierkegaard said about a self that is aesthetically dispersed because 
it lacked selfhood in this sense. Kierkegaard, of course, would have 
wanted to say that the self is more than a construct. 'That Individual' 
can come to self-presence when in contact with a moral order or critic- 
ally when in proximity to God. In a sense though the self has airways 
been present to itself in Kierkegaard. 
The self, then, is a reflexive agent that knows itself in self- 
knowledge and moves itself in self-mastery. The knower and the known 
combine in one self. There can be self-deception though, when a per- 
son is divided against himself. Also an individual, as we know since 
Freud, -is not as transparent to himself as Cartesian self-presence 
might suggest. I do not quite know myself, for example, in a moment 
of self-clarity and self-distinctness. But I have reflexive powers 
which give me a perspective on myself in terms of a moral order. I 
know myself in my history, in my self -intervention, in strong evalua- 
tion and in my self-examination within a moral order. 
I have referred to the distinction between the self and the person. 
It is obvious that there is a distinction to be made but the language 
of the distinction is not uniform. It hardly needs saying that not 
the least difficulty in discussing the whole area of personal develop- 
ment etc. is the problem of the use of language. Self, person and 
identity are all used differently by different writers. Harre for 
example uses personal development and self-development interchangeably 
and uses them to mean the process of becoming a personal being, that 
is, developing psychological individuality. It is about how the self 
comes to birth. What it is that applies the construct of the self to 
the 'self' is a difficult thought. However, what I am after is the 
idea that reflexivity is constitutive of the self and the way that 
reflexivity is bound up with the capacity to have second-order states, 
that is, beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires. 
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Identity Development 
In identity development, I have to be aware of what or who -- a. M. 
The what of selfhood is the form that humanity takes in me. I belong 
to late Twentieth Century Britain and I cannot therefore be a Don 
Quixote - that is not the sort of person I can be. Nor can -7 be the 
sort of person that goes on a Christian Crusade to the Holy Lands. 
Of course, there is no limit to the antics that people can get up to. 
But they are only antics. The who of selfhood is the sameness which 
is me with my idiosyncratic content. The what and the who of self- 
hood are inseparable. The form of who I am are those general charac- 
teristics of personhood detailed by Quinton. But they are instantiated 
in me. Those general characteristics are exhibited in what it is to 
be a person in the culture of the times. But they are gathered up in 
me. To have a personal identity is to know who we are. There is 
always-some set of self -interpretations that form personal identity. 
There are a host of expressions that try to capture what it is to 
have an identity. Sometimes 'self-image' is used to denote the 
impression that a person has of himself. At other times it is 'self- 
concept' that is employed to refer to the beliefs that one has about 
oneself. Although a person may capture himself under the aspect of 
self-image or self-concept, he may be wrong about the 'objective' 
standing of the content he ascribes to himself. A person can be 
corrected in respect of the truth of what he feels or thinks about 
himself. Such a correction may lead to a crisis in a person's iden- 
tity. Our self-image can be threatened, disrupted or destroyed. 
Those beliefs we have about ourselves and about our place in. the 
nature of things, may be undermined and result in our disorientation. 
It is clear that much which is subsumed under personal development, as 
the term is used and mentioned in practice, documents etc., is con- 
cerned with identity development and the fear of identity-malformation. 
Nevertheless, in all this, a person knows that no one else is who he is. 
If things go well the person will have a set of reflexive attitudes 
which have an integritive function of holding him together. And, of' 
course, as teachers we anticipate that things in this respect will go 
well. Or at leastq we act as though we anticipate it. 
We might say then that our identity is what we are attached to. 
Our identity or sense of self may be attached to impressions7 beliefs, 
reason, to narratives about ourselves, or to a community and so 
forth. 
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I might expand what I mean here by referring first of all to an e-, __ -4 rely 
different use of 'self'. Self in this usage would be contrastec' wi'-h 
identity. The self is that dangerous, sub-terranean 'volcanic' core 
that is universal, closed and threateningly stable. It is always 
precipitating us into anti-social behaviour. The identity, on tI. -e- 
other hand, is open and is that which grows and brings forth the indi- 
viduated individual. The identity is the individuated individual. 
It is culture which encourages developing identities in pursuit of 
their own development. Yet, there is always Peters' 'volcanic core' 
beneath the identity. 
I take the term 'volcanic core' from R. S. Peters who pictures our 
extra-human world as consisting of a non-personal human nature and a 
non-personal external world. 'Our' values are constitutive of the 
meanings that define our personal natures and they infase the natural 
world with human sense and significance. To this extent 'Men sail a 
boundless and bottomless sea ... I as Oakeshott says (1956 p 15) and it 
is the Lebenswelt that keeps us afloat. Peters speaks of '... the 
awesome spectacle of human beings trying to make some sort of sense of 
the world and trying to sustain and cultivate a crust of civilisation 
over the volcanic core of atavistic emotions'. (1.972 p 87) Assuming 
that children are reclaimed from nature, Peters says of them that they 
'start off in the position of the barbarian outside the gates'. (1967 
p 43) For some writers, who draw on such imagery, science or its 
pseudo offsprings, may encourage us to give back to nature some of our 
achieved humanity. We might say that an excessive concentration on 
the mechanics' of anythingg especially sexuality, may be to give some 
of our achieved artifice back to the indifference of nature. In our 
self -interpretations we may lose some of our established 
humanity in 
an excessive respect for science in its interpretation of what we con- 
sist in. We can anticipate the drift of Oakeshott's and Peters' 
argument. We need not follow it to appreciate the picture it presents 
of our fate. My point is that values and the meanings in which they 
are inscribed give us our distinctive human point of view. It is 
in 
our values that we are persons. 
Imaginative literature is full of examples of the dangerous Iself". 
A story might go as follows. Our 'senses' are stirred or enchanted 
by desirable people. What we call the 'heart' gives way. But the 
identity, in the guise of 'reason', prohibits a response to a desired 
person. The will, must retain the person's 
integrity. We are speak- 
ing hereq of courseq of Peters' 'passions' and an example would be 
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misdirected love in whatever form it takes. Identity in this case 
would be attached to reason. Reason says who we are because it 
enables us to stand back in judgement on those precipitating wants, 
desires, inclinations and appetites, that can only properly be called 
our own when they are integrated into our moral identity. This is not 
to say that reason need be thought to be the foundation of moralit,,,. 
We need not give reason this over-arching status in the constitution of 
morality. However, we still might want to situate the identity of the 
person in those decisive or critically strong evaluations that Charles 
Taylor speaks of throughout his work to be referred to shortly. Revert- 
ing to the more individuated construal of 'self', we might say that for 
Taylor the self is the moral identity of the actor. The self in this 
sense gains an identity for itself in its attachment to strong evalua- 
tions of worth. 
Taylor in his paper Legitimation Crisis? (1985 pp 252-269) wants 
to characterize modern identity. Putting it rather schematically, the 
modern self is the I ... sense we have of ourselves as free, self-defining 
subjects, whose understanding of their own essence or of their paradigm 
purposes is drawn from 'within', and no longer from a supposed cosmic 
order in which they are set'. The modern III is a natural being, 
characterized by aI... set of inner drives, or goals, or desires and 
aspirations'. Knowing who I am is to get clear about these. 'The 
horizon of identity is an inner horizon. ' (p 258) This is not a return 
to the once familiar introspectabilia in the Empiricist tradition. We 
are not self -suf f icient monads - Taylor argues for the situated self 
rather than the unencumbered one. The self is defined in community 
with others. 
This would be in contrast with Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971 
pp 3-4) who writes: 'The self is prior to the ends which are affirmed 
by it: even a dominant end must be chosen from amongst numerous possi- 
bilities. ' Identity for Taylor would be defined as what a person must 
be in I ... contact with 
in order to function fully as a human agent, 
and specifically to be able to judge and discriminate and recognize 
what is really of worth or importance'. To say that something 
is part 
of a person's identity is '.. - to say 
that without it (that person) 
should be at a loss in making those discriminations which are charac- 
teristically human'. That person would not know where he I ... stood, 
would lose the sense of what constituted beauty, what constituted 
nobilitYq what was truly worthwhile fulfilment 
(p 258) To say 
that modern man is situated 'within' is to say that his identity cannot 
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be confirmed or underwritten by a meaningful universe. We migh-- fnd 
such an underwriting in a medieval weltanschauung in which a cohesive 
world view confirms the person's identity. It is rather what modern 
man finds within himself that constitutes his world. What is wiý. n4n 
is also connected with ordinary life, the life of home-making, work and 
leisure. But it is men together who find themselves 'within', although 
Individualism as a weltanschauung falsely assumes that the indiv-idual 
man is prior to all what we should normally take as constituting him. 
Strong evaluation for Taylor is a property of public space. We 
can stand back from ourselves and become a partial object of our own 
assessment. But we are attached to objective values that provide the 
criteria of assessment. The self is the moral identity of the actor, 
because this self is constituted by standards external to the self's 
de facto desires, appetites and so on. We can ask ourselves if we 
want to be those sorts of people who give in to precipitating desires, 
appetites and inclinations. In asking this of ourselv es we have 
standards of worth outside of these 'inner' pushes and pulls. We can 
also be motivated by second-order wants - namely, we can want not to 
want what is unworthy of us. We are the sorts of being who can bring 
our de facto desires and inclinations into the human order. Taylor 
says that: 'The mere fulfilment of desire could never be a value 
sufficient to ground our moral categories. It could never be the 
basis of moral admiration ... or of indignation. ' 
(p 261) We might 
reflect here on Huxley's Brave New World in which the beings simply 
have de facto desires implanted in them but give no moral significance 
to their lives. They cannot say whether their lives are worthy or 
unworthy, wise or foolish, or admirable or degraded. Taylor wants to 
argue that it is next to impossible for human beings quite to do without 
some conception of intrinsic worth in their moral reflections. He also 
uses the term 'spiritual' to '... designate the goals and aspirations 
which we recognize as not only our de facto, but as having an 
intrinsic 
worth in our lives'. (p 268) 
This use of spiritual is apposite, for it might help us understand 
how it is to be taken when it appears in H. M. I. Reports and so on. To 
use Taylor's own term, people are often 
less than I self -clairvoyant' in 
their use of their central terms in describing man and 
his situation. 
In a more important sense Taylor needs this 
term to throw light on the 
way that 'fallen' modern man is less 
than transparent to himself. In 
many respects modern man has 
lost, or is in the process of losing, a 
sense of intrinsic worth over whole stretches of 
his life. To take an 
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example: were we sufficiently clairvoyant about the role of rationa1ity 
in our lives, we would see that rationality is a virtue-term and not a 
neutral one. Utilitarians fail to see that rationality should be a 
virtue-term for them. To be rational is to be the sorts of people 
take pride in this human capacity. If the universe does not underwrite 
our existence, we can still look upon 'disenchantment' and 'objectifica- 
tion' as human achievements. 'One wins through thereby, through 
austerity and courage, to autonomy, contact with reality, and hence 
efficacy. ' (p 270) This efficacy needs to be combined with respect 
for nature, which is absent in the less than clairvoyant instrumental 
rationality of modern industry, for example. 
The difficulty for Taylor is that if modern man has not 'fallen' 
from the Grace of an underwritten life, he has lost touch with a human 
setting that confirms his identity. The difficulty is how much of 
that strong evaluation is constitutive of modern identity? Modern man 
has been bribed with private affluence and may well be quite without 
some conception of intrinsic worth. It is true that modern man attaches 
his identity to his private space - his home, family, efficacy in the 
shape of his private car, affinity with those close to him and so forth; 
but he may have compromised himself too much for his consumer affluence. 
The humanization of work seems to be off the agenda, for example, entail- 
ing as it does the absence of the exercise of many of those essential 
human characteristics. 
In general terms we might say that the contours of our identity - 
that is, who we are - are defined for us by the history we are part of, 
the social roles and positions we fill and the moral narratives in 
which we are inscribed. How we are attached to these is another 
question. We might recall that having shown modern 'emotive' man to 
be essentially manipulativeg MacIntyre then proposes in its place a 
narrative conception of the self -a self constituted by a life story 
with a certain telos, or point. The unity of the self is a unity of 
a life in a narrative quest. The self is situated in inherited histori- 
cal forms. Of course, MacIntyrels argument is that modernity is the 
story of non-situated man and argues for an Aristotelian return. 
MacIntyre paints a picture of the leading identities of our time. 
They are socially constructed characters. MacIntyrels picture is as 
follows. (1981 pp 26-30) The Rich Aesthete is essentially appetitive. 
He both consumes and is consumed by other persons. The Manager and 
the Therapist know no distinction between rational and non-rational 
discourse. They are concerned to transform means into ends (and the 
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means, amongst other things, are human beings) and has lost any dis- 
tinction between manipulative and non-manipulative modes of thought 
and action. For the Therapist I ... truth has been displaced as a 
value and been replaced by psychological effectiveness'. Of course, 
not all modern identities are caught in the identities of these 
characters. But for MacIntyre, they are so central that the rest of 
us define our identities partly in reference to them. 
I have said that our identities are defined in terms of what we 
are attached to. But we may not be attached to anything, except in a 
self-consciously distancing sort of way. If the identity is not essen- 
tially linked to anything, what is the nature of such a disencumbered 
self? On the 'liberal' view, the self is prior to its ends, roles and 
dispositions. The self is the capacity to choose. On this interpre- 
tation of the self, shorn of its acquired accretions, it is not so much 
that the self disencumbers itself of accretions but rather that it is 
that the self is always in a relation of irony to whatever it is attached. 
Even what Taylor calls strong evaluation, on this liberal account, is 
chosen, and because of thischoice can be unchosen. But we need not 
read this as a logical thesis such that we have created ourselves from 
scratch by our choices. It is rather that we are related to everything 
through choice - that is, we see every attachment under the aspect of 
choice. 
We can see then that personal identity is bound up with strong or 
weak conceptions of the relationship between persons and their human 
setting. Yet it is not only that a person has a strong or weak rela- 
tion to his society; it is that he has a strong or weak relation to 
himself. The 'liberal' is portrayed by a communitarian conception of 
a person's relation to his social setting as being detached from what 
he seems to be implicated in. Choice is the foundation of his relation 
to the human world and to whatever personal qualities and attributes he 
possesses. Choice can always make things otherwise. The weakness of 
his relation to society and to his personal properties are connected. 
If his qualities and attributes are absorbed from society and he has 
learnt an ironically detached relation to them, liberal man once 
detached in this way has nothing left to bind him to society of a 
strongly evaluative nature. But what 
is the loss if our identities 
are not situated in the strong evaluations of a community 
but rather 
in those immediacies of inclination and desire? 
This might be to put 
it too schematically. It is not a matter, 
in reality, of these two 
extremes. The liberal is not a 
disguised libertine. He is just as 
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likely to be attached to those strong evaluations as is ýaylor but his 
attachments are mediated by choice. If our identities are in our 
attachments, it must be said that the liberal is ultimately in his 
choices. But, as this way of putting it implies, he is not clair- 
voyantly choosing every minute of his life. 
Taylor, and I choose him as he is as representative as any of the 
critics of atomistic liberalism, has said that he can scarcely conceive 
a human being quite without some conception of intrinsic worth. The 
implication is that the liberal has no conception of intrinsic worth. 
But if choice is the foundation of his identity and he is self- 
clairvoyantly attached to it, is he not the hero of a world vacated by 
God and is therefore an inhabitant of a world that cannot be under- 
written? But choices to be choices must have their criteria. Choices 
without criteria are nothing but a lucky or unlucky dip and are there- 
fore not choices but arbitrary pin-sticking. Yet may we not attach 
ourselves to our drives, desires and inclinations? As we have seen 
in the case of Kierkegaardian aesthetic man, this seems to be neither 
logically nor psychologically impossible. It is humanly impossible 
it might be said. Such an aesthetic experimentalism is inhuman and 
parasitic. This charge against the liberal is not that his identity 
is in aesthetic attachments b ut he has no protection against being 
consumed by them. Also, since society is not in many of its important 
contours atomistic, the liberal is parasitic on the taken-for-granted 
communitarian lineaments of society. If there is no strong citizenship 
in his conception of things, there is enough of it in reality for him 
to be the recipient of communal goods. 
I might mention in parenthesis that there is another way with 
'liberalism' as outlined here. Irony is not the last resting place 
but the last but one. We can be self-consciously attached to our role s 
and masks. We often use them in a calculating and deceitful manner. 
Even so we might feel that we are not a confluence of 'persons' and 
masks. In large part we have a self-clairvoyant relation 
to them. 
These roles, personas and masks are the stuff of personal and social 
transactions. But we find intimations within ourselves of a disenchant- 
ment with such dispensable encumbrances. 
Of course, we may become 
extremely vulnerable in a Idemasked' social existence. 
Without pre- 
tences and such social clothing, we may 
find it difficult to function, 
let alone survive, in a world shaped 
by roles, personas and masks. 
Yet we might feel a pull in ourselves 
to have more honest and truthful 
relations with our loved ones and neighbours. 
If these intimations of 
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the possibility of more 'spirituality' in our lives are not socia! 
conventions and utility in a disguised form our identities might 1Chen 
be in such value attachments. 
I have wanted in this discussion to lead up to the idea thal, 
persons have a strong or weak relation to their human setting and a 
strong or weak relation to their own qualities and attributes. We 
need to address personal development in the context of strong or weak 
relations of the person to his human setting and to himself. The 
question of what binds me together with other people, whether dear and 
near or impersonal and far, is bound up with what holds me together as 
an individual person. 
Michael J. Sandel in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982 
pp 147 ff) has presented a model in which he distinguishes three con- 
ceptions of community - the instrumental, the sentimental and the 
constitutive. The first conceives community as little more than an 
aggregative association I... wherein individuals regard social arrange- 
ments as a necessary burden and cooperate only for the sake of pursuinng 
their private ends'. This union need not be a Hobbesian state of 
nature. If we put the best construction on such a society (which may 
be our own society) it could be, as Charles Taylor admits, a society 
in which I ... restless ambition, 
the search for new fields to conquer, 
brings continued vitality and creativity ... 
(in which) ... concentra- 
tion and mobility widen our horizons ... (in which) ... a society of 
vital, striving, ambitious, mobile people is an exciting and creative 
place in which to live'. (p 252) In a sense this is why those who 
deplore such societies in their writing cannot get to such centres of 
high activity fast enough. Sandel's second community - the senti- 
mental conception - presupposes I ... the antecedent individuation of 
the subjects of cooperation, whose actual motivation may include 
benevolent aims as well as selfish ones'. If values and sentiments 
are shared, they are shared in the sense that each individual 
has a 
variety of other-regarding and self-regarding 
impulses in his own 
breast. As Hume has said: 'Some particle of the dove is kneaded 
into our frame together with the elements of 
the wolf and the serpent'. 
(Quoted by Benn and Peters 1959 p 42) 1 take it that this is the 
kind of thing that Sandel has in mind. 
The third conception of 
community is a constitutive or strong sense of 
community. It denies 
that the individual is antecedent to the community. 
The individual 
is in part constituted by the kind of community within which 
he was 
shaped and now participates. 
Sandel says that 'on this strong view, 
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to say that the members of a society are bound by a sense of com. --i, -, n"4 ty 
is not to say that a great many of them profess communitarian sen4-e-ts 
and pursue communitarian aims, but rather that they conceive their 
identity - the subject and not just the object of their feelinc-, and 
aspirations - as defined to some extent by the community of which they 
are part'. I would want to say that this threefold distinction of 
types of community and the identities appropriate to them are points of, 
reference on a continuum from weak to strong in the way that subjects 
are related to their human settings. In any society there are ingre- 
dients of all types. It is a matter of emphasis and commitment. 
But schools too are communities and they emphasize different con- 
figurations of values and practices. It is true that pupils, students 
and staff bring to these institutions what they have absorbed from 
other institutions and society at large. A useful distinction amongst 
various 'ethics' within a school is elaborated by Rex Gibson in 
Structuralism and Education. (1984 pp 68-75) He distinguishes the 
achievement ethic from those of social welfare and spontaneity. Gibson 
asserts that the achievement ethic is I ... at once obvious, pervasive 
and dominant'. It is importantly concerned with work, busyness, 
occupation, getting on, success and effort. Achievement is essentially 
individual achievement. Individualism is at its core and I ... each 
pupil comes to terms with his or her own personal success or failure 
in school work. The commitment of individual achievement is 
independence; a concern with self-reliance, individual responsibility 
and resourcefulness ... 
(and) ... 'standing on your own two feet'. ' 
The whole process is informed by rationality which insists upon I ... 
order, discipline, restraint, caution, codificationg classification, a 
concern for logicality and clarity, a distrust of ambiguity'. Achieve- 
ment implies ambitiong getting ong getting out of lower social status 
groups and so forth. It further implies a concern not simply to be 
in control of one's own life but to have power and influence over that 
of others. In short we pursue our private ends and this approximates 
schools to Sandel's instrumental community. One response to this 
picture would be that it misconceives the nature of the 'competition'. 
It is not a matter of one pupil againt others, but rather the pupil 
trying to master the study he has undertaken. If there is competition 
it is competition of the student or the pupil against himself. A 
response to this line of reasoning would be that 
it is not a matter o-' 
what we should like it to be but rather the way 
that it is. 
A social welfare ethic softens the harshness of the pursuit of 
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one's own interest. Achievement is about difference, hierar&%, a-d 
inequality. Social welfare stresses I... similarity, sharedness, 
equality and community'. The language of social welfare is well- 
being, pastoral care, caring and concern. It speaks of the 'w,, -Ie 
child' rather than that of fragmented cognitive achievement. 
achievement speaks of one type of identity, social welfare speaks of 
another. I have said that personal identity is in what we are attached 
to. But I have also quoted Hume to show that different attachments can 
compete in our own breasts. If we can speak of social welfare as a 
distinct and distinguishable configuration of values that finds expres- 
sion in a school it would be constituted out of elements from Sandel's 
second and third conceptions of community. 
Gibson's idea of spontaneity, as a structure of feeling, empha- 
sizes 'fun', the gang seeking 'kicks' and the peer group 'having a 
laugh'.. It is essentially concerned with enjoyment, hedonism and 
humour. Pleasure seeking will have nothing to do with the Protestant 
Ethic of work and delayed satisfactions. It is about the immediacies 
of the present moment. Gibson implies that we no longer speak of the 
'old hat' of 'let it all hang out', 'don't think of the future' and, 
we might add, 'live now and pay later'. Whether such expressions are 
old hat is a little off the point. Many educationalists have such 
attitudes in mind when they speak of the 'New Hedonism'. If we use 
my term and say that these three 'configurations of values' exist 
within the school there is unlikely to be harmony in an institution 
where they actively compete with each other. 
Superimposed on these three ethics is the competition amongst 
staff, and within each person for that matter, between a configuration 
of values centred on 'learning' and one centred on 'management'. 
Management is in the ascendency and is more likely to find its justifi- 
cation if it presents a school or college as threatened by spontaneity, 
especially if spontaneity is interpreted in terms of Peters, volcanic 
core of passions only just below the surface in the best of people. 
I do not only mean pupils and students. I mean teachers also. And, 
it must be sa idý it is in managements' interests to do just that. 
Management, of course, may simply be superior force. If not, it 
needs to convince those whom it manages that its legitimacy consists 
in its effectiveness. Management then becomes a normative term 
because it defines the proper relationship between people. But it 
needs to be said that its effectiveness just is its ability to persuade 
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people that it is effective. It then becomes effective because 
people act as though it were. We willingly accept that we, includ-ino, 
our wayward passions, are in need of constraint. (We might recall 
that trades union activity has often been presented in these terms. 
A further point is that the notion of effectiveness attaches to means 
and ignores ends. It is concerned with image, display and gesture, 
keeping ends at an ever-receding distance. Having said all this, it 
may still be a matter of superior force. Self-management too is 
increasingly lost in disguised force. Personal development then 
reposes on the conditions of its practice. 
Values or Aspects of the Good 
I have stated that the term personal development finds its sense 
in the domain of values and that a human individual Is personal develop- 
ment is in his social and moral development, especially in his moral 
development. I am after a strong connection between personal develop- 
ment and moral development and a strong connection between what it is 
to be a person and what it is to have a moral identity. We might say 
that personal integrity and moral integrity go together. An 'enlarged' 
self as opposed to a 'minimal' self is a moral self. As an individual 
comes to more generous conceptions of the good, so he develops in terms 
of them. I am not saying that morality starts in the head though. 
Our conceptions of the good are inseparable from our habituated moral 
dispositions. In many ways a person is a combination of moral concep- 
tions and habits and impulses in these respects. As we know, some 
people are stronger on habits and impulses than on conceptions. We do 
not need to have read Kohlberg to know that there are different 'stages' 
of moral development and that the form and content internal to these 
stages express our moral sensibility one way rather than another. 
One of the difficulties in speaking about values is that the term 
itself seems to be far removed from the things that actually have value 
and the responses that express our evaluations. It may seem that it' 
we linger over the term value we might latch on to what it means. At 
certain levels of abstraction, some writers give the impression 
that 
value is a kind of amorphous membrane through which 
things appear to 
have value. Or again, at certain levels of generality, other writers 
seem to suggest that what we say has value is 
the ground of the value, 
as though value spreads its diffuse self around. 
Again when others 
speak of value it is as though justice, mercy, pity, peace and 
love 
are glimpsed through the interstices of a meaningless materiality or a 
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world in which life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. 
Others again see values as part of the fabric of a Lebenswel t that o-: e- - 
lays a world of dead materiality. The one intuits value in the dept, s 
and the other on the surface of things, as it were. It is interesting 
here that Simone Weil thinks of the apprehension of value as something 
deep. The beauty of Gregorian chanting gives us a glimpse of goodness. 
She thinks that those who thirst for Gregorian chanting could not be 
perverted nor perpetrate wrongful acts. 'Seeing' or hearing is strongly 
connected with acting or not acting. (1965 p 138) 
However, we need to look at what we value and at the evaluations 
we attach to what we value. The domain of values is extremely broad. 
Not all values are moral values. And the scope of the moral, for some 
people, is either too wide or too narrow. As I have said, whatever 
the scope, moral values are thought to be a condition on other values. 
Although we might not want to accept the whole package which suggests 
that moral values are autonomous, prescriptive, universalizable and 
overriding, we still might wish to say that moral values do in fact 
override other values. But they do not become moral values because 
they possess this overridingness. Aesthetic values in the Bloomsbury 
sense are not moral values because they are given overridingness in 
areas in which they are not normally given. They may still be over- 
riding for the persons concerned but they are not moral because of that. 
We do not, then, only assess people, things, situations and states 
on social and moral grounds. We assess them on religious, aes'thetic 
and economic grounds as well as others. In the various dimensions of 
experience and departments of life, people can be holy, beautiful or 
occupationally successful. But if people are'assessed in these terms, 
the terms themselves and thus the objects to which the terms are 
attached can be further assessed. The objects of assessment can be 
ranked differently depending on different scales of values. 
Holy men 
may count for little where a certain kind of success ethic 
is predomi- 
nant. Life, too, in its various manifestations can 
be seen under 
different aspects. I am thinking of seeing the world under 
the aspect 
of the sacred and the profane, the just and 
the unjust and the tragic 
and the marvellous. We do then speak of what 
is morally, religiously 
or politically good, worthy7 desirable, excellent and 
so on. 
As I have indicated, we speak in terms of degrees and 
kinds of 
worth and importance. For example, people attach 
great importance to 
certain experiences, as did Wittgenstein 
in his Ethics Lecture. 
-ter Absolute value is different in kind from relative value. 
The lat 
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is a species of fact. It is a matter of the realization of one thir, ý; 's 
being conditional on the realization of another. Such relative judge- 
ments of value are of the form If ... then. In contrast Wittgenstein 
characterized his experience of wonder at the existence of the wor-Ic' 
and his feeling of' being absolutely safe no matter what the conditions 
in one's life as possessing absolute value. Such experiences feature 
in what it is for life to have meaning. 
Absolute value does not derive its value from its relation to some- 
thing else. There is a finality about such value, as there is not in 
our desires and inclinations. Desires, inclinations and preferences 
tend to be defined narrowly in such contexts. They are simply our own, 
without reference to what is of objective value. We can, of course, 
desire what is of objective value. Also some people might want to say 
that what is of objective value can be disclosed in our preferences. 
However, objectivity and self-existence at-ta, th to absolute value. 
It is a matter of what is 'out there' and not subjectively within, as 
it were. Godfrey Vesey says of absolute value, or absolute goodness, 
that we recognize or encounter it by the 'light it itself provides'. 
(1978 p XIV) Such values can be encountered also in a person's self- 
effacing and generous response to another's misfortune. The Good 
Samaritan did not respond to the man in need with half an eye on his 
own moral improvement. There was no double-mindodness in his response. 
So when we think of absolute value we need not be just thinking of 
Wittgenstein's Inuminous' experiences. 
There can be pre-eminent values in our lives but we might not wish 
to characterize them as absolute in value. But they can lend a colour 
to all things or, to change the metaphor, they can animate a whole 
culture. Whether self-reliance - that repeatedly stressed virtue in 
personal development, PSME 
'etc. documents - is an absolute value or not 
may be contested. We might say it is a pre-eminent value, 
though, 
because it is the key organizing value in a culture and because it 
rests on the sumpreme value of the individual. 
Self-reliance is said 
to animate American culture. Some people think 
that it is sufficiently 
important that it ought to animate British society. Others might think 
it is neither pre-eminent nor absolute. It is simply 
'political'. 
The important point is that we do in fact assess things on scales and 
rank things relative to each other. 
But we also give certain things 
a value of a different kind. 
I have already mentioned a range of things that are the objects of 
our assessments and distinctions of worth. 
Actions, their consequences, 
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motives and whole modes of life are assessed as worthy or unwor'ýhy, 
noble or base, better or worse or higher or lower. We single out for 
assessment the person as a whole as well as his qualities and at-. -. -ibu-_e_-- 
We are concerned too about the nature of our moral motivations. '20 our 
values issue from reason, a sense of duty, love, feelings, will, interests 
or needs? For example, reason may be the object of assessment or the 
final arbiter of assessment. But it is not only a matter of our 'jalues 
issuing from a construal of these powers of the mind and will or these 
sentiments. We also value some above the others. We might find our 
way about the world, including the moral world, in the light of reason 
but we might attach greater importance to love or our aesthetic feelings. 
Some people think that there is a kind of redemptive appeal in perceiv- 
ing the world through sentiments, feelings and emotional intuitions. 
An important division in our assessments of human achievements and 
pursuits is that between our personal qualities and attributes and those 
goods at which we ultimately aim. In the history of man's reflections 
on himself and on what would be a proper setting for his life, there has 
been a recurrent desire to specify the ideals Pf personal excellence and 
those ultimate goals and goods worth having. At various times and 
places men have wished to cultivate virtues, mastery of passions and the 
development of reason. They have also sought public esteem, social and 
economic success9 purity and immortalityg happiness, pleasure and emo- 
tional wellbeing. 
The items in our lists, more often than not, do not live together in 
harmony. But when they are not in conflict or are not inconsistent 
with each otherg we rank them on scales according to the importance we 
give to them. For some writers, it is in their scaling that they gain 
their value. Some are given priority over others. The value of each 
depends on its place on a hierarchically arranged scale. We perceive 
things as better or worse, as higher or lower and so forth in relation 
to each other. Some thinkers would not give any of these items founda- 
tional status. As we have seen, post-structuralist thought rejects 
central truths and fixed values. For example, there is no God nor 
pristine Cartesian selves to which we can trace back fixed values. 
There might be temporary resting places in our value-responses to things 
but what we value and how we value are in flux. 
As I have said, we assess a person as a whole as well as his 
qualities and attributes. Some of these qualities and attributes can 
attach to a person so closely that to assess them 
is to assess him. 
This is particularly the case with moral qualities and attributes. 
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When we assess an individual Is technical or occupational capabilitles - 
that is, when we say of him that he does things well or badly, correc--ly 
or incompetently or accurately or inaccurately - we may not be assess_4rZ 
the individual as such. We may not identify the individual witl - 
'- 
capabilities; he may not identify with them either. If the ind-ývidual 
does identify with them, he may feel crushed when the market cruelly 
pays no heed to this fact. If he does not identify, nor need not 
identify, with them, and if he treats them instrumentally, not much may 
hang on the fact as far as his conceptions of who or what he is as a 
person is concerned. His properties in these respects are so many 
detachable skills and so much serviceable know-how, which he treats as 
assets. Such non-constitutive ties between a person and his properties 
can, as we know, lead to alienation in all its forms. We find aliena- 
tion in many of those service sectors of the economy, which run personal 
development courses for their employees. The employees are told to 
really 'lay on a smile' in their presentation of self to customers. 
Their capacity to smile is then considered an external asset which 
they begin to treat as an instrumental property. 'Personal development' 
in this sense treats many personal intimate properties of this kind as 
marketable assets. We might consider Eugene Kamenka's words, here, 
when he says that we have become bad actors in our society in that we 
are people who are 'capable of assuming the externals of any personality' 
because we have none of our own. (1980 p 19) We need then an internal 
connection with values, with our capacity to smile, to remain with this 
example, if we are to become the sorts of people who have substance and, 
therefore, something to lose. 
I realize that I raise the question of how far we can move from 
our personal standpoints and occupy increasingly distanced perspectives 
on ourselves. Life is not lived in a view from nowhere. Such a 
drive to objectivity (and in the case of the smile lobjectivization' ) is 
as Thomas Nagel puts it, a 'departure from a specifically human or even 
mammalian viewpoint'. (1979 Ch 14) Such conceptions of reality would 
be representations of the nature of things in the absence of 
human 
beings and their peculiar perspectives on the world. According 
to 
this picture the subject is detached from the significance 
that things 
have for him from his subjective point of view. But this distancing 
from limited to more general perspectives is also found in 
Kant when 
he attaches the goodwill to a sense of 
duty. We need to abstract from 
our empirical concerns to a point of view 
that increasingly takes all 
points of view into account at the same 
time. 
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At a general level, perhaps the most abstract level of assessment. 
the term value is equivalent to the terms goodness, disirability, worth- 
whileness and excellence. These terms, along with the terms ri, 7', t an--4 
wrong, might be considered 'pure' value terns because the content 
implied in them in the various contexts of use is variable. For example, 
if the word good is essentially illocutionary in its import, its commen- 
datory function can attach to widely different contents. On an extreme 
interpretation such illocutionary force can become foundational without 
its sense being fixed by any determinate content. This is why on cer- 
tain views choice and decision can be said to be criterionless when 
they are refined and elaborated as foundational in ethical thought. 
(The term 'pure' can of course be used to mean uncontaminated by grosser 
materiality. Goodness, Truth and Beauty may be considered ethereally 
distanced from our corporeal existence. ) A pure term like good can be 
used as though it were possible to -occupy ever-receding perspectives 
on what we wish to bestow value. Again, 'importancelcan be used as a 
moveable label that signals ever more refined perspectives on what is 
'lower'. 
At rarefied levels we might oppose happiness to truth. We can 
of course explore these general notions in the details of plays and 
novels. Ibsen in his concern with 'life lies' is always setting one 
such general notion against another. Should one pursue freedom if it 
leads to unhappiness or truth if it ruins people's lives? As we know, 
truth spoken by certain people can amount to lies. They calculate 
with the truth. In my mentioning the detail in Ibsen's plays, we 
should recall those thicker terms of value and valuation such as brutal 
and generous. To mention brutal here is to introduce the term disvalue 
as distinct from value. 
The term value needs to be distinguished from valuation. If we 
attribute value to people, objects, situations and so forth, we also 
respond to value in terms of valuations. Valuations characterize our 
responses and reactions to whatever is of value or disvalue. J. N. 
Findlay, from whom I take the term valuation, lists a sample of valua- 
tion3 as follows: 'cherishing', 'setting store by', lesteeming', 
'prizing' and 'having a pro-attitude towards'. (1970 p 6) He makes 
the point that value is 'correlated in principle' with valuation. 
What is of value is the object of our valuations. We might say 
further, 
which Findlay does not, that an example would be that we 
love what is 
good and what is beautiful. We might go further and say 
that we ought 
to love what is good and what is beautiful. 
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The word ought nowadays might be thought to be anot-ý. er one of 
those pure moral terms, because no determinate content attaches t-C i'%'. 
The important point is that such terms as ought belong to the s; here 
of action. They are concerned with what one is required to do or -..: ha-. 
it is for something to be done out of duty or obligation. I do nct 
want to enter into the debate about the status of the right in relation 
to the status of the good but if one reflects, again, on the thought 
that God looked upon the great whales and saw that they were good, it 
seems obvious that we ought to respect and preserve them. The thought 
here is that would it were that something is the case rather than not. 
These whales have intrinsic worth and we ought to cherish them. They 
do not have value in that we cherish them. Rather we cherish them 
because they have value. Love does not create value in the object. 
As Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch have said love and attention disclose 
the worth of things. We might consider here what Findlay says about 
feeling in general: 
To feel about something may in certain privileged cases be 
the last, most penetrating way of knowing what the thing is, 
and what stands before us as the 'objective correlate' of 
such feelings may be in truth the very 'nucleus' of the things 
themselves. (1970 p 81) 
We might say then that it is only in love, and perhaps other feelings, 
that we have access to what is of value, that is, the reality of things. 
(It might also be said that when we come to know or understand the 
nature of something we come to love it. To come to understand the 
holy is to come to love it. We may not come to know by our unaided 
intellects though. We might have in mind here Newman's illative sense 
in which we arrive at beliefs and commitments via accumulated experience 
and the sensitive responses to things in life. The grace that might 
come with joy or peace may open our hearts to the truth in love. 
) 
Moreover, when we begin to love and see the worth in things we also 
begin to invest ourselves in them. There is also a return from them 
and therein might lie our emotional and spiritual wellbeing. 
The unconditional worth of things, especially people, can 
be dis- 
closed in experiences other than love. Love might 
follow from the 
disclosures though. Iris Murdoch says of Sartre: 
The value of the person is detected by 
Sartre, not in any 
patient study of the complexity of human relations, 
but simply 
in his experience of the pain of defeat and 
loss. In cool 
moments the individual is mercilessly analysed; 
his precious- 
ness is apprehended only in the emotional obscurity of a 
hope- 
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less mourning. PNo human victory can efface this absoluý-- 
of suffering. ') It is as if only one certainty remained: 
that human beings are irreducibly valuable, without any 
notion of why or how they are valuable or how the value can 
be defended. (1967 pp 81-82) 
Other people might discover the irreducible value of people in an 
overwhelming feeling of compassion when the fate of these people are 
seen to be at the mercy of stupid material processes, as Nietzsche 
might say. But such a down-grading of material processes might, for 
some people, be too dismissive of nature. Nature itself, under a 
certain aspectcan be a value-term. Nature is not a completely 
devalourized background to our own invented meanings, as it were. it 
is not seen under the aspect of staleness as in Hamlet, nor under 
the aspect of the absurd as in certain Existentialist writers, nor 
under the aspect of evil as in certain Manichean sects. Nature is 
seen rather as organic, vital and uncorrupted. It is contrasted with 
the artificiality and vanity of urban society. 
Nature, or certain aspects of it, can be seen as an object of 
wonder. We can marvel at it. Mary Midgley has said of stars, rocks 
or nematode worms that we can see them under the aspect of beauty and 
wonder. We marvel -at the Isuchness' of them. 'But to wonder involves 
love. It is an essential element in wonder that we recognize what we 
see as something we did not make, cannot fully understand, and acknow- 
ledge as containing something greater than ourselves. ' We drink in 
the glory. She continues: 'knowledge here is not just power; it is 
a loving union ... 1 
(1989 p 41) We come to value very highly such 
experiences. Meaning and value are intimately connected in such dis- 
closures. We come to understand something and then capture it in words 
that already exhude values. 'Wonder' and 'love' have value-tones about 
them. But we might also want to say that such disclosures make life 
meaningful and therefore they are irreducibly important for us. 
In other writers we find disclosures about our ultimate condition 
in a tragic sense of life. We have in such experiences an insight 
into the human condition and in consequence have an appropriate response 
to it. In his discussion of tragedy Anthony Quinton (1982 pp 105-106) 
quotes I. A. Richards in the context of Quinton's characterization of 
tragedy's central theme: the contingency of value. There is no value 
in the world apart from the efforts of men. The universe 
does not 
underwrite anything that is of value for us. Richards says 
that: 
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'Tragedy is still the form under which the mind may most 
clearly and freely contemplate the human situation, its 
issues unclouded its possibilities revealed. To this its 
value is due and the supreme position among the arts which 
it has occupied in historical times and still occupies ... (It) is too great an exercise of the spirit to be classed 
among amusements or even delights, or to be regarded as a 
vehicle for the inculcation of such crude valuations as may 
be codified in a moral. (1982 p 105) 
The value of tragedy is that it is the form that gives us our best 
insight into the human situation. It is indispensable for the developed 
life. Although I have not seen the tragic sense of life recommended as 
a constitutive part of personal development schemes, and therefore a 
hoped for part of the fully developed person, I have seen documents in 
which all the other terms discussed here have been recommended. For 
instance, wonder is recommended. We are not so much urged to nurture 
a sense of wonder in our pupils and students but rather foster the 
'skill of wonder' in them. 
We do of course attribute value or disvalue to whole perspectives 
on the world. A whole Weltanschauung may be thought to be true or 
false, in the sense that it represents or misrepresents what we conceive 
our lives to be about. When we occupy such perspectives, it is not 
just the perspectives that are thought to be worthy or unworthy or 
noble or ignoble, we too, since they are our moral frames of reference, 
will be thought worthy or unworthy or noble or ignoble to the extent 
that we are truthful to these perspectives. We are at once truthful 
to them and truthful to ourselves. Such general conceptions of, or 
perspectives on, the world and our place in it, entailing as they do a 
system of beliefs, norms, values, virtues, conceptions of the right 
and the good, all woven together to give meaning to life, may be subject 
to evaluation from perspectives outside them. An ethic of Christian 
agape or a revolutionary creed like Marxism will each have a perspective 
on the other. Again, from within the Bushido Code, 
British prisoners 
of war were objects of contempt because they had surrendered. 
This is 
not the end of the matter. Cultures as well as 
individual people can 
Iget stuck' at different 'stages' of moral development. 
They might be 
thought to be 'arrested' in Kohlberg's 'earlier' stages of moral develc, 7ý- 
ment. 
In the film The Bridge on the River Kwai different moral codes or 
stages of development were set in opposition 
to each other. The values 
internal to one code were explored to see what 
kind of perspective they 
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have on values within other codes. For example, the British 
ing Officer in the film lived by rigid military rules that in tLý. e cir- 
cumstances of Japanese captivity, were put to the service of ma -ý 
ing morale amongst British prisoners. From a perspective outsite- his 
code, his actions were madness. His lack of any superior moral vision 
betrayed him into becoming an unwitting accomplice in the Japanese ..; ar 
effort. It is true that at the end of the film certain self-reactive 
attitudes did break through and the officer felt guilt perhaps. ý,! e 
can, then, feel guilt, remorse, base, ignoble etc. both from wi--"-)in our 
code and, if we can achieve it, from a perspective outside it. 
As I have indicated, values can come in configurations or gestalts. 
It is notthen, a matter of surveying the world and picking out discrete 
facts or objects then projecting a pro or con attitude on them. Some- 
thing's being poisonous might approximate to this model. But even 
here what is poisonous, is picked out in a fairly obvious way. it 
reposes on clear human concerns and interests. 
When values are in configurations or gestalts they mutually 
support one another. But in such configurations one or more values 
might be given foundational status. Utility, absence of harm, freedom, 
choices, equality, love, reason, happiness, fidelity, rational agency, 
the will, the good will, dutyg the moral law and so on have all been 
pride of place in one gestalt or another. It is obvious that the 
values enumerated here will not be compatible with each other and, of 
course, they will not all feature in one gestalt. Importantly, when 
one or more values are pressed too far they become imperialistic and 
suppress the worth of other values. If happiness is given too much 
weight, whether in such formulations as the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number or not, it can distort our moral sensibility. Duty, 
if pressed too far, can become mean and ungenerous. In our saying in 
what duty might consist, we might forget that it has to be used in our 
moral exchanges. A Wittgensteinian response might be made here. 
Instead of asking what duty might consist in, we might rather require 
it to be applied to the details of our moral life. It is in the 
particular cases that we begin to see what we can use 
the term to do. 
The complexity of actual cases become authoritative in 
that the general 
idea cannot do justice to what is obvious in our moral life. 
(There 
-art is a lesson in this for personal development. But right at 
the st 
we find difficulties, for it is not clear whether 
the term perso----l 
development has a sufficiently clear ordinary use such that we can 
build 
on it and say what it consists 
in. The word duty is clear enough until 
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we start to refine it and attempt to reconstitute the whole of =r'ality 
in terms of it. In the case of personal development the diff"4-ulty is 
where to find the rough ground. ) 
Although it might be a mistake and a distortion to pick out as 
central certain moral or quasi-moral notions and then refine and 
elaborate them to make them foundational, it is still the case, given 
the diversity of value-notions in our lives, that we try in a rough and 
ready way to impose some order on them. As individuals we usually 
absorb the order as we absorb the values. Contractarian morality, 
utilitarianism or Kantian formalism may be too confining as definitive 
accounts of our moral life but each points to certain central concerns 
in that moral life. There are then many distinctions and divisions 
in the domain of values. I wish to pick out the following broad 
classifications. 
1. Moral and Non-Moral Values We assess our lives and concerns 
according to which sub-divisions within the domain of values we are 
focussing on at the time. Our grounds might be moral, aesthetic, 
religious, economic or political. But within each sub-division there 
are further divisions. In the history of art certain schools and 
traditions emphasize different ranges of subject matter and certain 
f ormal f eatures . The Dada Movement rejected all those values that 
were supposed to underpin civilization but which, in fact, were impl i- 
cated in the slaughter on the battlefields in the First World War. 
Honour, patriotism, family, art, religion and morality did not for the 
Dadaists answer human needs. The formal characteristics of their 'art' 
emphasized the rejection of these values. In different schools of 
economics, certain analytical tools and foundational ideas such as 
general welfare or laissez-faire market freedom are emphasized at the 
expense of others. As I have said, within morality different concepts 
are emphasized, down-graded or ignored. 
2. Moral and Quasi Moral Divisions On a broad interpretation of 
morality, we order our lives in terms of obligations, duties, rights, 
freedom from coercion, welfare, utility, perfectionist ends and goals, 
privacy, community, emotional and spiritual wellbeing, dignity and the 
pursuit and completion of our projects. Obligations may rest on pieties 
or contracts. Rights and welfare may be defined narrowly or broadly. 
Our perfectionist ends may be in general undertakings like the construc- 
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tion of Chartres Cathedral or personal commitments liý,: e a purs,, 4-, , -' a 
'- C- 
specialism within natural history. Even here the divisions c-, -e--"ap 
and mutually support one another. 
3. Moral Gestalts Our values are often organized into whole perspec-- 
tives on our lives. I have given many examples throughout my discussion 
of what these consist in and what it is to live in accordance with them 
for ourselves and other people who share or do not share them. a 
plural society we have to live with each other and there have to be 
attempts to find some values that are sufficiently shared to at least 
prevent ruinous conflict. Are justice and rationality always somebody's 
justice and reality and, more specifically, always somebody's in parti- 
cular? All we can do is explore and develop what is internal to a 
perspective and see how far we can go. Conceptions of the good life 
are not reconcilable. - This raises the question of whether the State 
should be neutral between different conceptions of the good life. I 
should like to give a sketch of three such gestalts. What I say can 
be linked to what I have said about each writer earlier in my discussion. 
It should also be remembered that in discussing these pictures of 
personal development I have drawn on the language of personal develop- 
ment found in practice and in official documents etc. I am placing 
the language in situ as it were. 
a. Marxist Emancipation What many Nineteenth Century thinkers 
had in-common was the desire to encompass the humanity of the person, 
however defined, in the educational process rather than accommodate a 
person to the functions of the wage earner. Marx wanted to liberate 
the individual from his alienated condition and to assert the individual's 
essence againt the physically crushing and dehumanising implications of 
his productive role. Marx sa ys that one's 'own self-realization 
exists as an inner necessity7 a need'. (1963 p 165) The conditions 
for this realization are the shedding of false images that the worker 
has of himself and the humanization of the production process. But it' 
we try to foster a view of education based on such a view of self- 
realization, what is the nature of the self that is brought 
to reality 
or actuality? Is such an education a means towards a realization of 
a 'second nature' entailing perhaps a correction of original 
inclinations? 
If a person is an lachievement'7 what are the raw materials of 
this 
achievement? As I have said previously, 
there is something suspicious 
about the idea of a natural law of development, whose 
direction it is 
the teacher's function to serve. Marx is, however, somewhat ambivalent 
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about the idea of human nature. Sometimes he talks as thoufr, ', at 
an essence that is fulfilled or damaged in his embroilment will s 
production of the means of life. At other times he talks as 1'.. ough 
human nature were an historical achievement. If there is no pre-social 
nature, then this nature must be an achievement. (This point raises 
the question of whether we are interpretation all the way down. There 
is no human nature as it were that supports our self -interpreta", ý ons. ) 
But if it is an achievement, whence our criteria for an identification 
of alienation and dehumanization? If we talk about the 'best' that 
has been achieved in human history as the touchstone for self -realization, 
is this 'best' relative to history and not to some constitutional human 
essence? The nature of the self may be sedimentary layers deposited 
by history or, to change the image, an ensemble of social relations. 
Gramsci has said that self-understanding is an historical achievement. 
'The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of 
what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself' as a product of the histori- 
cal process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, 
without leaving an inventory. ' (1975 p 85) If self-realization is an 
, inner necessity, a need', it would seem not to be founded on 'original 
existences'. 
b. Lawrence: Recovery of Primal Instinct In his essay 
'Democracy' (1950 pp 79-85) D. H. Lawrence says that there is a 'quick 
of self' that is the essence of each man. It is all too easy to If all 
from spontaneous reality into dead or material reality. And all 
education should be guarding against this fall. ' Earlier in the essay 
Lawrence said '... you needn't go on trying to save the living soul of 
your neighbour. It's hands off., Do you think you are such a 
God- 
Almighty bird of paradise that you can grow your neighbour's goose- 
quills for him on your own loving house-sparrow wings? 
Every bird 
must grow his own feathers ... I. These quotations might give 
the 
flavour of child or student centred learning. 
They do not amount to 
the same thing of course. We may detect 
in much of the writing in 
general a continuum from a strong communitarianism 
to an extreme egoism. 
For example, what are we to make of 
individual development as a spon- 
taneous outflow of the 'quick of self" 
In contrast Marx says of 
individual development that 'Only in community with others 
has each 
individual the means of cultivating his gifts 
in all directions ... 
(1963 p 168) 
Lawrence contrasts the individual with the person. 
He writes 'An 
individual is that which is not divided or not dividable. 
A being ..., e 
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shall not attempt to define, because it is indefinable. I 7. he : er-z--r 
or the personality on the other hand is a 'human being as he aDpears- 
others, and personality is that which is transmitted from the pers--n tc. 
his audience: the transmissible effect of a man'. Lawrence, '-: ) -ake 
his point, takes some words from an American novel. They are: ". "i 
ego had played a trick on me, and made me think I wanted babies when 
only wanted the man' . Lawrence asks what is the difference between 
the 'authoress' ego and her me'. The ego is her second self which she 
carries with her. The second self is 'very pernicious, dictating to 
her issues which are quite false to her true, deeper, spontaneous self, 
her creative identity'. The second self is a 'horrible incubus' 
beneath which the spontaneous self tries to gain release. Lawrence 
advises us never to trust anyone who has an 'unmistakable personality'. 
Lawrence is -obviously concerned with an extreme form of individual 
development but not egoistic development in the ordinary sense, although 
there is the chance we will not be able to tell the difference. The 
ego is a false semblance, developed in the interests of social utility. 
I have mentioned already Lawrence's novel Women in Love in which 
Lawrence expresses his ideas most clearly through Birkin. Two people 
who are in love with each other should leave their egos behind 'so that 
that which is perfectly ourselves may take place within us'. He also 
makes the point that the person is a human being as he appears to others. 
This view of individual development would rule out all the Goffmanesque 
stuff of learning to manage one's impressions for a better presentation 
of oneself for work in those service industries that need 'personality'. 
But if the development of the individual is concerned to prevent 
'stunting', 'warping' or 'clogging with weeds' of the natural 'growth' 
or 'blossoming of the individual', we need empirical data about 
the 
fruits of such 'attempted development both for the individual and 
for 
the setting in which the individual lives his life. 
Anthony Quinton says of Lawrence that in his writing we find a 
'message about the healing character of primal instinct and of 
the 
destructiveness of rational foresight7 cautious calculation, the 
stifling armour of bourgeois prudence-' 
(1982 p 31) 
C. Weil: A Sacrament of Self-Obliteration 
Personal development 
might be seen to have evolved as an aspiration 
at the same time as 
there has been a pull from the impersonal to 
the personal. But the 
impersonal need not need be a species of 
indifference. Personal 
development might be towards the impersonal. 
Simone Weil views the 
individual as something like an accretion of attributes centred on a 
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I child-like belief that good and not evil will be done to him or 
This belief is the impersonal part of the soul. It is not concerned 
with the idiosyncracies of personality. Truth, Goodness and Ee_ý: ýu-lv 
are impersonal in this sense. They are essentially concerned -, _`_'n 
absence of the ego - of getting one's self out of the way. T, eim zp e, 
sonal is crucially about seeing other people as irreducibly important_ 
The unquenchable desire for good is at the heart of the individual and 
that is impersonal. The personal can easily be inhuman. Weil says 
in Human Personality (1981 p 21 )I (A) modern factory reaches perhaps 
almost the limit of horror. Everybody in it is constantly harassed 
and kept on edge by the interference of extraneous wills while the soul 
is left in cold and desolate misery. What man needs is silence and 
warmth; what he is given is an icy pandemonium. ' (my emphasis) These 
thoughts call to mind the use of Personal development as a protest to 
the effect that the individual person is a victim of constraints which 
inhibit the development of what are thought to be essential human 
characteristics. Simone Weil's very being protested for herself and 
others that she was a being which. thinks, the denial of which was 
imminent in the conditions of factory life. In general she also wanted 
to say that she was a being born for a fellowship in love not hate. 
In moral gestalts various strands are woven together: a vision of 
the nature of reality a nd our place in it, caught perhaps under the 
aspect of wonder or tragedy; a set of interpersonal values that display 
some order; a view of what our good consists in, found in our proximity 
to God or in our creative labour, for instance; and an array of self- 
reactive attitudes which place us higher or lower in relation to a 
moral order, captured in such terms as honest or dishonest. 
4. Other Regarding and Self-Regarding The important division between 
what it is right to do in respect of other people and what it is good 
to pursue for ourselves is at the centre of moral thought. I have 
mentioned rights, welfare, utility, dignity, justice etc. that define 
our collective moral framework. Each person owes and 
is owed something 
in our organized lives together. But the value-space we occupy 
is 
individual too. We want our lives to add up to something for ourselves. 
We want our lives to be worthwhile and meaningful. 
In these res:, -e::, cts 
our own dignity and worth is attached 
to the worth and meaning we find 
in our pursuits and projects. We might find 
these in those perfec- 
tionist ideals or in those self-conceived and self-executed projects 
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-, 1 11 -1 1--; that give fulfilment to our lives. We are, to this extent, 
in what is of value to us. But because what we pursue is aFent- C) 
centred, it does not mean that its worth is exhausted in our 4rCljr:: ý'ions 
or preferences. There is often an objective reference in the-. I- 1: ' we 
find fulfilment in our pursuits and projects, our worth too is meas-_ýre_ý 
in terms of them. To pursue a vocation or cultivate a friendship is to 
invite an objective appraisal of our success or failure. It is also to 
assess ourselves in self-reactive attitudes. Obviously, we aim tko get 
something important out of our vocations and friendships but our a is 4- 
cannot focus on what we get out of them. We have to genuinely care 
about the objects of our pursuits. In love we find our fulfilment in 
the 'perfections and the felicity of the beloved', (1898 p 422) as 
Leibniz has put it. 
Our love for others may go well beyond the specifications that 
caused the love. We want the good for the beloved no matter what 
prompted our hearts originally. But even in those pursuits and pro- 
jects that do not immediately involve the interests of other people, 
they do not simply address our de facto inclinations. We invest our- 
selves in them and we can then fail by the standards we have implicitly 
endorsed. We are not 'punctual' selves that last only so long as what 
precipitates us at the moment. We are not spasms of impulse that go 
their own way because of the absence of principle as one might para- 
phrase Kant - although some of us may approximate to the condition of 
Don Giovanni. Even in this case it is thought by some that Giovanni 
provoked a certain independence of spirit in the women he seduced. 
Intrinsic and Relative Value 
Of all the distinctions amongst and within values this one is 
crucial. What I am af ter is a characterization of values which 
differs in kind from values that are relative, extrinsic and instru- 
mental. We might speak of values that are absolute, intrinsic, 
categoric or inherent. We are after things which are good 
in them- 
selves, have a finality about them and do not depend on what 
is 
extenal to them for their reality. They are 
the values that are con- 
L hey stitutive of our profounder qualitative 
distinctions of worth. T 
provide us with our orientations in life; 
they define the space in 
which our lives have worth and meaning. 
We are not contingently 
attached to such values. They are the 
frames in which we locate our 
identities and from which we direct our lives. These values are -1, -" 
many varieties. They are central to what 
it is right to do and whaL 
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it is good to be. 
Absolute or intrinsic values are central to gestalts. Sc-le 
writers speak poetically about such values. For these ,: riters s,, ýcýý 
values give a 'metaphysical' shape to a world that extends 'rom 
past into the future in terms of things, events, causes and sequences. 
At best our organizational values help us to survive or cope in the 
vital order of nature. Life is more effectively endured if we orga- 
nize things better. In a world without absolute values man arlproxi- 
mates to a thing in a Hobbesian state of nature. In this world we 
try to match efficient means to fleeting ends. But there are values 
that do in fact differ by a whole world. If things go well for us we 
cherish beauty, know the truth, do the good and worship the holy. 
These values ingress into time and can, with a certain poetic license, 
be characterized as timeless. (See Kohak 1984 pp 18-22) 1 have given 
enough examples of those things in which we find beauty, truth, goodness 
and holiness. However we characterize them they have intrinsic worth 
and we orientate ourselves and our lives in terms of them. 
Some writers, not enough one may say, see education principally 
as the care of the soul by means of the nourishment that absolute and 
intrinsic values provide. Roy Holland says that we need to put before 
our children, and the younger the better, 'the very best and most 
beautiful things we know, and as far as possible only these things'. 
(1980 P 72) We do a violence to children if we do not attempt to make 
them into beings with something to lose. The following words have 
been quoted often enough in contexts such as these but they bear repeat- 
ing: 'Whatsoever things are true, ... . honest, ... just, ... pure, 
... lovely, ... of good report; 
if there be any virtue, and if there 
be any praise, think on these things-' It is what becomes part of us 
that tells us who we are. 
It is said then that if we perceive that things can be done or 
simply contemplated for their own sake, we become persons of a certain 
kind. We are diminished as person if we do not see any magic in the 
web of things. An image which has often 
been used by writers on 
education is the one from Yate's poem 
Among School Children. The 
image is in the last stanza: 
0 Chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer, 
Are you the leaf, the blossom, or the bole? 
0 body swayed to music, o brightening glance, 
How can we know the dancer f rom the chance? (1967 p 1217) 
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Such words have a richness that defy any one interpretation but ---ey 
have been read as displaying an ideal of how the mind might be re' a-e-4 
to what it grasps, of how work and the worker come together int-, a 
union of fulfilment and how meaning and experience unite to secure us 
against alienation or anomie. Roger Scruton interprets the siýan:: a as 
an individual's absorbtion into his Lebenswelt. (1987 p 617) Ex: ýeri- 
ence is so imbued with meaning that the individual is not detacýýeý 
from the rich content of the concepts that lock him into his form of 
life. Instrumental calculation and utilitarian disenchantment displace 
the sense of concepts under which we intend them. An example, which 
Scruton does not discuss, might be those theologians who demythologize 
their Faith such that religious language cannot mean what we intend it 
to mean. Another kind of disenchantment is one where our subjective 
appropriation of a certain fullness of meaning is denied us. We might 
consider Kierkegaard in this respect who wrote: 
The law for the development of the self with respect to 
knowledge is this, that the increasing degree of knowledge 
corresponds with the degree of self-knowledge, that the 
more the self knows, the more it knows itself. If this 
does not occur, then the more knowledge increases, the 
more it becomes a kind of inhuman knowing for the produc- 
tion of which man's self is squandered, pretty much as men 
were squandered for the building of the pyramids, or as men 
were squandered in the- Russian hornbands to produce one 
note, neither more nor less. (1968 p 167) 
The enemies of absolute and intrinsic values are a technical or 
instrumental view of education and the 'superficially opposed but 
actually complementary and equally uneducated view of education as 
self-expression and the consequent over valuing of authenticity, com- 
mitment and spontaneity I, so says Kamenka. 
(1980 p 19) Everything 
depends on what is meant bylovervalue'. As I have said, some writers 
give these terms foundational status and 
therein make them essentially 
criterionless and contentless. 
We overvalue them if this is what is 
meant. 
But the important thing is to'build up' pupils and students so 
that self-expression, authenticity, commitment 
and spontaneity are 
given the correct weight 
in our educational endeavours. The danger 
is that we may start in the wrong place. 
In this respect 'Values 
Clarification' may be suspect. The 
individual clarifies, expresses 
and develops his own values. 
The danger of values clarificat-ion, fýýr 
some writers, is that the 
basic value is the freedom to choose, 
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presupposing, perhaps, that since there is no objective basis 
asserting that some values are better than others, we are left 
mately with criterionless choices. On an extreme interpretation of 
values clarification, one finds such recommendations as I ... sc'------7s 
must not be allowed to continue fostering the immorality of morality'. 
This was written in the context of not I ... drying up students' sense 
of their own sexual identity'. I have often heard such expressions 
used in personal development seminars. 
At the best, in values clarification, one would have to be sensi- 
tive to the stage that the young people were at. What may be appro- 
priate at one stage may not be so at another. It is obvious that in 
the case of children, one would need to look at those who are to clarify 
values. Would it be the children themselves, unaided by suggestions 
from their teachers? Or would it be the teachers who tease out res- 
ponses? The direction of the clarification cannot but be influenced 
by the teacher's presence. In some versions of values clarification, 
teachers are recommended to avoid moralizing, criticizing or presenting 
their own values. Teachers should rather concentrate on simply helping 
(helping? ) children clarify their own values. Critics have drawn 
attention to possible abuses here. The first is that children are in 
no position to take responsibility for their own value acquisition and 
clarification. The second is that the mere presence of a 'disinterested' 
teacher, prompting with 'self-revelatory' techniques, create some kind 
of*moral climate. This second objection could be expanded to accuse 
value clarifiers of not so much creating an atmosphere in which a child 
could breathe purer moral air but rather creating a vacuum in which no 
moral self can survive. 
To illustrate difficulties in such self-awareness on the part of 
children, I refer to a recent development in the self-distancing of 
children from the possible dangers of close personal relationships. 
I quote from a Guardian newspaper report. (1987) 'Techniques 
(of kid- 
scape) are based on the premise that children have a right 
to say no, 
even to someone they love, if they do not want to be 
touched or kissed'. 
Now nobody would want to underestimate the extent of child abuse. 
But 
an undiscriminating scepticism, implied in such 
techniques7 can lead to 
a certain corruption in young children. 
If we begin to question all 
the love and care that makes us human, before we have 
become someone of 
substance, there is a great danger we will grow up suspicious 
and lack- 
ing trust and affection. 
In the official literature of personal development we 
find such 
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'building up' expressions as 'habits of diligence', 'precision', 
'poise ability to concentrate on specif ic subjects an e- - ort 
learn physical self -discipline and self -control a process o_` aýap- 
tation' and so forth. If one wants an image of the polar oppos4te of 
tradition, discipline, restraint and so on, one might contemplate "111r. e 
following passage from The Shock of the New by Robert Hughes. The 
setting is something like a 'theme park' in which one is bombarbed 
with 'information' - meaning by this any amount of random, unordere, -ý 
data. 
One institution which opened in Philadelphia in 1976, the 
Living History Center, was conceived as a clicking, strobing 
temple of McLuhanist 'information' -a shrine of bombardment, 
a parody of the Pop museum of the future, where no visitor 
could be assumed to have an attention span of more than 2.9 
seconds and every fact is subordinated to the sludge of 
'pattern recognition'. There, children have what is conven- 
tionally called a non-elitist, multi-dimensional learning 
experience, looking at automatic index wheels full of period 
bus-tickets and fruit labels, and listening to snatches of 
the Declaration of Independence on the phone. The medium 
is the message here, and it turns the brain to ccrnflakes. 
(1980 P 362) 
If one thinks that this educational experience with its emphasis 
on 'pattern recognition', whatever that amounts to, is the stuff of 
insanity, I can reveal that some such 'multi-dimensional learning 
experience' has not only been entertained but imitated in certain Life- 
style Enhancement Courses. 
'Building up' then does not place the emphasis on equipping young 
people with instrumental skills and knowledge, or turning constitutive 
personal qualities into detachable assets or encouraging free expres- 
sion before a person has become someone with something to express. 
It rather places the emphasis on the kind of understanding that grasps 
that things can be done for the good of them, that discerns that cer- 
tain values exist for their own sake and that recognizes that the good 
of somethings have a finality about them. This kind of understanding 
is for personal formation or, as I have said previously, for self- 
formation (Bildung). It is not a matter of understanding for survival 
or coping in an instrumental sense. It is a matter rather of 
'edifica- 
tion'. We need to develop an aesthetic response to things - that is, 
see things under the aspect of contemplative respect. 
'Respect' does 
in fact derive from 'look'. Absolute or intrinsic values exist lout 
there' and we become what such values mean to us. Read 
(1986) and 
Dunlop (1986) are concerned with the idea of how we are 'built up' as 
persons. 
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Reflexivity, Identity and Value 
I have wanted to show that reflexivity and identity are the two 
essential constituents of our personhood - what it is to be person-1.41-'-e 
- and that both are strongly connected with absolute or intrinsic %-all_ýe 
- that is, those values that have a worth in themselves or those 
we pursue for the good of them. Our valuations focus on values. We 
treasure those people who are near and dear to us. We respect people 
in general insofar as we honour their rights, provide for their welfare 
and recognize their dignity. And we attach ourselves to assorted 
objects in the extra-human world. We belong, to pi ck up Strawson's 
idea (1974), to a structure of moral sentiments and feelings - non- 
detached participatory, objective and self-reactive attitudes and 
responses - and to a world of medium-sized objects that tend to embody 
meanings and values which throw back images of who we are as persons. 
We belong crucially to language. And it is in our conversations 
amongst ourselves and about the objects in our common human world that 
we enlarge meaning (what gives worth to our lives) and value. People 
and things matter to us. We are constitutively in orders of rightness, 
frames of significance and stretches of deeds, actions and transactions 
that are interpreted in categories of meaning. Meaning in a general 
sense is about how one thing is connected with another. It is in 
perceiving and making connections that meaning exists. Meaning both 
furnishes us with our values and, in another sense, is that in which we 
find the worth of things. 
Values provide us with the terms of our self-interpretations. 
We display self-knowledge and self-mastery in relation to values and we 
maintain our identities in values that matter and have significance for 
US. As I have said, we are not punctual selves but enlarged selves. 
We exist across time as the same persons - we are unified and continu- 
ous entities - largely because what matters and 
has importance for us 
has mattered in the past, matters in the present and will matter in the 
future. We take pride in our past achievements, feel remorse for our 
failures, continue to accept our responsibilities and intend to keep 
our promises. For memory to be memory, we must remember where our 
values lie and where we stand. What matters 
for us and what values we 
endorse are what we are measured in 
terms of - most critically ho-, -, we 
measure ourselves. 
To make use of Charles Taylor's words again: values are one 
needs to be in 'contact with in order 
to function fully as a human 
agent, and specifically to be able to 
judge and discriminate ant 
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recognize what is really of worth and importance'. (1985 p 258) 
our pursuit of what is of value and in our discriminative valuat-Jons, 
we need a certain amount of self-awareness, self-knowledge and self- 
control. To know who we are - that is, to have moral identity and 
integrity - is more than to be able to answer to our name or f J! z1.; re in, 
a genealogy. (Some children are denied these things of course. 
Recently a young child in a court case only answered to IOi! '. Cn -4 1d- 
C4 ren need more than a name, as I have said. They need to have spe ial 
relationships with people who value them above others but who expect 
more from them because of this. ) We need, then, to belong to a moral 
order in which we know how to locate ourselves. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Conclusion 
Personal development, as we have seen, can cover f ar more than 
might be educationally intended within the general headings of PS: ý_E, 
PSMHE etc. I have wanted to argue that I personal I is crucially con- 
strained by what is meant by 'social', 'moral' etc. in the general 
headings. Of course, some educationalists say that if one wished 
for an example of an educational concern that is opposite of subject- 
based education it is the frontierless concerns of personal develop- 
ment, PSME etc. In this respect personal development, PSME and so on 
would be run together with all those other 'factitious' areas of the 
curriculum - Social and Life Skills, Human Enhancement Studies, 
Integrated Studies and so on. They are all cobbled together with 
bits and pieces from subject-based education, general knowledge, hints 
and wrinkles on how to cope with life, fragments from once secure 
trades and vocations and morsels of know-how from new-tech industries. 
The list can go on. Essentially such factitious schemes of work 
have their design on the bottom layers of the educational system. 
I have wished to argue that personal development within PSME etc. 
focuses on the moral development of the human individual. In spite 
of the so-called factitious elements within these areas there is a 
strong pull towards a concern with the proper ways to be persons. 
Moral identities have to be built up in preparation for an individual's 
life as a moral agent. I. have said that when we reflect on personal 
development, PSME, or whatever, we should ask: personal in respect of 
what?; development towards what?; and personal development in rela- 
tion to what? The most general answer is that it is personal in res- 
pect of an individual's taking on the properties of what is of the 
nature of persons. Such an answer suggests that personal development, 
as the educational objective of PSME, is the sovereign idea in educa- 
tion; it is the overarching objective that is resident in whatever 
else is undertaken in education. In this respect it is like self- 
development, in the Millian sense, in which the individual is encouraged 
to appropriate his generic human endowment. It is the education of 
the whole person, insofar as this is an educational ideal. Such an 
education would be contrasted with the training of an attenuated 
person, insofar as the individual is not meant to be built up into a 
whole person. 
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Self -development is not selfish development, altlýo-_z-'- as we -a-., e 
seen it might be perverted into this on certain interpretations of f 
self-realization. Self -develooment (-nuld inrlivit- fn- P,. -ýýrnlsn 
cultivation of friendship which is not a selfish pursuit. However. 
I have said that personal development in PSME is more determinate in 
that personal development takes its sense from the terms moral and 
social. (I know that I social I is of ten interpreted as a weasel word 
I have stressed the word moral even though it may not appear in the 
general heading, as in PSE. If one looks at the educational recommen- 
dations in PSE or PSHE the moral component is prominent and sometimes 
predominant, although the word is not mentioned. Health as wellbeing 
is, of course, a moral notion. I would further suggest that morality 
is central because it is our moral natures that is often focussed on 
and because morality is at least a determinate enough area of concern, 
unlike the factitious components in such areas. And since we have to 
justify what is done under our various headings on educational groundsý 
morality can be justified. How one 'does' morality is another matter. 
One would expect it to be done in all areas of the curriculum, although 
it should not be omnipresent. 
As far as schools are concerned, we are not speaking about morality 
as a second-order discipline - the kind of theoretical reflection that 
goes on in universities. Even in universities, it is thought that too 
much theory can produce students who become morally impotent in the con- 
duct of life. Too many sides to moral issues are seen because one 
tradition speaks in one voice and another in a different voice. Rela- 
tivism leads to scepticism. In schools one has to be more cautious, 
especially as one goes down the age scale. 
As we have seen7 outside education in a formal sense, personal 
development tends to be used interchangeably with self-realization, 
self-fulfilment and so forth. Personal development 
in this sense 
asks the question: under what conditions is life lived at 
its best? 
Some writers suggest that my life is lived best when I know what 
it is 
for a human being to live his life at his best. For example, our 
natures are rational and we know ourselves best 
in the use of our 
reason. In the exercise of our reason we are in 
that state of vital 
spiritual wellbeing known as eudaimonia. Other writers say we 
live 
best when we live authentically in full and in intense contact with 
those boundary conditions in life - those inescapable psychological 
states and the correlative structural conditions of our lives such as 
our own death, dread, suffering, anguish, responsibility and7 for the 
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more cheerful, wonder. The most crucial boundary condition -cr 
like Kierkegaardis that acute sense of one's own sellf-presence. 
want to know myself best and not in any universal property suclý as 
reason. But even here, individuality is enhanced when it is in con- 
tact with what promotes its knowing itself best - namely to be in co! ý- 
tact with God. Marx would say that we understand ourselves best- in 
community with others. Our essential properties are publicly 
defined properties. On any interpretation of self-realization, a 
person has to be in contact with something for him to realize himsel-'. 
What is taken into education from such flights into notions cr' 
our best or ultimate good is best left to each educationalist to dis- 
cern for himself. Nevertheless, I have tended to use the term moral 
in a broad sense to include not only what it is considered right to do 
but also what it is considered good to be. I have been concerned 
with what we need to be in contact to be person-like in a full sense. 
Our moral natures are expressed in our appropriate responses to 
what we are and what we-need to be in contact with to live well. We 
need a first-person perspective on the world that orientates us in 
terms of properly constituted actions, feelings, motives and volitions. 
But formal education does not bring that first-person perspective on 
the world into existence. Our personal being, that is, our psycho- 
logical individuality, is a product of our upbringing in general. 
Formal education should enhance it though. Wittgenstein defined 
ethics broadly to incorporate not only how we should live rightly in 
respect of other people but also fully in respect of the worth and 
meaning we find in or give to our individual lives in relation 
to 
things of intrinsic worth. Some of his apercus may not be to every- 
one's taste, though, when he says, for example, something 
to the 
ef . fect that we are not here to enjoy ourselves. 
Personal development, that is, individual development within 
PSME etc., is more a _perspective 
than a delimited subject area. it 
should be concerned with what promotes 
the development of our Moral 
natures in a broad sense. It needs 
to foster those values in which 
we find life worth living as well as 
those in which we give proper 
regard to other people. We are, of course, 
intimately bound up with 
other people, even though we may 
forget it at times. I use the word 
should above and this might be seen as an 
intrusive judgement of value. 
But what something might pretend to be on grounds of 
logic, wha'- some- 
thing is said to be empirically and what something ought 
to be are not 
separable in an easy way. In education we constantly see 
things 
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under the aspect of should. What should be the case cannot witn ease 
be derived from what is the case. And we know it. Leading fiFures 
in the Conservative Party know this too and that is why they invoke 
morality against what actually goes on in the market-place. 
Personal development merges into self-development in a Millia, - 
sense. Both are concerned with the fullest development of the whole 
person. But as I have said in respect of PSME etc. individual develop- 
ment has to be in relation to some content; and there is also the 
manner of the individual's relation to it. He endorses values as his 
values. He finds meaning in and fulfils himself in values that are 
found in work, love, religion, politics and leisure pursuits. In his 
values he has a reflexive relationship to himself as well as a relation- 
ship to what is of value. He endorses his values and, in the measure 
that he does, he also -brings his own life under the aspect of these 
values. An individual's particularity, as it were, exists in his 
endorsements, his life plans, his life ideals and his specific projects. 
He exists in his own right and pursues his -own good. But he needs to 
be in relation to some content to be able to put his stamp on things. 
Personal development is development in relation to the content that 
'moral' and Isociall specify. And, as I have said, much of what might 
get done under the heading of personal development within PSME might 
equally get done under self-development. It is the spirit which 
informs our educational endeavours which is important. 
Certain unit ideas or ideals recur in personal development, PSME 
etc. I have indicated what the content centrally is. The important 
question is how much individual difference and independence of mind 
is acceptable within the various dimensions of experience and depart- 
ments of life. In economic life how much unrestrained market liberty 
is tolerable? In religion can we do without intermediaries altogether? 
In morality choice cannot be foundational; but to what extent can a 
person define his morality against prevailing morality? I should add 
here that when we speak of independence of mind and self-reliance we 
need to ask in relation to what are these developed and exercise, t? 
We find these notions often recommended as curriculum pursuits in PSME 
but are we talking about these 'virtues' in relation to what 
is con- 
tained in the social and moral dimensions of life? One cannot, for 
example, express independence of mind within economics without 
knowing 
a good deal of economics. We need to know what 
it is to back up a 
claim with reasons or evidence. 
We value non-interference in certain aspects of our lives. e 
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wish to pursue our own good in our own way in contitions 
To what extent this is a comprehensive ideal is another matter. sa 
limited ideal it is expressed in those personal projects that pup-4-'s 
and students undertake in areas such as General Studies. _T',, is --, ere- 
by hoped that a sense of responsibility emerges out of such indivi, "la', 
efforts. Non-interference is connected through responsibility w 47- 
autonomy and authenticity. We develop as individuals as we ac-_ cn 
our own behalf, do things in our own right and pursue things in our 
way. We also see the world from our own perspective. Furthermore, 
other people cannot stand in our places. We have to do our own living 
and loving; we have to bear our own suffering and experience our own 
grieving. It should be obvious that I am not being solipsistic about 
this. We live authentically to the extent that we are true to our 
values - those that we have endorsed - and to the extent that we remain 
firm on the groundwherewe have taken a stand. 
In self-knowledge we have some understanding of the springs of our 
motivation and some grasp of our situation relative to how other people 
see it. We should begin to know, in self-knowledge, our temperaments, 
limitations and where our values lie, as we attempt to live our lives 
in terms of our decisions and commitments. We need to learn self- 
control as we discern discontinuities between what we want and desire 
and what are the proper demands on us. All these considerations enter 
into our self-interpretations. We are different sorts of human being 
as we interpret ourselves differently. The terms of our self- 
interpretations are diverse. We might think of those massive self- 
misunderstandings and self-misinterpretations of those East European 
leaders who have not only failed by their own professed standards but 
also by the standards of Capitalist man who they were supposed to have 
left behind. To what extent these people were bewitched by figures 
in hagiologyý caught up in ideas such as a person's character is his 
destiny or deceived by cynicism, I will not comment further. They 
might lamely refer to Ivan Broesky who believes that greed is a virtue- 
term. One can feel good about greed. What it means for a person to 
be fulfilled in these values might be thought to be scarcely intel- 
ligible. But these 'values' enter into their self-interpretations. 
The last unit idea or ideal I mention is dignity or self-worth, 
or whatever other variations on the concept are found in PSME etc. 
We need to learn to claim this value ideal for ourselves and grant it 
to other people. It is said that part of personal development is to 
learn that we have it. But we need to cultivate those qualities and 
attributes that underwrite it, so that we can claim it with confidence. 
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